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ABSTRACT
Since populations must both produce (through work) and reproduce themselves in 
order to survive, studies of ethnic stratification that consider only the economically- 
productive dimension fail to come to grips with the complexities of human existence. As a 
result, such studies have limited use for policy makers who might attempt to address the 
situation, and/or to consider the extent to which a given policy may further exacerbate (or 
ameliorate) ethnic inequality. In an effort to incorporate a demographic dimension into the 
study of ethnic stratification, this thesis drew on the theoretical frameworks of ‘total social 
production’, investigating the extent to which demographic reproduction—manifested as 
population age structure, but also involving ethnic differences in the timing of family 
formation and, implicitly, family composition and size—has interacted with factors related 
to economic production (particularly, labour force participation, the gaining of educational 
qualifications, income), to play a role in ethnic stratification in New Zealand.
Although constrained by a lack of reliable socio-economic data on the indigenous 
Maori population until the 1940s, the study proper covers the period 1840-1991. Five 
conceptual chapters develop the theoretical and methodological framework, paying 
particular attention to issues such as ethnic classification and the related difficulties of 
exploring ethnic differentials over time. The substantive chapters begin with an historical 
overview, in which the colonisation and eventual proletarianisation of the Maori 
population by the incoming settler, primarily European population, is described. As data on 
Maori become available they are woven into the analysis, and the development of 
demographic and socio-economic differentials between the two populations is described 
and examined in the context of colonisation and its aftermath. Four further substantive 
chapters examine whether trends in these differentials have diverged or converged over 
time, and the extent to which the demographic variables— especially age structure— have 
been involved. A final chapter explores the key socio-economic differentials (labour force 
participation, employment, income) in the context of the ‘Easterlin Hypothesis’— the 
argument that cohort size plays a role in inequality—exploring whether or not the socio­
economic and demographic patterns and trends have been linked, both within and between 
the two ethnic groups.
The study found an even more complex situation than first envisaged. The youthful 
age structure of the Maori population was, for example, already well understood by 
scholars of ethnic stratification to account for a sizeable—if seldom quantitatively 
demonstrated—proportion of aggregate Maori unemployment. What was not expected was 
that the contemporary age structures of the Maori and European/non-Maori populations 
would turn out to be, at least partly, a legacy of the historical appropriation of Maori 
resources by European. Nor was anticipated the complexity of the age-structural effect, 
which in several instances added to Maori disadvantage, but often offset or partially 
concealed it; nor the extent to which cohort size would be found to correlate with ethnic 
inequality; nor the extent to which the period of childbearing and childrearing would 
coincide with the highest levels of inequality between Maori and European/non-Maori 
females (despite the fact that ethnic differences in family formation and family size appear 
to be one of the factors that reduced income inequality within certain income categories); 
nor the extent to which conventional understandings of changes in the timing of family 
formation and family size may need to be re-examined.
These findings aside, however, perhaps the most unexpected was the extent to 
which Maori disadvantage on many indicators had declined to near zero by the 1960s and 
1970s, but then increased during the 1980s, and continued to increase until at least 1991, 
when the period covered by the thesis ends. These recent trends, which move in the 
opposite direction to what might have been expected, have an important message for those 
who believe that market forces will deliver a just society.
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Preface
This thesis grew out of three deficits. The first was my perception that a 
demographic perspective was missing from the stratification literature. For me, a journey 
through the disciplines of demography, sociology and anthropology during my 
undergraduate and Masters years had presented a picture of two populations (Maori and 
European) with very different age structures and family formation patterns, passing 
simultaneously through the same political economy and policy-making environment. The 
demographic characteristics, I felt, must interact in various ways with the events and 
policies of the period. In 1991, for example, when it was announced that the age of 
eligibility for the adult rate of unemployment benefit was being raised (overnight) from 
20 to 25 years of age, I wondered about the potentially discriminatory aspects of this 
otherwise ‘ethnically-neutral’ policy. At the time, 36 per cent of the Maori working age 
population were aged between 15 and 24 years, compared with 24 per cent of the non- 
Maori population, and the former were experiencing an unemployment rate three times 
that of the latter. Thus I also became aware of the second deficit, this being the lack of 
attention paid by policy-makers to the potential implications of such discrepancies.
The third deficit I discovered when I attempted to research the former issue for 
my Masters thesis. I encountered great difficulty in finding useful empirical material. 
Much of the literature had taken at face value the crude statistical differences between 
the two populations, often acknowledging issues such as age structure, but seldom 
exploring them further. The material was also often of limited assistance because factors 
such as the ethnic classification or the age groups to which the data pertained were 
seldom noted, meaning that discrepancies between the various collections could not be 
resolved in order to develop a satisfactory time-series analysis.
This thesis addresses these deficits. One deficit that could not be addressed must 
also be acknowledged. The thesis was written prior to the availability of data from the 
1996 Census, and thus the study-proper ends in 1991. Between 1991 and the present, a 
number of important events have occurred that may have a significant bearing on the 
findings of this thesis. Uppermost amongst these were the peaking of unemployment in 
1992 at 11.8 per cent of the labour force, and its fall to just on 7 per cent at the time of 
writing; and in 1994, the announcement by the Government of its plan to make 
substantial reparation (raupatu) for the confiscation of Maori land.
Nevertheless, the most recent Household Labour Force Survey data show that 
Maori remain three times more likely than European to be unemployed. Recently 
released data from the 1996 Census also show that the mean total income of all Maori 
males of working age has declined to 65 per cent of that of their non-Maori 
counterparts, down from its peak in 1981 of 77 per cent, whilst for the employed male 
population the decline was from 78 to 72 per cent (Martin 1997c). For all 15-64 year 
old females, and employed-only females, the declines were to 78 and 83 per cent, from 
their respective peaks in 1986 and 1991 of 86 and 94 per cent. Most commentators see 
these increases in income disparity as reflecting a combination of continuing changes in 
labour force composition, remuneration for skills, and the 1991 restructuring of the 
welfare state, which post-dated the period covered by this thesis. At that time, arguably 
severe cuts were made to almost all income support benefits, and substantial restrictions 
in eligibility were implemented. Certainly it has been widely argued by leading academics 
in the field that the 1991 changes have substantially increased income inequality and 
poverty in New Zealand, and there can be little doubt that Maori will have been 
especially affected.
SETTING THE PROBLEM
11
OVERVIEW
..it is the structure o f class relations, o f class power, which will 
determine the manner and degree to which particular demographic 
changes will affect long-run trends in the distribution o f income and 
economic growth, and not vice-versa (Brenner 1976:31).
Populations must both produce and reproduce if they are to survive. As a result, 
research that gives primacy to one or another aspect of human existence not only over­
simplifies what is really a complex situation, but also compromises the basis upon which 
those who would address important social issues attempt to do so. The alternative, a 
more holistic approach, is far less tidy, but provides a more realistic basis from which to 
begin.
The relationship between ethnic stratification and the demographic features of 
ethnic groups, such as their relative age structures, reflects one such issue. Typically, the 
study of ethnic stratification, which investigates the development and maintenance of 
societal divisions based on ethnicity, focuses on factors related to economic production, 
such as the extent to which each ethnic group is concentrated within a certain range of 
occupational, educational or income bands. Unless specifically concerned with women, 
such studies pay little attention to the role that the reproduction of the ethnic group itself 
might play in the maintenance of ethnic stratification. This is not to say that the 
demographic dimension is ignored by scholars of ethnic stratification. Many such 
analysts control for statistically, or at least acknowledge, the effects of ethnic differences 
in age structure (or family type and size) on such issues as income inequality. Rather, it 
is a contention that— when acknowledged—factors such as age structure are seen as 
methodological issues only, and not in terms of their interdependence with historical 
events, opportunity structures and policies (period factors). As a result, their a priori 
relationships with, and implications as potential forces in the continuing maintenance of, 
ethnic stratification, are largely overlooked, as are their policy implications, and indeed, 
perhaps, their policy obligations.
2The general exclusion of a demographic perspective from studies concerned with 
ethnic stratification is not difficult to understand. Most Marxist scholarship, for example, 
holds that the field of economic production has primacy over all other human activities. 
Weber, similarly, failed to find a place for the phenomenon in his class-status-party triad. 
Paralleling these traditions, both classical and neo-classical economics, despite then- 
preoccupation with notions of supply and demand, see demographic reproduction as an 
‘externality’. Brenner (1976:31), as the above quotation illustrates, stated categorically 
that any active feedback of demographic forces into class relations will not occur (see 
also Seccombe 1983:22).
Drawing on the premises of total social production, however, that is, the 
argument that societies must both produce and reproduce if they are to survive (Cordell, 
Gregory and Piche 1987, 1994:23-24; Seccombe 1993), this thesis argues that 
demographic forces can feed back into class relations, especially when these class 
relations are framed in terms of ethnic stratification— or, as is argued later, a cultural 
division of labour (Hechter 1975, 1978). Putting the argument at its most simplistic— 
and extrapolating from an old demographic adage, ‘the rich get rich and the poor get 
children’— it can be said that the rich (populations) get older age structures and the poor 
(populations) get young ones, at least at certain historical junctures. Here age structures, 
which reflect the combined effects of births, deaths, and, usually to a lesser extent, 
migration, are the outcomes, or dependent variables, of the underlying socio-economic 
characteristics. When these different age structures pertain to sub-populations, such as 
ethnic groups, the groups can be expected to have different interactions— or social 
relations— with economic production. A younger population will have proportionately 
less of its members owning the means of production (whether these be capital, skills or 
qualifications); an older population will have more. Here age structures— demographic 
forces— are the independent variable, and socio-economic class is the outcome. The 
methodological process of standardisation can refine such comparisons, but it cannot do 
anything about the ongoing realities: it is the people in the ‘empty class structures’ 
(Wright 1985:10) or status groups who ultimately have such relationships, not their 
statistically controlled numbers. Indeed, unless statistical controls are used in a critical 
manner, they can remove from view the very factors that create the difference.
Addressing a parallel issue, Seccombe (1983:22) saw the problem this way:
3[T]here has been an unfortunate counterposition of the socio-economic to the 
demographic, as if these two dimensions of social relations were materially 
inseparable under capitalism or elsewhere, and as if the lines of causality ran, 
unidialectically, only one way from the socio-economic and political to the 
demographic ...
Formally, the argument that demographic forces may be implicated in the 
maintenance of ethnic stratification can be based on five premises. 1) If there is no 
reproduction of the labour force or the population, there can be neither economic 
production nor markets, and vice versa. 2) Demographic reproduction, which has both 
micro- and macro-level analogues, both responds to, and influences, economic 
production, and vice versa. 3) The productive and reproductive dimensions of human 
existence (which together comprise total social production) are fundamentally 
interdependent. 4) Where different ethnic groups have differing relationships with 
economic production, their demographic regimes are also likely to be different, and vice 
versa. 5) The differing outcomes of demographic reproduction, such as differing ethnic 
group age structures, and their sub-components, such as the timing of family formation, 
family type and size, have the potential to interact with structural and/or policy-related 
factors to the advantage or disadvantage of one or other group.
Drawing on these premises, this thesis applies a total social production 
perspective to the ethnic stratification of the Maori and European populations of New 
Zealand.
1.1 ELABORATING THE PROBLEM
Despite New Zealand’s long held and widely promulgated ideology of 
egalitarianism, a significant body of literature attests to the fact that in the 1990s, the 
Maori Ethnic Group (comprising 13 per cent of the total population, hereafter referred 
to as Maori) remains disproportionately over-represented in the lower levels of all key 
socio-economic and demographic indicators. There is also considerable evidence to 
suggest that disparities between Maori and the European-origin population (comprising 
80 per cent of the total population, hereafter referred to as European) have increased 
over recent years, as successive New Zealand governments have introduced ‘the most 
comprehensive free-market reform program ever undertaken by an OECD country’ 
(Shirley 1993:1). Significant amongst these reforms has been a shift from concerns with
4social equity, where attempts were made by the state to ameliorate underlying 
inequalities between Maori and European (and males and females), to concerns with 
fiscal efficacy, where market forces are viewed by the state as being the most desirable 
determiner of social well-being and outcomes (Shipley et al. 1991:12; cf. Boston and 
Dalziel 1992; Kelsey and O’Brien 1994; Dalziel and Higgins 1996; Easton 1997a:44-53; 
Dalziel 1997).1
Many intuitively plausible explanations—which are elaborated in the following 
chapters— are given for the underlying disparities. For example, a number of Marxist- 
oriented analyses identify Maori and European as having relationships characterised by 
class (Bedggood 1979, 1980; Davis 1982; Wilkes, Davis, Tait and Chrisp 1985), eth- 
class (Macpherson 1977; Triin 1979), and class fractions (Phizacklea and Miles 1980; 
Spoonley 1982, 1988; Miles and Spoonley 1985; Loomis 1990). Common to all is that 
Maori disproportionately comprise the working class and the reserve army of labour (the 
unemployed), that ‘racial’ identification is significant, and that economic, political and 
ideological factors contribute to the maintenance of inequality. Where the studies differ 
is in their interpretation of the potential for change, ranging on a continuum from a 
transitional or temporary failure of the Maori and European working classes to develop 
a common class consciousness and thus to bring about collective social action, to self- 
perpetuating situations of relative permanency.
Similarly, neo-Weberian premises such as internal colonialism (for New Zealand, 
see especially Pearson and Thoms 1983; Pearson 1988) hold that once a cultural (or 
ethnic, or racial) division of labour is established, as occurred in New Zealand during the 
early years of colonisation, the resulting divisions become largely self-maintaining. From 
this perspective, the maintenance of inequality is due to deeply entrenched institutional 
practices, often referred to as institutional racism, which— often unintentionally— 
continue to discriminate against the colonised population long after the more direct 
forms of racism have disappeared.
At a more empirical level, although tending to support the theory of dual labour 
markets, it is equally valid to argue that the contemporary work-place requires an 
increasingly skilled and accredited workforce (see Harris 1995 for a comprehensive
1 See also Spoonley 1982, 1988:87; Brosnan 1984, 1987; Douglas 1985, 1986; Waldegrave and 
Coventry 1987; Royal Commission on Social Policy 1988a; Butterworth and Mako 1989; Callister 
1989; Social Monitoring Group 1989; Brosnan and Wilson 1989; Shirley, Easton, Briar and Chatterjee 
1990; Walker 1990; Dalziel 1991a, 1991b; Shirley 1993; St.John 1992, 1994; Novitz and Wilmott 
1992; Easton 1995a.
5review on New Zealand). For a variety of reasons, which are elaborated in the following 
chapters, Maori have lower levels of qualifications than do their European counterparts. 
Largely as a result of this factor, Maori have been over-represented in low-skilled 
occupations, and in those industries that have been most affected by economic 
restructuring. As Maori gain qualifications, it is expected that these differentials will 
decrease (Harker 1990:201). However, it must be noted that others (Wilson 1979; 
Messina, Fraga, Rhodebeck and Wright 1992) have argued that despite improving 
qualification levels, occupational disparities between Maori and European continue to 
grow.
A further broadly acknowledged—if seldom empirically demonstrated— factor 
contributing to these disparities is the relative age structures of the Maori and European 
populations. The median age of the Maori population is currently 21 years, whilst that of 
European is 34 years. Conventionally, this very significant demographic differential is 
invoked as explanation for a large portion of the structural differentials. Income is 
generally highest for people around the middle and upper years of life, of whom the 
European population has a greater proportion. Unemployment, a phenomenon which is 
currently highest for young people, sees proportionately more Maori exposed to its risk, 
and so on.
However, in both of these scenarios a number of factors are confounded. For 
example, although the European population has a higher mean total income by virtue of 
its age structure, higher incomes are also correlated with higher levels of educational 
qualifications. For the most part, such qualifications are gained at the younger adult 
ages, where greater and increasing proportions of Maori are currently to be found. A 
younger population may also experience higher unemployment than an older population, 
but ongoing technological and structural change in the workplace mean that its skills are 
likely to be more in demand than those of the latter, resulting in proportionately more of 
its members having the potential to move into the labour force, whilst those of the older 
population are more likely to move out. Similarly, a population which is having most of 
its children at younger ages (such as Maori)2 and thus deriving a shorter 
intergenerational replacement period than a population that is experiencing older 
childbearing (such as European), has the potential to see each successive generation 
educated at a faster rate, thus more rapidly increasing its cultural capital (qualification
2 Almost half of Maori childbearing is accounted for by women under the age of 24, whilst for European 
the equivalent proportion is just over one quarter. This issue is elaborated more fully in Chapter 3.
6base). Last but not least, the age structures of the Maori and European populations have 
been slowly converging for some years. Each of these factors should be mitigating 
against relative increases in Maori unemployment, and generating a relative increase in 
Maori mean total income. Thus, differences in age-structure as part explanation for 
different group-level socio-economic outcomes, and particularly for trends in socio­
economic differentials, cannot be invoked uncritically.
Indeed, more important than ethnic differences in age structure in generating 
group-level differences in income and labour force status may be the manner in which 
such demographic differences simultaneously expose the Maori and European 
populations to certain otherwise-egalitarian (ethnically-neutral) period factors, such as 
political-economic restructuring, changes in the opportunity structure, and changes in 
wage and income support policies. An example can be seen in the 1991 raising of the 
age of eligibility for the adult rate of unemployment benefit, from 20 to 25 years— a 
change in income support which, very importantly, post-dates the period covered by this 
thesis. At that time, there were 0.4 Maori 15-24 year olds to every Maori aged 15-64, 
whilst the corresponding ratio for the non-Maori population was 0.2. Thus, even if the 
unemployment-population ratios of Maori and European youth had been identical, the 
policy would have had a disproportionate impact on the Maori population by virtue of 
its age structure alone (Jackson 1994a; 1995a). As it was, the Maori youth 
unemployment to population ratio was double that of their European counterparts. 
Incorporating the multiplicative effects of age structure, the relative impact of the above 
policy on the Maori population would therefore have been closer to 4 times greater (2 x 
2) than that experienced by European, not twice as great as the unemployment ratios 
themselves imply (see also Easton 1995b:207).
The combined potential of age structure, unemployment, and this particular 
policy to increase existing ethnic inequalities did not stop there. The lowered 
unemployment benefits, which for unemployed 20-24 year olds represented a 25 per 
cent reduction in income, resulted in a substantial shift of fiscal responsibility from the 
state to the families of those affected. At 15-24 years, the ratio of Maori to those at the 
parental ages most likely to be affected (35-54 years, see Jackson 1994a:47) was exactly 
double that for European. That is to say, there were 1.22 Maori aged 15-24 years for 
every Maori aged 35-54; for the European population the corresponding figure was 0.61 
(Jackson 1994a:85). Together, the impact of the age structure-unemployment-policy 
triad for the Maori population might thus again have been closer to a factor of four: both
7Maori youth unemployment, and the Maori ‘parent-youth’ ratio, double that of 
European.3 * Furthermore, because unemployment is inversely correlated with age; 
because unemployment is higher for Maori than European at all ages; and because Maori 
parents are on average several years younger than their European counterparts (Jackson, 
Pool and Cheung 1994:40-41), those Maori parents who were suddenly 
disproportionately charged with these extra fiscal responsibilities were themselves also 
disproportionately affected by unemployment (Jackson 1994a: 151-5, 1995a).
The complex nature of these inter-related processes and their implications for an 
increase or a decrease in ethnic stratification cannot be adequately conceptualised in the 
absence of a demographic framework. Certainly demographic factors are not something 
that market forces, premised on notions of egalitarianism, can readily accommodate. 
Before developing this thesis further, therefore, it is necessary to say a few words about 
the ideology of egalitarianism and its potential for reproducing— and possibly 
exacerbating—ethnic stratification.
Briefly stated, the ideology of egalitarianism has two faces. On the one hand it 
says that everyone should be treated the same; on the other, it discriminates against 
those who, because populations are heterogenously comprised, are different. 
Acknowledged by Aristotle as long ago as 2000 years, this paradox is explored in the 
contemporary setting by Saunders (1990:43-44). Saunders argues that there are at least 
three different meanings of equality: legal equality (where everyone is equal under the 
law7), equality of opportunity (access), and equality of outcome. Because people (and 
sub-groups) are different, the only way of achieving either equality of opportunity or of 
outcome is by treating people (and sub-groups) differently, thus discriminating and 
thereby negating the first type of equality. Discrimination, in turn, may be positive (for 
example, equity-based) or negative (e.g. racism), intended or unintended. Myers 
(1993:176-7), for example, argues the importance of distinguishing between disparate 
treatment (discriminatory actions) and disparate impact (discriminatory outcomes). 
Disparate treatment, he argues, can range from ad hoc decisions that are not based on 
clearly defined premises; through discriminatory application of rules (taken here to 
include policies) that are not in and of themselves discriminatory, but result in disparate 
treatment of otherwise identical individuals; to situations where the rule was formulated
3 Intermarriage means that these proportions will not accurately reflect Maori or European
‘dependency’ at the level of the family. The issue is discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
8with the explicit intention of discriminating according to certain criteria. Each of these 
approaches can result in disparate outcomes.
To these arguments, which tend to be concerned with ‘racial’, gender, social 
disability and socio-economic characteristics, this thesis proposes group-level differences 
in demographic composition. That is to say, differing ethnic group age structures, and 
differing reproductive dynamics in general, can result in disparate outcomes that are, 
essentially, of the unintentional kind.
Important in these respects are the arguments of American economist Richard 
Easterlin (1987a), whose ‘birth and fortune’ hypothesis holds that cohort size— as 
opposed to age structure per se—is a potential cause of inequality. Large cohorts, 
Easterlin argues, experience greater competition than small cohorts for scarce resources, 
such as employment and earnings, and as a result the former both delay their family 
formation to later in the life cycle, and have smaller families, than smaller cohorts. 
Consequently, large cohorts give rise to small cohorts, and vice versa, the demographic- 
economic interactions setting in motion a self-generating sequence of waves of 
population, and, potentially, waves of inequality.
Although several aspects of Easterlin’s arguments are antithetical to classic 
understandings of demographic change (elaborated more fully in Chapter 3), and 
moreover, pay almost no attention to the role of period factors (in particular, changes in 
the political dimension), his proposed relationship between economic factors and 
demographic change per se reflects the consensus. That is to say, both Easterlin and, by 
and large, the demographic patrimony, hold that socio-economic change is a primary 
determinant of demographic change, and that in turn, demographic change is a primary 
determinant of socio-economic change. Although Easterlin alluded to the application of 
his arguments at the level of the ethnic group only in passing (1987a: 161), it is plausible 
that similar dynamics hold true, and may be especially applicable to the situation of 
ethnic stratification.
In order to comprehensively address the issue of ethnic stratification in New 
Zealand, then, a number of factors must be taken into account. Firstly there is the 
historical situation, whereby the New Zealand labour market and most factors associated 
with it are argued to have become cleavaged along ethnic boundaries, resulting in a type 
of race-class nexus. Secondly there are the dual labour force arguments, which suggest 
that once the Maori and European populations achieve unity in qualification levels, other 
structural equalities will follow. Thirdly there are the contemporary age composition and
9other underlying demographic factors and their antecedents. Fourthly there is the ever- 
changing political economy with its smorgasbord of policies, and with which 
demographic factors can be presumed to interact.
1.2 THESIS OUTLINE
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part (comprised of Chapters 1-5) 
develops and operationalises the central arguments; the second (Chapters 6-11) creates a 
comprehensive profile of ethnic stratification and its associated demographic dynamics; 
and the third (Chapter 12) considers the contributions of the total social production 
perspective. The study covers both historical and contemporary periods, but its primary 
focus is the 1976-1991 period during which the New Zealand economy underwent major 
economic restructuring.
Following this section, Chapter 1 concludes with a summary of the intended 
contributions of the thesis. In Chapters 2-5, the key conceptual, theoretical and 
methodological issues are elaborated: Chapter 2 addresses the topic of ethnic 
stratification, with particular attention to Hechter’s (1975, 1978) theory of a cultural 
division of labour; Chapter 3 addresses the topic of total social production, locating the 
so-termed ‘Easterlin hypothesis’ under this genre; Chapter 4 develops the thesis’s 
empirical methodology and analytical framework; and Chapter 5 describes and critiques 
the data sources.
In addition to expanding on a number of key concepts, such as ethnicity, 
stratification, class, and demographic transition, an important component of Part I is 
discussion of the classification ‘Maori’. Four issues (elaborated in Chapter 5), which 
need to be acknowledged here, are paramount. First is that the Maori Ethnic Group is a 
collective category developed for statistical purposes. As such it does not necessarily 
correspond to the way in which those covered by the definition view themselves. Second 
is that intermarriage and inter-ethnic conjugality may further undermine the application 
of the classification ‘Maori’, even to individuals. Third is that the criteria used to define 
ethnic classification have changed over time, resulting in significant data discontinuities. 
Fourth is that since approximately 50 per cent of families classified Maori have one 
parent who is non-Maori (a finding of Chapter 5), it is difficult to conceptualise and 
operationalise family data within a stratification framework. Accordingly, the unit of 
analysis for this thesis is, more appropriately, the aggregate experience of individuals,
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meaning that factors of significance to some aspects of the overall analysis, such as 
family type and size, must be incorporated in an indirect rather than direct sense.
Also in Part I, the thesis’s four key analytical techniques are detailed, amongst 
which two—component analysis and cohort analysis— are of particular importance to 
the total social production perspective. The former (component analysis) was chosen 
over normative standardisation techniques for its elegance in separating out—yet 
keeping visible— the proportion of the crude (unstandardised) percentage difference 
between two groups (in this case, Maori and European) for any given variable that is 
due to either age structure or the underlying ( ‘true’ or unexplained) difference that 
remains once age structure has been controlled. This is a valuable index in that policy 
responses to inequality—when developed—are typically addressed at crude indices, 
whereas component analysis provides an opportunity to identify and target more specific 
objectives. At the same time, however, such an approach by necessity focuses the 
analysis on experience within each given category. It thereby deflects attention from the 
effect of the size of the category on the experience of the ethnic group as a whole, a 
factor that must be acknowledged separately.
Similarly, cohort analysis, which traces the experience of birth cohorts as they 
age, also sacrifices the size-effect coming from each compositional category. On the 
other hand, it provides an opportunity to assess the universality or otherwise of the 
macro-level trends, and thereby their policy implications. That is to say, cohort analysis 
permits the assessment of w'hether or not trends demonstrated at the macro-level have 
been similarly experienced by all cohorts, or are unique to individual cohorts, permitting 
both interpretation and policy responses to be more refined. Unfortunately, because of 
data limitations, these two techniques can be applied only to data for the 1976-1991 or 
1981-1991 periods.
Part II is developed around six empirical chapters. The first of these, Chapter 6, 
provides an historical overview of the development of ethnic stratification and 
demographic differentials in New Zealand. It focuses on the period 1840-1940, and 
explores the extent to which the developing demographic differentials were dependent 
variables of the processes of colonisation/ethnic stratification. Each of Chapters 7-10 
focus on a conventional indicator of ethnic stratification, beginning with an historical 
overview and then undertaking the component and cohort analyses noted above. 
Chapter 7 examines ethnic differentials in labour force status and employment status; 
Chapter 8 examines industrial and occupational differentials; Chapter 9 examines
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educational differentials, and Chapter 10 examines income differentials. In each of these 
four chapters, demographic reproduction—manifested primarily as age structure— is 
treated as an independent variable of ethnic inequality, and the question is asked, to 
what extent do ethnic differences in age structure add to, or reduce, the relative 
concentration of one or other ethnic group in each given socio-economic category. In 
Chapter 11, a limited exploration of the Easterlin hypothesis in a New Zealand setting— 
and in an ethnic context within that setting—is undertaken. In that chapter, cohort size, 
rather than age structure per se, is treated as an independent variable of inequality. In 
addition, the chapter also examines the extent to which both cohort size and socio­
economic inequality are linked with the timing of family formation, thereby returning the 
analysis to a focus on demographic factors as dependent variables.
Chapter 12 concludes the thesis by considering the findings of Part II in relation 
to the theoretical and other premises outlined in Part I.
1.3 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS
This thesis makes three key contributions. First, it argues that demographic 
reproduction is not marginal to either productive relations or ethnic stratification, but 
instead represents an interdependent dynamic that must be centrally incorporated into 
the analysis of ethnic stratification, ideally carried out under the auspices of total social 
production. In applying these essentially theoretical premises to empirical data by way of 
component and cohort analyses, the thesis has the potential to broaden understandings 
of the processes associated with the persistence of ethnic stratification, and thereby to 
contribute to its amelioration. Second, in the process, the thesis creates a comprehensive 
historical empirical profile of ethnic stratification in New Zealand. An important aspect 
of this compilation is the systematic identification of key points of continuity and 
discontinuity. Since no similar study exists under one cover, the thesis can be considered 
a benchmark study. Third, just as demographic forces have received minimal attention in 
the stratification literature, so too has ethnic stratification been a muted theme in the 
demographic literature (Sullivan 1977:165). In linking the two patrimonies, this thesis 
makes a contribution to current understandings of demographic change in a setting 
where the colonisation of an indigenous group has been a structuring force.
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2
ETHNIC STRATIFICATION: CONCEPTS AND THEORIES
...there is little agreement on how best to integrate racial or ethnic 
differences into traditional models o f stratification, if  indeed, such a 
task is seen as desirable in the first place (Pearson and Thoms 
1983:191).
2.0 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 1 the argument that demographic replacement has been more or less 
ignored in studies of ethnic stratification was introduced. Little, however, could be said 
there about the two central concepts— ethnic stratification and demographic 
reproduction—nor about the theoretical premises that underlie either them or the overall 
argument. This chapter addresses the first of these concepts, integrating ideas about 
ethnic stratification into a New Zealand setting, and touching on their methodological 
implications. Importantly, by way of responding to the above quote from Pearson and 
Thoms, the chapter is more concerned with understanding why and how the various 
concepts and theories fit together, than with how they are used in this thesis, which is 
the concern of Chapters 4 and 5. The chapter concludes by linking the overall discussion 
to the second part of the argument, that of demographic reproduction, which is itself 
elaborated in the following chapter.
2.1 ETHNIC STRATIFICATION
Ethnic stratification describes the division of important aspects of a society, 
particularly aspects of its economic production, along ethnic boundaries. It is not, 
however, an unproblematic concept. Not only are there many different ideas about what 
constitutes both ethnicity and stratification, but when the two are combined it is often 
also necessary to consider the ethnicity-race nexus. This is because the concept of 
ethnicity has, in many instances, merely become a substitute for the now scientifically 
discredited concept of race, while it was the latter that structured and validated not only 
the initial, but also many contemporary social relations between ethnic groups. This is 
certainly the case in New Zealand, where much of the empirical data for this thesis,
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although compiled on the census basis of self-ascribed ethnic group affiliation, traces 
back at the minor classification level to its earlier racial categories. Indeed, the concept 
of race— which was initially used to legitimise colonial relations between Maori and 
European—has been perpetuated into the 1990s, through widespread official (for 
example, police), social and media usage, and through state-level bodies and policies 
such as the Office of the Race Relations Conciliator and the Race Relations Act.
In addition, since ethnicity is generally defined on the basis of cultural criteria, 
the phenomenon of ethnic stratification cannot be understood without reference also to 
culture. Similar must be said of the concept of stratification, which cannot be understood 
without reference to class. The following discussion, therefore, links ethnicity with 
stratification, through the concepts of race, culture, and class. It then draws these 
together with reference to Hechter’s (1975) notion of a cultural division of labour.
2.1.1 Race, Racism and Race Relations:
Because the concept of race predates— and, it is widely argued, continues to 
inform—that of ethnicity, this chapter begins with it. Race refers to the biological 
classification of discrete groups which share genetically inherited physical 
characteristics, most notably skin colour. It is not possible to identify precisely when the 
concept was first used to hierarchically categorise human diversity (Banton 1983:3-5). 
However, that it was used in such a manner by many of the European colonists and then- 
descendants with whom this thesis is concerned, and that ethnocentrism—the belief that 
one’s own race or culture is superior to all others— structured that ideology, is today a 
broadly acknowledged fact. Importantly, the supposed inferiority and immutability of the 
physical characteristics encountered by European colonisers (and missionaries) were 
also typically ascribed to the group’s social and cultural facets, such as social and 
economic organisation, intellectual beliefs and development. Together the complex gave 
rise to the idea of the ‘great chain of being’, a socio-religious hierarchy in which God 
was placed at the top, priests above ordinary humans, and Europeans (Caucasoids) 
above Asians (Mongoloids), Negroes and Aboriginals (sub-divisions of the Ethiopian 
race). Through the processes of competition and selection it was believed that the more 
inferior races would eventually give way to the superior, an ideology which 
simultaneously provided justification for colonisation, and for ‘smoothing the dying 
pillow’ of aboriginal populations such as Maori (Featherston, cited in Buller 1884:54). A
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racial group was thus not only defined on the basis of physical criteria, but it was also 
defined ideologically and politically.
A substantial literature now rejects the biological concept of race as having any 
scientific validity (UNESCO 1975). The two principle reasons for this were scientific 
recognition of the large extent of interbreeding between racial groups, which renders the 
idea of fixed boundaries meaningless; and the fact that intra-racial variation is often 
greater than inter-racial (Eriksen 1993:4). Nevertheless, as Eriksen (1993:4) argues, 
what is important is the continuing social and cultural relevance of the idea that race— 
and thereby racial intellectual differences—exists: it is the idea, not its validity, that 
informs people’s beliefs and actions in relation to it.
Important amongst these actions (and inactions) are negative discrimination on 
the grounds of perceived race (racism), and failure to acknowledge the existence and 
implications of institutional racism, that is, the ‘way in which groups are differentially 
treated by institutions as a result of a [culturally biased] set of organisational policies and 
procedures’ (Spoonley 1988:24). In terms of the former, a (perceived) racial group may 
be advantaged or disadvantaged by the actions of ‘gatekeepers’— individuals who 
control access to resources such as employment, health, housing or justice. In terms of 
the latter, racist outcomes— which, as implied in the previous chapter, are often 
unintentional—may ensue from policies and practices that reflect the values and beliefs 
of the dominant group, and which, usually inadvertently, systematically advantage 
members of the dominant group and disadvantage those of others. The valuing of 
academically acquired credentials over matauranga (knowledge or wisdom, according 
to Maori values) is one such example. Also very important is the notion of ‘self fulfilling 
prophesy’, whereby the beliefs held about the inferior capabilities of a group— or an 
individual of that group— first assist in the establishment of the systems of disadvantage, 
and are then used to justify those beliefs when, by the dominant ideology’s standards, 
those groups or individuals fail.
Irrespective of whether or not racism is involved, the term race relations refers to 
such relationships. These relationships arise through processes of inclusion and 
exclusion based, generally, on competition over resources. Initially, it was the biological 
characteristics of each group that were believed to influence the relations between the 
members of each group, but later this gave way— at least at an academic level— to an 
understanding of the role of articulating political and economic structures (Banton 
1983:32). Coinciding with the latter came the shift to the concept of ethnicity.
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2.1.2 Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations:
In contrast to the biological basis and supposed immutability of race, ethnicity is 
a social category, defined on the basis of cultural criteria, self- and group-identity 
(Glazer and Moynihan 1963; Banton 1967; Cohen 1978). Although ethnic groups tend 
to have myths of a common origin and to encourage endogamy (Eriksen 1993:12), flux, 
process, ambiguity, and complexity are also central features (p.9). Indeed, most 
importantly, ethnic groups develop out of mutual contact. Like social classes, they do 
not exist in isolation. To speak of an ethnic group in total isolation has been likened to 
the sound of one hand clapping (Eriksen 1993:9). Drawing on a detailed investigation of 
the ways in which the concept is currently used, Eriksen (1993:12) sees ethnicity as:
an aspect of social relationships between agents who consider themselves as 
culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom they have a 
minimum of regular interaction.
As such, contemporary concepts of ethnicity emphasise relational dynamics, and 
in the manner of Barth (1969) are focused very much on the boundaries that delimit the 
ethnic group, rather than on the ‘cultural stuff they enclose (Eriksen 1993:37). That 
said, as Barth explained, an ethnic boundary is a site of inclusion/exclusion that is subject 
to continuous social and political negotiation. As a result it is not immutably fixed. Both 
the ethnic groups and the individuals of which they are comprised may identify as 
belonging to (or being affiliated with) different groups at different points in time, as a 
result o f their location in, for example, competition over resources or political power. Of 
considerable importance to this argument is that the boundaries between ethnic groups 
do not always correspond with cultural boundaries. Some ethnic groups can be 
culturally similar, yet have highly volatile relationships. In a similar manner to the 
argument about perceptions concerning race, it is the perception that there are important 
cultural differences, and the making of these socially relevant, that gives a social 
relationship its ethnic element (Eriksen 1993:12).
The arguments suggest, therefore, that what is contained within an ethnic 
boundary may certainly characterise the actions, values, beliefs etc. of the ethnic group, 
but it does not create or constitute that group on its own. Rather, the group is created 
and constituted via relations between such groups ( ‘we’ are this, because ‘we’ are not 
that), and those relations are themselves created and constituted through that social 
contact, their importance varying according to the situation (Eriksen 1993:18).
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Certainly it seems to be dynamics at the interface between ethnic groups that are 
preventing the ‘American melting-pot’ (Glazer and Moynihan 1963) from occurring, an 
argument that may also be applicable to ideas about ‘the distant end-result of [racial] 
integration’ ( ‘a final blending’) between Maori and pakeha (meaning non-Maori, usually 
of European origin) (Booth and Hunn 1962:3). Rejecting the idea that Maori should 
assimilate with pakeha, that is, that Maori ‘should cast away their distinctive 
characteristics and immediately adopt the ways of pakeha’,1 the Department of Maori 
Affairs (pp. 2-3) in the 1960s called for an integration in which ‘a whole new culture 
[would result from] the combination and adaptation of the two pre-existing cultures’. 
However, in New Zealand as elsewhere, rather than eradicating ethnic differences, the 
increasing association of such ethnic groups throughout the twentieth century seems to 
have resulted in a strengthening of ethnic identities, increasingly evidenced in the 
widespread assertion of difference, the ‘reinvention of tradition’ (Keesing 1989), and the 
various types of ethnic mobilisation and nationalism (Pearson 1988).
Conversely, another aspect to the argument of fluidity between ethnic groups is 
the issue of intermarriage—or inter-ethnic partnering (which is discussed more fully in 
Chapter 5), whereby it may become problematic for an individual to identify as 
belonging to one or another ethnic group, or for that individual to be acknowledged by 
others as belonging. This represents a very pertinent situation in contemporary New 
Zealand, where the demographic outcome (births) of not only inter-ethnic, but also 
inter-tribal, relationships are resulting in intra-ethnic tensions over the division of 
raupatu (compensation for the illegal dispossession of Maori from their tribal lands 
during the period of colonisation) recently wrested from the State. Indeed, the situation 
highlights an issue which is of considerable importance to this thesis, but because of lack 
of appropriate data cannot be examined further. This is that the category ‘Maori Ethnic 
Group’ is applied to a population which defines itself in terms of its major {iwi and 
hapu) and minor (whanau) sub-divisions,2 and not as a single compound. As a result of 
historical tensions between some of these groups, significant intra-ethnic differences— 
perhaps even stratification—exist, and undoubtedly underlie many of the inter-ethnic 
differences that are the subject of this thesis.
1 Thus in reality referring to cultural rather than racial characteristics.
2 A whanau is an extended family group; a hapu (tribal group) is comprised of a number of whanau; 
and an iwi is comprised of a number of hapu which trace their origins to a particular waka (canoe).
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Like the shift from biological to cultural criteria for the defining of certain social 
groups, therefore, the focus on the relational dynamics of ethnicity represents an 
important development for understanding the maintenance of ethnic groups, ethnic 
relations, and thus, ethnic stratification. This is all the more so because similar relational 
arguments have been applied to the cultural factors upon which the concept of ethnicity 
is premised. Reflecting the general position of anthropologists in the late 1980s, Keesing 
(1989:16), for example, argued that culture is neither a static nor autonomous 
phenomenon, but is achieved through a constant process of negotiation between 
symbolic structures and historical origins. Similarly, Lilley (1990:173-184) argued that 
the popular view that either ethnic groups or ‘cultures’ exist— or have ever existed— as 
homeostatic, closed systems, which disintegrate on contact with each other, is untenable. 
Instead, interaction between groups brings about exposure to new ideas, the new ideas 
build upon the existing ideas, and the outcome is a culturally-specific (to each group), 
dialectical synthesis (Worsley 1984:36). What, then, is culture?
2.1.3 Culture and Ethnic Stratification:
As with race and ethnicity, there are many and varied understandings of culture. 
In the 1950s, approximately 300 definitions had been documented (Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn 1952; Eriksen 1993:10). Instead of attempting to record here what would 
amount to only a small selection—and centrally acknowledging that differing theoretical 
perspectives preclude any notion of a single anthropology— the issue is approached 
instead by briefly reviewing how the concept of culture is currently used (and misused), 
and how these understandings relate to the foregoing.
In general, contemporary anthropologists view culture as a complex system of 
shared meanings, which, depending upon the theoretical proclivities of the 
anthropologist, may be structured around an organising principle such as religion, 
kinship, or the market. Both meanings and principles, which are often implicit or only 
subconsciously understood, involve ideas about social, economic and political 
organisation, and are evidenced in each society’s norms, values, rules, structures, and 
institutions, as well as in its material objects. The question of whether or not economic 
factors— the production of subsistence— should be given primacy remains an important 
debate between anthropologists of the various Marxist traditions, as well as others, but 
either way there is widespread acceptance that culture represents the totality of a 
society’s ideas and institutions, its entire infra- and super-structure: it is not an
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institution of a society, amenable to reductionist methodologies, as is often implied in 
non-anthropological literature (see especially the critique by Kertzer 1995). The position 
is perhaps best summed up by Smith (1988:x), who proposes that:
People do not insure their subsistence or their family wage and then go about 
behaving culturally and ideologically. The question is not what is a product of 
the market or the labour process and what is cultural, but how the market and 
the labour processes are cultural and shape the way we live our lives.
A second area of general agreement between contemporary anthropologists is 
that cultural ideas are not just passively absorbed by those bom into (or entering) the 
culture, but are also interacted with—both from within and without— contributing to 
cultural change. While anthropological views of culture have always been holistic, this 
focus on the interaction between structure (the political economy and its policies), 
agency (the actor), and the wider world (globalisation), which parallels much of the 
foregoing discussion, represents a fairly recent shift in the anthropological discourse. 
Prior to the 1960s, when the dynamic nature o f culture came to be more fully 
appreciated, most of anthropology’s focus was on culture as a constraint: people acted 
in accordance with their culture. This was the era of Parsonian (and Malinowskian) 
functionalism, the theoretical paradigm that saw each culture comprised of internal 
components that were functionally necessary to that culture’s continuation, and which 
gave surprisingly little recognition to the cultural implications of interactions between 
geographically coexisting (and often trading, warring, and exogamously marrying) 
groups.
Importantly, in relation to ethnic stratification, it can be argued that a system of 
shared cultural meanings centrally concerns the allocation and legitimisation of social 
roles: who does what, especially in the processes of achieving subsistence and 
demographic reproduction; who is permitted to be in control (or make decisions on 
behalf of others); and how property rights, such as control over the results of production 
(both economic and demographic), are assigned. Historically, the major social roles have 
been assigned by gender (as in the universal sexual division of labour), age (overtly in 
tribal and kinship societies, covertly in many capitalist/bureacratic structures), class 
(who works, who receives), skin colour (racial and ethnic divisions appear to be almost 
as universal as sexual ones), and caste (although often viewed as reflecting religious 
beliefs, caste divisions are essentially productive roles, determining who touches what,
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does what, and who gives to or receives from whom). The allocation and legitimisation 
of social roles on the basis of educational qualifications and merit, rather than ascription, 
is a relative newcomer to the different cultural systems of the world, and is as yet by no 
means universal, even in mainstream capitalism.
Centrally related to the issue of role allocation— and the bridge that can be 
argued to unite race, ethnicity, culture and stratification— is the concept of 
ethnocentrism, the ideological belief that one’s own group and cultural ways of doing 
things are superior. An often overlooked feature of ethnocentrism is the set of ideas 
about whether or not the pursuit of economic subsistence (and the demographic 
replacement that sustains it) should be a collective or individual responsibility; whether 
an individual’s success or failure lies with them or elsewhere, and so on. From this 
perspective it is important to reflect that most of the beliefs and values of the (West) 
European way of doing things ‘affirm the central values of capitalism and competition’ 
(Spoonley 1988:20). Spoonley points out that this ‘arrogantly assumes that the values of 
European capitalism are universally desired values that constitute the norm and impart 
obvious benefits’. (They are also very much ‘male’ views, but in terms of ethnic 
stratification per se this is a digression.)
Indeed, it is not simply the beliefs, but the power to institutionalise those beliefs, 
that leads to ethnic stratification. As several writers have noted, the early colonial 
struggles in New Zealand were not simply over resources, but also over whose ideology 
would predominate (Ministerial Advisory Committee 1986:5-7; Oliver 1988:4-5). 
Because this argument can be readily substantiated in the New Zealand setting (see 
Chapter 6), its more conceptual and theoretical aspects can be left aside. For now, it is 
equally important to explore the argument that, once begun, the processes of 
stratification, like those of racism and class have the potential to develop their own 
impetus. Accordingly, ethnic stratification needs now to be distinguished from class.
2.1.4 Ethnic Stratification and Class:
The two major perspectives on class derive from Karl Marx and Max Weber, 
both of whom treated stratification as a conflict over power. Where they differed is that 
Marx emphasised productive relationships as giving rise to stratification, and Weber, the 
market.
From an orthodox Marxist perspective, the emergence and persistence of class is 
centrally located in the system of capitalist production. Class is primarily understood in
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terms of class relations, these being the relationship between groups of people and the 
means of production. Orthodox Marxism identifies three primary classes, two of which 
are polarised as a result of their fundamentally opposite relationship to the means of 
production, one as owners (the bourgeoisie), the other as workers (the proletariat). The 
third class is the self-employed but non-employing petit-bourgeoisie, which is 
recognised along with two other minor classes, the unemployed and under-employed 
lumpenproletariat, and the aristocracy, who gain their wealth from various forms of 
rent. More recently, neo-Marxists have elaborated the characteristics of several 
additional contradictory class locations, such as those who are simultaneously employed 
but, by virtue of the ownership of ‘exploitation assets’, such as qualifications or a place 
in the bureacratic hierarchy, extract a kind of rent from their subordinates (e.g. Wright 
1976, 1985). The development is significant, in that it shifts from a emphasis on demand 
(for labour), to one in which supply (especially of skills) is a factor.
Central to Marxist frameworks are also the concepts of class structure, referring 
to classes as empty structures into which people enter and which are continuously re­
created independently of the specific actors who fill them; class formation, referring to 
the social relations between individuals within these classes, which in turn determines the 
development of class consciousness’, and class struggle, this being the tension between 
the classes, and the outcome of class consciousness (Wright 1985:10). For Marx this 
struggle was the motor of history, and its manifestation in revolutionary action caused 
each mode of production to be replaced by a new one.
Conversely, from a Weberian perspective, class is theorised in terms of market 
relations, rather than relations of production. Weber agreed with Marx that ownership of 
property (not only capital, but also education and skills) gave individuals an advantage, 
but also saw social status and political power as equally involved. Weber also believed 
that the type of property owned— for example, the type of qualifications or skills— 
created both supply and demand for that property, and thus differentiation in reward. 
The similarities between these premises and those of neo-Marxists such as Wright 
(1976, 1985) are striking.
For Weber, class arising from economic factors was therefore but one o f three 
key social differentiating forces, the others being the status group (or stand, with 
membership based on group affiliation, such as religion or ethnicity) and party (political 
affiliation and lobbying power). Because ‘[a] status group typically includes individuals 
of different classes, whereas a class typically includes individuals of different status
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groups’ (Hechter 1978:293-4), Weber saw these locations as cross-cutting, and did not 
believe that classes would be able to develop the shared interests that would lead to 
revolutionary action. By contrast, he saw status groups and party as providing 
alternative bases for group formation that were ostensibly independent of the relations of 
production.
Applying both Marxian and Weberian notions of class to the issue of ethnic 
stratification, Eriksen (1983:7) argues that class and ethnic differences are very different 
because social class always involves systems of social ranking, whereas ethnicity may 
not. That is to say, some polyethnic societies are indeed ranked according to ethnic 
membership, but, as implied above, the rankings refer first and foremost to imputed 
cultural or racial differences, not to the ownership of property or an achieved status. 
Certainly this is the case in New Zealand, where the ownership of property and the 
contemporary relations of production are disproportionately, but not entirely, divided 
along ethnic boundaries. That said, there can be little dispute that the proportion of 
Maori in the working class is greater than the corresponding proportion of European 
(Wilkes, Davis, Tait, and Chrisp 1985:26).
However, it does not follow that the analytical frameworks of Marx and Weber 
are irrelevant to the analysis of ethnic stratification. Hechter (1975, 1978:294), for 
example, argued that such analysis may be better served by discarding the 
unidimensional concepts of each and incorporating them into a new whole, a cultural 
division o f labour. This is the ‘internal colonialism’ argument (based on the arguments 
of Blauner 1972) that the processes of European colonisation gave rise to ‘a system of 
stratification where objective cultural distinctions are superimposed upon class lines’ 
(Hechter 1975:30). Focusing equally on class, the status group, and party (political 
power), the argument holds that once such a group is assigned to the disadvantaged 
position in a society it will stay there. Reflecting the relational views on ethnicity and 
culture outlined above, such an argument directly opposes the diffusionist (melting pot) 
position that co-existing ethnic groups will eventually fully assimilate.
Because the internal colonialism model—which is outlined below—has already 
been substantiated in the New Zealand context (Pearson and Thoms 1983; Pearson 
1988), and because its use offers the opportunity to simultaneously consider both the 
diffusionist and separationist arguments,3 it is these arguments that are the focus of
3 That is, the degree to which Maori and European are integrated, and the degree to which they are not.
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attention for the remainder of this chapter. Before elaborating Hechter’s arguments, 
however, it is worth first clearly locating the tradition in the stratification literature, and 
then briefly examining the few existing theoretically-derived perspectives on European 
and Maori relationships.
Pearson and Thoms (1983:192-3) argue that in fact not two but three broad 
traditions can be discerned in the stratification literature: ‘pure’, ‘pluralistic’, and what 
might be termed ‘permanently self-sustaining’ variants. The pure form, they argue, and 
which they note represents quite paradoxical positions, sees racial (or ethnic) differences 
as strictly subordinate to class. On the one side, racial and ethnic differences are viewed 
as residual or lag effects of class systems of inequality. The argument holds that these 
differences will eventually be subsumed by socio-economic status, and presumably class 
consciousness, once educational and other non-ascriptive factors approach unity.4 On 
the other side, in fairly orthodox Marxist terms, racial and ethnic differences are seen as 
dysfunctional for the formation of the proletariat as a class fo r  itself That is to say, race 
and ethnicity present obstacles to the development of class consciousness, but merely 
reflect a transitional stage that will eventually give way to class.
The second variant, which Lockwood (1970, cited in Pearson and Thoms 
1983:193) suggests should come under the rubric of pluralism, sees racial and ethnic 
differences—both economic and ideological—as so embedded in the social fabric of 
certain societies that any conflicts arising from them are only going to promote changes 
within the system, rather than of the system itself. From this perspective, the ideological 
and political dimensions assume equal importance with the economic, and, although 
both stmcture and agency (objective and subjective boundary formation processes) are 
involved in the long term maintenance of ethnic stratification, the role of the dominant 
class remains paramount.
Although the pluralist position therefore sees racial and ethnic differences as 
extremely persistent, it differs from the third variant in that the latter sees the differences 
as permanently self-reproducing— similar to, but distinct from, class. In these studies, as 
in the second variant, the political and ideological dimensions act to maintain race and 
ethnic stratification through both structural and agency processes, but in doing so they 
create independent bases of social inequality. That is to say, as with racism, the
4 This seems to me to be a neo-Marxist approach which also incorporates dual and segmented labour 
market theories, the latter of which are discussed below. However, here I am recording the views of 
Pearson and Thoms.
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inequalities no longer depend upon the active manipulation or intervention of the 
dominant classes, but develop a life of their own. Generally, these writers employ class 
fraction arguments in which there is almost no likelihood of the development of 
collective class consciousness. This variant was elaborated in the neo-Weberian 
approaches of Rex and Tomlinson (1979), Phizaclea and Miles (1980), and Rex (1981).
In close association with the latter—and comprising, it is argued here, a fourth 
position on ethnic stratification—is the work of Hechter (1975, 1978), derived from 
Blauner (1972). As implied above, this position holds that colonial-derived relations 
have their own unique dynamics which demand a more colonially-oriented framework. 
Importantly, as is elaborated below, the key point on which Hechter’s work differs from 
writers of the third variant is its emphasis on the incremental development of 
revolutionary potential.
Excluding studies which do not make their theoretical premises explicit, the first 
sub-variant—the ‘pure’ Marxist argument that racial and ethnic differences are either 
residual or lag effects of class— does not appear to be represented in the New Zealand 
literature.5 It may, however, be reflected in the neo-Marxist approach of Wilkes, Davis, 
Tait, and Chrisp (1985), which employs the ‘contradictory class location’ model 
ascribed to Wright (1976, 1985). In this study, Wilkes et al. identified considerably 
different class structures for Maori and pakeha. Maori, for example, were shown to be 
less than half as likely as pakeha to be Bourgeoisie (owners or part owners of companies 
employing more than ten people), and almost twice as likely to be workers (with no real 
supervisory functions and low or no autonomy). Maori were even less conspicuous as 
small employers, being only one fifth as likely as pakeha to be so classified (see also 
Davis 1982) 6
Framing his argument in Marxist terms of articulating modes of production, 
Bedggood (1979, 1980) is responsible for most of New Zealand’s work representing the 
second stream of the pure variant—the view that race and ethnicity present temporary 
obstacles to the development of class consciousness. From this perspective, Bedggood 
showed how Maori social and economic organisation had been overcome and destroyed
5 An excellent summary of the early paucity of studies on ethnic stratification and class in New Zealand 
can be found in Metge (1976) and Pitt (1977), and a somewhat critical review of economist’s analyses 
of Maori economic experience over the longer term is given in Dalziel (1991a).
6 Importantly, in relation to the arguments of this thesis, it should be noted that the study by Wilkes et 
al. acknowledged the potential effects of the differing age structures of the two populations. However, it 
neither controlled for them, nor considered their broader implications.
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by the capitalist mode of production of the incoming European. Maori, he argued, were 
systematically dispossessed of their land and economic base, and, left with only their 
labour power to sell, became an almost completely proletarianised population. By 
contrast, the European population was disproportionately present amongst the 
Bourgeoisie and middle classes. Bedggood also argued that the welfare state merely 
masked these inequalities between Maori and European, rather than ameliorating them. 
From this perspective, not only were racial or ethnic differences obstacles to class 
consciousness, but so too was the welfare state. Whilst little appears to have been said 
about the latter, some aspects of Bedggood’s arguments have been strongly criticised 
for their fundamentalism, and their failure to acknowledge important divisions within 
Maoridom (Parkin 1979:36, cited in Pearson and Thoms 1983:195).
Much of the remainder of New Zealand’s work on ethnic stratification has been 
carried out under the third and fourth variants, which see ethnic stratification as a 
permanently self-reproducing phenomenon. Employing the class fraction arguments of 
the third variant, Spoonley (1982, 1988), Miles and Spoonley (1985) and Loomis (1990) 
focused on the political economy of migrant labour, showing how migrants (including 
Maori moving from rural to urban labour markets) were slotted into the different 
structural divisions of the labour force. Polynesians joined the disproportions of Maori in 
the unskilled and semi-skilled primary and secondary sector occupations; European- 
origin migrants joined the disproportions of European in the skilled and professional 
positions. All the above writers see these destinations as not merely merit-determined; 
ideological, political, and institutional (racism) factors were very much involved, leading 
to the longer term potential for ethnic differences to develop their own independent 
impetus and become self-sustaining (see also Macpherson (1977) and Triin (1979) on 
the notion of ‘eth-class’).
Seemingly paralleling these arguments— although working within an entirely 
different discourse— are those relating to dual and segmented labour markets, explicated 
in New Zealand in the work of Bowie (1983a), Easton (1983a, 1991, 1995b), Brosnan 
and Hill (1983), and Manatu Maori (1991). By and large these studies see the relative 
labour market positions of Maori and European as reflecting underlying differences in 
qualifications, skills and experience, often exacerbated by employer-discrimination and 
occasionally by the actions of the state (see Harris 1995 for a comprehensive review). 
The outcome, disproportionate inclusion for European in the primary (advantaged) 
labour markets, and for Maori in the secondary/peripheral (disadvantaged) labour
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markets, along with their respective financial rewards, becomes self-generating, in the 
former case through access to employment security, internal labour markets, and skill­
updating, and in the latter case, through casual, low skilled work and disrupted 
employment-potential networks.
Located somewhere between the third and fourth variant is the work of Pearson 
and Thoms (1983). Here the more recent phase of race/ethnic relations in New Zealand 
is suggested as reflecting an ethnic resurgence which corresponds ‘with similar signs of 
cultural revitalisation and ethnic based social movements around the world’ (Pearson 
and Thoms 1983:210). As the earlier discussion on ethnic and cultural boundaries 
argued, the ongoing dynamics of capitalism have not led to the integration of physically 
and ethnically differentiated groups, but instead have had the opposite effect, fostering 
‘long dormant primordial loyalties’ and tensions (McRoberts 1979:293, cited in Pearson 
and Thoms 1983:211). In New Zealand, Pearson and Thoms argue, there has been a 
great deal of merging between Maori and pakeha, but on all fronts it is less than total 
and invariably reflects the superordination-subordination dynamics that characterise 
colonised populations (see also Barber 1989 on the use of race relations policy as an 
administrative strategy for the appropriation of Maori resources). In consequence, they 
argue, a model of ethnic relations is required that ‘acknowledges important but limited 
forms of cultural and social diffusion but at the same time stresses the centrality of 
factors that inhibit, indeed appear to debar, the dissolution of ethnic and racial 
boundaries’. This model, they conclude, is Hechter’s notion of internal colonialism.
2.1.5 Internal Colonialism:
Hechter’s internal colonialism model grew out of Robert Blauner’s (1972) 
efforts to examine the relative situations of American Blacks within the United States, 
by comparing them with initially-majority indigenous groups which are colonised by 
minorities from geographically distant locations, and subsequently become controlled 
through external relations between those countries (Pearson and Thoms 1983:213). The 
latter he termed classical colonialism; the former, internal colonialism. In New Zealand, 
Pearson and Thoms argue, a transition from classical to internal colonialism can be 
readily identified.
Drawing, in addition, on the development of underdevelopment and dependency 
schools of thought (particularly Frank 1969 and Wallerstein 1974), Michel Hechter 
(1975, 1978) similarly examined the experience of Scotland and Wales vis-ä-vis the
26
historical expansion of the English State. In his study, Hechter applied the linked 
concepts of regional core (colonial centre) and periphery (colony) to the ethnic groups 
involved, a premise which, due to the multi-ethnic composition of many other such 
regions, has been vigorously disputed (McRoberts 1979:296; Pearson and Thoms 
1983:215). Shortcomings aside, however, the model’s strength lies in its argument that 
the political, social, economic, and cultural systems of the core become superimposed 
upon those of the periphery and give rise to a ‘cultural division of labour’, wherein 
members of the core group are disproportionately assigned to situations of advantage, 
and members of the periphery to situations of disadvantage. Because of the subsequent 
institutionalisation of the core group’s systems, along with appropriation of surplus 
value inherent in the capitalist system, the core group gains at the expense of the 
periphery. Unless significant changes occur in both the structural conditions and the 
ideology that sustains them, the inequalities that were established via the initial processes 
of colonisation become permanently entrenched, and may even exacerbate.
From Hechter’s perspective these processes have the further potential to increase 
inter-ethnic tensions. He accepts that over time, some degree of diffusion and 
acculturation between the two (or various) groups will undoubtedly occur. However, he 
argues that contrary to the potential outcomes implied by diffusionist theory, where the 
heightening of interactions between groups is argued to bring about a lessening of inter­
group inequalities and a reduction in inter-ethnic tensions, the internal colonialism model 
suggests that the peripheral group will eventually assert itself in reaction to the 
dominance of the core (1975:10). Accepting that some individuals of the peripheral 
group will achieve high status occupational roles, Hechter posits three scenarios, each of 
which contain incrementally greater reactive potential (1975:41). Under the first 
scenario, he proposes that ‘high occupational status’ individuals may come to identify 
with the core group, and may as a result undergo a subjective re-identification of their 
ethnic identity. This scenario, he argues, would serve to remove potentially divisive 
leadership from the peripheral group and to thereby ensure the stabilisation of the 
cultural division of labour. Under the second scenario, Hechter argues that such 
individuals may attempt to maximise their individual power by acting as brokers between 
the two groups. As ethnic leaders these individuals may seek to narrow the material 
differences between the two groups by appealing to essentially uni vers alistic values. 
Hechter argues that the consequences of this scenario are less clear, but the probability 
is that should any change occur it will be gradual. The third scenario Hechter sees as the
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assertion by such individuals of the equal and even superior value of the peripheral 
culture. Under this scenario the separateness of the periphery as a nation may be 
claimed, and independence sought. By and large Hechter sees this last scenario arising as 
a result of the slowness of economic integration in the face of larger expectations, and 
associated with the development of more militant action. Although all three scenarios 
may exist simultaneously, the degree to which one or other might become prominent 
Hechter relates to the overall probability of achieving economic integration, this being 
largely determined by factors such as the relative demographic size of the groups, the 
indispensability of the periphery’s role in the national economy, and the kinds of policies 
adopted by central government.
When laid out in this manner Hechter’s model can be seen to contain two key, 
though apparently contradictory, strands. The first strand focuses on the structural 
aspects of the stratification process and argues that the cultural division of labour is 
essentially self-reproducing; the second focuses on the social action
(behavioural/agency) response and argues that the cultural division of labour contains 
varying degrees of revolutionary (or mobilisation) potential, which involves 
demographic, economic, and political determinants.7
Applying Hechter’s arguments in the New Zealand context, Pearson (1988) adds 
to his study the role of ethnic group leadership as proposed by Ross (1980). Pearson 
explains that within Ross’s model there is an expectation that different forms of 
collective identity will emerge at different stages of societal development and intergroup 
relations (p. 175). The Maori population, Pearson’s study finds, can be seen to be 
moving through such a series of transitions, from communal groupings, through the 
experience of minority subordination, to an emergent or realised ethnic group status. 
Importantly, with the onset of renewed attempts to seek greater degrees of self 
determination by Maori, Pearson also implies a potentially reactive ethnic awakening 
within the majority pakeha population (pp. 187-88). This is certainly reflected on 
contemporary talk-back radio shows, and in an increasing number of newspaper articles.
7 It is on this second point that I conclude the approach constitutes a fourth variant of the stratification 
literature.
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2.2 SUMMARY
Ideas about race, ethnicity and culture, then, are intrinsically tied to ideas about 
economic production and power. In the case of New Zealand, they are also tied to a 
colonial history and the capitalist nature of society. All of these processes are reflected 
in Hechter’s theory of internal colonialism, which holds that, contrary to ‘melting pot’ 
assumptions of eventual integration and/or assimilation, the longer term prognosis for 
colonised populations is the entrenchment of initially established differentials and/or the 
potential for an increase in inter-ethnic tensions. Pearson’s (1988) combined use of the 
arguments of Hechter (1975) and Ross (1980) has substantiated both situations for New 
Zealand.
Pearson’s (1988) approach, is, however, expressly concerned with theorising and 
illustrating Maori ethnic revival, and as a result emphasises the role of human agency. In 
contrast, this thesis has a structural focus. It investigates the extent of economic 
integration implied in Hechter’s model through conventional stratification indices, it 
extends Hechter’s premises beyond the potential role of demographic size to the more 
comprehensive realm of demographic reproduction (thus introducing a population 
composition dimension), and it considers the interdependence of each component in an 
overall political-economic context. First, however, the thesis turns to an elaboration of 
the demographic aspects of these arguments, which were seldom acknowledged in any 
of the foregoing literature.
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3
DEMOGRAPHIC REPRODUCTION: 
CONCEPTS AND THEORIES
All human societies are necessarily involved in three interrelated 
productions which cannot be subsumed one to the other: (I) the 
production of the means of production; (II) the production o f the means 
of subsistence; and (III) the production of labour power on a daily and a 
generational basis (Seccombe 1983:29).
3.0 INTRODUCTION
If populations must both produce and reproduce if they are to survive, studies of 
ethnic stratification are seriously lacking in their appreciation of interactions between the 
two. By contrast, this chapter elaborates the argument that demographic reproduction 
may play a role in the process of ethnic stratification, and needs to be examined, along 
with factors related to economic production per se, under the auspices of total social 
production.
The chapter begins by outlining the general propositions associated with the 
latter, a largely theoretical argument that sees economic and demographic factors as 
fully interdependent. However, because much of the small body of literature which 
arguably represents this genre is not framed in the explicit terms of total social 
production, the chapter then turns to alternative material that embodies similar 
arguments. Chief amongst this material—in relation to the central concerns of this 
thesis— is the so-termed ‘Easterlin hypothesis’ (1987a), which emphasises the potential 
for relative cohort size to be both a cause and a consequence of socio-economic 
inequality. These arguments, in turn, demand a rudimentary understanding of 
demographic change, both as a dependent and independent variable. The chapter 
addresses these issues, and concludes by combining the two sets of premises— those 
pertaining to total social production in general, and those pertaining to the Easterlin 
hypothesis in particular— into a single set of propositions pertaining specifically to ethnic 
stratification.
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3.1 TOTAL SOCIAL PRODUCTION
Although there is a dearth of literature framed in the explicit terms of total social 
production, the basic premises of the concept have been around for a long time and are 
essentially non-controversial: neither production nor reproduction can take place in the 
absence of the other. Certainly Malthus (1798), who saw population growth as 
outstripping economic growth, and later, Boserup (1976), who saw the same factor as 
stimulating economic growth, had much to say about the fundamental interdependence 
of the two, as has much of the population and development literature since (see 
especially Hajnal 1959, 1982; Tilly 1978; Wrigley and Schofield 1981; McNicoll 1980, 
1989; Coale and Watkins 1986; Handwerker 1986; Wrigley 1988; Greenhalgh 1983, 
1989, 1990, 1995; Dyson 1991; Johansson 1991; Watkins 1991; Folbre 1994; 
McDonald 1996).
Simultaneously, a debate has developed over whether or not one or other factor 
should be—or can be— given analytical primacy. As noted in Chapter 1, most Marxist, 
Weberian, classical and neo-classical economists see demographic reproduction as a 
factor which, although regularly acknowledged as having generated the labour force and 
consumer populations, is secondary or external to the workings of the economy itself. 
By and large this position reflects the fact that economic analysts are principally 
concerned with population in terms of labour force participation and unemployment 
rates (stocks and flows), a situation that arises out of the premise that it is the cyclical 
expansion and contraction of capital that dictates the cyclical demand for labour and its 
various skills, and not its demographic supply. In an analogous manner, analysts of 
ethnic stratification tend to focus on the relationship between the economic and 
ideological dimensions, and generally ignore the demographic.
The small body of literature that can be interpreted as pertaining explicitly to 
total social production, however, argues that economic production and demographic 
reproduction are both material processes, and that neither dimension can be 
subordinated to the other. Overall, these writers argue, the problem of economic 
primacy reflects a general failure to adequately conceptualise and integrate the 
generational replacement of labour power. That is, where, when, why and how the 
population of which the labour force is comprised, and not merely the relative deficit or 
surplus of labour at any given time, originated. Similar must be said of the genesis of the
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consumer population, without which capitalist production would have rapidly ceased, 
and capitalism with it.
Drawing on the Marxian notion that each historic mode of production has its 
own special law of population, and emphasising Engels (1884) argument that the 
production of the means of subsistence and the reproduction of human beings are the 
determining factors in history, Cordell, Gregory and Piche (1987, 1994:23-24) offer a 
comprehensive elaboration of the argument (given here in slightly abridged form):
1 Social organisation can function only if conditions that make possible the 
continued production of both the means of subsistence and of human beings in sufficient 
quantity and quality are met. This is termed social reproduction.
2. The production of human beings is an integral part of social reproduction, and, 
although appearing to be an aggregate of isolated acts between individual couples, is 
nevertheless a socially determined form of production.
3. As with any type of production, the production of human beings requires labour. 
Thus, total labour implies both labour to produce the means of subsistence and labour to 
produce human beings. A key process in the production of human beings is the sexual 
division of labour.
4. A fundamental social necessity is that the labour force must produce both the 
means of subsistence and [the conditions for the production of] human beings. Thus, the 
production and reproduction of the labour force is one of the conditions for total social 
production.
5. Another of these conditions is that there must be control of production, and of 
the division of labour and values and norms. The crucial questions are who controls, 
how control is exercised, and how control is resisted.
6. Three elements underpin the reproduction of the labour force: (a) the 
replacement of older workers to respond to new demands and to offset deaths and 
emigration; (b) the maintenance of the existing labour force in good health (which 
involves the provision of adequate food, shelter, sleep etc.); and (c) a system of social 
security (material support) for non-working members (that is, the unemployed, sick, 
elderly, children). These renewal processes centrally involve procreation and the 
recruitment of humans produced elsewhere (migration).
7. Each of the above elements (replacement, maintenance and renewal) requires 
labour and access to the means of subsistence, and specific costs are associated with 
each. An important question is what group or groups absorb each set of costs.
8. The family as an institution represents the main locus of production and 
reproduction of the labour force, being responsible for its replacement, maintenance and 
renewal. Within the family, the sexual division of labour, with women performing most 
of the domestic work related to the production and reproduction of the labour force, is
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crucial. The extent to which these costs and responsibilities are shared with other social 
institutions depends on the specific historic conditions.
9. The conditions for the production of the labour force are maintained and 
reproduced both by relationships of power, and through ideology and values. Dominant 
groups control the institutions that create and reproduce both the legitimating ideology 
and its praxis.
10. Competition and conflict between dominant groups for the control of the labour 
force, and between dominant and dominated groups, are historical facts. These tensions 
are the source of change in the production and reproduction of the labour force, and for 
the production and reproduction of the associated demographic regime, which is 
historically and contextually specific.
Although not explicitly elaborated in the foregoing work, very important to these 
arguments and to their application in this thesis is the concept of lag time, first as it 
pertains to the period between births and their eventual arrival at the labour market, and 
second as it pertains to the childbearing patterns of subsequent generations. As implied 
above, from most economic perspectives— at least under a capitalist regime—the 
demand for labour is determined by the cyclical phase of capital extant at that moment, 
that is, whether it is in an expansionary or contractory phase, and has little or nothing to 
do with demographic supply. Similarly seen as having little to do with past demographic 
patterns, the demographic literature sees the demand for children as generally reflecting 
extant socio-economic and cultural circumstances. Since the mid-1970s, for example, 
this demand has been seen as reflecting a neo-classical type of choice between having 
children and achieving material aspirations (albeit the latter possibly reflecting values 
developed in the parental home). Out of this framework has developed a general 
understanding that sees the delayed childbearing and low fertility of what has been 
termed the ‘second demographic transition’ (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; van de 
Kaa 1987, 1988; Lesthaeghe 1991, for New Zealand see Jackson and Pool 1994) as 
both cause and effect of high levels of personal material well-being, and early 
childbearing and high individual fertility as reflecting the opposite.
However, taking a more interdependent and intergenerational perspective, 
American economist Richard Easterlin (1980, 1987a, 1987b and passim) proposes a 
rather different argument. When times are good, he argues (perhaps when capital is in a 
specific expansionary phase, such as occurred between the late 1940s and 1950s), there
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is an increase in the Crude Birth Rate (live births per 1,000 population).1 After the 
relevant lag time, and given minimal effects of death and migration, this increase results 
in a concomitant increase in competition between these individuals as they reach the 
labour market. Subsequently, this competition, which pertains to resources in general, 
disadvantages the cohort economically and results in both a delay in family formation 
and a decrease in the number of children it gives birth to. Conversely, when these 
resulting births eventually reach the labour market themselves— assuming no major 
changes in death or migration rates—they experience relatively less competition, enjoy 
relatively advantaged material well-being, and as a result have earlier and more births. 
Thus, a self-generating sequence is established in which relatively disadvantaged large 
cohorts derive relatively advantaged small cohorts, and vice versa. In contrast to 
demographic convention, which holds that the greater the proportion of young adults in 
a total population, the higher the Crude Birth Rate, Easterlin argues therefore that ‘the 
population of young adults and the birth rate [move] inversely—when the proportion of 
young adults rises, the birth rate falls’ (Easterlin 1987a:55). So too with ease of labour 
force entry, and economic fortunes in general.2
Resonating with the above arguments of total social production, Easterlin 
proposes that each cohort’s material well-being and its demographic behaviour is thus a 
function o f both extant and prior economic and demographic factors, and that these 
factors in turn contribute the future material well-being and demographic strategies of 
each offspring cohort. These cyclical premises he then uses to explain the rise in births 
associated with the post war baby boom, a supposed ‘aberration’ in a long term 
downward trend that has not been satisfactorily explained in conventional demographic 
transition terms. That is to say, Easterlin argues that baby boom parents belonged to 
small cohorts, and as a result of less competition were able to marry early (cohabitation 
was far less frequent), have children early and have more of them. Similarly, he applies 
the argument to the subsequent economic and demographic (‘baby bust’) experiences of 
American baby boomers, who, he argues, have had to alter their demographic behaviour 
in order to maintain a favourable standard of living—perhaps reflecting perceptions of 
that of their parents’— in the face of deteriorating labour market conditions (see also
1 A number of conceptual and methodological shortcomings are evident in Easterlin’s model, not least 
those aspects based on the Crude Birth Rate. This and other issues are taken up below and in the 
following chapter.
2 Aspects of Easterlin’s arguments have also since been applied to issues such as crime, suicide, 
marriage and divorce, voting, educational outcomes, and retirement funding.
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Easterlin 1968; Easterlin, Wächter and Wächter 1978; Freeman 1979; Smith and Welch 
1981; Schultz 1981; Easterlin, Macdonald and Macunovich 1990). The application of 
these ideas to minority group issues, and thus, implicitly, to the issue of ethnic 
stratification, Easterlin alludes to only in passing (Easterlin 1987a: 161). However, 
before this possibility can be explored further, it is necessary to more fully understand 
the dynamics of demographic change.
3.2 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION: A BRIEF DESCRIPTION
Demographic transition describes the phenomenon whereby moderately high 
mortality (death) and fertility (birth) rates, which together result in populations of 
static/slowly changing size and age structure, decline to low levels, again achieving a 
stable, and eventually— at least theoretically— a stationary (zero population growth, 
ZPG), state.3
In the classic model of demographic transition, which describes the experience of 
several Western European populations, the pre-transitional age structure is triangular- 
shaped, with the largest proportions of the population located in the younger age 
groups, and a correspondingly low median age. Mortality levels then begin to decline, 
resulting for a time in an even younger age structure. That is to say, because declining 
mortality has its greatest effect at the youngest ages, more infants and children survive, 
eventually becoming reproducers themselves; and because fertility has not yet fallen or is 
only beginning to fall, the proportion of the total population in the younger age groups 
increases. The population growth that is derived from the resulting youthful age 
structure is known as the ‘momentum effect’ (Keyfitz 1971:71-80), and is greater than 
that which would be expected from that population’s net reproduction rate. After a 
period, and for a variety of reasons, uppermost amongst which are social and economic 
change, fertility levels also fall, and, in combination with sustained low mortality, derive 
a ‘mature’ population— a population with a high median age and a somewhat 
rectangular shaped age structure. Once the built-in growth from the effect of momentum
3 For the basic premises see Notestein 1944; Davis 1945; Coale 1973; Caldwell 1976. For arguments 
that pre transitional rates were moderately high and then increased, rather than being initially ‘very 
high’ as first thought, see Coale and Demeny 1983; Dyson and Murphy 1985; Coale and Watkins 
1986). More recent— and somewhat challenging—perceptions regarding the notion of stationarity are 
discussed below.
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is spent and the rate of growth falls to zero, this age structure becomes— theoretically— 
more or less permanent, the so-called stationary population.
The transition itself, as the concept implies, is the period of instability in 
population size and structure between the beginning and end points of transition 
(Demeny 1972). Differences between populations in the timing and velocity of mortality 
and fertility decline thereby result, at least for a time, in populations— and sub­
populations such as ethnic groups—with differing age structures. Such dynamics 
underlie the earlier noted differences in age structure between European and Maori, the 
former experiencing a classical transition between the late 1800s and the 1970s (albeit 
‘interrupted’ between the late 1930s and 1961 by the baby boom—discussed below and 
in Chapter 6), and the latter experiencing a ‘delayed’ variant of the classical transition 
(e.g. Pool 1991a:5) between the 1940s and the 1970s.
Complicating this model, which has been heavily criticised (e.g. Knodel and van 
de Walle 1979; Coale and Demeny 1983; Dyson and Murphy 1985; Coale and Watkins 
1986; Hodgson 1988; Szreter 1993; van de Kaa 1996), are three somewhat inconsistent 
features. First, as implied, is the baby boom, which was experienced in all developed 
countries, and which in New Zealand saw the non-Maori Total Fertility Rate (TFR4) rise 
from 2.1 (the theoretical replacement level) in 1936, to 4.2 in 1961, and return to 
replacement in 1977. These years of fertility increase (1936-1961), which followed a 
globally-experienced Depression and the Second World War, were associated with a 
decline in age at marriage and childbearing, an increase in the proportions marrying, and 
an increase in family size.
Second, the years 1961 to the mid-1970s, during which time fertility declined 
and returned to replacement level, were the vanguard of the period referred to above as 
the ‘second demographic transition’. During this period, the fall in fertility was 
associated with a fall in the proportions marrying, especially at younger ages, an increase 
in age at childbearing, and an increase in the proportions having zero or one child(ren). 
These dynamics (which are still in progress), are returned to below. In the interim, it 
should be understood that many demographers reject the notion of a ‘second’ transition, 
and simply see the baby boom as an aberrant— and largely unexplained—phenomenon, 
which interrupted a longer term trend (see especially Cliquet 1991).
4 The TFR is a synthetic measure approximating the average number of children a woman would give 
birth to over her lifetime if she were to experience the age-specific fertility rates current in any given 
year.
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Third, a small groundswell of publications have recently observed that the 
fertility of a number of developed countries is continuing to fall even though well below 
replacement, in which case such populations could eventually decline in size, a scenario 
that would have significant— and unprecedented— implications for population age 
structure (Demeny 1995), and with it, the social, economic and political organisation of 
those societies (McDonald 1996).5 The capacity to sustain a population’s dependent 
members (its youth, elderly, unemployed etc.), for example, depends upon there being a 
sufficiently sized labour force and tax base. Alternatively, the situation of sub­
replacement fertility may also be transitory, reflecting a previously un-theorised phase 
between past and future homeostasis (Coleman 1986; Lee 1987; Lesthaeghe 1980; 
Wilson 1996; Wilson and Airey 1997). Either way, as the arguments pertaining to total 
social production contend, the material well-being of a population is inherently bound to 
its capacity to replace itself, a task that may (either intentionally or unintentionally) also 
involve migration.
3.3 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION: SOME EXPLANATIONS
Explanations for demographic transition are, like those pertaining to ethnic 
stratification, many and varied. Indeed, as van de Kaa (1996) argues, so diverse and yet 
so plausible are most of the explanations that it is impossible to arrive at a synthesis: 
instead, it is better to see each as a ‘narrative’ or ‘sub-narrative’ that contributes to the 
whole. However, and at the acknowledged risk of oversimplifying what is a very 
complex situation, it is the contention of this thesis that two underlying explanatory 
themes predominate: economic-ideational and cultural-ideational— although even then, 
as Smith (1988:x), Kertzer (1995) and others cited in the previous chapter argued, the 
distinction is spurious. A brief review of these explanations follows, preceded by an 
outline of relevant technical issues.
3.3.1 Technical Issues:
The concept of fertility refers to number of live births. In relation to 
demographic transition theory, fertility was originally measured via the Crude Birth Rate 
(CBR), which, as noted earlier, is the number of live births divided by the number of
5 Such concerns have long been a feature of perspectives on population in France. What is new is the 
recent discovery that the possibilities may eventually apply to all, or most, countries.
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population. The index, which is purely concerned with population size and growth, is 
problematic when used comparatively, due to the fact that it does not allow for temporal 
changes in age structure or the timing of family formation, or for differences in these 
factors between populations. That is to say— and partially contradicting Easterlin’s 
arguments outlined above—classic demographic understandings are that populations 
with large proportions of women at the reproductive ages will have higher CBRs than 
populations with low proportions.
Between the 1930s and 1950s the cmde measure was joined by the more refined 
Net Reproduction Rate (NRR), which is a synthetic period measure of the average 
number of live daughters a woman would bear during her reproductive life is she were 
to experience the age-specific birth rates of the reference year; and, in the 1950s, by a 
third measure, the similarly synthetic and period-specific Total Fertility Rate (TFR), 
which is the average number of live births per se a woman would bear during her 
reproductive life is she were to experience the age-specific birth rates of the reference 
year. Both the NRR and the TFR are based on age-specific rates (ASFRs), and thus 
control for both temporal changes in age structure and for differences in this factor 
between populations. However, as with the CBR, neither can accommodate temporal 
changes in the timing of family formation, a measure which requires recourse to data for 
true cohorts. De Beer, Beets, Bosman and Willems (1991:140) explain:
If, at a certain point in time, increasing numbers of women decide to stop 
childbearing... then the total number of births will decrease due to the loss of 
third and higher order births. If, at the same time, increasing numbers of young 
women decide to postpone the arrival of a first and/or second child to a later 
age, then the total number of births drops even further... Summing up these age- 
specific rates, gives very low TFR values.
After a number of years the tide might turn. The women who postponed 
childbearing will have grown older and may decide to [begin childbearing] at age 
27, 30, or even later [and] the fertility rates at these ages [will] start rising again.. 
[If] at the same time, the youngest generations., prefer to have their first and or 
second child at young ages again, then fertility rates at these ages will also start 
rising... their sum, the TFR, ends up at a high level again.
As De Beer et al. explain, all women involved here (hypothetically) had two 
children, their fertility did not change at all. The only thing that changed was the age at 
which they had those children, leading to an artifactual change in the period TFR. The 
issue itself, as it impacts on period fertility rates (such as those used above to describe
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the baby boom), is well recognised and understood (see particularly Jones 1990; Cliquet 
1991:18-20; Ni Bhrolchäin 1992; Demeny 1995:3). However, its broader implications, 
particularly as they pertain to comparisons between sub-populations such as ethnic 
groups, are generally not.
For example, the TFRs of two sub-population ethnic groups may indicate 
convergence, when in fact it is a convergence in the index only, not in the behaviour or 
the underlying characteristics understood to be associated with family formation. Since 
the late 1980s, for example, the TFRs of the Maori and European populations have 
more or less converged, at just on 2.2 births per women. However, as Jackson, Pool and 
Cheung (1994) found, approximately seven years separate the peak ASFRs of the Maori 
and European cohorts which began their reproductive careers in the early 1980s, 
compared to only one year for their counterparts in the 1960s. That is to say, the bulk of 
childbearing for Maori of these cohorts occurred around age 21; for European it 
occurred around age 28. Two decades earlier, the corresponding ages were 22 and 23 
years. In contrast to the idea that Maori and European family formation strategies are 
converging (Pool 1991a:4, 213), therefore, it appears that it is only the synthetic levels 
that have converged. Indeed, the cohort disparities suggest quite different sets of 
explanatory circumstances, to which the chapter shortly turns.
At least part of this problem reflects a significant and essentially unresolved 
analytical issue within the discipline of demography, that is, how to relate the descriptive 
aspects of population change to the interpretation and explanation of reproductive 
behaviour.6 According to Francisco (1996), the discipline has had an historical 
preoccupation with issues of population size and growth, and as a result it has been 
concerned with fertility as an output, as opposed to an outcome, measure. The former 
refers to the quantity or number of live births per women; the latter, to the cluster of 
practices, attitudes and knowledge of both sexes that might explain the whys and 
wherefores of fertility output (Francisco 1996:79-80). As fertility transition has 
progressed it has become increasingly important to understand how and why fertility 
change occurs. This understanding requires more of a focus on fertility as an outcome of 
many complex relationships, not least those between conjugal partners. Nevertheless, as
6 In the case of New Zealand, the problem has also reflected a frustrating lack of appropriate micro­
level data. However, the issue has recently been resolved with a first-ever comprehensive survey, 
publications from which are just beginning to emerge (Population Studies Centre, University of 
Waikato, New Zealand).
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Francisco contends, it is the output measures that are still widely used to explain 
behavioural change. One significant analytical implication, he argues, is that the 
discipline of demography may need to re-evaluate its somewhat singular focus on 
females, and to more comprehensively incorporate the characteristics and circumstances 
of males, that is, to develop a ‘two sex’ demography. This is nowhere more evident than 
in the case of ethnic fertility change, where conjugal partners may belong to different 
ethnic groups, and where rates constructed on the basis of data pertaining to females 
only may significantly over- or under-estimate both output and behavioural change 
(Jackson 1996).
As the issues pertain to this thesis, however, the major problem is with 
Easterlin’s use of the CBR (and as an adjunct, the TFR) as the basis of his model, and 
the failure to distinguish between period and cohort fertility, leading to serious 
conceptual, theoretical and methodological conflations of some of the model’s key 
components. These issues are taken up in Chapter 4, but in the interim it should be 
noted that it is possible for the CBR and the TFR to fall, but for cohort size to remain 
almost unchanged, due to an increase in the number of women giving birth. Similarly, 
where Easterlin proposes a standard gap of 20 years between each large and small 
cohort, a generational shift in the timing of family formation would by definition derive 
two different period-gaps— a ‘late’ childbearing gap of, say, twenty-eight years; and a 
shorter gap of, say, twenty-three to twenty-five years, when the socio-economic 
situation is reversed. Indeed, by most western standards, a gap of 20 years (implying an 
average age at childbearing of 20 years) would be far too short. These factors are of 
vital importance both to Easterlin’s hypothesis and to its application here, because whilst 
(theoretically) they determine the relative size and the number and proportion of large or 
small cohorts in a population at any given time (Easterlin 1987a: 140), they cannot be 
ascertained from either the CBR or the TFR.7
3.3.2 ‘Economic-Ideational’ Explanations:
At the highest level of abstraction are two macro-economic explanations for 
demographic transition. The first, which stems from Marx and Engels— and thus, it is 
important to note, predates attempts to explain the transition proper— has seen very 
little development in demography (cf. Levine 1977; Caldwell 1982; Seccombe 1983;
7 Explained in Chapter 4, an indication of shifts in the timing of family formation can be ascertained 
from the age-specific components of the TFR, but this was not the approach employed by Easterlin.
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Cordell, Gregory and Piche 1987). This is the theoretical argument used by Seccombe 
(1983) and Cordell et al. (1987) that each mode of production contains its own law of 
population. That is, as each historical stage, with its different systems of production and 
consumption is encountered, so too the family changes. Neither Marx nor Engels, 
however, fully elaborated the demographic aspects of their arguments. For Marx, a brief 
comment in Chapter 25 of Capital suggests that the outcome of increasing 
proletarianisation and its concomitant povertisation would establish a self-generating 
mechanism whereby proletarian births would eventually become proletarians themselves. 
However, the overall tendency, according to Engels (1884), would be for the mode of 
production to change in a manner that would cause the family to become smaller, and 
thus (implicitly) for demographic transition to take place.8
The second macro-economic explanation is based on the classical understandings 
of demographic transition noted above, that fertility decline is a consequence of an a 
priori decline in infant mortality.9 These understandings have led to the highly 
descriptive (and similarly unidirectional) contention that a country’s infant mortality rate 
(IMR) and its fertility levels are inversely correlated with its Gross National Product 
(GNP): the higher the GNP— or the more developed a country’s health and education 
infrastructure, the lower the IMR and fertility.10 {Ergo, as argued in the introduction, the 
lower the IMR and fertility, the older the age structure, the higher the proportion of 
those who own wealth or the means of production. Seemingly paradoxical, therefore, 
are the arguments contained in the Easterlin hypothesis, that the more advantaged— or 
wealthier— the cohort, the higher its birthrate and thus, implicitly, the greater its 
contribution to a youthful age structure. However, as implied above, the two arguments 
are not incompatible. Rather, as Easterlin posits, the situation of each cohort is, like the 
age structure to which it contributes, also transitory. The determining factor, in relation 
to the contribution that each cohort will make to the age structure and overall wealth of 
the population to which it belongs, depends in large part upon the number and
8That said, it is important to acknowledge the extent to which demographic factors were given an 
important role by one writer. Implicitly debating with Marx, Alexander Chayanov (Thomer, Kerblay 
and Smith 1966:68, 245) demonstrated that the size and composition of the late 19th Century Russian 
peasant family at different stages of its existence, and not social factors per se, caused differentiation of 
peasant farms into capitalist or proletarian farms.
9 It is important to note here Omran’s (1971, 1982) model of epidemiological transition, which 
elaborates three different types of mortality transition: classic, delayed, and accelerated. As also noted 
above, for similar reasons, fertility decline can precede a substantial decline in mortality.
10 The argument is the same whether GNP or GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is the indicator employed.
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proportion of large or small cohorts in the population at any one time, which in turn 
depends upon the length of the intergenerational period.)
Moving down the abstraction ladder are the various micro-level explanations 
given to the underlying—behavioural—dynamics of fertility change. Two main schools 
of thought predominate: changes in the economic costs and benefits of children, as 
elaborated in the wealth flows theory of Caldwell (1982); and shifts in the value systems 
of parents, as elaborated in the second demographic transition arguments of Lesthaeghe 
and van de Kaa (1986); van de Kaa (1987, 1988), and Lesthaeghe (1991-2). Although 
both sets of explanations can be perceived as primarily ideational in nature, they in fact 
centre on the notion of rational choice, and emphasise utility (new-household or micro- 
economic) theories, which endeavour to explain why people make certain choices 
between scarce resources and options.11 The first set, which is generally associated with 
the onset of fertility decline, sees parents as having to choose between having many 
children for the goods and services they provide (whether or not they actually have them 
with this intention, e.g. Dyson 1991:81), and having to support those children in a 
changed environment that on the one hand keeps more children alive, and on the other, 
requires them to be educated and restricts their early access to jobs. Increased sibling 
competition for scarce resources is closely associated wdth these ‘quantity of children’ 
arguments, as are supply, demand, and attitudinal arguments pertaining to contraception 
(the latter explicated in the ‘intermediate-’ and ‘proximate-determinants’ frameworks of 
Davis and Blake, 1956, and Bongaarts 1978). The second set, which is associated with a 
shift to later and lower childbearing, sees young adults as choosing between having 
children, if at all, and achieving other non-familial goals and aspirations. Increasing 
female labour force participation, the associated arguments of role incompatibility and 
opportunity costs, the widespread availability and usage of efficient contraception, and 
perceptions about the future costs of educating children (quality of children) are 
particularly implicated.
Although essentially framed in economic-ideational terms, both sets of 
arguments are also routinely posited in highly evolutionary terms. Failure to contracept, 
or, at the level of population, to complete the transition, tends simultaneously to be 
ascribed to deeply rooted cultural values (e.g. Caldwell 1982; Lesthaeghe 1983, 1991- 
2:2-9; van de Kaa 1987:5-11; cf. Robinson 1992:457, cited in Kertzer 1995:3). Indeed,
11 As such they are strongly reflective of Becker’s (1960, 1981) ‘new household economics’, which 
theorised the demand for children (as ‘consumer goods’) within an economic utility framework.
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most micro-economic theories are in fact a linear combination of normative (cultural) 
and utility (rational actor) arguments. They link, but make a general distinction between, 
on the one hand, pre-transition fertility (and mortality) as governed by culturally 
normative (but geographically diverse) patterns of behaviour; and, on the other, late- 
and post-transition fertility as being largely motivated by individual (but paradoxically 
globally homogeneous) rational choice.
These normative-utility arguments are not without substantial critique (e.g. Day 
1985; Jones 1990; Hammel 1990; Szreter 1993; Hayes 1994; Kertzer 1995), and indeed 
are increasingly seen as untenable (Wilson and Airey 1997:18). Certainly the fertility 
mediating role of institutional, administrative, and political dimensions cannot be denied 
(McNicoll 1980, 1989; Greenhalgh 1989, 1990; Watkins 1990, 1991; Hoem 1993; 
Cleland 1994; Chesnais 1996), as, nor can, the ‘path dependency’ arguments of 
McNicoll (1993), which hold that current choices are largely predetermined by previous 
choices and the circumstances in which they were made. Moreover, where these 
dimensions concern policy, Johansson (1990, 1991) argues that not only direct policy 
innovations, but also the indirect effects of what she terms ‘net’ policy, that is, the 
unintended outcomes of not one, but a whole constellation of policies, can have a major 
influence on demographic behaviour. Furthermore, this influence may be quite different 
in different socio-economic contexts. Oppenheimer (1984) argues that even ostensibly 
similar demographic outcomes may have quite different determinants, interpretations, 
and ongoing implications for different populations. Reflecting aspects of Easterlin’s 
thesis, for example, she argues that declining fertility for some groups (e.g. American 
Blacks) may be a function of falling labour force participation and incomes— for males 
as much as for females, the former of whom are usually missing from studies of 
changing fertility— as much as it may reflect rising participation and incomes for others 
(e.g. American Whites). Similarly, higher or lower participation rates per se do not 
necessarily mean that a group is better or worse off (Sullivan 1978:166). For some, 
especially at the younger ages, a low rate may be a good sign (perhaps reflecting 
increasing participation in tertiary education), whilst for others it may reflect 
discouragement and withdrawal from the labour force. Alternatively, a high labour force 
participation rate may be a negative indicator of, for example, the necessity to put work 
ahead of study.
Most importantly, the experiences of men and women cannot necessarily be 
interpreted within the same framework. Indeed, from the latter perspectives, the
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essentially neo-classical and male-oriented assumptions about relationships between 
(usually female) labour force participation, earnings, and family formation strategies, 
may be particularly spurious (see also Cordell et al. 1987:16). Certainly they fail to 
explain why fertility in most developed countries rose to produce the baby boom at the 
very time that female labour force participation and earnings were also increasing. They 
also fail to explain why both fertility and labour force participation have historically been 
higher for some sub-population groups than for others, for example, for Black compared 
with White Americans (Presser 1971:329-330).
Class-related arguments of fertility change have also been broadly substantiated 
(see for example Schneider and Schneider 1984; Handwerker et al. 1986; Kertzer and 
Hogan 1989; Greenhalgh 1989). In these studies, the temporally-differing (but 
‘classical’) fertility transitions of different social classes is related to differing 
relationships with, and abilities to maximise, changing macro-level opportunity 
structures. However, even in these studies, there is an implicit acceptance of the 
inevitability of demographic transition, and minimal acknowledgment of the extent to 
which compositional differences within the observed demographic outcomes (e.g. 
differences in the timing of family formation, age structure) could potentially play a role 
in the class structure.
3.3.3 ‘Cultural-Ideational’ Explanations:
Explicitly ideational arguments—of which there are considerably fewer— 
downplay the economic dimension and emphasise the diffusion of ideas (Cleland and 
Wilson 1987; Cleland 1994; Caldwell 1995). As these and other studies, such as those 
pertaining to pre-industrial France (e.g. Knodel and van de Walle 1979) and the Indian 
state of Kerala (Mahadevan and Sumangala 1987) clearly demonstrate, demographic 
transition can be achieved in the absence of significant economic improvements, at either 
macro- or micro-level. Similarly, transition can equally well be resisted, when 
ideological—especially religious and political—norms and value systems conflict with 
those required to bring about transition. Cleland (1994), particularly, identifies the 
nature of some of these conflicts, and the many different pathways to transition that can 
result (see also McIntosh and Finkle 1985, and Gulhati and Bates 1994 on the political 
aspects). Likewise, the ‘proximate determinant’ frameworks of Davis and Blake 
(1956:211-235) and Bongaarts (1978, 1982) clearly identify the role of attitudes and the 
cultural context in facilitating or obstructing fertility change.
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That said, as has already been argued, the distinction between what is ideational 
and what is economic—or cultural or social or political—is itself problematic. Watkins 
(1991), for example, in her seminal study Markets, States, Nations and Bedrooms... 
argued that whilst much of the western European fertility transition did indeed come 
about as social and communication networks expanded across linguistic and cultural 
borders, the ideas that were communicated were very much related to the perception of 
a changing economic environment, and not least to the desirability of accessing certain 
consumer goods. Similarly, in arguing recently that the now-falling fertility of most of 
the developing countries has essentially been ‘talked down’ through schooling and the 
media, Caldwell (1995:6) centrally acknowledged the transition as a technology- 
dependent process, the result of economic development (and concomitant ideas about 
the ultimate economic value of fertility transition) elsewhere.
On this point Szreter (1993) goes further, arguing that demographic transition is 
not so much an ideational or economic or social phenomenon as it is an ‘idea’ that has 
been (or is being) achieved through a political-economic agenda (see also Hodgson 
1988; and van de Kaa 1996). Moreover, he argues, it is an idea that has become 
empirically irrefutable. In its original formulation, first implied by Thompson in 1929, 
and more fully elaborated in the early post-war years by Notestein (1944), Kirk (1944) 
and Davis (1945), demographic transition (inclusive of both its mortality and fertility 
components) was the dependent variable of underlying socio-economic change. In its 
reformulation between 1945 and 1950, fertility change became re-oriented as an 
independent variable of economic development, and thereby its own rationale for the 
emphasis on family-planning programs that followed. Accordingly, as both dependent 
and independent variable, the ‘idea’ of demographic transition has become a tool for 
measuring its own progress.
3.3.4 Ethnic Fertility Differentials
Most theoretical approaches to the study of ethnic fertility differentials derive 
from the United States, and are premised on either racial, ethnic or religious differences 
in family size and/or the age at which childbearing is undertaken. Two perspectives, 
neither of which has seen much development since their emergence in the 1970s, are 
prominent: the social characteristics or assimilationist hypothesis, and the minority 
group status hypothesis. The former holds that fertility differentials reflect socio­
economic differentials, and will disappear once the underlying socio-economic
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differences disappear. The latter holds that even when groups are similar socially and 
economically, minority group membership continues to exert an effect on fertility 
(Goldscheider and Uhlenberg 1969:361-362; Rindfiiss and Sweet 1977:113; Frisbie and 
Bean 1978:1-10; cf. Day 1985, who also considers minority group membership in 
numerical terms). This is not to say that minority group membership causes fertility to be 
necessarily higher or lower than average fertility. Rather, it is an argument that sees 
‘other aspects of minority life besides those associated with socio-economic status 
contributing] to minority fertility patterns’ (Bean and Marcum 1978:194).
The first perspective essentially mirrors the dual market arguments recorded in 
the previous chapter, that is, that underlying differences in labour force participation and 
earnings leading to differential fertility and family formation strategies reflect underlying 
socio-economic differences, especially education (but also, it must be noted, prior 
fertility and family formation). In both cases, ethnicity (or more generally, ‘race’) is seen 
as a proxy for socio-economic status, and there is an assumption of an eventual 
economic and demographic ‘melting pot’. Although not explicitly discussed in these 
terms, this is the framework within which New Zealand’s ethnic fertility differentials 
have generally been located (e.g. Pool 1991a). The recent near-convergence in total 
fertility rates for Maori and non-Maori thus implies convergence in socio-economic 
status.
Conversely, the self-generating fertility effects of the second perspective (the 
minority group status hypothesis) mirror the earlier discussion on the maintenance of 
ethnicity, but in relation to fertility are argued to arise from other aspects of minority 
life, such as the proposed insecurities associated with incomplete acculturation or 
assimilation—that is, assimilation on some dimensions, such as education or occupation, 
but not others, such as intermarriage (Goldscheider and Uhlenberg 1969:370). 
According to Gordon (1964:76), for example, there are seven such dimensions: cultural, 
structural (meaning primary group level entry into cliques, clubs, institutions etc.), 
marital, identificational (meaning a shared sense of community or nationalism), attitude - 
receptional (meaning that there is an absence of prejudice), behaviour-receptional 
(meaning an absence of discrimination), and civic (meaning that demands are not 
asserted through conflicts of power). For those minority couples who are highly 
assimilated, the argument holds that there will be a desire to consolidate their socio­
economic position by having smaller families. Conversely, for those who are 
‘insufficiently assimilated’, the outcome may be either smaller or larger families. From
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this perspective, the high levels of intermarriage in New Zealand are suggestive of high 
levels of assimilation on several other counts, and may therefore also be implicated in the 
near-convergence in Maori and European fertility rates.
The minority group status hypothesis thus holds that the fertility of minority 
groups will depend both upon the degree and type of assimilation (thus involving intra- 
ethnic variation as much as inter-ethnic), and differs from the social characteristics 
hypothesis in that it (a) sees some of these factors as extra-economic (e.g. 
identificational), and (b) proposes that these latter factors will mitigate against 
assimilation occurring on all counts. In terms of Maori and European fertility, the 
distinction may assist in explaining why total fertility rates, but not the timing of fertility, 
have converged. That said, Frisbie and Bean (1978:3-6) argue that, with the possible 
exception of marital assimilation, all of Gordon’s dimensions appear to be derivatives of 
either cultural or structural assimilation. Moreover, they argue that the distinction 
between the two hypotheses is somewhat spurious. Indeed, their contention that 
ambiguities in the underlying premises reflect conceptual and methodological 
underdevelopment remains as pertinent today as when written in the 1970s. For 
example, and mirroring the normative-utility argument outlined above, Frisbie and Bean 
note that in situations where ethnic fertility differentials are explained by reference to 
extra-economic factors such as values, norms and ideologies, their interpretation tends 
to be framed in terms of culture. In these cases the resulting interpretation concerns 
what is unique about the ethnic group. By contrast, where fertility differentials are 
explained with reference to social and economic characteristics, the cause is seen as 
structural (or compositional). The former, these writers suggest, suffers from an 
uncritical use of the notion of culture; the latter, from a failure to distinguish between 
simple composition effects and inequalities in power and position in the stratification 
system (see also Goldschieder and Uhlenberg 1969; Goldschieder 1978:157-159). The 
claim is strongly reflective of Sullivan (1977:165), who argued that just as demographic 
forces have received minimal attention in the stratification literature, so too has ethnic 
stratification been a muted theme in the demographic literature. As implied, the deficit 
continues to this day.
Indeed, the correspondence between these arguments and many of those outlined 
in relation to ethnic stratification is striking. In particular are the similarities between the 
self-generating economic effects of ethnic group membership (as proposed in Hechter’s 
internal colonialism thesis), and the self generating demographic effects of minority
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group status, versus the idea of either economic and/or demographic melting pots 
(assimilation). Taking cognisance of both sets of arguments, this thesis proposes 
therefore that an increasing belief in the ‘idea’ of an inevitable demographic transition— 
as articulated by Szreter— has led to a concomitant preoccupation with the notions of 
assimilation, acculturation and integration associated with the social characteristics 
hypothesis, and that together these have deflected investigation away from alternatives. 
One such alternative may be to examine ethnic fertility change— and demographic 
change— under the premises of total social production.
3.4 TOTAL SOCIAL PRODUCTION AND ETHNIC FERTILITY
In order to apply the premises of total social production to the situation of ethnic 
fertility differentials, it is useful to first summarise the above discussion, and then to 
distinguish fertility, as a dependent variable, from fertility— in terms of demographic 
reproduction— as an independent variable.
Despite some comments that may have suggested otherwise, there can be no 
dispute about whether or not demographic transition is occurring, or, in many cases, has 
occurred. Indeed, there is increasing evidence of ‘a world wide convergence on very 
small families’ (Alam and Leete 1993:83). However, it appears clear that, irrespective of 
the analytical approach taken, essentially opposite arguments are being used to explain 
the phenomenon, especially its component of fertility decline (see van de Kaa 1996 for 
an excellent exposition of the complexity of the situation). For example, falling birth 
rates are argued to reflect an increase in material well-being and aspirations for some 
individuals and couples, but a decrease in these factors for others. Alternatively, they 
may reflect good material conditions at some historical junctures, and bad conditions at 
others, or simply changing conditions. They may similarly reflect positive or negative 
interpretations of underlying labour force participation, for both females and males, and 
these interpretations may also differ over time, especially as they relate to age. From an 
‘ideational’ perspective, falling birth rates may reflect social or cultural change as much 
as political benevolence, or coercion, or the indirect or net effects of one or a whole 
range of policies that had quite different objectives. Technically, falling birth rates may 
equally well reflect falling parity and/or rises in the age at childbearing. As Wilson and 
Airey (1997:2) argue, understandings of demographic transition per se may have been 
distorted by an increasing methodological compartmentalisation of its elements.
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In reality, demographic—and particularly fertility—transition reflects varying 
combinations of all of these factors, and the search for a unifying meta-theory, especially 
a uni-directional one, may have been a futile exercise. Indeed, the preoccupation of 
demography with tracking the transition, and increasingly with elaborating its various 
pathways, may have deflected interest away from a more fruitful engagement with its 
compositional and post-transitional implications. That is to say, whilst the effects of 
changing and/or falling fertility on issues such as female labour force participation, 
gender equity, fluctuating school rolls and population ageing have been increasingly 
examined, the notion of employing demographic reproduction as an independent variable 
of ethnic inequality (in the style of Easterlin) has seldom been utilised. Only recently, for 
example, have arguments surfaced that question the utility of redirecting resources from 
the young to sustain the welfare costs of the elderly, as is currently the case in several 
low fertility countries (Chesnais 1996; Esping Anderson 1996; McDonald 1996). 
Essentially, such policies are premised on the neo-classical argument that the cost of 
having and caring for children is a private issue (cf. Folbre 1994). However, as explained 
above, population ageing is a function of falling birth rates, that is, a reduction in the 
size of each new cohort at the younger ages. These lost births in turn represent a loss to 
the future labour force that will ultimately provide the pensions (whether these be 
publicly or privately funded) to the numerically and proportionately enlarged elderly 
population. The current policy of reducing fiscal support to the young, especially young 
families, in a period of high unemployment, including making it more difficult for young 
mothers to combine work and childbearing, can only exacerbate this situation. That is to 
say, since one male income is now seldom considered sufficient to support a family, and 
moreover, since women are now educated for the purposes of formal employment and 
may, as a result of other policies, have incurred debts in the pursuit of qualifications etc., 
the current policies are likely to cause women to further restrict their fertility. In essence 
this could bring about a near inversion of the classic population pyramid, with enormous 
proportions of elderly at the top, and very few births at the bottom. The conclusion, 
McDonald (1996:15) argues, is that ‘policies need to give explicit recognition to the fact 
that children are valuable to the whole society, not just to their parents’.
As these arguments pertain to ethnic groups and the concerns of this thesis, there 
is a particular need to recognise that first, even convergence in fertility levels between 
such groups does not necessarily mean convergence in the underlying factors. Certainly 
the late 1980s achievement of similar TFRs for Maori and non-Maori New Zealanders
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was not associated with a convergence in the timing of family formation. In turn, this 
situation means that while policy-makers may begin to grapple with the problems of an 
ageing total population, within that population may be another (or others) that require(s) 
quite different types of policies.
Second, and combining now the arguments relating to ethnic fertility differentials 
and to ethnic stratification under the auspices of total social production, there is a need 
to recognise that this combined demographic-economic diversity may in fact never result 
in true convergence, but may instead develop its own self-generating dynamics. That is 
to say, if, as the Easterlin hypothesis holds, the combined economic and demographic 
regimes of the present are the result of the combined economic and demographic 
regimes of the past, then (a) the peaks and troughs of cohort size for each ethnic group 
may not be occurring in synchrony; (b) the intergenerational period of each ethnic group 
is unlikely to be the same; and (c) the population dynamics which are likely to be having 
the most influence over competition for resources will be those of the numerically 
dominant population. Thus, the differing age structures, family sizes and/or timing of 
family formation which characterise, for example, the Maori and European populations 
will simultaneously encounter the same period effects, that is, the same political- 
economic environment with its extant opportunity structures, its policies about who pays 
for such things as tertiary education or children, etc. In some instances this confluence 
may be advantageous, and in others disadvantageous. For example, if one ethnic group 
(e.g. Maori) has a large proportion of its population at the younger ages during a period 
in which jobs are in short supply and tertiary education or the family in general are 
private (and expensive) costs, that ethnic group is likely to be materially disadvantaged 
relative to one (e.g. European) that concurrently has an older age structure, especially if 
that group experienced advantageous conditions (including a relatively benevolent pro- 
family political-economy) when it had a young age structure itself. This relative effect 
will obtain because any age-specific effects will be multiplied by the relative proportions 
at that age. Moreover, because it is the length of the intergenerational period, as much 
as proportionate cohort size, that, according to Easterlin, determines the experience of 
each subsequent cohort, the relative number of large or small cohorts in each ethnic 
group will have an impact on each group’s overall material well-being. Finally, if the 
relatively disadvantageous economic conditions of the present are in fact largely 
attributable to the current demographic structure of the dominant ethnic group (e.g. 
European), then minority ethnic groups (e.g. Maori) may be both relatively
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disadvantaged by and, to return to the previous chapter’s arguments of internal 
colonialism, under-developed by, the former’s economic-demographic interactions.
These premises can now be briefly restated in terms of their implications for 
ethnic stratification under the auspices of a total social production framework.
3.5 TOTAL SOCIAL PRODUCTION AND ETHNIC STRATIFICATION
1) If there is no reproduction of the labour force or the population, there can be neither 
economic production nor markets, and vice versa.
2) Demographic reproduction, which has both micro- and macro-level analogues, both 
responds to, and influences, economic production, and vice versa.
3) The productive and reproductive dimensions o f human existence are therefore 
fundamentally interdependent.
4) Where different ethnic groups have differing relationships with economic production, 
their demographic regimes are also likely to be different, and vice versa. This is because 
the different demographic characteristics of contemporary ethnic groups, such as the 
micro-level factors of family size and timing of family formation, and their macro-level 
analogues of age structure, cohort size and intergenerational period, encounter the 
political-economic environment and its opportunity structures and policies 
simultaneously. This confluence may be advantageous or disadvantageous, at either or 
both micro- and macro-levels, but it is unlikely to have the same effect on all ethnic 
groups because any differences will be multiplied by the relative proportions at each age.
5) The population dynamics which are likely to have the most influence over 
competition for resources, and may indeed have largely determined socio-economic 
conditions at any historical point, are likely to be those of the numerically dominant 
population, and possibly even the numerically dominant cohort(s) within that population. 
However, it may also require political dominance for demographic dominance to be an 
influential force.
6) If both propositions (4) and (5) hold true, then minority groups (here meaning those 
lacking in socio-economic or political power) may be both disadvantaged and under­
developed as a result of the demographic-economic interactions of the dominant group.
The thesis now turns to the task of drawing these arguments together in a 
methodological framework.
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4
METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
4.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter draws into a methodological and analytical framework the two 
ostensibly disparate fields of inquiry discussed in the previous chapters: ethnic 
stratification and total social production, with particular emphasis on the role of 
demographic reproduction associated with the latter. In those chapters, the conceptual 
and theoretical aspects of each field were outlined, and each chapter concluded with a 
line of inquiry that seemed especially appropriate to the specific concerns of this thesis. 
In the case of ethnic stratification, this was the theory of internal colonialism (Hechter 
1975, 1978), which holds that once an ethnic group is colonised, the structural and 
institutional framework established by the dominant population will continue to recreate 
the original dominant-subordinate relationships, long past the time when the ideological 
and economic factors that facilitated their initial establishment were cogent. In the case 
of total social production (Seccombe 1983; Cordell et al., 1987, 1994:23-24), which 
holds that the pursuit of subsistence and the reproduction of the population are 
fundamentally interdependent (populations must both produce and reproduce if they are 
to survive), attention was focused on the Easterlin hypothesis (Easterlin 1987a), which 
holds that at certain historical junctures, demographic factors such as cohort size have 
the potential to become independent variables of inequality. The premises were 
employed to argue that the economic-demographic interactions of minority ethnic group 
cohorts are likely to be interdependent with those of the numerically and/or politically 
dominant group. The key question is whether or not this effect proves to be negative or 
positive, and the extent to which period factors such as historical events, opportunity 
structures, and policy appear to be involved.
Importantly, both theories of ethnic stratification and of ethnic fertility 
differentials were shown to have considerable correspondence, and moreover, for these 
premises to have seen widespread empirical application. The task of this chapter, and 
indeed the objective of this thesis, is to bring about a synthesis whereby the overall 
argument can be empirically investigated. That is to say, the thesis seeks to examine the
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extent to which the processes of ethnic stratification might be at least partially 
maintained by the interactive effects of internal colonialism and total social production, 
with emphasis on the role of demographic reproduction. The analytical framework for 
this task is now outlined, followed by an elaboration of the various techniques and 
indices. The chapter concludes with a brief review of the strengths and limitations of the 
overall approach, leading on to Chapter 5 in which a full critique and discussion of the 
thesis data sources is given.
4.1 TOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Validation or refutation of the key arguments of this thesis essentially depend 
upon whether or not trends in economic production and demographic reproduction for 
each ethnic group tend toward convergence or divergence; and whether or not the 
trends for each ethnic group appear to be linked, both within and between ethnic groups. 
These postulates can be restated as four loosely testable hypotheses, each of which are 
further elaborated below. By ‘loosely testable’ is meant that in attempting to draw 
together a number of theoretical and empirical approaches in search of a deeper 
understanding of the processes of ethnic stratification, rather than being satisfied simply 
with its description, there is a need for some sacrifice of rigour.
Reflecting Hechter’s argument that a cultural division of labour will see 
production-related differentials continually recreated, it can be stated that:
(1) over the long term, divergent or parallel trends in production-related variables 
(labour force and employment status; industrial and occupational distribution; 
educational qualifications; income) will essentially support the argument o f a cultural 
division o f labour, whilst convergent trends will essentially refute it.
Reflecting the ‘birth and fortune’ argument of Easterlin (1987a) that cohort size 
is a potential cause of socio-economic inequality, and vice versa—and ignoring for the 
moment both the effects of migration and factors exogenous to the cohort, such as 
changes in socio-economic policy and technologically- and politically-induced changes in 
productivity, it can be stated that:
(2) (i) especially small (trough) cohorts experience lower levels of competition fo r  jobs 
and earnings than do especially large (peak) cohorts, and as a result begin their family 
formation earlier and have more children than do large cohorts;
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(2) (ii) as' a result of these dynamics, trough cohorts are followed a generation later by 
peak cohorts, and peak cohorts are followed a slightly longer generation later by small 
cohorts, creating a self-generating cycle o f inter-cohort inequality.
Expanding Easterlies premises at the level of the ethnic group, it can be stated that:
(3) (i) where different ethnic groups have differing relationships with economic 
production, their demographic regimes and thus their age structures are also likely to 
be different, and vice versa.
(3) (ii) the size o f the cohorts o f the dominant group can be expected to have more 
influence on the employment and earnings experience of the cohorts o f a minority 
group than vice versa.
Drawing these arguments together within the total social production arguments 
of Cordell et al. (1987, 1994:23-24), namely, that economic production and 
demographic reproduction (manifested as cohort size and age structure) are 
fundamentally interdependent— and continuing to ignore the issue of migration and 
factors exogenous to the cohort— it can be stated that:
(4) over the long term, both intra- and inter-ethnic trends in production and 
reproduction will be inter-dependent.
These four ‘hypotheses’ comprise the underlying questions upon which Chapters
6 - 11 are based, although they are neither tested in a conventional sense, nor addressed in 
the order given. Instead, demographic reproduction is treated first as a dependent 
variable in relation to the processes of colonisation (Chapter 6), second as an 
independent variable in relation to a broad range of socio-economic indicators (Chapters
7 - 10), and third as both independent and dependent variables in relation to key socio­
economic indicators (Chapter 11). The issue of migration and other factors such as 
changes in technology, the political economy and the policy environment in general are 
discussed in each chapter at the appropriate junctures. In the interim, it should be 
understood that these factors were generally acknowledged but not considered of major 
importance to the Easterlin hypothesis (e.g. Easterlin 1987a: 16), which essentially 
treated the American population as a closed economy. Earlier contributions to the 
theory had, however, incorporated migration (Easterlin, Wächter and Wächter 1978).
Hypotheses 1 and 4 give rise to the underlying questions of Chapter 6, which 
examines the historical relationship between colonialism, the development of ethnic
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stratification (reflecting economic production) and changes in the Maori and European 
age structures (reflecting demographic reproduction) over the period 1840-1940. Age 
structure is treated as a dependent variable, and the key question asked is whether or not 
it undergoes any substantial changes in relation to changing socio-economic/productive 
status.
Since, due to data limitations, it is not possible to test these hypotheses in 
conventional terms, the manner in which they are explored requires elaboration. First, in 
the absence of data on age structure for the early colonial period, it is necessary to use a 
proxy index, life expectancy at birth (e°0). In the context of a high mortality population, 
as describes the Maori population following late-18th and early-19th Century contact 
with European, the greatest force of mortality is at the youngest ages, with the result 
that there are relatively low proportions at these ages, even when fertility levels are high 
(e.g. Pool 1991a: 102). An increase in infant and childhood mortality (a decline in e°o) 
would therefore see a further decline in the proportions at young ages, leading to a 
maturing of the age structure; a decrease would see the opposite. A substantial directly 
documented increase in e°0for the Maori population occurred between 1946 and 1956, 
when programs to eradicate tuberculosis first began to make their mark, and Maori e°0 
increased by approximately 17 per cent (Pool 1991a: 145-151). By comparison, the 
magnitude of the increase for the following decade was in the vicinity of 7 per cent. 
Accordingly, a ‘substantial’ change in demographic reproduction during the early 
colonial period can be denoted by a change in e°o of similar magnitude to that occurring 
around the late 1940s.
Unfortunately, data limitations still mean that the relationship can be assessed 
only approximately, against estimations and back-projections developed by Pool (1967, 
1977, Tables 4.6 and 5.5, 1991a:29-58, 77). However, as estimates of, and more 
detailed data on, age structure become available through the later 19th and early 20th 
centuries, ‘substantial’ can also be denoted by a change in the direction of the trend in 
the proportion of the population aged 0-14 years, from, for example, a consistently 
declining proportion, to a consistently increasing proportion.
Chapters 7-10 pick up the story as socio-economic data begin to become 
available for Maori, generally in the 1950s, but in some cases earlier. These chapters 
also follow the arguments contained in Hypotheses 1 and 4, but in these chapters age 
structure is treated as an independent variable. Each chapter and sub-chapter examines 
ethnic differentials and trends in the socio-economic variable(s) under investigation
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through three main methodological techniques: (a) an historical overview based on 
simple percentage distributions, usually summarised as indices of dissimilarity (ID); (b) 
component analysis, whereby the component of the observed (crude) difference in the 
proportion of Maori and European/non-Maori with each characteristic that is due either 
to age structure or to the true (underlying) differential is demonstrated; and (c) age- 
specific and/or cohort analysis, the latter of which traces the experience of cohorts as 
they age. Unfortunately, data limitations generally restrict the two latter analyses to the 
1976-1991 period.
These three techniques— discussed in more detail below—permit in each chapter 
an incremental shift from the macro- towards the micro-level, each level addressing a 
different issue. Each overview, for example, whilst unrefined in terms of factors like 
ethnic differences in age structure, gives an indication of the extent to which each ethnic 
group must accommodate certain realities, such as ‘dependency’, typically defined in 
relation to the population aged 15-64 years, and examined from a slightly different 
perspective in Chapter 7. Each component analysis, on the other hand, offers a basis for 
a more refined policy response to ethnic inequality. That is to say, policy measures 
seeking to address ethnic inequality—when developed— are typically directed at crude 
percentage point differentials. These crude indices often conceal the ‘true’ extent to 
which one or another population experiences advantage or disadvantage from one or 
another component (explained more fully below). They also conceal the fact that the 
various components often differ quite substantially by category. For example, age 
structure may give an advantage in the full-time employment category to one sex-ethnic 
group at one point in time, but not to part-time employment for the same group at the 
same point in time. Finally, each analysis by age group and/or cohort provides an 
opportunity to assess the universality or otherwise of the patterns and trends shown by 
the foregoing analyses. Cohort analysis, for example, permits a review of trends across 
the life cycle— albeit in most cases for three or four observations only (for five-year age 
groups at five-year intervals), the consequence of a dearth of relevant data. Specifically, 
the latter technique permits (a) an assessment of the universality or otherwise of patterns 
and trends both within and between cohorts (respectively, intra- and inter-cohort 
patterns and trends), and (b) the identification of intra-cohort ‘lag effects’, whereby, for 
example, low levels of employment or qualifications or income at the younger ages may 
be made up at older ages.
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Positive points aside, it must be emphasised that both age-specific and cohort 
analyses identify the probability of a given group being in one or another category at 
one or another time, rather than the impact of the factor on the ethnic group as a whole. 
The distinction is important because age-specific indices are often seen as more valid 
comparisons of ethnic equality or inequality than aggregate ot crude indices, whilst in 
reality they ignore the potentially differing proportions of each ethnic group that the data 
pertain to. Component analysis, as outlined above and detailed below, provides a bridge 
between the two, although it too suffers from the fact that the size-effect of each 
category must be acknowledged separately.
Chapter 11 draws the foregoing together in an analysis which undertakes a 
limited examination of demographic reproduction as both independent and dependent 
variables of inequality. Aspects of all four hypotheses are involved, but the methodology 
is primarily concerned with Hypotheses 2 and 3. The key question in relation to 
demographic reproduction as an independent variable is whether or not ethnic 
differences in the key production-related factors of employment and income are a 
function of cohort size. In relation to demographic reproduction as a dependent variable, 
the key question is the extent to which the former findings result in either a delay or 
acceleration of the timing of family formation for each ethnic group.
Implicit within these two questions is also the issue of interdependence between 
ethnic groups. That is to say, as Hypothesis 3(ii) implies, the numerical dominance of the 
European population means that socio-economic and socio-demographic trends for 
Maori may not be independent of those of European, but instead may be a function of 
total cohort size (Maori and European combined). Accordingly— and in part by way of 
illustrating Easterlies original formulation of the arguments (hereafter referred to as the 
‘classic’ hypothesis)— Chapter 11 begins with a review of trends at the level of the total 
population. It then applies the arguments at the level of the ethnic group, considering 
cohort size in both absolute and relative terms. In the former case, the key question is 
whether or not the classic hypothesis holds true for each ethnic group, and the latter 
case the question is whether or not an increase or decrease in ethnic inequality may be 
correlated with an increase or decrease in the proportion of Maori within each total 
cohort, hereafter referred to as the ‘expanded’ Easterlin hypothesis.
Aside from the latter expansion of the original hypothesis to facilitate analysis by 
ethnicity, three other methodological refinements to Easterlin’s analytical model are 
made. The rationale for these changes are as follows. According to Easterlin (1987a: 15),
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two key steps are involved in testing his argument: (i) assessing the effect of earlier birth 
rates on relative numbers of workers when working age is reached, and (ii) assessing the 
effect of relative numbers of workers on earnings and employment experience. As 
regards step (i), Easterlin juxtaposes the CBR (births per 1,000 women) lagged by 20 
years with the ratio of younger (15-29 years) to older (30-64 years) members of the 
working age population. As regards step (ii), he applies the younger-to-older framework 
to such factors as earnings, employment rates, female labour force participation, 
education, and income vis-ä-vis the TFR. The latter is also used— implicitly more than 
explicitly— to assess changes in family size, but no elaboration of an analytical technique 
for examining the proposed shifts in the timing of fertility is given.
The first methodological refinement concerns the fact that— as Easterlin himself 
explains (1987a:54)— a key factor influencing the relative size of each birth cohort (also 
referred to as a generation by Easterlin, p.7) is the relative number of women of 
reproductive age. As a result, the CBR is not the best indicator of cohort size.1 In New 
Zealand, as shown in Figure 4.1.1, the CBR in 1961 (the peak of New Zealand’s baby 
boom) was 26.95, and in 1971 was 22.5, but the number of births over the period 
declined by only 1.4 per cent, from 65,390 to 64,460. This semi-stability of birth 
numbers was accounted for by an 18 per cent increase between 1961 and 1971 in the 
numbers of women at reproductive age, reflecting the arrival at childbearing age of the 
first of the baby boomers, bom in the late 1940s and early 1950s. An especially large 
cohort (numbering 60,153) was also bom around 1990, by which time the CBR had 
fallen to 17.9. This ‘baby blip’ reflected both the ‘current’ births of the post-peak baby 
boomers, and the ‘recuperated’ births of a sizeable proportion of the peak baby boomers 
who had earlier delayed their childbearing (Cheung, Jackson and Pool 1994; Jackson 
and Pool 1994:24), a conflation which simultaneously refutes and supports key points of 
Easterlin’s hypothesis.
1 This would appear to be even more so if the unit of interest was the age-specific group (e.g. females 
aged 20-29 years) that Easterlin stated he was concerned with, instead of the ‘demographers standard 
“age structure” explanation of fertility’ (Easterlin 1987a:54-55).
Figure 4.1.1
Crude Birth Rate and Number of Births, Total Population, 1961-1995
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Accordingly, and whilst acknowledging Easterlin’s use of the CBR and TFR as 
weaknesses in the classic hypothesis, Chapter 11 explores the issue of cohort size as a 
cause of inequality by focusing directly on the actual size of the cohort. Furthermore, 
because the effects of migration and death can differ substantially by cohort, especially 
where the comparison is between cohorts bom 20 years apart (cf. Easterlin 1987a: 16, 
who states that these effects differ very little), Chapter 11 focuses on the size of the 
cohort at the key labour force entry ages, taken here to be 20-24 years.
The second—but closely related—methodological refinement concerns 
Easterlin’s use of ratios of data for two very broad age groups, 15-29 and 30-64 years. 
Aside from the fact that these groupings are too blunt to be very useful analytical 
instruments, when examined over time the same persons appear repeatedly, first 
amongst the younger group, and later amongst the older group. Whilst this methodology 
is potentially useful for ascertaining the consistency of advantage or disadvantage for 
especially small or large cohorts across their life cycle, similar and sharper comparisons 
can be gained by comparing either the experience of 20-24 year olds vis-ä-vis then- 
cohort size across time, or the experience of true cohorts across their life cycle. Indeed, 
given that the Easterlin hypothesis is centred on the notion of the cohort, it is surprising 
that the latter was not the unit of analysis. The two latter options (direct comparison of 
data for 20-24 year olds, and ‘true’ cohort analysis) also have the advantage of being 
more readily amenable to analysis by ethnicity, since, under Easterlin’s classic
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methodology, ethnic relativities would become ratios of ratios. Accordingly, and whilst 
some broad age group relativities are used to illustrate the arguments at the level of the 
total population, the analysis by ethnicity focuses on the experience of 20-24 year olds 
across time, and of cohorts across their life cycle, albeit with data limitations restricting 
the latter to the 1976-1991 period.
The third methodological refinement concerns the part of the Easterlin 
hypothesis that relates to shifts in the timing of family formation and resulting family 
size. As noted above, these issues received little conceptual or methodological attention 
by Easterlin. First, the TFR is not a good indicator of changes in family size, since, like 
the situation in relation to the CBR, it conflates current births with recuperated births, 
those that were disproportionately deferred by some cohorts to later ages. Again, true 
cohort measures are the only means of assessing the trend. In New Zealand, the 
completed or cumulative fertility rate (CFR) has always been less volatile than the TFR, 
remaining well inside the latter’s upper and lower bounds. For example, the peak CFR 
(3.5) this century occurred for the women bom in 1931 who gave birth during the peak 
baby boom years, whilst the TFR at the peak of the baby boom was 4.2 (Khawaja 
1985:157-159). Second, true shifts in the timing of family formation can be assessed 
only through examination of cohort age-specific fertility rates, or the mean or median 
age of each cohort at childbearing.
Despite the three points made, data limitations in fact make it very difficult to 
follow through with an analysis based entirely on the cohort. Detailed fertility data for 
Maori females became available only in 1962, whilst back projections by Bu (1993) 
extend the possibilities, but not very far. In addition, at the time of writing, completed 
cohort fertility rates can be computed only for cohorts bom prior to 1950. Accordingly, 
in this thesis, it is not possible to examine all aspects of the hypothesis (Chapter 11 
undertaking a limited exploration of the arguments only), and analysis pertaining directly 
to changes in family size is not undertaken. Instead, the indicator used for assessing 
demographic change as the dependent variable of inequality arising from cohort size is 
the timing of family formation. Specifically, it is the age at which the peak age specific 
fertility rate (ASFR) has occurred for each cohort that has passed this juncture, such an 
index not requiring completed fertility data (see also Jackson, Pool and Cheung 1994). 
In relation to analysis by ethnicity, where the age structures of the two ethnic groups in 
question are very different, this index is also superior to that of the median age of
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childbearing, which is influenced by the relative proportions of women at each age in 
each ethnic group.
Finally, the fact that Chapter 11 undertakes only a limited exploration of the 
arguments must be emphasised. In applying the Easterlin hypothesis at the level of the 
ethnic group, an analysis that does not appear to have been carried out elsewhere— or at 
least, does not appear in the literature available to this thesis— and in working within the 
limitations imposed by both the data and the constraints of one thesis chapter, it is not 
possible to do more. For example, the identified weaknesses in the hypothesis indicate 
the need for component analysis to separate out age composition and recuperation 
effects (see Cheung, Jackson and Pool 1994, Chapter 3), an approach more suited to an 
entire thesis than a component of a single chapter.
To summarise, four main steps are involved in the task of examining ethnic 
stratification in a total social production context. The first (Chapter 6) involves an 
examination of the relationship between the processes of colonisation in New Zealand, 
the development of ethnic stratification between the Maori and European populations, 
and the changing age structures of the two populations. In that chapter, demographic 
reproduction (age structure) is treated as the dependent variable. The second step 
involves examining the effects of age structure on a range of socio-economic 
differentials, thus treating demographic reproduction as an independent variable of 
inequality. This exercise generates four further substantive chapters, one each on ethnic 
differentials in labour force status and employment status (Chapter 7); industrial and 
occupational distribution (Chapter 8); educational qualifications (Chapter 9); and income 
(Chapter 10). The third step (Chapter 11) involves the application of the Easterlin 
hypothesis (in a refined form), and an expanded version of the hypothesis, to appropriate 
data, drawn in part from Chapters 6, 7 and 10, and in part from fertility data not used 
elsewhere in the thesis. In that chapter, demographic reproduction is treated as both an 
independent and dependent variable. The fourth and final step (Chapter 12) considers 
the contribution of the total social production perspective to the study of ethnic 
stratification, and some of the implications of the findings.
4.2 INDEX CONSTRUCTION
Much of the analysis in Chapters 6-11 is based on percentages, percentage point 
differences, and ratios. These indices are referred to in the text at the appropriate
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junctures, and need no detailed explanation here, other than to note that percentage 
point differences are generally the indices of preference because (a) a substantial relative 
improvement in a small category, for example, in the proportion of a population with a 
bachelors or post-graduate qualification from 1 to 2 per cent (a 100 per cent increase), 
can be very misleading; and (b) percentage point differences correspond with the index 
of dissimilarity, which is widely used throughout the substantive chapters. They are also 
more amenable to working with mean rather than median income data, the index 
preferred for Chapters 10 and 11 because of its greater sensitivity to changes in 
distribution. Four indices/techniques do, however, require more detailed elaboration: the 
proportionate ratio; the index of dissimilarity; component analysis; and cohort analysis.
4.2.1 The Proportionate Ratio:
The proportionate ratio is the ratio of the proportions of each ethnic group in 
each age-sex group (or any other compositional category). Its equation, which is 
comparable to the conventional technique of indexing a rate for a given observation to 
that for an earlier observation, is:
PR = pcx/pcy............................................................................................... (1)
Where PR = proportionate ratio; pc = the proportion of the ethnic group in
compositional category c (e.g. the age-sex group); x , y = ethnic groups jc and y.
4.2.2 Index of Dissimilarity:
Originally designed to measure the degree of residential segregation by race 
(Duncan and Duncan 1955:493-503), the formula for this index in relation to 
occupational segregation by ethnicity is:
ID = £  [Xb - Yb]/2 (2)
Where Xb represents the percentage of employed males or females of ethnic 
group X in a given occupational category b\ Yb is the percentage of employed 
males or females of ethnic group Y in the same category; and ID (Index of 
Dissimilarity) is the minimum percentage of males or females of ethnic group Y 
who would have to change occupation for their occupational distribution to be 
identical to that of males or females of ethnic group X.
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Any other compositional category (e.g. an industrial or qualification category) 
can be substituted for b to derive an index of dissimilarity for any other social indicator 
(e.g. industry or qualifications). A result of 100 would indicate complete dissimilarity, 
whilst an index of 0 would indicate complete unity. However, a number of problems 
have been identified with this index. First, the number of categories (or classes) influence 
the results (Shryock and Siegel 1976:233). The results (e.g. an index of dissimilarity of 
20 for occupation) are thus of greatest value when compared with similarly computed 
indices, and of least value when compared with indices for other social indicators. The 
problem also means that what is a high or low index is somewhat arbitrary (cf. Hugo 
1986:97, who proposed that an index below 20 would indicate little dissimilarity, whilst 
one exceeding 50 would indicate significant dissimilarity). Accordingly, this thesis is 
more concerned with the direction of trends in each resulting index, than with their 
absolute levels.
Second, when applied to occupational segregation, the index of dissimilarity has 
been argued to be deficient in that it assumes that the different occupational categories 
and the numbers of different ethnic groups and/or of males and females within them, 
comprise equal proportions of the labour force (Gibbs 1965; Karmel and MacLachlan 
1988; Fargher and Maani 1993). Closely related is the argument that if the workforce 
were to be redistributed in the manner implied by the index of dissimilarity, there would 
be consequential changes in the occupational structure (Karmel and MacLachlan 
1988:188). Discussion of the measures proposed to alleviate these problems can be 
found in Appendix A. However, Jones (1992) argues that such measures have the 
potential to render analysis unsatisfactory and potentially misleading, by implying that 
the smaller the group, the less its degree of pure segregation matters. Arguing that 
weighted indices are more concerned with ‘replacement’ than with dissimilarity, Jones 
argues that the index of dissimilarity developed by Duncan and Duncan remains valid for 
the purposes of demonstrating segregation. Accordingly, it is the index of dissimilarity 
based on that formulation that is used in this thesis.
4.2.3 Component Analysis:
As Carmichael (1995:33) explains, any summary measure is a product of at least 
two things: (i) the underlying level or incidence of the phenomenon of interest (the 
specific measure), and (ii) the composition of the population for which the calculation is 
made, that is, the extent to which the population is concentrated in compositional
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categories (defined by, for example, age, sex, marital status, education or employment 
status) where the phenomenon of interest is particularly likely or unlikely to occur. If the 
effects of (ii) are not controlled (assuming choice of the correct variables to standardise 
for, and use of sufficiently detailed compositional categories), any ratio-type measure 
used to make comparisons either within or between populations, at either a single point 
in time or over time, is at risk of yielding distorted comparisons. For example, change or 
differences in the underlying level of a phenomenon and in the composition of the 
population can be operating in opposite directions, the observed change or differences in 
the summary measures being the net effect of these opposing forces.
Because it is the intention of this thesis to focus attention on these underlying 
factors, rather than to render them invisible as is often the case in analyses concerned 
with similar issues, the problem is addressed in two ways. First, it utilises component 
analysis (often referred to as decomposition analysis), a refined form of standardisation 
that splits the difference between two summary measures (in this case, the crude 
differential between Maori and European), into components that are attributable to (a) 
differences in age structure, and (b) differences in the underlying level of a composition 
or phenomenon (e.g. occupation). Second, where the former approach is inappropriate, 
it standardises data for the Maori population to the age and/or compositional categories 
of the European population.
With minor alterations to the notation, Carmichael’s (1995:51) formula for 
component analysis is:
Csm = 
Cc
0.5 [M (l) - Msl(2) + Ms2(1) - M(2)]
0.5 [M (l) - Ms2(1) + Msl(2) - M(2)]
(3)
(4)
Where:
Csm = Component due to differences in the underlying characteristics
Cc = Component due to differences in population composition
M (l) = Summary Measure 1, relates to Population 1
M(2) = Summary Measure 2, relates to Population 2
Msi(2) = Summary Measure 2 directly standardised to Population 1
Ms2(l)  = Summary Measure 1 directly standardised to Population 2
As detailed in Carmichael (1995:52-53), these algorithms are based on 
standardising the summary measures for each population against the age composition of 
the other, to derive alternative expressions for Csm and Cc, which may have slightly
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different values. The two values are then summed and averaged (see Appendix B for the 
underlying rationale). Interpreting the results from these equations then proceeds in a 
manner similar to that associated with standardisation per se (described below), only in 
the case of component analysis it is the sign (+ or -) on each component that is 
important, and how this sign compares with that on the overall difference between the 
two original (unstandardised) summary measures. If the sign on a component is the same 
as that on the overall difference, that component helped produce the overall difference. 
If the sign on a component is opposite to that on the overall difference, that component 
has partially offset, or moderated the overall difference (i.e. made it less substantial than 
it would otherwise have been). Importantly, the standard population must match 
precisely the denominator for the summary measure that is being decomposed. That is to 
say, if the summary measure is that for labour force participation for the population 
aged 15+ years, the standard population must be the population aged 15+ years. If, on 
the other hand, the summary measure is the proportion of persons within the full-time 
labour force who are in a given labour force category, the standard population must be 
the full-time labour force.
In this thesis, both component analysis and standardisation per se have been 
carried out using the process of direct standardisation, the formula for which is:
Ms(i) = £c m,(c).ps(c)....................................................................................(5)
Where Ms(i) denotes the summary measure for population i standardised to the 
composition of population s; c denotes the compositional categories defined 
using the variable(s) for which we are standardising (age, age-sex categories); 
m,(c) denotes the specific measure equivalent to M(i) for compositional category 
c for population i; and ps(c) denotes the proportion of the standard population s 
in compositional category c (Carmichael 1995:39, with minor alterations to the 
notation).
Interpretation of the result proceeds by comparing the summary measure for the 
standardised population with either its unstandardised equivalent or with the measure for 
the standard population (which is itself unstandardised). Interpretation also rests on one 
important axiom, that is, that standardised measures are hypothetical. That is to say, 
‘standardised values are values we would expect the summary measure in question to 
take on i f  the standard population composition, rather than the actual composition, 
prevailed’ (Carmichael 1995:38). This means that no significance can be attached to the
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absolute levels of the standardised summary measures, only to comparison with other 
measures standardised using the same standard composition.
Chapters 7-9 employ both component analysis and simple standardisation. In 
Chapter 10, which deals with income differentials and with additional compositional 
factors, only standardisation is used. The latter approach is taken is because the multiple 
offsetting effects that derive from the multiple components complicate interpretation 
whilst adding very little to the picture that can be presented by simple standardisation. In 
all cases, however, both standardised and unstandardised results are shown.
4.2.4 Cohort Analysis:
The fourth and final key technique used in this thesis is that of cohort analysis, 
equations for which are:
Kpcix = pcix1.......pcixt+n.......
Kpciy = pciyC.......pciyt+n.......
K rt"'t+n = (Kpcix/Kpciy)1"'1™
■(6)
■(V)
( 8)
Where K denotes cohort analysis; pci denotes the proportion of the cohort in the 
compositional category of interest i (e.g. labour force status and/or educational 
level and/or income); x and y denote ethnic groups x and y; t denotes time; n 
denotes the nth observation; and r denotes the ratio of values for ethnic groups x 
and y.
According to Ryder (1965:845), who proposed cohort analysis as a way of 
attempting to understand social change, ‘a cohort may be defined as an aggregate of 
individuals ... who experience the same event at the same time interval’ (see also 
Shryock and Siegel 1976; Glenn 1977; Hagenaars 1990). Typically this common event is 
birth, but cohorts are also regularly identified in relation to such events as labour force 
entry, marriage, and reproduction. Methodologically it is useful to have a mental picture 
of how data for cohorts are assembled. As shown in Figure 4.2.1, the process utilises the 
well known Lexis grid, a matrix organised so that data for given social groups (e.g. five 
year age groups) correspond to the period for which the observation pertains. The intra- 
cohort experience is then traced by reading any diagonal down and to the right; the 
inter-cohort experience, by comparing the diagonals. Data on each diagonal are thus 
considered as pertaining to each cohort. As regards the validity of this assumption, two
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caveats are important. First is the distinction between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ cohorts. For 
various reasons, such as entry into cohorts by immigration, and out via emigration and 
death, demographic cohorts do not constitute closed populations. Pure, closed cohorts 
can be captured only through the use of micro-level and panel studies in which the same 
individuals are traced over time.
Figure 4.2.1 
The Lexis Grid
Age Group and 
Year of Birth
1976 1981 1986 1991
20-24
(Bom 1952-56)
A
25-29
(Bom 1947-51)
B A
30-34
(Bom 1942-46)
C B A
35-39
(Bom 1937-41)
D C B A
40-44
(Bom 1932-36)
D C B
45-49
(Bom 1927-31)
D C
50-54
(Bom 1922-26)
D
Of particular importance to this thesis, Easterlin, Wächter and Wächter (1978) 
argue that at certain historical junctures, employment opportunities may be more 
affected by migration than by the dynamics of natural population growth. Prior to World 
War II, swings in the US labour supply were largely influenced by migration, whilst 
post-war their cause has been the lagged effect of the birth rate. Given that net migration 
into New Zealand over the early 1970s was considered ‘high’, and in 1974 peaked at 
more than 33,000 persons, accounting for more than 48 per cent of New Zealand’s 
population growth in that year (Demographic Trends 1993, Table 1.5) and equating at 
the time to approximately 13 per cent of the Maori population, it is essential to 
acknowledge migration in the methodological framework for this thesis. However, since 
migration data are not readily available by ethnicity, it is impossible to do any more than 
acknowledge its potential impact. That is to say, both European/non-Maori and Maori
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populations are of necessity treated as closed populations, but the potential effects of 
migration are acknowledged at the appropriate junctures.
The second caveat to cohort analysis is that at least three inter-related effects are 
simultaneously present. These are age, period and cohort (Hagenaars 1990). The age- 
effects refer to biological, psychological and sociological factors, examples of which are, 
respectively, sexual maturity, personality, and legal age o f leaving school or entering the 
labour market. These effects may be mutually compensating; for example, increasing age 
may have a positive effect on income— at least until a certain age is reached— but a 
negative effect in terms of increasing obsolescence of skills, leading to early redundancy 
and lower income. An age-specific effect refers purely to the measure for a given age 
group. Period effects, by contrast, refer to events and circumstances that may occur to a 
cohort within a relatively short time duration in response to, for example, a war, a 
specific policy or the restructuring of an entire political economy. Finally, cohort effects 
refer to the unique experience of any given cohort, for example, its lifetime experience 
with respect to its fertility level, labour force participation, or mean income. Confusion 
between age-specific and cohort effects can be avoided by realising that whilst both 
essentially refer to the same unit of analysis, cohort effects refer to cumulative 
experience, based on observation of age-specific rates as the cohort ages. Similarly, the 
difference between period and cohort measures requires the distinction between 
synchronic and diachronic techniques, the former deriving cross-sectional (snap-shot) 
perspectives; the latter, the longitudinal perspective illustrated by the Lexis grid.
In reality, all three effects are mixed together, and their separation one from the 
other can never be complete. Indeed, when looked at from this existential perspective it 
can be seen how very difficult interpretation of any single factor is rendered. Not only 
may mutually compensating effects be occurring, but interpretation may also be quite 
different in circumstance a or b. Nevertheless, for analytical purposes, the different 
factors can be usefully separated into dependent and independent variables. For example, 
period events or circumstances, such as economic restructuring (independent variable) 
may result in high levels of youth unemployment (dependent variable). When 
encountered by a population with an age structure that is particularly vulnerable to those 
specific events or circumstances (independent variable), the outcome may be longer term 
cohort effects (dependent variable). Restated in terms of the central concerns of this 
thesis, period effects such as increased competition for age-related resources, 
encountered simultaneously by two ethnic groups with dramatically different age
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structures, could be expected to have different effects on the cohorts of each group, and 
ultimately on each group as a whole.
4.3 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES, A BRIEF ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The strengths and weaknesses of this study can be approximately divided into 
two dimensions: conceptual/theoretical, and methodological/analytical.
As regards the conceptual and theoretical dimensions, ethnic stratification 
between Maori and European New Zealanders has already been substantiated across a 
broad range of historical and contemporary studies, and there is thus strong support for 
the arguments associated with internal colonialism. That said, however, very few such 
studies have examined the issue empirically over time, nor have they paid more than 
superficial attention to the potential role of ethnic differences in age structure in 
recreating— or ameliorating— ethnic stratification. Extrapolating from this position, and 
recognising that ethnic fertility differentials are generally— although not exclusively— 
understood by demographers to reflect socio-economic inequalities, it also seems 
justifiable to argue that the relative age structures of the Maori and European 
populations are— at least to a considerable extent— a consequence of ethnic 
stratification.
Applying the Easterlin hypothesis at the level of the ethnic group also seems to 
have considerable merit because, if cohort size is indeed a cause of intergenerational 
inequality, the age structure of a numerically dominant population would be likely to 
affect the employment and earnings experience of a proportionately small population. 
Furthermore, in attempting to refine Easterlin’s methodology for these purposes, the use 
of sharper analytical tools (i.e. narrower age groups and ‘true’ cohort analysis) can also 
be expected to assist in the development of the theory, and of the theory of demographic 
change in general.
Alternatively, critics might argue that New Zealand’s ethnic differentials may not 
be socio-economically derived but instead, largely cultural in nature, and that an 
approach that gives more recognition to the latter should have been adopted. In this 
regard the thesis takes the position of Smith, Kertzer and others cited in Chapter 2, that 
what is cultural and what is socio-economic is so intertwined that it defies analytical 
separation. Instead, if there are major weaknesses in the methodology they pertain to (a) 
the exclusion of other ethnic collectivities, such as the Pacific Island and Asian/Other
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populations (which together comprise the remaining 8 per cent of New Zealand’s total 
population), a decision made on the grounds of insufficient data; and (b) in Chapters 7- 
11, the methodological/analytical assumption of ‘closed’ populations. Because migration 
data are not available by ethnicity, the thesis must largely ignore its effects. The issues of 
ethnic classification, intermarriage (or inter-ethnic partnering and births) and data 
discontinuity are, however, considered in some detail the following chapter.
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5
DATA SOURCES, A CRITIQUE AND DESCRIPTION
5T) INTRODUCTION
One significant methodological problem arises in the course of this exercise: that 
of data discontinuity, with specific reference to the issue of ethnic classification. The 
problem as it relates to ethnicity is due in part to changes over time in data collection 
procedures and their associated definitional criteria; in part to inter-ethnic births; in part 
to ‘category jumping’, whereby individuals— either purposefully or inadvertently—move 
from one ethnic designation to another between censuses and other time-series 
collections; and in part to differences in these factors between data collections (Pool 
1961, 1963, 1964, 1977, 1991a; Brown 1983; Department of Statistics 1988; Mulgan 
1989; Morrison 1991; Gould 1992). Along with these discontinuities are also those 
deriving from temporal changes in the census criteria used to define labour force and 
other socio-economic categories.
The consequences of the problem are far reaching, affecting everything from 
socio-economic and demographic categories in general, to the construction of rates by 
ethnicity, wherein the numerators and denominators do not always come from 
collections based on the same criteria. This chapter turns first to the intertwined issues 
of ethnic classification, inter-ethnic births, and the construction of ethnic indices, and 
then to a description of the thesis databases, wherein the remaining issues are addressed.
5.1 THE STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF ‘MAORI’
Historically, two disparate criteria have been used to classify Maori and other 
New Zealanders into racial and ethnic groups: the concept of biological descent, that is, 
the proportion of racial blood believed to be contained within an individual; and more 
recently, the notion of cultural affiliation, whereby people who self-identify with a 
distinctive historical, cultural and linguistic experience contrast themselves against other 
such groups. Until September 1995, all vital registrations (births and deaths) data were 
based on the former. The census, on the other hand, used variations of the former from
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the first Maori census in 18671 up to and including the 1971 Census, whilst since 1976 
combinations of both biological and cultural criteria have been used (see Appendix C).
As a result of these procedures, and in deference to the 1974 Maori Affairs 
Amendment Act,2 the census until and including 1971 defined as a ‘Maori’ a person with 
half or more Maori blood (Sole Maori), and since and including the 1976 Census as a 
person with any degree of Maori blood, the questions enabling both Sole Maori and 
Maori Ancestry populations to be enumerated. That is, until the 1976 Census those 
persons whose blood fraction fell below 50 per cent were not classified Maori, 
regardless of their own preferences. The same criteria obtained for Vital Registrations 
data until 1995, with only births and deaths registering 50 per cent or more Maori blood 
being classified Sole Maori (discussed further below).
Although reflecting a quest for greater validity of ethnic classification, the 
changing criteria render the compilation of ethnic statistics over time highly problematic, 
especially during the period 1976-1991. However, at the 1986 and 1991 Censuses, the 
use of questions covering both ethnicity and descent enabled three major classifications 
of ethnicity to be enumerated: Maori Ancestry, Maori Ethnic Group, and Sole/Single 
Origin Maori. The numbers in each of these classifications in 1991 were, respectively, 
511,278; 434,844; and 323,493. By re-running the census master files for the period 
1976-1986, Statistics New Zealand have been able to generate socio-economic and base 
population data for that period similar to the Maori Ethnic Group classification. The 
result is an internally consistent database for those years, from which two of the 
databases used for this thesis (described below) were derived. Similarly, at my request 
and to my specifications, Statistics New Zealand generated a fertility database (also 
described below) that also approximates the ethnic group classification.
It must, however, be acknowledged that data gathered on biological criteria prior 
to 1986 may also reflect the Maori Ethnic Group classification more than the narrower 
Sole/Single Maori Origin classifications. According to at least five highly reliable 
sources— Metge (1976:42), Pool (1977:44-45, 199la :24-34, and passim) the New 
Zealand Department of Statistics (1988), Morrison (1991) and Gould (1992)— Maori 
may have always identified themselves on a mixture of cultural and biological criteria. 
That is to say, ‘even where the census question was framed in terms of genetic
1 The Maori population was partially enumerated for the first time in 1857-8 (Department of Statistics 
1988:44). Prior to that date, data come mainly from local ‘head counts’.
2 This Act defined a Maori as a person of the Maori race of New Zealand inclusive of any descendant of 
such a person (Department of Statistics 1988:46-7).
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composition, many respondents already selected their answer to it on cultural/ethnic 
criteria’ (Gould 1992:38), a phenomenon discernible as far back as the 1926 Census 
(Department of Statistics 1988:46). As part evidence, Gould, for example, cites the 
phenomenon of heaping, the practice of choosing the nearest blood fraction, whereby at 
the 1981 Census the largest proportions of Maori reported ‘full’ or ‘half Maori blood, 
rather than fractions in between. Gould also found considerable correspondence between 
these data and the blood fraction recorded by name-matched individuals in the 
Department of Statistics’ 1980/81 Social Indicator Survey (Gould 1992:41). These 
caveats, which indicate less discontinuity than might otherwise be apparent from the 
foregoing comments, should be kept in mind when observing historical trends in the 
following chapters.3
Indeed, there is a general concurrence that the census provides a reasonably 
consistent time-series of Maori data up to and including 1981, although Gould (1992) 
suggests that where historical trends are being examined, data from the 1976 Census 
should be excluded. After 1981 he proposes that the approximately equivalent data are 
One-Ethnic Origin Maori for 1986 and One Ethnic Group Maori for 1991. The latter 
proposals are followed in this thesis. However, where historical trends are being 
established, data for 1976 are included, with the caveat that the internally consistent 
databases for the period 1976-1991 provide a useful comparative base.
5.1.1 Intermarriage: Conceptual, Methodological and Substantive Considerations:
As noted in Chapter 2, inter-ethnic marriage/partnering and the births resulting 
from such unions are of particular relevance to the issue of ethnic stratification, not only 
because of the commonly posed question in New Zealand, ‘when is a Maori a ‘Maori’?’ 
(see especially Pool 1963, 1991a: 11-25), but also because of their potentially 
assimilative or integrative role (e.g. Gordon 1964). The two factors are of course 
inherently linked. An individual bom of two (or more) racial or ethnic groups will 
typically be exposed to the physical characteristics and cultural environment of both 
parents and/or their broader familial networks, rendering the idea of fixed boundaries 
between such groups—racial or ethnic—meaningless.
3 On a more pragmatic note, it is also worth observing that few people of any ethnicity are likely to be 
able to readily compute their blood fraction, especially those persons and populations who/which had 
little formal education.
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Although regularly noted as being widespread, very little empirical evidence 
regarding the extent of inter-ethnic partnering between Maori and European has been 
published. By and large this is because ethnicity is not recorded on marriage registration 
certificates, whilst Maori are somewhat more likely than European to be in de facto 
unions (Carmichael 1996:27). However, two potentially useful sources of information 
are available. First are the vital registrations data which, as mentioned above, have been 
used historically to construct the biological race of each birth. Table 5.1.1 shows how 
the first part of this process was achieved. All cells with a combined fraction of 50 per 
cent or more Maori blood were taken to indicate Sole Maori births (in 1991, 6,946 
births). From this table the proportion of births which had parents of differing ‘racial’ 
groups can also be ascertained. In 1991, there were a total of 9,725 births where at least 
one parent was Sole Maori, that is, at least one parent claimed a Maori blood fraction of 
50 per cent or more. For only 3,557 (36.58%) of these births, however, were both 
parents Sole Maori. The remaining 63.42 per cent of these births thus had one Sole 
Maori and one non-Sole Maori parent.4
Table 5.1.1
Registered Births by Combined Blood Fraction of Parents, 1991
Father
M o th e r Non-Maori 25% Maori 50% Maori 75% Maori 100% Maori Not Specified T O T A L
Non-Maori 37498 841 881 180 438 5608 45446
25% Maori 878 527 304r 62 394 512 2677
50% Maori 858 305 1091 117 468 629 3468
75% Maori l ia r 29 78 152 39 73 483
100% Maori 625 379 377 20 1215 658 3274
Pacific Is. 3824 76 122 17 1021 512 4653
T O T A L 43795 2157 2853 548 2656 7992 60001
Source: Unpublished data, Statistics New Zealand, Table 20060
Legend:
1 Births classified Sole Maori (50% or more Maori blood) = 6,946)
Parents classified Sole Maori (50% or more Maori blood) = 9,725
Parents in Maori Ethnic Group (25% or more Maori blood) = 12,559
4 Births which had blood percentages other than 25, 50, 75 and 100 per cent are apportioned by 
Statistics New Zealand to their closest rounded proportion. Births where the father’s ethnicity is not 
specified, but are born to women classified Sole Maori, are all classified Sole Maori (Statistics New  
Zealand, personal communication).
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Similarly, if a broader definition of Maori is used—this definition considering all 
persons with 25 per cent or more Maori blood to belong to the broader Maori Ethnic 
Group, it can be calculated that of the 12,559 births where at least one parent was 
Maori, 38.32 per cent (4,813) of these births had one non-Maori parent. Thus, although 
reproductive couples do not account for all members of the population, a rough estimate 
of the extent of inter-ethnic partnering can be calculated: if a narrow definition is 
employed, approximately two-thirds of Maori of childbearing ages are currently in inter­
ethnic unions; if a broader definition is used, approximately one-third.
The second source of data on intermarriage or inter-ethnic partnering is the five- 
yearly census, which at most censuses has collected the racial, and more recently the 
ethnic, group of both parents (or adults) in two-parent and couple-only families. A 
similar method to that just described for birth data was employed in the 1951 and 1956 
Censuses to establish the extent of intermarriage in the Auckland district, through 
examination of the parenthood of all Maori-origin children under the age of 15 years 
(Census of Maori Population and Dwellings, 1951, vl, pp.4-8 and vIII, pp. 66-68; 1956, 
vIII, pp. 33-38). The 1956 Census (p.33) recorded that 97 per cent (46,603) of such 
children had parentage such that they would be classified Sole Maori.
An alternative approach, similarly drawing on census data, is presented in Figure 
5.1.2, which shows the ethnicity of adult partners in all two-parent and couple-only 
families at the 1991 Census. The data in the last column show that in just over fifty per 
cent of all families where one partner claims Maori ethnicity, the other partner claims 
European ethnicity. On this indicator the extent of inter-ethnic partnering for Maori can 
thus be understood to be around fifty per cent.
Table 5.1.2
Ethnicity of Parents in Couple-Only and Two-Parent Families, 1991
Couple Only |Two Parents Plus Two Parents Plus Mean (W) across
Families Dependent Children Dep. + Adult Children 3 Family Types
Maori* European7 Maori* European7 Maori* EuropeanA Maori* EuropeanA
B oth  P a r tn e r s  S a m e  B h n ic ity 30.66 89.27 39.20 83.69 51.40 84.45 40.42 85.80
O n e  P a r tn e r  M aori, O n e  E u ro p e a n 61.38 4.87 51.30 9.00 40.69 8.81 51.12 7.56
O n e  P a r tn e r  F^icific Is. 3.80 0.79 5.28 1.54 3.88 1.65 4.32 1.33
O n e  P a r tn e r  A s ia n /O th e r 0.77 1.08 0.73 1.48 0.46 0.79 0.65 1.12
O n e  P a r tn e r  B h n ic ity  Not S p e c if ie d 3.39 3.99 3.49 4.28 3.58 4.31 3.48 4.19
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number 22953 289215 42987 244968 9135 42201 25025 192128
Notes: "Percentage of families in each category with one Maori parent
Percentage of families in each category with one European parent. 
(W) Mean weighted byfamilytype.
Source: Supermap
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The patterns differ quite substantially for each ethnic group by family type. In 
couple-only families, for example, Maori are more likely than in any other family type to 
be in an inter-ethnic union. For European in this family type, this is less likely to be the 
case. The disparity may reflect the differing age structures of the two populations, the 
younger age structure of the Maori population reflecting the higher proportions of de 
facto  couples noted above; the older age structure of the European population reflecting 
higher proportions of older ‘empty nesters’. If so, the data suggest an increasing 
gradient of inter-ethnic partnering, the younger the family, the more likely for it be inter­
ethnic. This intuitively correct suggestion is further supported in the data for two-parent 
families, those with ‘dependent children only’ having higher proportions of inter-ethnic 
unions than those with dependent plus adult children.
The implications of these findings for the study of ethnic differentials in New 
Zealand could be very large. For example, youth dependency (the ratio of 0-14 year olds 
to 15-64 year olds) will be greater for Maori because children from inter-ethnic 
marriages (or relationships) tend to be classified as Maori. Similarly, the financial 
support of an unemployed 15-24 year old Maori will often be shared between one Maori 
and one non-Maori parent. These points need to be kept in mind when interpreting the 
findings of the following chapters. However, it is a central contention of this thesis that 
it matters very little whether or not an individual is, technically speaking, a ‘Maori’. 
When the socio-economic data for all of those persons who claim to be Maori are 
aggregated, the results cluster disproportionately around the lower bounds of a broad 
range of social indicators. If, on the other hand, data for those persons who some 
observers might ‘objectively’ consider not to be Maori were reassigned to the non- 
Maori/European statistics, the result would almost certainly increase the socio­
economic differentials between the two groups. This outcome would occur because 
those who acknowledge Maori ancestry but do not affiliate with the Maori ethnic group 
are believed to have socio-economic characteristics closer to the non-Maori majority 
(Mulgan 1989; Pool 1976, 1991a: 14-15; Gould 1992:43, 64-5). That is to say, the two- 
part ethnicity question (ancestry plus cultural affiliation) used in the 1991 census 
suggested that the number of persons who claim Maori ancestry is approximately 20 per 
cent greater than the number who claim cultural affiliation (Gould 1992). Inclusion of 
data for such Maori ancestry persons in the Maori Ethnic Group statistics would
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therefore be likely to cause a favourable skewing of the socio-economic characteristics 
of the latter, and a potential dilution of the true situation (Gould 1992:49).5
Thus, and although the widespread extent to which persons claiming to be of 
Maori {or European) origin are of mixed parentage must be both centrally 
acknowledged and constantly recalled throughout the following chapters, this thesis uses 
the term ‘Maori’ as a self-identified expression of ethnic affiliation, and accepts census 
data so classified at face value. Also, most of the analysis uses census data for both the 
numerator and denominator, so several of the problems noted above are lessened.
5.1.2 Ethnic Classification and the Construction of Fertility Indices:
Unfortunately, somewhat less confidence can be placed in the ethnic 
classifications underlying the fertility-related components of this thesis, at least in part 
because these data have often not reflected self-identification. Instead, as with mortality 
data (McKegg 1996), the classification is often made by others (Department of Statistics 
1988:123). However, as implied earlier, other issues are equally pressing. Since 1976 the 
differences in ethnic classification between vital registrations and the census have had 
significant implications for the construction of ethnic fertility rates, their numerators 
coming from the former and their denominators from the latter (Pool 1964, 1977, 1981, 
1991a; Pool and Sceats 1981; Brown 1983; Sceats and Pool 1985; Khawaja 1985, 
1986).
In addition are two less often acknowledged but equally significant issues, these 
being that— as described above—the numerators of published ethnic fertility rates 
(numbers of births) are themselves constructs, derived from the combined blood fraction 
of the mother and father; whilst the denominators are then chosen to match the resulting 
ethnicity and the age of the mother, whether or not it is in fact the actual ethnicity of the 
mother. That is to say, as was shown in Table 5.1.1, significant numbers of births to 
women of each ethnic group are methodologically cross-assigned to the other group, by 
virtue of their Maori blood fraction. As a result, all Maori fertility ‘rates’ published prior 
to 1995 are not rates at all, but ratios of, for example, births classified Sole Maori to 
women classified Sole Maori (Jackson 1995b). The same applies to non-Maori births.
5 This phenomenon is also suggested in Household Labour Force Survey (HLFS) data (1986), where 
unemployment rates for those who claim full Maori descent are highest, those for European are lowest, 
and those for European-Maori combinations lie in between, though generally closer to the Maori than 
the European rates.
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Quantifying the difference between published rates (i.e. ratios), and rates more 
appropriately calculated using ‘births by the age and ethnicity of the mother’ in the 
numerator, Jackson (1995b) showed that the discrepancy resulted in a net 
underestimation of births to women classified Sole Maori by 7 per cent in 1976, 4.8 per 
cent in 1981, 11.5 per cent in 1986, and 3.9 per cent in 1991. Similarly, Sole Maori age- 
specific fertility rates (ASFRs), Total Fertility Rates (TFRs) and the resulting ethnic 
differentials between Maori and non-Maori were all a little greater over the period than 
previously recorded. Nevertheless, the age-specific discrepancies were quite minor, and 
thus the ratio data can be considered to provide an acceptable indication of historical 
patterns and trends.
That said, in terms of this thesis, another technical problem arises. For much of 
the analysis, socio-economic data for the period 1976-1991 are based on the Maori 
Ethnic Group and non-Maori/European classifications. These data are also used in 
Chapter 11, which, among other things, considers the relationship between cohort size, 
socio-economic differentials and ethnic differences in the timing of childbearing. 
Accordingly, as noted above, a fertility database utilising the Maori Ethnic Group 
classification was sought from Statistics New Zealand.
5.2 DESCRIPTION OF DATABASES6
All data for the substantive chapters of this thesis are drawn from either 
published material based on the quinquennial censuses or annually released vital 
registrations data, or from the specially derived databases also compiled from these 
sources and referred to above. In general, historical trends are based on the former, and 
the more detailed component and cohort analyses on the latter. It should be noted, 
however, that in no instance where historical data were drawn from the published work 
of other researchers, was it possible to undertake the component and cohort analyses 
directly on those data. In general, either those data were given for Maori and total 
populations, and required conversion to Maori and non-Maori classifications; or the age- 
specific data necessary for the standardisation and component analysis procedures were 
absent; or the age groupings differed by ethnicity. These limitations meant recourse to
6 1 gratefully acknowledge the generosity of Professor I. Pool, Director of the Population Studies Centre, 
University of Waikato, New Zealand, for making available to me the two databases (A and B) described 
below, and that of Statistics New Zealand for the provision of Database C.
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the original data sources and the compilation of a series of sub-databases, each of which 
are given in the appendix to the relevant chapter. For the sake of clarity, the various 
sources and their strengths and limitations are discussed by chapter.
5.2.1 Chapter Six (Historical Overview):
Data for Chapter 6 are either drawn directly or compiled from published sources, 
and comprise a mixture of historical qualitative and quantitative material. By and large 
the latter pertain to population dynamics and trends only (numbers, fertility, life 
expectancy and migration); all tables and figures are appropriately footnoted, and no 
additional comment is required.
5.2.2 Chapter Seven (Labour Force Status and Employment Status):
Diachronic analysis of labour force and employment status by ethnicity—with a 
focus on the effects of age structure— is fraught with difficulty. Three major problems 
occur: lack of data prior to 1951, and by age for the period 1956-1971 inclusive; the 
changes in ethnic classification noted above; and changes in the definition of the various 
labour force and employment statuses.
The first of these problems means that much of the analysis in Chapter 7 pertains 
only to the period since 1951, and to the population aged 15+ years; and that the 
component and cohort analyses of labour force and employment status are generally 
restricted to the 1976-1991 period.
The second problem, that of census changes in the classification of ethnicity, 
means that there is a shift in the published data between 1986-1991 from the Sole/Single 
Origin Maori and non-Maori classifications used prior to 1991, to the Maori Ethnic 
Group and non-Maori classifications, although two caveats must be noted. First, in 
1991, labour force status data for three ethnic classifications of Maori (Single Origin 
Maori; Maori Ethnic Group; Maori Ancestry) were published, but these data neither 
gave unemployment separately, nor disaggregated by any other than very broad age 
groups. As a result, the Sole Maori data are used to complete an historical overview of 
total labour force participation rates per se, but not for the remaining analyses. Second, 
the extent of the discontinuity appears to be very small, total full-time labour force 
participation rates for Sole/Single Origin Maori males and females in 1991 being 59.11 
and 32.43 per cent, and those for Maori Ethnic Group males and females being 60.04 
and 33.78 per cent (Census o f Maori Population and Dwellings 1991, Table 35).
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Third, the key discontinuities in labour force and employment status data pertain 
to whether or not part-time workers are included in the labour force; the hours that 
denote full- and part-time participation; and the criteria used for defining unemployment. 
Between 1891 and 1945, for example, anyone who either received an income for work 
or generated an income for someone else from their activity (thus ‘assisting without 
wages’) was considered to be ‘actively engaged’ and part of the census labour force 
(Rankin 1990:3). Between 1945 and 1981 inclusive, the census labour force consisted of 
those persons who worked full-time, then meaning 20+ hours per week, assisted as an 
‘unpaid relative’, or were officially unemployed. In 1986 the census changed its 
definition of full-time work to 30+ hours, and for the first time included part-time work 
(1-29 hours). This move also bought part-time unemployment into the labour force for 
the first time.
Until 1981, the census criteria for classifying full-time unemployment were ‘not 
employed’ and ‘available for work’. In 1981 ‘seeking work’ was added, and in 1986 this 
was changed to ‘actively seeking work’. In addition, from 1986, those unemployed but 
starting a new job in the next four weeks were considered to be employed. These 
changes made it progressively more difficult for individuals who considered themselves 
to be unemployed, to be officially classified as such. At the 1991 census, for example, 
only 74 per cent of those who indicated they were unemployed were officially classified 
as such (Statistics New Zealand, personal communication; Jackson 1994a:32).
The remaining persons are classified as ‘not in the labour force’. This group 
includes women caring for children at home, the retired, and students who are not 
employed— those working either full- or part-time are enumerated in the labour force 
(Statistics New Zealand, personal communication). Given substantial reductions to 
tertiary education subsidies since 1989 (New Zealand University Students Association 
1995), an increase in the number aged 15-24 years in employment in 1991 might be 
expected.
Contrasting with these complexities, most variables in the specially-derived 
Database A (described below) available for this thesis and covering the period 1976- 
1991 are internally consistent, due to regrouping of the census data by Statistics New 
Zealand. For example, the labour force data for all years were re-grouped to reflect the 
1986 30+ hours full-time and 1-29 hours part-time definitions. Unfortunately these data 
are not disaggregated further, meaning that hours worked cannot be included in the
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analysis.7 There is one (probably minor) discontinuity in the data between 1981-1986, 
from full-time unemployment to full-time plus part-time. In both 1976 and 1981, only 
those persons seeking full-time work were able to indicate that they were unemployed. 
People seeking part-time work may have ticked the appropriate box, but the number 
doing so has never been estimated (Statistics New Zealand, personal communication). 
The shift is unlikely to have had a major effect, especially for males, less than 3 per cent 
of whom worked part-time in 1981. For females the comparative proportions were 17 
per cent for European and 10 per cent for Maori. The conflation does not affect full- and 
part-time employment, data for which are given separately. Unfortunately, the database 
does not contain data on employment status (self-employment, wage and salary earner 
etc.). The full list of variables is shown in Table 5.2.1.
Table 5.2.1
__________________________DATABASE A (1976-1991)________________________
Age
(Five Year Age Group)_______________________________________________________________________
Sex
(Male; Female)______________________________________________________________________________
Ethnic Group
(European; Maori Ethnic Group; Pacific Island/Polynesian; ‘Other*, Not Specified)_________________
Labour Force Status
(Full-time 30+ hours; Part-time 1-29 hours; Unemployed; Not in the Labour Force; Not Specified)
Industry
(Agriculture Hunting Forestry Fishing; Building and Construction; Community, Social and Personal; 
Electricity, Gas and Water; Finance, Insurance, Property; Manufacturing; Mining and Quarrying; 
Transport Storage Communications; Wholesale Retail Restaurant; Not Specified)___________________
Occupation
Administrative Managerial; Agricultural Forestry Workers Fishermen; Clerical; Production Transport 
Equipment Operators; Professional Technical; Sales Workers; Service Workers; Not Specified)______
Database A is derived from the Census Personal Questionnaire and is comprised 
of a matrix table cross-tabulating the variables listed in Table 5.2.1. Each cell of the 
matrix records the numbers of the usually resident {de jure) population with the given 
characteristics, for example, five year age group X sex X ethnic group X labour force 
status X industry X occupation. Table 5.2.1 also gives the minor disaggregations of 
these variables. For all years 1976-1991, ethnic classification approximates the cultural 
affiliation definition employed at the 1991 census. That is to say, in retrospectively
7 Nor are hours worked published by ethnicity, although some studies employing unpublished data do 
exist.
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regrouping the database, Statistics New Zealand endeavoured to make ethnic 
classification consistent with the ‘Ethnic Group’ classification noted earlier. The 
process, which involved a hierarchical procedure for assigning multiple ethnic group 
responses to a single ethnic group, was originally ‘developed with the aim of giving 
priority to non-Pakeha-European groups and special priority to Maori and Pacific Island 
groups’ (Statistics New Zealand 1993:26), and ensures that for statistical purposes each 
respondent is counted only once. The procedure is:
•  If New Zealand Maori is one of the groups reported, the person is assigned 
to New Zealand Maori;
•  Otherwise, if any Pacific Island group is one of the groups reported, the 
person is assigned to the Pacific Island Group;
•  Otherwise, if any group other than a European/Pakeha group is one of the 
groups reported, the person is assigned to ‘Other’;
•  Otherwise, the person is assigned to European/Pakeha.
In order to derive an historical analysis from the forgoing data sources, the 
following approach is taken. Historical trends in both labour force and employment 
status are drawn from published data and pertain to the Sole/Single Origin Maori and 
non-Maori populations, with the caveat that in all but one instance (the overview of 
labour force participation rates per se) the data reflect a shift in ethnic classification 
between 1986-1991. As noted above, this shift is not considered to have a substantial 
impact on trends. A potentially greater impact obtains from the inclusion of part-time 
data in the published labour force status and employment status data from 1986, 
especially for females, although again the long-term trends in labour force participation 
per se given in Chapter 7 are free from this discontinuity. All such discontinuities are 
fully annotated at the base of each table and figure, and their implications discussed in 
the text at the appropriate junctures.
For the component and cohort analyses of labour force status, data are drawn 
from Database A. This shift means a concomitant shift to populations classified 
European and Maori Ethnic Group, and to the ‘working age’ population, those aged 15- 
64 years. This age group is preferred to that of the population aged 15+ years, because 
the analysis is partially concerned with the issue of dependency, typically measured in 
relation to the working age population per se, and not the proportion of the working age
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population actually in employment. The only other discontinuity affecting trends is that 
pertaining to the shift from full-time only to full-time plus part-time unemployment 
between 1981-1986. As noted, the effect is believed to be small.
The component and cohort analyses of employment status, on the other hand, 
require a return to published data, and thus to the discontinuities and caveats noted 
above.
5.2.3 Chapter 8 (Industry and Occupation):
Historical data for industry and occupation by ethnicity are affected by several of 
the same limitations and caveats as labour force and employment status (Morrison 
1991:34). In addition, they are affected by changes in the classification of each industry 
and occupation. However, the analysis in Chapter 8 circumvents the problems in two 
ways. First, historical trends in industrial change are drawn from the work of Thompson 
(1985), whose time-series 1926-1981 is considered New Zealand’s benchmark on the 
subject. Thompson’s data are given for Sole/Single Origin Maori and non-Maori for the 
entire period, and pertain to the full-time labour force only. Similarly, historical trends in 
occupational change are drawn from the work of Brosnan (1987), whose time-series 
1956-1986 provides a similar benchmark study, also pertaining to the Sole/Single Origin 
Maori and non-Maori full-time labour force populations, and within which changes in 
occupational classification have been accounted for by regrouping the data according to 
the criteria detailed by Brosnan.
These data are supplemented for the period 1976-1991 with those drawn from 
Database A, in which both industry and occupation have been regrouped by Statistics 
New Zealand to reflect the major (1-digit) occupational and industrial classifications 
employed at the 1986 census. The data are thus— as near as possible— internally 
consistent across the 1976-1991 period. Importantly, the resulting categories differ to 
those employed by both Thompson and Brosnan, and for that reason are treated 
separately. They are also the data on which the chapter’s two component analyses (one 
each on industrial and occupational distribution) are carried out.
5.2.4 Chapter 9 (Educational Qualifications):
Questions on completed qualifications were relative late-comers to the census, 
asked for the first time in 1966. Data were also collected in 1971, and between 1981 and 
1991 inclusive, but not in 1976. That is to say, in 1976 the census question asked about
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current enrolment in a qualification, but not about completed qualifications (Morrison 
1991:31). As a result, almost the entire analysis in Chapter 9 is based on the second 
specially derived census database compiled by Statistics New Zealand and detailed in 
Table 5.2.2.
The same procedures as above for regrouping by ethnicity and labour force 
status were followed, as were similar procedures for qualifications, with the result that 
the two databases are essentially continuous. That is to say, there is a considerable 
degree of continuity between all analyses based on Database A or B.
Table 5.2.2
_________________________ DATABASE B (1981-1991)_________________________
Age
(Five Year Age Group)__________________________________________________________________________
Sex
(Male; Female)_________________________________________________________________________________
Ethnic Group
(European; Maori Ethnic Group; Pacific Island/Polynesian; ‘Other’, Not Specified)____________________
Labour Force Status
(Full-time 30+ hours; Part-time 1-29 hours; Unemployed; Not in the Labour Force; Not Specified)_______
Educational Qualifications
(No Qualifications/Still at School; Secondary School Qualifications Only; Bachelors/Post Graduate
Qualifications; Other Tertiary Qualifications; Qualifications Not Specified)___________________________
Income Band ($ New Zealand in Census year)
1981 (25 income bands): Nil or Loss; 1-249; 250-499; 500-999; 1,000-1,999; 2,000- 
3,499; 3,500-4,999; 5,000-6,499; 6,500-7,999; 8,000-9,999; 10,000-11,999; 12,000- 
13,999; 14,000-15,999; 16,000-17,999; 18,000-19,999; 20,000-22,499; 22,500-24,999;
25.000- 27,499; 27,500-29,999; 30,000-34,999; 35,000-39,999; 40,000-49,999; 50,000- 
59,999; 60,000 and over; Income Not Specified.
1986 (17 income bands): Nil or Loss; 1-1,000; 1,001-2,500; 2,501-5,000; 5,001-7,500; 
7,501-10,000; 10,001-12,500; 12,501-15,000; 15,001-17,500; 17501-20,000; 20,001- 
25,000; 25,001-30,000; 30,001-35,000; 35,001-40,000; 40,001-50,000; 50,001 and over; 
Income Not Specified.
1991 (14 income bands); Nil or Loss; 1-2,500; 2,501-5,000; 5,001-7500; 7501-10,000;
10.001- 15,000; 15001-20,000; 20,001-25,000; 25,001-30,000; 30,001-40,000; 40,001-
50,000; 50,001-70,000; 70,001 and over; Income Not Specified._____________________
In terms of educational qualifications, the main shortcomings in the database 
concern the incremental broadening (or narrowing) of the criteria used to define each 
qualification category. Historically, for example, the ‘other tertiary qualifications’ 
category pertained primarily to teaching, technical and trade qualifications which took a 
number of years to complete. Increasingly it has covered a wide range of occupation-
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specific qualifications, some of which involve training periods of weeks or months rather 
than years. The result is an ongoing increase in the size of the category, which cannot be 
linked to any particular qualification or policy change, and a subsequent decline in the 
‘no qualifications’ and ‘secondary school qualifications only’ categories. Similarly, 
although clearly located in a policy change in 1986, the University Entrance 
qualification, awarded since 1944 via accreditation (or internal assessment) for a 50 per 
cent average over four subjects during the sixth form year (four years secondary 
schooling), was replaced by the Sixth Form Certificate and also became awarded for 
individual subjects. The shift simultaneously increased the numbers and proportions with 
a secondary school qualification, reduced the numbers and proportions with no 
qualifications, and increased the age at which students gain the qualifications that admit 
them to a tertiary institution (Carmichael 1996:37).
Historical trends, which as noted cover a very limited and dislocated period, are 
similarly affected by earlier changes in the criteria used to define the School Certificate 
qualification, a national examination typically sat after 3 years of secondary schooling, 
and until 1970 denoting a minimum of four subjects passed. From 1970 a pass in any 
subject gained the sitter a School Certificate in that subject.
A problem also exists with the categories under which the qualification data for 
1966 and 1971 were published. In 1966, the categories were approximately the same as 
those given in Figure 5.2.2. In 1971, however, the ‘other tertiary qualifications’ data 
were given separately in one census table, and conflated amongst the three other 
categories in another. It was not possible to reconstruct the categories to match those 
for 1966. Accordingly, the indices of dissimilarity for those two observations cannot be 
viewed as true trends, a point discussed in the text at the appropriate juncture.
5.2.5 Chapter 10 (Income):
As with the labour force data described above, data on income by ethnicity were 
not collected until 1951. Although published by age in that year, this did not occur again 
for Maori incomes until 1976, meaning that few detailed time-series studies of ethnic 
differentials in income exist.
One other discontinuity of significance occurred between 1976 and 1981. This 
was a shift from census questions concerning total income exclusive of benefit income, 
to the inclusion of benefit income. That is to say, social security income was not 
classified as declarable income until the 1981 Census. Although the numbers receiving
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benefit income other than the universal Family Benefit prior to 1981 were relatively 
small— in 1976 approximately 4.2 per cent of all persons aged 15-59 years (Martin 
1977:4)—these factors undoubtedly differed by sex and ethnicity. For example, the 
Family Benefit was a universal payment based on number of dependent children, which 
at the time differed markedly between Maori and European (Jackson and Pool 1994, 
Chapter 8). The benefit was small in dollar terms ($6.00 per week for each child), but in 
1976 amounted for each child to 4.3 per cent of the average weekly wage. The Family 
Benefit component of the income of a family with 3 children would therefore have 
equated to 13 per cent of the average weekly wage. Since this component was excluded 
from the 1976 data, it was decided not to use income data for that year in the 
component and cohort analyses of Chapter 10.
However, in order to provide an overview of historical trends, data which do 
incorporate the discontinuity are presented in Chapter 10, having been drawn from 
published sources. The remaining data used in Chapter 10 are drawn from Database B, 
income bands for which can be seen in Table 5.2.2 to have differed at each census year: 
25 in 1981, to 17 in 1986, to 14 in 1991. The database records the number of persons in 
each band (by age, sex, ethnicity and the other variables given in Table 5.2.2), at the 
dollar value pertaining in each Census year. For the purposes of this thesis the data were 
adjusted to the Consumer Price Index (CPI), using 1991 as the base year (1991=1.00) 
and the multipliers 1.534 for 1986 and 2.689 for 1981 (Easton, personal 
communication). In order to construct income means, it was also necessary to determine 
upper boundaries and mid-points for the highest income bands. These mid-points were 
set at $90,000 for 1981 (a band interval of $60,000); $75,000 for 1986 (band interval 
$50,000); and $105,000 for 1991 (band interval $70,000) (Easton, personal 
communication) .8
Because these data include benefit income, and thus have implications for the 
analysis of trends in Chapter 10, it is necessary to acknowledge significant changes to 
the payment structure over the 1981-1991 period.9 These changes can be approximately 
divided into two groups. (1) Between the 1981 and 1986 censuses— and excluding the 
period June 1982-November 1984, when a wage-price freeze was in effect— the
8 Brian Easton is a well known New Zealand economist.
9 For the following data I am particularly indebted to Kay Goodger of the Social Policy Unit, New  
Zealand Department of Social Welfare.
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unemployment (UB) and domestic purposes (DPB) benefits10 underwent incremental 
increases not only in value, but also in eligibility. In October 1981, for example, 
eligibility for the UB was extended to those engaged in approved employment-related 
training programs. In November 1983 a similar Training Incentive Allowance was 
introduced for DPB recipients. In December 1984 the Child Supplement Payment (a 
benefit that had been introduced in 1973 to assist in the maintenance of the first child of 
a sole parent, and in 1984 worth $59 per week, or 21 per cent of the average weekly 
wage) was extended to children other than the first child, although at a lower rate of 
$6.00 per week; and a means-tested Family Care Benefit was introduced for workers 
whose earnings fell below a given threshold. By the 1986 Census the Child Supplement 
was worth $70 per week (or 20 per cent of the average weekly wage) for the first child 
and $10 per week per additional child (3 per cent of the average weekly wage). Over the 
1981-1984 period, eligibility for National Superannuation remained essentially 
unchanged from its inception in 1977, when universal entitlement had been set at age 60, 
but in 1985 a ‘National Superannuitant’ surcharge of 25 cents for every dollar of other 
taxable income above a certain limit ($6,240 for individuals; $5,200 each for married 
couples) was introduced. This reduced the incomes of retirees on higher incomes, but 
had no effect for those whose incomes were derived solely from the pension. During the 
1981-1986 period, all forms of income support were regularly adjusted by the CPI at 6- 
monthly intervals.
(2) During the period 1986-1991, eligibility for some benefits was first increased 
(although for some beneficiaries, especially sole parents, the changes meant a reduction 
in income) and then incrementally reduced, whilst toward the end of the period some 
general benefit cuts were also implemented.* 11 In April 1986, for example, the Child 
Supplement, Family Care and other pre-existing family tax rebates were replaced by a 
more comprehensive means-tested Family Support programme, which applied to sole 
parents and low-wage earners alike. The change reduced the payment for first children 
to $36 per week (10.4 per cent of the average weekly wage) but increased payments for 
additional children to $16 per week (4.6 per cent of the average weekly wage). In
10 The UB is paid only to those registered as unemployed and actively seeking full-time work. The DPB 
is essentially a carers benefit, paid to unsupported sole parents, and persons caring full-time for the 
disabled. However in certain circumstances it is also paid to unsupported single women without 
children.
11 Further and considerably more repressive changes followed in April 1991, but because these occurred 
after the 1991 Census, the last observation for which data in Chapter 10 are analysed, they are not 
detailed here.
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August 1986 an important change came with the equal apportionment of all social 
security and national superannuation payments. This shift meant that benefits for couples 
and families, which had previously been paid to one partner, usually the male, were from 
that date paid separately to each spouse. This change, which came into effect shortly 
after the 1986 Census, will have had the effect of lowering the 1991 Census incomes of 
affected male recipients, and increasing those of females, vis-ä-vis their relative levels in 
1986. In October 1986 all benefit rates were increased by 5 per cent to compensate for 
the introduction of GST (initially levied at 10 per cent), and the National Superannuitant 
surcharge rate was reduced from 25 to 18 cents in the dollar. In April 1987 income 
exempt from the National Superannuitant surcharge was increased (to $7,800 for 
individuals and $13,000 for couples), and the threshold at which Family Support could 
be applied for was increased.
In July 1988, however, no six-monthly CPI adjustment was made to any social 
security benefit. In April 1989, the basic benefit for sole parents with one child was 
increased by a smaller amount than for those with two or more children, although family 
support payments for second or subsequent children aged 16-17 years and still at school 
were more than doubled, from $16 to $32 per week, the latter move following a cut in 
unemployment benefit rates for 16-17 year olds in January 1989. In October 1989, the 
Family Support abatement threshold was increased, and, in April 1990, the benefit 
became payable to the principal carer (usually the mother), where previously it had been 
split between partners for couples with children. In August 1990, a requirement that sole 
parents receiving the DPB identify the other parent (introduced in 1981 for the purposes 
of the Liable Parent Contribution Scheme) or receive a lower benefit rate, was extended 
to those receiving benefits other than the DPB. In December 1990, the minimum age of 
eligibility for unemployment benefit was raised from 16 to 18 years, and in February 
1991 (prior to the 1991 census), the telephone service rental allowance (a small subsidy 
introduced in 1989 to assist beneficiaries with the cost of maintaining a telephone) was 
abolished.
Benefit schedules indicate that income relativity between the various benefits was 
maintained throughout the 1981-1986 period. However, the changes will have had an 
effect on aggregate level incomes as a result of compositional differences in the 
population. For example, larger proportions of Maori than European have children, are 
sole parents, and/or are unemployed, and it is probable that the general improvements in 
benefit income over the 1981-1986 period increased the aggregate mean incomes of
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Maori vis-ä-vis European, whilst the opposite could be expected for the 1986-1991 
period, especially in the year prior to the 1991 Census. Similarly, the shift to an 
individual-basis for payment of benefit incomes following the 1986 Census and again in 
1990 will have deflated the 1991 incomes of unemployed and not-in-the-labour-force 
males, and inflated those of females, vis-ä-vis their levels in 1986; whilst the restrictions 
in eligibility and ultimate removal of unemployment benefit for 16-17 year olds in 1990 
will have reduced the 1991 Census incomes of 15-19 year old Maori, due to the 
somewhat higher proportions unemployed of Maori than European/non-Maori at these 
ages.
Clearly it is not possible to determine from the complexity of these changes, 
which particular factor(s) will have most affected the various income trends shown in 
Chapter 10. Indeed, yet another factor affecting incomes (and especially income 
relativities between Maori and European) was a substantial rise in the minimum wage in 
1985, which both increased the incomes of low wage earners at the 1986 Census, and 
will have entered into the incomes of the unemployed and not-in-the-labour-force, due 
to the phenomenon of labour market churning (movement in and out of the various 
labour force statuses). Nevertheless, since it is necessary in that chapter to make some 
assumptions, the foregoing provides a basis.
Chapter 11 (Birth and Fortune):
Chapter 11 draws in part on population and fertility data from Chapter 6, on 
employment data from Chapter 7, and on income data from Chapter 10 (these data 
sources requiring no additional description); and in part on unpublished fertility data, 
hereafter referred to as Database C. Database C is comprised of single-year-of-age 
fertility data for the years 1981, 1986 and 1991 for the Maori and non-Maori 
populations, and was specially compiled for use in this thesis by (and as a result of 
extensive communications with) Statistics New Zealand, so as to approximately reflect 
the Maori Ethnic Group classification used at the 1991 Census.12 In this endeavour, data 
for birth mothers classified as having 25 per cent or more Maori blood were aggregated. 
Whether or not this somewhat arbitrary demarcation line reflects the self-perceptions of 
those involved, it is impossible to say. In justification of the decision it is argued that at 
the 1991 Census, the population that defined itself as affiliating with the Maori Ethnic
121 am especially indebted to Ian Richards of Statistics New Zealand, who spent considerable time and 
effort discussing the various issues with me by fax.
89
Group comprised 85 per cent of the population that acknowledged Maori Ancestry per 
se. This is somewhat larger than the 63 per cent who claimed (or were classified) Sole 
Maori origin, the previous criterion for defining a ‘Maori’ birth.13 The framework 
assumes, therefore, that approximately 15 per cent of parents with some degree of 
Maori Ancestry claim to have (or are classified by others as having) less than 25 per cent 
Maori blood.
For the purpose of establishing shifts in the timing of family formation, one of 
the main issues of interest in Chapter 11, it is preferable to use single-year-of-age 
fertility data. However, because Database C covers a relatively brief time-frame (1981- 
1991), it is not possible to establish long term trends. Accordingly, these data are used 
where appropriate, whilst longer term trends are drawn from published material.
5.3 TOWARDS ANALYSIS
Together these databases contain a comprehensive profile of ethnic stratification 
in New Zealand. They also, however, generate an enormous amount of empirical 
material— an intended, if somewhat cumbersome, contribution of the thesis. In order to 
permit the text to flow as freely as possible, raw data and background tables are 
consigned to the appendices, whilst their contents are illustrated graphically within the 
text. Importantly, it should also be recalled from Chapter 1 that the various 
discontinuities outlined above are a central feature of the substantive chapters, in that 
part of the contribution of this thesis is the compilation of a comprehensive database 
under one cover, and its explication, not only for the purposes of validity, but also for 
the elucidation of those who may later use or extend that database.
13 As noted at the outset of this chapter, the 1991 census recorded the Maori Ancestry, Maori Ethnic 
Group and Sole/Single Maori Origin populations as numbering, respectively, 511,278; 434,844; and 
323,493.
PART 2
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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW:
FROM TREATY TO RETREAT TO RE-ENTRY
6.0 INTRODUCTION
No analysis of ethnic stratification in New Zealand can begin without first 
acknowledging the processes of European colonisation, begun in earnest with the Treaty 
of Waitangi in 1840 and facilitated through a series of legislative acts over the remainder 
of the nineteenth century, and into the early years of the twentieth. Indeed there can be 
little controversy over the argument that these processes systematically dispossessed 
Maori of their economic base and relegated them, en masse, to a subordinate socio­
economic, demographic and political position vis-ä-vis most of the European 
population. Accordingly, this chapter provides first a condensed history of the early 
development of ethnic stratification in New Zealand, covering the period 1840-1940, 
during which time Maori briefly—and very successfully—interacted with the incoming 
capitalist economy, but then, from the 1860s to the 1930s, politically betrayed and 
physically overwhelmed, they withdrew to their rural hinterlands. Central to the 
discussion is consideration of the development of demographic differentials between the 
two populations. Finally, the re-entry of Maori into the capitalist system—beginning 
with mass urbanisation in the 1940s and 1950s— is located in an age-structural context.
Importantly, it should be kept in mind that this thesis is not about re­
substantiating the existence of ethnic stratification in New Zealand, but about expanding 
the parameters by which the phenomenon is understood. In this sense it sees 
demographic differentials as both dependent and independent variables of inequality. It 
should also be noted that underlying all matters discussed here, significant regional and 
tribal differences exist. Although these differences are undoubtedly of importance to the 
study, they are beyond the scope of the thesis.
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6.1 THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS: BETRAYAL AND WITHDRAWAL
Whatever the social, economic and demographic situation of pre-contact Maori 
(Firth 1959; Pool 1977, Chapter 3; Sutton 1986; Davidson 1984, 1992), and despite an 
intensifying decline in numbers brought about by contact with European diseases against 
which Maori had no immunity (Crosby 1986:232, 268; Pool 1991a:44-46), one point 
about the early years of colonisation must be particularly stressed. Between annexation 
in 1840 and the late 1850s the different hapu and iwi which collectively comprise the 
Maori population were, on the whole, highly entrepreneurial and prosperous. 
Outnumbering Europeans by approximately 40 to 1 in 1840, numerous historical 
accounts record the rapid adaptability, enthusiasm and innovation with which Maori met 
the market economy (Sutch 1942:33-34; Firth 1959:450; Pearson and Thoms 1983:197- 
8; Royal Commission on Social Policy [RCSP] 1988b:5-6; Minsterial Advisory 
Committee 1986, Appendix 1:10; Pearson 1988:168; Temm 1989:6-7; New Zealand 
Law Society 1989; Penetito 1991). Traders, whalers, and, in the mid-1840s, settlers left 
poverty-stricken by the mismanagement of the New Zealand Company (Sutch 1942:23), 
were all heavily dependent upon Maori for resources. By the 1850s Maori tribes not 
only produced and supplied most of the food requirements of the settlement of 
Auckland, but also exported foodstuffs to Australia and throughout the Pacific. 
Furthermore, they transported this produce in a substantial fleet of Maori-owned coastal 
and trans-Tasman shipping vessels. An example of the Maori commercial base is evident 
from the following Minsterial Advisory Committee (1986:10) report:
By the 1850s Maori tribes owned and operated most of the coastal shipping of 
the North Island. By 1858 there were 53 Maori vessels of more than 14 tons 
registered in Auckland alone... In 1857 the Bay of Plenty, Taupo and Rotorua 
tribes numbering about 8000 people had several thousand acres in wheat, 
potatoes, maize and kumera. They owned nearly 1000 horses, 200 head of cattle, 
5000 pigs, 4 water-powered mills and 96 ploughs. On top of this they owned 43 
coastal vessels of around 20 tons each and more than 900 canoes.1
Importantly, much of this wealth accrued to Maori as the result of the 
articulation of kin-based principles of social and economic organisation with the settler 
market economy. For example, Maori held no concept o f land ownership in the
1 Similarly the Waikato tribes in 1853 had ten flour mills in operation, others under construction 
(Metge 1976:32), extensive wheat, maize and potato fields, and numerous horses and cattle (Temm 
1989:5).
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European sense. Rather, they saw themselves as ‘belonging to the land where their feet 
stood’— that is, to their turangawaewae, the tribal land of their ancestors (Metge 
1976:109)— and subscribed instead to notions of tribal jurisdiction over these areas, and 
to communal use-rights and labour obligations therein (Metge 1976:1-15).2 
Subsequently, the wealth resulting from these communal efforts was also tribally 
‘owned’. A number of commentators have argued that more than anything else it was 
these communal principles that were antithetical to the establishment of a fully 
functioning capitalist society on New Zealand soil, and which, under the rhetoric of 
‘beastly communism’, were marked for destruction (Minsterial Advisory Committee 
1986:5-7; Oliver 1988:4-5).
An accurate account of the alienation of Maori land and its transference to the 
European settler economy is made difficult because the various sources that record the 
information are often contradictory (Condliffe 1959:116). Furthermore, official statistics 
do not show the details of annual land sales until 1856. Nevertheless, it is well 
documented that the processes of land alienation centrally concerned the State 
(including its Statesmen, who were among the largest benefactors— Condliffe 1930:103, 
120; Sutch 1942:25; Dalziel 1992:107), that its endeavours were for the most part in 
direct contradiction to the principles of the Treaty (see Appendix D .l), and that central 
to both were the speculative ventures of the New Zealand Company founded prior to 
annexation by Edwin Gibbon Wakefield. The Company, established for the dual purpose 
of buying up Maori land and selling it on at a profit, and settling New Zealand according 
to the systematic principles of the Wakefield Plan whereby ‘a proper balance would be 
achieved between land [its price determined so as to restrict its purchase to capitalists], 
capital and labour’ (Gardner 1992:59), began, ostensibly, with a mixture of social and 
economic objectives.3 For the State, however, first came the tasks of expunging native 
title and securing the land, then disposing of and financially assisting with the 
development of that land. Both tasks were achieved via a series of legislative acts and
2 Every inch of pre-contact New Zealand was subdivided into distinct regions with defined borders, and 
these regions were occupied by individual tribes (Sinclair 1992a:66-69). Customary title to the land was 
determined by right of descent involving knowledge of complex genealogical and occupational 
histories, complemented by active occupation. Land could be won or lost in battle, but the rights to that 
land could be obtained only through active secure occupation.
3 The New Zealand Company grew out of an earlier ‘New Zealand Association’, formed in 1837 with a 
mixture of philanthropic and economic objectives. Supposedly uppermost amongst these was the 
opportunity for British subjects to escape the negative social conditions existing in Britain at the time. 
However, by 1838 the Company was selling land before it had even been purchased, many of the 
idealistic philanthropists withdrew, and the economic principles took over (Sinclair 1992a:71-72, see 
also Appendix D.2).
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policies that were, for the most part, explicitly racist. Too numerous to be elaborated 
here, the main innovations and their objectives, along with some of the earlier legislation 
that was designed, ostensibly, to protect Maori, are listed and discussed at more length 
in Appendix D.2.
Despite increasing resistance on the part of Maori to sell, the process of land 
alienation was highly efficient. By 1856, sixteen years after the signing of the Treaty, 
Maori retained considerably less than one half of their original 66 million acres. The 
whole of the South Island and more than 6 million acres of the North Island had passed 
into European hands (Sutch 1942:33). By 1860, Maori retained only one third of then- 
original holding. In that year frustrations on both sides erupted. Large-scale fighting 
broke out between the settlers (supported by the military) and Maori in the Taranaki 
area of the North Island. Finally, in 1863, in an endeavour to put down the ‘uppity 
natives’ further north in the Waikato, Governor George Grey ordered a military invasion 
and started the Land Wars (Temm 1989:8). Not content with the resulting 
disproportionately high loss of Maori lives, nor the fact that the wars were in deliberate 
violation of Article II of the Treaty, confiscation of large tracts of land from so-called 
‘rebellious tribes’ followed. So too did the Native Land Court and the revamped Native 
Lands Act (1865), with their combined objectives of furthering the conversion of Maori 
land to individual title and the simultaneous requirement that Maori agreeing to sell must 
now prove ownership of their traditional lands, a change which involved prohibitive 
survey and legal costs. Not only did such moves foster both intra- and inter-tribal 
dissension and conflict (Sorrenson 1956:81, 1992:153; Sinclair 1957:110-225), but, 
drawn into debt in order to prove ownership, the land was often impounded to discharge 
that debt (Metge 1976:35).
By the mid-1860s, increasingly landless, deprived of assets accumulated in the 
pre-war period, and psychologically distressed, the Maori population retreated to their 
rural hinterlands, away from contact with Europeans and from any significant 
involvement with the market system (Sutch 1969:68; Bedggood 1980:50,81; Parsonson 
1981:161; Preston 1985:59; Pool 1991a). Where, in the early years of colonisation, 
relatively high levels of material well-being—including higher levels of literacy than in 
the settler population— had existed amongst Maori, now poverty, sickness and death 
became rampant. Despite a rise in estimated fertility, which Pool (1991a:77-81) 
attributes to either a natural decline in the virulence of venereal diseases initially 
introduced by European crews and settlers; and/or a change in the proximate
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determinants of fertility (marriage patterns, breastfeeding periods, postpartum sexual 
mores—undoubtedly reflecting disorganisation of previous social controls - e.g. Metge 
1976:29-21),4 Maori numbers fell both absolutely and relatively, from around 70,000- 
90,000 in 1840 (Pool 1991 a:55), to around 42,000 in 1896, by which time they 
comprised less than 6 per cent of the total population and retained less than one sixth of 
their original land holding (see also Sorrenson 1963:21). Table 6.1.1 gives an indication 
of the velocity and broader implications of this change.
Table 6.1.1
Population Change, Maori and Non-Maori/European, 1840-1896
Numbers Annual Change (%) Per cent Distribution
Year Maori Non-Maori Maori Non-Maori Maori Non-Maori
1840* 70-90000 c. 2000 97+ <3
1858 56049 59413 . .. 48.54 51.46
1874 47330 297654 -1.1 11.2 13.72 86.28
1878 45542 412465 -1.0 8.5 9.94 90.06
1881 46141 487889 0.4 5.6 8.64 91.36
1886 43927 576524 -1.0 3.4 7.08 92.92
1891 44177 624474 0.1 2.7 6.61 93.39
1896 42113 701101 -1.0 2.3 5.67 94.33
Notes: * Pool 1991:55
Source: Papps 1985, Tables 9 and 10.
The discrepancy between rising birth numbers and falling population numbers 
was, of course, accounted for by a fall in life expectancy (e0°), which at the time of 
annexation had been around 28-30 years and compared quite favourably with that of the 
settler population. Between the 1850s and the 1880s it declined to and sat at little more 
than 20 years (estimated by Pool 1985:230, 1991a:77). From there, due in part to 
increasing immunological experience, it gradually edged up, but ended the century at 
only 30 years, around half that of the European, and implying a Maori infant mortality 
rate at least three times that of the European rate. Importantly, as Pool argues, it was 
not the absolute level of Maori e0° that was so appalling, being in fact higher at the time 
than for some parts of Europe, but its level vis-ä-vis that of the settler population with 
whom Maori had by then co-resided for more than half a century, and to whom the 
Treaty of Waitangi had guaranteed ‘all the Rights and Privileges of British citizens’. As 
Pool (1991a:59-103) aptly describes the period, these were indeed ‘decades of despair’.
4 Importantly, these and other data predating 1913 for Maori fertility and 1920 for Maori mortality 
indices reflect back-projections computed by Pool (1967, 1977, 1991a). According to Pool, all data are 
somewhat unreliable until approximately 1936.
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Nevertheless, the combination of rising fertility and rising e0° right at the end of 
the period saw— at least in some regions—the beginnings of a sustained increase in 
Maori numbers (Pool 1991a: 101). Two important and seemingly paradoxical factors 
that would come to play an important role in the following decades must also be 
acknowledged. The first was the response of the State to the strong desire and 
considerable efforts by Maori to avail themselves of formal education (Fitzgerald 1970; 
Barrington 1971; Bridges 1971; Ramsay 1972; McKenzie 1982). As noted above, the 
beginning of the period had seen a disproportionately large sector of the Maori 
population literate, a factor due almost entirely to the pre-colonisation activities of the 
mission schools, but also continued after annexation by partial state funding.5 Between 
1867 and the end of the century educational opportunities for Maori were further 
extended with the passing of the Native Schools Act, the transference in 1869 of Maori 
mission schools to the newly created Department of Education— making primary 
schooling free and universal for Maori, and following the precedent set for European 
children just two years earlier— and the Native Schools Code, which in 1880 finally 
exposed Maori children to the normal British primary school curriculum. Around 1880 
the first scholarships also became available for Maori to attend post-primary education, 
and the very significant Te Atue College began to prepare the first Maori for entry into 
tertiary education. However, as Sutch (1969:68) and Metge (1976:35) caution, the 
objective of much of this legislation was not so much the education of Maori as their 
Europeanisation or assimilation. Indeed, others have also argued that the Maori scholars 
of this era were really being prepared to act as cultural brokers. Certainly some of the 
first graduates ‘adapted their politics to Pakeha politics and accepted the conditions that 
were imposed upon them as the price for becoming a part of the Pakeha system’ 
(Minsterial Advisory Committee 1986:9). These words clearly resonate with Hechter’s 
(1976:41) arguments put forward in Chapter 2.
The second ostensibly paradoxical factor was the establishment in 1867 of Maori 
representation in Parliament. However, in terms of population numbers at the time 
(approximately 50,000 Maori; 250,000 European) the four Maori and seventy-two 
European seats so established meant there was little about the move that was truly 
representative (Royal Commission on Social Policy 1988b:7). Indeed, ten years later,
5 In the mid-nineteenth century the ‘education system’ such as it was used Maori as the language of 
instruction, resulting in more Maori being literate in their own language than settlers in theirs 
(Spoonley 1988:8). From 1867, however, English became the main language of instruction, and 
increasingly Maori pupils were forbidden to speak Maori at school.
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arguing that there had been no Maori capable of ceding sovereignty in 1840, Chief 
Justice Prendergast was able to declare the Treaty null and void (Wi Parata v. The 
Bishop of Wellington 1877, 3 NZLR 72; Temm 1989:9), clearing the way for the 
transfer of any remaining Maori land (at the time approximately 15 million acres), and 
ultimately Maori labour, into the market economy. Overruled in 1901 by the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council (following petition by Maori), the government promptly 
passed the Land Titles Protection Act (1902), nullifying the Privy Council finding and 
effectively quashing Maori objections (Temm 1989:11). This is not to say that Maori 
voices were silenced. Indeed, throughout this period (as to the present day) Maori chiefs 
and elders actively protested the loss of their land and the betrayal of the Treaty. In 
addition, suffrage in 1892 had been extended to Maori and European alike. However, by 
then representing around six per cent of the population and this proportion still 
declining, Maori voices remained largely ignored.
A third factor—whilst not exactly paradoxical in nature— also deserves mention. 
The cash economy in place over these years meant that Maori as well as European were 
forced to pay cash for the farming needs and other expenditure they incurred where they 
had previously been able to barter. As a result, whilst Maori subsisted on whatever land 
they retained, they supplemented this existence with occasional wages as labourers on 
farms, road and port construction (Bedggood 1980:30; Thompson 1985:24). They also 
borrowed European farming tools and techniques, adapting them to the framework of 
communal life (Metge 1976:34). As Metge argues, these practices not only assisted in 
preserving the integrity of Maori land and social order, but were implicated in arresting 
the fall in Maori numbers.
For European, on the other hand, and despite the widespread poverty associated 
with the Wakefield plan in the early years of settlement and the long depression of 1865- 
95 (Sutch 1942:20-23, 55-74, 1968:3-34), the period between annexation and the end of 
the century was, overall, one of slowly consolidating pastoral and export-related wealth. 
This is not to say that the wealth was universally shared. Indeed, access to land, 
resources and jobs were never equally distributed amongst the settler population, and 
whilst the Maori population had moved en masse from communality to marginality over 
the period (Pearson 1988), a class structure had developed simultaneously amongst the 
settler population (Sutch 1942:vi, 1966). As Sutch succinctly states:
From the very beginning New Zealand had more people dependent for a
livelihood on selling their labour than were independent working farmers, or
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farmer-employees .... inequalities of income, insecurity, unemployment, and 
poverty are the inevitable concomitants, so much so that the results become the 
main problem of the country.
Certainly in the 1890s, two-thirds of the labour force were either wage earners 
(59 per cent) or unemployed (Thompson 1985:130). However, as is shown in Chapter 7, 
this was lower than the proportion of the labour force that would be wage earners at any 
time during the following twentieth century. Moreover, as a proxy indicator of general 
material well-being, European life expectancy (e0°) at the end of the century was the 
highest in the world, and was, as noted above, now higher than the Maori e0° by 
approximately 30 years. Simultaneously, European fertility—which, at a Total Fertility 
Rate (TFR) of 6.7 in the 1870s had been higher than that for Maori (Gibson 1971, cited 
in Pool and Sceats 1985; Pool 199la:64)—was falling rapidly, and whatever the cause 
of this decline (Pool and Tiong 1991),6 one important result was a further lessening of 
the sibling cross-infection, malnutrition (arising from too many mouths to feed) and 
maternal health problems that had previously led to high levels of infant mortality (Pool 
1985:153). In addition, along with the combined processes of pioneer settlement, the 
availability of cheap land, and government support for its acquisition and development, a 
pervasive ideology of self advancement had arisen, whereby New Zealand was seen as a 
‘glorious country for a working man’ (sic). Failure to achieve was thus strongly equated 
with lack of effort, a factor which, in combination with an ideology that cast the so- 
called ‘Maori Wars’ as deriving from Maori aggression (Spoonley 1988:10), saw Maori 
as the cause of their own plight.
Despite the fact that the following years 1900-1940 ended with a dramatic 
improvement in Maori health and living standards, most of the period is viewed by 
analysts as one of sustained marginalisation and/or semi-independence from European. 
On the one hand, government policies increasingly endeavoured to assimilate— or 
integrate—Maori into the economic, political, health and cultural systems of the 
European; on the other hand it regulated that participation and emphasised that Maori
6 Pool and Tiong primarily ascribe the fall to a massive decline in fertility at the younger ages. This may 
have reflected an economically-driven fall in the marriage rate as suggested by Sutch (1968:30-31), who 
demonstrates a strong positive correlation between falling product prices and rate of marriage. Certainly 
Pool and Tiong’s regionally-disaggregated analysis, which was not able to eliminate nuptiality effects, 
identifies that the velocity of fertility decline was marginally greater during the depression years. It was 
also more pronounced in the urban areas—the wealthier landholders possibly being less affected. 
However, Pool and Tiong also demonstrate that the fertility decline continued its downward trend more 
or less unperturbed until the 1930s, suggesting that other factors, such as schooling-related changes in 
the economic value of children, were also involved.
98
incorporation was on European terms (Minsterial Advisory Committee 1986:9). For 
example, where Maori tried commercial farming on whatever land was left, its poor 
quality, combined with a relative lack of capital, technical skills, marketing expertise, 
legal advice and government support, doomed it to failure. Not until the 1920s were 
Maori Land Boards permitted to loan money— money that had accrued from rental for 
Crown use of Maori land—to Maori farmers (Sutch 1969:194; Minsterial Advisory 
Committee 1986:13), and not until 1929 were State Advances— subsidised financial 
assistance made available by the State to European farmers— also extended to the Maori 
population, who, despite the wholesale destruction of the kinship mode of production 
and the tribal relationships that went with it, were viewed as being able to subsist 
indefinitely in their traditional communal fashion (Macrae 1975:144).
Nor was access to the industrial structure or the education that might have 
assisted in reducing ethnic differentials equal. In 1926, when approximately 14,440 
Maori were enumerated as having some form of employment (a crude activity rate of 35 
per cent for males, 9 per cent for females; compared to 65 and 17 per cent respectively 
for non-Maori males and females),7 Maori males were more than twice as likely as their 
non-Maori counterparts to be in primary industry, half as likely to be in secondary 
industry, and one quarter as likely to be in tertiary industry (Thompson 1985:127). 
Similarly, Maori females were seven times more likely than non-Maori females to be in 
primary industry, ninety-five per cent less likely to be in secondary industry, and three 
times less likely to be in tertiary industry. Undoubtedly these differentials reflected the 
existence of two articulating economies (Bedggood 1979; Thompson 1985:124) rather 
than the widespread participation of Maori in the capitalist economy. However, even 
when these differentials began to decline between 1926 and 1936— the proportion of 
Maori males in secondary industry, for example, almost doubled— the improvements 
reflected little assistance from the education system. As late as 1932, the National 
Expenditure Commission recommended that all secondary school scholarships to Maori 
be abolished, resulting in the government cutting two year scholarships by a quarter and 
discontinuing third year scholarships (Sutch 1969:310). In 1935, following arguments 
that the only future for Maori was one based on the land, the school curriculum further 
entrenched this attitude, continuing to offer Maori pupils training in unskilled and
7 Maori labour force data were not collected until 1951. These rates have been computed by applying 
data from Zodgekar 1985, Tables 241 and 242, p. 98 to census population numbers given in Appendix 
D.3.
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domestic vocations only. In any case, a general absence of secondary schools in the main 
areas of Maori population until the 1940s meant that few Maori pupils could, until that 
point, take their education beyond primary level.
The period also saw increasing institutionalisation of Maori with a further series 
of ‘Native’ institutions being either established or having their earlier functions altered 
(Minsterial Advisory Committee 1986:9). Of particular importance amongst the latter 
was the Native Land Court and its associated Acts, the workings of which continued 
over this period to separate Maori from their land, and to subject to specific usage and 
conditions of sale, any land that remained in Maori title (Condliffe 1959:76-77). For 
example, both the Public Works Act of 1908 and the Native Land Act of 1909 
authorised the taking of Maori land without having either to give notice (continued in 
the case of the Public Works Act until 1974) nor to pay compensation (Temm 1989:11). 
Condliffe’s (1959:76-77) account of the historical role of the Land Court is particularly 
illuminating:
..the Native (now Maori) Land Court was created as a permanent tribunal 
charged with the investigation and settlement of native land titles ... One of the 
chief purposes of its creation was to secure sound titles for land which had been 
or would be bought. In quieting titles and apportioning the purchase moneys 
equitably between the Maori owners it has been invaluable. Throughout its 
history, however, it has been a means of facilitating the separation of Maori from 
their land as equitably and painlessly as possible. In this way it has been the chief 
mechanism in the breaking up of the Maori economy and the destruction of tribal 
organisation and discipline.
Early in the same period, however, two important pieces of legislation that 
appear to have had a favourable impact on the health and overall potential for future 
material well-being of the Maori population were also passed: the Public Health Act and 
Maori Councils Act (both 1900). Together with the considerable efforts of the first 
Maori physicians (Sutch 1969:187-193) and the public health nurse movement, a few of 
whom were Maori, the primary health care campaigns that resulted from this legislation 
saw considerable improvements for Maori in the areas of sanitation and hygiene (Pool 
1991a: 119).8 A widespread program of vaccination was also begun.
In the 1920s these measures were stepped up, due in large part to an increase in 
European sympathy for the Maori situation (Sutch 1969:192). A number of factors were
8 It is worth noting, of course, that many of these problems had come about from Maori being forced to 
live in crowded conditions on small tracts of low lying and swampy land.
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involved in this change of heart. One was the voluntary participation and legendary 
efforts of Maori in World War I, which engendered considerable respect and an element 
of obligation by those who had previously little to do with their Maori counterparts. 
Another was recognition of the shocking number of Maori deaths from the 1918 
influenza epidemic, a rate perhaps ten times as great as that for European (Rice 1988, 
Table 6.1; Pool 1991 a: 117-118). Indeed, recognition by the 1920s that the Maori 
population was still declining proportionately—by then down to its nadir of 4.5 per cent 
of the total population, may also have been instrumental. Conversely, and somewhat 
ironically, was the growing realisation that since Maori no longer held sufficient land for 
survival, they were in danger of either urbanising and competing with Europeans for 
jobs, or becoming a charge on the State (Sutch 1969:193).
The resulting innovations, one of which was the first releasing of monies for 
Maori land development noted above, in no way bridged the gap between Maori and 
European standards of health and living. Indeed, during the Depression of the 1930s 
employment on public work schemes was at first denied to Maori, seeing many casual 
workers return to their remaining tribal lands (Thompson 1985:124) and exacerbate the 
situation there. It was not until the policies of the first Labour government in 1935 that 
the position of Maori really began to change (Sutch 1969:308). However, together the 
various events and circumstances did nevertheless result in an overall rise in Maori 
female e0° from 30 years in 1900 to approximately 47 years by 1940 (Pool 1991a: 114). 
This was accompanied by a further increase in the estimated TFR from around 5.9 to 6.9 
(Pool 1991a: 112), resulting, by the end of the period, in a doubling of Maori numbers. 
Thus, although the period can rightly be described as one of marginalisation, it was also 
one of ‘recuperation in isolation’ (Pool 1991a: 104-129, see also King 1992:286).9
Somewhat conversely— and although Europeans remained considerably well 
ahead of Maori, the years 1900 to 1940 saw, overall, a marked slowdown in the rate of 
European population growth and material well-being. A number of factors were 
involved, uppermost of which were participation in the first world war and now entry 
into the second; the influenza epidemic of 1918; changes in farming technology which 
had significantly reduced rural employment; a major depression in the 1930s; and the 
years between the wars being described by Sutch (1968:37-45) as an inter-war
9 It should be noted, however, that the mortality associated with the influenza epidemic of 1918 had 
subsequent effects on fertility, in turn causing a reduction in the rate of population growth for the years 
immediately following.
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depression. Fertility had continued to fall almost monotonically throughout the period 
(Khawaja 1985:154-55), in 1935 reaching an all-time low of 2.05 and reducing the 
annual rate of natural increase—which in the 1870s had overtaken migration as the 
largest source of population growth—to around 1 per cent. Between 1932 and 1935— 
as had also occurred during the worst years of the earlier depression— net migration 
turned negative, showing an overall loss of almost 10,000 persons. Frustration with high 
unemployment and falling living standards saw the first Labour government (1935) 
elected on a platform of social and economic reform, leading, in 1938, to the 
establishment of New Zealand’s welfare state.
Nevertheless, vis-ä-vis Maori, life for the primarily European-origin population 
remained relatively good. Until the 1920s, Maori land was still being alienated to 
European at an average rate of 250,000 acres per annum, advantaging both European 
farmers and their supporting industries. Industrialisation—relatively slow to become 
established in New Zealand—was now seriously challenging the pastoral-based economy 
(Easton 1996a: 11), producing opportunities for displaced rural workers in the secondary 
and tertiary industries. Non-Maori—predominantly European— life expectancy 
continued to rise, from 60 years for females at the turn of the century, to 69 years by 
1941 (Pool 1985:219). Certainly the falling fertility of the period may have reflected the 
negative socio-economic circumstances of the period. However, since it also coincided 
with an overall increase in the proportions of successive birth cohorts ever-marrying, 
along with a steady fall in the cohort mean age at marriage (O’Neill 1985:195, 203; 
Jackson and Pool 1994:26), there is evidence that whatever socio-economic factors 
were affecting period fertility they were not restricting the ability of couples to marry. 
Furthermore, completed cohort fertility rates had in fact begun rising prior to the 
Depression, whilst by 1940 the TFR had recovered to 2.6, largely as a result of falling 
age at both childbearing (Khawaja 1985:155-9) and marriage.
Ignoring for now the effects of migration (which primarily affected European 
population), Figure 6.1.1 summarises the overall effects of these different fertility and 
mortality regimes as reflected in the age structures of the Sole Maori (50 per cent or 
more Maori blood) and non-Maori (predominantly European) populations across the 
period 1911-1936. Most obvious are the completely different directions in which the 
two age-structures moved, that for Maori becoming considerably younger, and that for 
non-Maori, considerably older.
Figure 6.1.1
Broad Age Groups as Percentage of Total Population, 
Sole Maori and Non-Maori, 1911-1936
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Source: Census of Population and Dwellings, various years (see Appendix D.3)
Importantly, the patterns reflect an almost monotonic continuation in trends that 
had begun in the previous century, or perhaps even earlier. Between 1857 and 1901, for 
example, the proportion of the Maori population aged 0-14 years had increased from 
around 27 per cent for males and 29 per cent for females, to 36 per cent for males and 
38 per cent for females (Pool 1991a: 102). Conversely, for European, the proportion in 
the same age-group had decreased, from a high of 42.4 per cent in 1878, to 31.5 per 
cent by 1906 (Neville 1985:37). The suggestion that these inverse trends may have 
begun even earlier lies in the fact that from the time of Cook’s first voyage (1769), the 
immunologically-virgin Maori population experienced demographic shocks10 that had 
produced a mature age structure (Pool 1991a:29-58),n a phenomenon still evident at the 
end of the nineteenth century when approximately 10 per cent of the Maori male 
population and 8 per cent of the female population were over the age of 60 (Pool 
1991a: 102). By contrast— and although the age structure of the European population
10 As implied above, these shocks involved an increase in disease-related mortality and a fall in fertility, 
the latter due to high levels of pathological sterility from venereal diseases brought by Cook’s sailors.
11 Pool (1977, 1991a:29-58) estimates that at the time of European contact Maori birth rates would have 
been in the range of 38-40 per 1000, death rates around 30-35 per 1000, and e0° around 28-30 years. 
Applying back-projection methodologies to a range of potential contact population sizes, he argues that 
approximately these levels would have been necessary for the population to have increased from its size 
at the time of first arrival, sometime between 500 and 1000 AD. By the early 1840s birth rates had 
fallen to the vicinity of 30 per 1000 (4-5 births per woman), death rates had risen to a much as 45 per 
1000, and e0° was somewhat less than 28 years.
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reflected its largely migrant composition, making comparison valid only in contextual 
terms— the proportion of the European population over the age of 65 in 1874 was a 
mere 1.2 per cent (Neville 1985:37). From that point these proportions changed. By 
1911, the proportion of European over the age of 65 had more than doubled, to 4.7 per 
cent, whilst for Maori the proportion over the age of 60 had fallen for males by more 
than one-third, and for females by almost one-third, to 6.4 and 5.6 per cent 
respectively.12
There can be little argument that the demographic changes experienced by Maori 
between contact and the late 1930s were interlocked with those of European (Pool 
1991a:4)— a point returned to below. This is not to say that European contact was the 
only cause of Maori demographic change— clearly other factors such as marginal food 
supplies and protein availability in the period prior to contact and/or colonisation would 
also have been implicated (Sutton 1986). However, as outlined above, the early years of 
colonisation were years of prosperity for many Maori, and thus any subsequent 
deterioration in Maori health and material well-being, along with changes to the social 
structure around which Maori family formation was organised, must be largely ascribed 
to the changing political-economic and demographic balance of the post-annexation 
period; so too the age which these changes produced.
6.2 REVIVAL AND TRANSITION
The situation of Maori over the period since 1940 reflects a dramatically altered 
involvement with the European social and economic system, brought about largely by 
the advent of the second world war and the subsequent post war economy. The changes 
spread simultaneously across three main fronts: urbanisation, formal labour force 
participation, and incorporation into the workings of the welfare state— in particular, to 
improved health and education services.
A general perception exists that Maori were encouraged to urbanise at the behest 
of the government (Spoonley 1985:14). Certainly the velocity of the change, shown in 
Table 6.2.1 and argued to be amongst the most rapid for a minority group anywhere 
(Gibson 1973:71-82), reflects a concerted effort, even when the effects of natural 
increase are discounted. However, others (e.g. Ministerial Advisory Committee 
1986:15-17) have argued that the shift was never an organised exodus planned and
12 Data are not available for the exact same age groups until 1911.
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directed by the government or by any other agency. Rather, it was an aggregate result of 
Maori initiative, created by opportunities for unskilled urban employment amidst the 
growing shortage of labour associated with the second world war and the post-war 
economy. Moreover, as entry into the war-time industry gathered momentum, 
responsibility for the massive task of organising, housing, training and attending to 
Maori welfare needs was handed over to and effectively carried out by Maori 
themselves. This exercise, which resulted in the establishment and semi-autonomous 
networking of 356 tribal and executive committees, was viewed over those years by 
both Maori and the State alike as a means of finally breaking the nexus of Maori 
inequality (Ministerial Advisory Committee 1986:16-17).
Table 6.2.1
Total and Maori Urbanisation (Percentage), Intercensal Increase in Urbanisation 
for Maori, and Percentage of Intercensal Increase for Maori due to Natural 
________________ Increase and Migration, 1926-1991________________
Per Cent Urban
Intercensal 
Increase 
for MaoriA
Per Cent of Intercensal Increase 
for MaoriA due to:
Total* MaoriA Natural Increase Migration
1926 15.6 11.7
1930 62.8 . . .
1936 . . . 17.3 29.3 68.1 31.9
1940 61.7 . . .
1945 . . . 25.7 . . . 23.1 76.9
1951 68.1 29.0 17.2 48.1 51.9
1956 35.0 18.6 45.2 54.8
1961 75.2 46.0 21.8 36.0 64.0
1966 . . . 61.6 20.4 30.5 69.5
1971 78.1 74.6 13.1 41.9 58.1
1976 83.0 76.2 18.7 60.1 39.9
1981 83.6 80.0 . . .
1986 83.8 79.0 . . .
1991 88.4 81.7 . . .
Notes: *1930-1976: Adminstrativs units of 1000 persons ormore;
*1981-1991:24 Main Urban Centres.
A1926-1991:24 Main Urban Centres.
Source: 1926-1976, Watson 1985, Tables 59, 60 and 61
1981-1991, Compiled from Census of Population and Dwellings.
Importantly, these comments should not be interpreted as implying that Maori 
gained ground whilst their European counterparts were away at war. As with the first 
world war, the legendary efforts of the first Maori battalions were again followed by 
disproportionately heavy voluntary enlistment. As previously, this factor engendered a 
great deal of respect and increasing sentiments of obligation by European New
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Zealanders. However, by 1945, with more than one quarter of Maori urbanised 
(compared with two-thirds of the total population), the return of peace saw an almost 
immediate return to old attitudes and to the doctrine of European paternalism. A 
parliamentary bill prepared by key Maori protagonists with the intention of converting 
the established network of tribal committees and executives to the effort of 
reconstructing the Maori social and economic universe, was taken over by the 
(European) Minister of Maori Affairs and passed into law with its central Maori 
aspirations removed (Minsterial Advisory Committee 1986:17-18). Thereafter, as many 
have argued (and will be illustrated in the following chapter), urbanised Maori 
disproportionately comprised a pool of reserve labour to be hired and fired at need 
(Watson 1985:122).
Before considering the demographic implications of the changes, it is also 
important to acknowledge that (as implied above) Maori urbanisation had a significant a 
priori demographic context— the Maori population at this time was consummate for 
entry into the formal labour force not only because of its relatively low levels of formal 
attachment, but also because its growing and increasingly youthful population could no 
longer be maintained on its still-dwindling rural resources. These demographic factors 
had both negative and positive implications. On the negative side were the extremely 
high levels of youth dependency contained within the Maori age-structure, shown in 
Table 6.2.2. (Importantly, the effect of the differing Maori classification in the upper and 
lower panels of Table 6.2.2 should be noted. The data in the upper panel are perhaps the 
more valid for considering the issue of dependency, because those in the lower panel 
ignore to a greater extent the sizeable proportion of Maori children that have a non- 
Maori parent. The term ‘dependency’ is meant here in its aggregate form, and not in 
terms of familial dependency.) For a population with limited qualifications and skills, 
entry into the formal labour force would be at the unskilled and low paying end, and 
thus this dependency— in the 1940s considerably more than double that of non-Maori— 
would have to be met with relatively lower resources than those available, on average, 
to the latter. On the positive side this same youthful age structure would, ostensibly, see 
the Maori population gain qualifications, skills and improved health at a faster rate than 
its non-Maori counterpart. So too, once Maori fertility and mortality rates came to 
approximate those of the non-Maori population, would the relative size of the Maori 
working age population increase, and thus bring about reductions in its relative 
dependency ratios—that is, the ratios of the proportions of the population aged 0-14
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and/or 65+ years to the proportion of the population aged 15-64 years. However, as 
Table 6.2.2 also indicates, this did not begin to happen in any sustained fashion until the 
late-1960s, whilst even by 1991, relative Maori youth dependency remained higher than 
it had been in the early 1900s.
Table 6.2.2
Youth, Aged and Total Dependency, Maori and Non-Maori, 1911-1991
Youth Dependency (a) Aged Dependency (b) Total Dependency (c)
Year Maori | Non-Maori Ratio* Maori | Non-Maori Ratio* Maori | Non-Maori | Ratio*
Sole/Single Origin Maori and Non-Maori
1911 713 490 1.46 71 74 0.95 784 564 1.39
1916 762 535 1.43 65 78 0.83 828 613 1.35
1921 753 493 1.53 65 77 0.85 817 570 1.43
1926 817 460 1.78 83 78 1.07 901 538 1.68
1936 879 376 2.34 74 97 0.77 953 473 2.02
1945 914 395 2.31 58 138 0.42 971 534 1.82
1951 911 457 1.99 50 154 0.32 961 611 1.57
1956 928 507 1.83 46 159 0.29 974 666 1.46
1961 1009 541 1.87 41 155 0.26 1050 695 1.51
1966 1054 519 2.03 40 148 0.27 1095 667 1.64
1971 1001 500 2.00 40 150 0.27 1041 650 1.60
1976 862 453 1.90 41 154 0.26 903 607 1.49
1981 679 404 1.68 41 166 0.25 720 570 1.26
1986 543 358 1.52 41 172 0.24 584 530 1.10
1991 519 337 1.54 45 185 0.25 565 522 1.08
Maori Ethnic Group and Non-Maori
1981 765 385 1.98 40 170 0.24 805 555 1.45
1986 664 337 1.97 40 176 0.22 704 514 1.37
1991 625 318 1.96 42 189 0.22 667 507 1.31
Notes: (a) Number of persons aged 0-14 years per 1000 aged 15-64 years
(b") Number of persons aged 65+ years per 1000 aged 15-64 years 
(c) Number of persons aged 0-14 and 65+ years per 1000 aged 15-64 years 
'Maori dependency per Non-Maori dependency.
Non-Maori = Total Population minus specified Maori classification 
Source: Computed from the age volumes of each Census (see Appendix D.3)
The apparent steadfastness of the Maori index for youth dependency vis-ä-vis 
that of European reflects, of course, the population dynamics of both groups. On the 
Maori side, between the early-1940s and 1961, there was sustained high fertility in the 
context of rapidly falling infant mortality, the latter brought about in part by urbanisation 
and improving living standards, in part by universal hospitalisation of maternity cases 
and the associated ante-natal, maternal and child health measures, but overwhelmingly 
from a substantial fall in deaths and cross-infection from tuberculosis (Pool 1977, 
1991a: 133-160). Importantly, as Pool (1997, Chapter 6, 1991a: 149-151) argues, the 
decline in mortality began before the introduction of antibiotics and chemotherapy, and 
must be attributed instead to wide-spread social legislation which followed systematic 
X-ray screening for tuberculosis with comprehensive social welfare back-up, most
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notably free medical treatment and state-subsidised housing. Together these dynamics, 
which undoubtedly saw Maori perceive a substantial reversal of their previous 
misfortunes, caused an equally substantial increase in the proportion of the Maori 
population aged 0-14.
Thereafter Maori fertility also began to fall, at first slowly and then rapidly, 
leaving in its wake the slowly and then rapidly subsiding levels of youth dependency 
evident in column 1 of Table 6.2.2. The fact that Maori urbanisation played a role in this 
fertility decline is undoubted—the shift of young Maori away from their extended 
families would, for example, have meant the breaking of some social mores and, at a 
pragmatic level, a certain loss of child carers. However, that the major decline in Maori 
fertility did not occur until the late 1960s, when close to two-thirds of Maori were 
urbanised, suggests that other factors were equally important. Maori children may, for 
example, have initially remained (or been sent to live) with relatives in rural areas, a not- 
unlikely scenario given the socio-cultural organisation and informal adoption networks 
of the period (Douglas 1977), and one that would have minimised the role 
incompatibility associated with formal labour force participation. Indeed, it is plausible 
that Maori fertility stayed high until 1961 as a combined result of the perceived socio­
economic changes of the period, and of the continuation of Maori social organisation, 
which would have facilitated the large families that Maori in general valued. It would 
also, of course, have reflected the phenomenon of momentum effect (described in 
Chapter 3), whereby the declining infant mortality of earlier years would have resulted in 
an incremental increase in the numbers of each cohort reaching reproductive age.
The apparent decline in relative youth dependency between 1951 and 1961, 
observable in column 3 of Table 6.2.2, is, on the other hand, more a reflection of non- 
Maori population dynamics, in particular the baby boom, which, between 1940 and 
1961, not only increased the proportion of non-Maori at the younger ages, but did so to 
a considerably greater extent than for Maori. These underlying non-Maori dynamics, 
which, aside from their commonly-experienced link with the post-war increase in 
marriage rates in most developed countries, have never been satisfactorily explained, can 
be ascertained from columns 2 and 4. Importantly, although both sets of dynamics 
(Maori and non-Maori) can be perceived of as having had a similar outcome, namely 
youth dependency peaking between 1961 and 1966 for both populations, it is essential 
to keep in mind the extreme differences in their underlying determinants. For non-Maori, 
who for some time had enjoyed relatively low infant mortality, youth dependency
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increased because birth rates (and numbers) increased; for Maori, birth rates—which had 
increased during the latter part of the nineteenth century— stayed more or less the same, 
whilst numbers rose and the fall in infant mortality accelerated. These trends, located in 
their historical context, are plotted in Figures 6.2.1-6.2.3, the latter of which— for the 
reasons explained in Chapter 4— shows life expectancy at birth (e0°) rather than infant 
mortality.
Figure 6.2.1
Total Fertility Rates (Births Per Woman), Maori and Non-Maori, 1840-1995
CC 2 -
Non-Maori —■— Maori —x  — Total
Source: S e e  Appendix D.4.
Figure 6.2.2
Number of Births (Cohort Size) Maori and Non-Maori, 1866-1995
60000
-- 8000a 5oooo --
*- 7000
40000 --
-- 5000 o
30000 -■
-- 4000 «
Non-Maori
-- 3000 m• =  20000 - - Maori
- -  2000
£  10000
- -  1000
) I i  4—t f + H - H -+ 4
i - m ' » - ' t N . O C O C 0 0 5 C M W C 0 1» - ' f rc o ^ i - c o c D c o r ^ i ^ h ' r ^ - o o o o o o o i O iCO CO CO t-CO N- CO O
Source: Vital Statistics, Demographic Trends, various years (see  Appendix D.4)
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Figure 6.2.3
Life Expectancy at Birth, Maori and European/Non-Maori, by Sex, 1840-1995
Non-Maori Females
aori Males
Non-Maori Males
Maori Female:
Notes: Maori data prior to 1926 based on indirect estimation techniques (Pool 1985).
Source: Maori data prior to 1926: Pool 1985, Figure 31;
Pool 1985, Tables 116 and 12; Pool 1990:41;
Demographic Trends 1993, Table 4.9 (See Appendix D.5 for all data).
Before returning to the implications of the relative age structures derived from 
these dynamics, attention is drawn to an earlier point regarding the apparently 
‘interlocked’ nature of these age structures, and the proposals given in relation to 
Hypothesis 4 in Chapter 4 (that an increase or decrease in e0° of approximately 15-20 
per cent over a ten year period for either population would reflect a ‘substantial’ 
change). Although Maori life expectancy data for the early historical period are based on 
the technique of indirect estimation and thus are subject to a degree of error (see Pool 
1982), the dramatic decline in female e0° between 1840 and 1856— a magnitude of some 
30 per cent— is further supported by a second estimation also of this level in 1896 for 
both males and females. That this decline was a direct result of an equally substantial 
change in the productive base of the Maori economy, and with it, social and economic 
relationships between Maori and European, must also be concluded from the foregoing 
historical review. Similarly, it would appear that the dramatic increase in European e0° 
between 1840 and 1876 (an increase of 68 per cent) also reflected these changed social 
and economic relationships, whilst the slowly increasing Maori e0° from the end of the 
century, and the dramatic improvement between 1946 and 1956 (an increase of 17 per 
cent in ten years) reflects a substantial reversal of the earlier situation. Thus the
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hypothesis that such trends are connected is well supported, in the first case suggesting 
that the substantial improvements in European/non-Maori life expectancy over the 19th 
Century were in large part a function of the material well-being of the European 
population, initially appropriated from Maori, whilst the declines for Maori reflect, along 
with the ravages of disease and war, the opposite; and in the second case, that the tum- 
of-the-century beginnings of demographic convergence (at least in terms of e0°) occurred 
as the benefits of living in the wealthiest country in the world (as measured by GDP per 
capita) were gradually extended to Maori, albeit on paternalistic terms.
These arguments are returned to in Chapter 11, which considers in more detail 
the fertility trends depicted in Figure 6.2.1 for the 1960-1991 period, against the relative 
employment and earnings experience of Maori and European. For now, the focus returns 
to the resulting ethnic differences in age structure, and to the various ways in which, for 
the purposes of this thesis, the data need to be understood. Reflecting the foregoing 
patterns and trends, columns 3 and 4 of Table 6.2.3 show that between 1911 and 1945 
the relative proportions of Maori to non-Maori aged 0-14 years underwent a steady 
increase. Between 1956 and 1961, as the European baby boom cohorts impacted upon 
the European/non-Maori age structure, the proportions of Maori to non-Maori began to 
decline, and, although they underwent a further brief increase around 1966, reflecting a 
slightly greater rate of decline in European than Maori fertility between 1961 and 1966 
(22 per cent, compared with 20 per cent, see Appendix D.4), the proportional decline 
continued, at least until 1986.13 However, as the data in column 5 imply, these trends tell 
only part of the story, that which has implications for understanding the overall effect on 
each ethnic group of the relative proportions of each group approaching the age of 
labour force entry and/or eventually becoming employed (or unemployed). Whilst this 
manifestation of age structure is central to the concerns of Chapters 7-10, the numerical 
ratio data in column 5, by contrast, relate to the absolute size of each group, and have 
implications for understanding the relationship between cohort size and inequality as 
examined in Chapter 11. The distinction between the two is perhaps best illustrated by 
recalling from Chapter 4 that the percentage ratio (column 4) acts as a multiplier of any 
age-specific effects, whilst the numerical difference (column 5) reflects the contribution
13 Again it should be recalled that the Maori Ethnic Group is likely to have experienced a 
disproportionate increase in numbers from the inclusion of inter-ethnic births, especially at these 
younger ages. However, this situation is of major significance only where ‘dependence’ ratios are being 
compared. These comments apply also to Tables 6.2.4 and 6.2.5, and to Figures 6.2.4 and 6.2.5.
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to the total cohort made by Maori within the cohort. Importantly, the former shows a 
general decline after the effects of peak fertility were passed, whilst the latter increases.
Table 6.2.3
Percentage of Population Aged Less Than 15 Years by Ethnic Classification,
Percentage Point Difference Between Maori and Non-Maori, Proportionate Ratio 
of Maori to Non-Maori, and Numerical Ratio of Maori to Total, 1911-1991
Sole/Single Percentage Point Percentage Ratio* Numerical Ratio#
Origin Maori Non-Maori Difference* Maori: Non-Maori Maori Total
1911 40.0 31.3 8.7 1.28 0.06
1916 41.7 33.2 8.6 1.26 0.05
1921 41.4 31.4 10.0 1.32 0.05
1926 43.0 29.9 13.1 1.44 0.06
1936 45.0 25.5 19.5 1.76 0.09
1945 46.3 25.8 20.6 1.80 0.10
1951 46.5 28.4 18.1 1.64 0.09
1956 47.0 30.4 16.6 1.55 0.09
1961 49.2 31.9 17.4 1.54 0.10
1966 50.3 31.1 19.2 1.62 0.12
1971 49.1 30.3 18.8 1.62 0.12
1976 45.3 28.2 17.1 1.61 0.13
1981 39.5 25.7 13.8 1.53 0.13
1986 34.3 23.4 10.9 1.47 0.13
1991 33.2 22.2 11.0 1.50 0.14
Maori Ethnic Group and Non-Maori
1981 42.4 24.8 17.6 1.71 0.19
1986 39.0 22.3 16.7 1.75 0.20
1991 37.5 21.1 16.4 1.78 0.21
Notes: ’Percentage Maori minus Percentage Non-Maori
Percentage of Maori as a ratio to Percentage of Non-Maori 
#Numberof Maori as a proportion of number of Maori plus Non-Maori 
Source: Computed from the age volumes of each Census (see Appendix D.3).
Nevertheless, as explained in Chapter 3, the combined circumstances of falling 
infant mortality and falling fertility which ultimately give rise to a declining proportion of 
youth, are, in turn, typically correlated with an inverse and ostensibly positive increase in 
the proportion of the population at the working ages (15-64 years). Table 6.2.4 shows 
the relative expansion of the latter sector for Maori. The difference between the two 
populations peaked in 1936 at nearly 17 percentage points, whilst by 1991 it was 
approaching unity. The extent to which this shift may have translated into positive 
increases in Maori labour force participation and income over the period, and thereby 
into an improved capacity to accommodate the higher levels of dependency shown 
above, however, can only be ascertained by turning to labour force and other 
production-related data, as is done in the following chapters.
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Table 6.2.4
Percentage of Population Aged 15-64 Years by Ethnic Classification, Percentage 
Point Difference Between Maori and Non-Maori, Proportionate Ratio of Maori to
Non-Maori, and Numerical Ratio of Maori to Total, 1911-1991
Sole/Single Origin Percentage Point Percentage RatioA Numerical Ratio#
Maori Non-Maori Difference* Maori: Non-Maori Maori:Total
1911 56.1 64.0 -7.9 0.88 0.04
1916 54.7 62.0 -7.3 0.88 0.04
1921 55.0 63.7 -8.7 0.86 0.03
1926 52.6 65.0 -12.4 0.81 0.04
1936 51.2 67.9 -16.7 0.75 0.04
1945 50.7 65.2 -14.5 0.78 0.05
1951 51.0 62.1 -11.1 0.82 0.05
1956 50.7 60.0 -9.4 0.84 0.05
1961 48.8 59.0 -10.2 0.83 0.06
1966 47.7 60.0 -12.3 0.80 0.06
1971 49.0 60.6 -11.6 0.81 0.07
1976 52.5 62.2 -9.7 0.84 0.07
1981 58.1 63.7 -5.6 0.91 0.08
1986 63.1 65.4 -2.2 0.97 0.09
1991 63.9 65.7 -1.8 0.97 0.09
Maori Ethnic Group and Non-Maori
1981 55.4 64.3 -8.9 0.86 0.11
1986 58.7 66.1 -7.4 0.89 0.11
1991 60.0 66.3 -6.4 0.90 0.12
Notes: 'Percentage Maori minus Percentage Non-Maori
P ercentage of Maori as a ratio to Percentage of Non-Maori
#Number of Maori as a proportion of number of Maori plus Non-Maori
Source: Computed from the age volumes of each C ensus (see  AppendixD.3).
As Table 6.2.5 shows, the proportions of Sole/Single Origin Maori elderly at the 
end of the period were somewhat lower than they were at the beginning (a fall of more 
than 25 per cent), whilst the opposite is true for non-Maori (an increase of 156 per 
cent). Clearly (as Table 6.2.2 also showed), the greater youth-related dependency faced 
by Maori over the period was strongly and increasingly matched by the greater aged- 
dependency of non-Maori. Even the greater rapidity of the 1970s fertility decline for 
Maori, shown earlier in Figure 6.2.1, had by 1991 made little impact on the growing 
percentage point difference between the two populations in the proportion of elderly.
However, the greater rapidity of fertility decline for Maori will have its sequel in 
a considerably more rapid ageing process than that experienced by non-Maori, the early 
manifestations of which can be ascertained from Table 6.2.5. In the quarter-century 
between the nadir of Maori elderly in 1966, and 1991 (employing the Sole/Single Origin 
Maori classification), the proportion of Maori aged 65+ increased by more than 50 per 
cent, against a 37 per cent increase for non-Maori. Although of minimal import in the 
1990s (and indeed, the increase reflecting less than a single percentage point in absolute
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terms), the relative velocity and magnitude of this shift will have consequences for Maori 
aged dependency in the middle of the twenty-first century.
Table 6.2.5
Percentage of Population Aged 65+ Years by Ethnic Classification, Percentage 
Point Difference Between Maori and Non-Maori, Proportionate Ratio of Maori to
Non-Maori, and Numerical Ratio of IVLaori to Total, 191Ll-1991
Sole/Single Origin Percentage Point Percentage Ratio7' Numerical Ratio#
Maori Non-Maori Difference* Maori: Non-Maori Maori:Total
1911 4.0 4.7 -0.8 0.83 0.04
1916 3.6 4.9 -1.3 0.73 0.03
1921 3.6 4.9 -1.3 0.73 0.03
1926 4.4 5.1 -0.7 0.87 0.04
1936 3.8 6.6 -2.8 0.58 0.03
1945 2.9 9.0 -6.1 0.33 0.02
1951 2.5 9.6 -7.0 0.27 0.02
1956 2.3 9.6 -7.2 0.24 0.02
1961 2.0 9.1 -7.1 0.22 0.02
1966 1.9 8.9 -6.9 0.22 0.02
1971 1.9 9.1 -7.1 0.21 0.02
1976 2.1 9.6 -7.4 0.22 0.02
1981 2.4 10.6 -8.2 0.22 0.02
1986 2.6 11.3 -8.7 0.23 0.02
1991 2.9 12.1 -9.2 0.24 0.02
Maori Ethnic Group and Non-Maori
1981 2.2 10.9 -8.7 0.20 0.03
1986 2.3 11.6 -9.3 0.20 0.03
1991 2.5 12.5 -10.0 0.20 0.03
Notes: "Percentage Maori minus Percentage Non-Maori
Percentage of Maori as a ratio to Percentage of Non-Maori 
#Num ber of Maori as a proportion of num ber of Maori plus Non-Maori 
Source: Computed from the age volumes of each Census (see Appendix D.3).
Figures 6.2.4 and 6.2.5 summarise the above dynamics in terms of overall 
changes in population age structure. Evident in the first two panels (1911 and 1916) of 
Figure 6.2.4 is the relatively mature age structure experienced by the Maori population 
around the early years of the century, reinforced by what would appear to be the effects 
of high infant and child mortality occurring some 30-40 years earlier, during the isolation 
years of the 1870s and 1880s. However, the compression shown in these age structures 
around 30-40 years of age is also a reflection of subsequent population dynamics. As 
shown earlier in Figure 6.2.1, birth rates are believed to have been rising during the 
1860s to 1870s and to have peaked around 1886, whilst these trends were accompanied 
by a small but accelerating decline in infant mortality (Pool 1991a:75-82), bringing about 
a subsequent increase in the proportion at younger ages and a reversal in the trend of 
population ageing.
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Figure 6.2.4
Age Structure of the Maori Population, by 5-Year Age-Group, 1911-1991
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Source: Compiled from age volumes. Census of Population and Dwellings, various years (see Appendix D3)
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Figure 6.2.5
Age Structure of the Non-Maori Population, 
by 5-year Age-Group, 1911-1991
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So too are the effects of Maori (male) participation in the Second World War 
visible in the panel for 1945. Over the years between 1911 and 1945 can also be seen the 
increasing youthfulness of the Sole/Single Origin Maori age structure, peaking in 1966, 
and the rapid shift thereafter to an increasingly rectangular structure, typical of an early 
post-transition population. That said, the small increase in the 0-4 year age group in the 
panel for 1991 appears to run counter to these trends. So too do the increasingly 
youthful age structures depicted in the three panels for the Maori Ethnic Group 
population (1981a, 1986a and 1991a), located at the base of Figure 6.2.4. The extent to 
which these trends are due to the currently high proportions of women at childbearing 
ages— deriving from the births of the 1960s; and/or to an increase in the proportion of 
children being classified as Maori by their parents, is uncertain. However, assuming that 
these children continue to identify as Maori (i.e. that they do not shift to alternative 
ethnic classifications over time), the latter point is also somewhat irrelevant. As 
explained in Chapter 5, the technical facets of Maori blood fraction are considerably less 
important than are patterns and trends in the social indicators for those who claim to be 
Maori.14
For the non-Maori population, data for which are shown in Figure 6.2.5, the 
effects of the two world wars (the indents in the relevant age structures at 20-30 years 
primarily reflecting troop absences), the following baby boom with its peak in 1961, and 
the increasing rectangularisation of the age structure since, are also clear. For non-Maori 
more than Maori however, these structures reflect not only changing fertility and 
mortality, but also migration.
Reorganising these data by cohort (see Appendix D.6) permits the longitudinal 
effects of attrition (by deaths and emigration) and/or augmentation (by immigration) to 
be illustrated. These data show that non-Maori cohorts bom 1922-1946 were heavily 
augmented over their middle-adult years by the immigration of the 1970s, the greatest 
effects being experienced by the cohort born 1937-1941. For both males and females in 
this cohort, cohort size peaked at age 35-39, by which time it had increased in size by 23 
per cent over its size at birth. This was closely followed by the experience of the cohort 
bom 1932-1936, which reached its peak size at age 40-44, when it was 21 per cent 
larger than at birth. By contrast, the size of the cohort bom 1957-1961, at the peak of 
the baby boom, and aged 30-34 years in 1991, experienced its peak size (thus far) at age
14 Important in this regard is the attention paid to the ethnic classification of the data employed in the 
following chapters.
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15-19 for males and age 10-14 for females, at which time it had increased by a mere 3 
and 4 per cent respectively. Thereafter the cohort declined in size, its male component 
falling to 91 per cent of its size at birth, its female component, to 98 per cent.
Indeed, cohorts bom 1952-1971 appear to have been particularly affected by net 
out migration, a phenomenon that applies to non-Maori and Maori alike, but is even 
more pronounced for Maori. The Maori male cohorts bom 1957-1961 and 1962-1966, 
for example, had by 1991 (when aged 30-34 and 25-29 years) declined in size by 23 and 
24 per cent respectively. For Maori females these proportions in 1991 had similarly 
declined by 15 and 16 per cent.
Unfortunately, these effects, which are of some import to the key questions 
being explored in this thesis (see, for example, Zodgekar 1985 on the labour force), 
cannot be explored in any detail. However, their implications are again noted in Chapter 
11, which considers the effect of cohort size on ethnic inequality. In the interim, the 
thesis turns to the analysis of ethnic differentials in New Zealand’s socio-economic 
structure.
6.3 SUMMARY
The Maori chiefs who signed the Treaty of Waitangi on behalf of their tribes in 
1840 did so in a spirit of co-operation, believing that the Crown would protect them 
against the more negative features of colonialism, whilst extending to them its benefits. 
They could not have forseen the extent to which the incoming settler population would 
so rapidly and dramatically overwhelm their numbers, physically, socio-economically, 
culturally and politically. Indeed it is recorded that one such chief said later that he had 
planned to station one or two pakeha at each of his pa sites, in order that the latter 
would act as liaison between trade goods produced by Maori, and the markets in Britain 
(reference unknown).
Most importantly, the subsequent fall in material (and physical) well-being of 
Maori was pre-empted not by any inherent incapacity to develop economically, but by 
settler greed for the highly productive land, and through facilitation of access to it by the 
overtly racist and legal processes of a succession of settler governments. So 
dispossessed, Maori had no alternative but to eventually re-enter the market economy 
as— disproportionately— sellers of their labour power, and thus New Zealand’s initial 
relations of production came to be established along these essentially racial boundaries.
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This is a point that must be emphasised, because it is common to see the situation of 
Maori in the 1990s referred to as reflecting 150 years of involvement in the capitalist 
economy, whereas in truth the period is closer to 50 years. Indeed, even the first 20 of 
these latter years must be viewed from the special perspective associated with the mass 
urbanisation of Maori from their rural hinterlands and semi-subsistence economy.
Over the period in its entirety, both the European/non-Maori and Maori 
populations experienced demographic transition, that of the former beginning shortly 
after arrival in New Zealand, and at the turn of the century conferring on it the highest 
levels of life expectancy and one of the lowest fertility rates in the world; that of the 
latter beginning after the turn of the century with a slowly accelerating fall in infant 
mortality, but not followed by fertility decline until the 1960s. However, prior to this 
‘delayed’ variant of demographic transition for Maori was demographic change of a very 
different sort— one in which infant mortality (and mortality per se) and then rates of 
childbearing initially increased, seemingly as a result of the material, political and social 
disruption wrought by colonisation, but also reflecting the legacy of venereal disease 
brought by sailors and whalers prior to 1840. Although seldom articulated in Marxist 
terminology, such ‘pre-transition’ patterns have been increasingly recognised in the 
demographic literature as occurring when the capitalist mode of production comes into 
contact with a traditional/domestic economy. What has been less well acknowledged is 
the extent to which the subsequent age structures and their long-term implications are a 
direct result of these dynamics, and not least of the power relations between the affected 
groups. For the European population, demographic transition occurred largely as the 
result of the growing wealth of the population, appropriated from the indigenous Maori. 
For Maori, demographic transition was not merely of the ‘delayed variant’, but was for a 
long time also denied by virtue of that appropriation. That the Maori population in both 
the 1940s and the 1990s should be so youthful vis-ä-vis European is equally a 
consequence of these ‘delayed’ dynamics (albeit also reflecting the disproportionate 
allocation of inter-ethnic births to the Maori Ethnic Group) as are the socio-economic 
and policy implications that these relative age structures engender.
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1
ETHNIC DIFFERENTIALS IN LABOUR FORCE STATUS AND
EMPLOYMENT STA TU S
7.0 INTRODUCTION
The situation of the Maori population as it began to re-enter the capitalist 
economy in the 1940s was that of a disproportionately proletarianised and youthful 
society, two characteristics often associated with the economically disadvantaged 
populations of the world. However, given equality of opportunity in a country renowned 
for its egalitarianism and ‘self made men’, these two factors would not necessarily 
equate with disadvantage for Maori. In the first place, a population that had only its 
labour power to sell stood to be near fully employed in the forthcoming post-war 
economic boom, and, ceteris paribus, to eventually become employers and self- 
employed in similar proportions to European. So too, over time, would a relatively 
youthful population stand to gain disproportionately in terms of both education and 
contemporary skills acquired in the work-place, making it better equipped to compete in 
a technologically advancing labour market. Furthermore, as implied in the previous 
chapter, once the fertility of that youthful population fell it would enjoy a window period 
in which the proportion of those at the working ages would expand for some years 
before the negative effects of population ageing would begin to cancel out those gains. 
Taken together, these factors imply a process of decreasing labour force participation 
differentials, and decreasing compositional differentials within that participation.
This chapter explores these arguments through an examination of trends and 
differentials in labour force status and employment status. Each of the two sections 
begins with an overview of historical trends and then moves to a component analysis 
whereby the proportion of the observed (crude) differential for each category that is due 
to (a) age structure and (b) the underlying— ‘true’— difference (reflecting factors such 
as qualifications, skills) is demonstrated. Each section concludes with a review of age- 
specific trends for key indicators, in some cases by cohort, the latter giving an indication 
as to whether changes across the life cycle have been endogenous to certain cohorts, or 
universal.
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Importantly, as explained in Chapter 5, ethnic and other classificatory changes 
across the period mean that data are often somewhat discontinuous. Considerable 
attention has been paid to this essentially irresolvable matter, and all discontinuities and 
discrepancies have been fully acknowledged.
7.1 LABOUR FORCE STATUS
Figure 7.1.1 shows long term trends and ethnic differentials in full-time labour 
force participation. Most obvious is the overall decline in participation for males of both 
ethnic groups, against an equally substantial increase for females, at least until 1981- 
1986, and the fact that rates for Maori and non-Maori have been remarkably similar for 
most of the period, especially for females. Moreover, since the mid-1950s for males and 
the early 1970s for females, Maori rates have been a little higher than those for non- 
Maori, remaining so until the most recent observation (1991).
Figure 7.1.1
Full-Time Labour Force Participation Rates for Sole/Single Origin Maori and 
Non-Maori Populations Aged 15+ Years, by Sex, 1911-1991
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Source: Appendix E.1
As implied above, however, these levels are significantly affected by the differing 
age structures of Maori and non-Maori. When the observed differentials (the difference 
between the crude labour force participation rates of non-Maori and Maori) are
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subjected to component analysis, as in Figure 7.1.2, the underlying differentials show 
higher participation for Maori only for males (denoted by negative values), only between 
1971 and 1981, and to a much more marginal degree than implied by the observed 
differentials. At all other observations and for both sexes, the underlying differentials 
show higher participation for non-Maori. This fact is concealed because the Maori age 
structure is more ‘advantageous’ to labour force participation at all observations, and, 
with the exception of data for males between 1971-1981, either offsets or completely 
cancels out the underlying differentials.1 Furthermore, where Figure 7.1.1 showed 
greater similarity of female than male participation rates and trends, Figure 7.1.2 shows 
that underlying inequality has historically been somewhat greater amongst females, 
although this situation has recently reversed.
Figure 7.1.2
Component Analysis of Ethnic Differentials in Full-Time Labour Force 
Participation Rates for Population Aged 15+ Years, by Sex and Ethnic
Classification, 1951-1991
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Notes: 1951-1976 = De Facto population, 1981-1991 = De Jure population.
1951-1986 = Sole/Single Origin Maori; 1991= Maori Ethnic Group. 
Non-Maori = Total Population minus specified Maori classification. 
Source: Appendix E.2
1 It should be noted that there is a very slight difference in the data for 1991 between Figures 7.1.1 and 
7.2.2. The difference reflects the fact that whilst total full-time labour force data for the Sole/Single 
Maori Origin population in 1991 were published, the age specific data necessary for standardisation 
purposes were not. The discrepancy between the two classifications is very small, the LFPR for 
Sole/Single Origin Maori males used in Figure 7.1.1 being 59.1 per cent, and that for Maori Ethnic 
Group males in Figure 7.1.2 being 60.0 per cent. The equivalent figures for females are 32.4 and 33.8 
per cent.
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Importantly, the use of the term ‘advantage’ is not meant to imply that high 
levels of labour force participation are necessarily good or desirable, especially at the 
younger, tertiary education ages, or at the older, retirement ages, an interpretation that 
could be attempted only by turning to age-specific data. However, because 
unemployment is included in the index for labour force participation, the category itself 
is a rather blunt instrument for even attempting such an appraisement. Accordingly, 
attention is turned instead to labour force status.
First, it should be recalled from Chapter 5 that the data contain a significant shift 
in the classification of the labour force between 1981 and 1986, from full-time only to 
full-time plus part-time, and in the hours that denote full- and part-time. This essentially 
irresolvable shift2 has minimal effect on the distribution for males, but a considerable 
effect on trends in the proportion of females in each category. Nevertheless, as Figure 
7.1.3 shows, for neither group was the broader definition of employment enough to 
counter the substantial increases between 1986 and 1991 in the proportions unemployed 
and not in the labour force. That is to say, despite a potential increase in the proportions 
in employment due to the inclusion of part-time work from (and including) 1986, the 
proportion in employment actually fell, for both sexes and both ethnic groups. By 1991, 
just over half (50.4 per cent) of all Maori males over the age of 15 were not in 
employment (unemployment plus not in the labour force), against 36 per cent of all non- 
Maori males. (Data for females are discussed separately below). Furthermore, for males, 
these proportions reflect substantial increases over their corresponding rates in 1951, 
when only 21 per cent of all Maori males, and 18 per cent of non-Maori males, were not 
in employment.
The data thus also identify a substantial decline in inter-ethnic differences with 
regard to the relative proportions of those in employment, for males, from 0.96 Maori 
per non-Maori in 1951, to 0.78 in 1991. Since the Maori age structure is considerably 
younger than that of non-Maori, it would be expected that the proportion of the former 
in employment would be higher, rather than lower, than the latter. Indeed, this is what 
might have been suggested by the labour force participation data in Figure 7.1.2. The 
findings thus suggest that the Maori male population has been receiving very little
2 By drawing on Database A it would have been possible to aggregate full- and part-time employment 
for the 1976-1991 period, but this would have simply temporally re-located the disjunction. Figure 7.1.4 
below suggests that the trends would have differed only minimally.
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employment-related advantage from its more youthful age structure, an issue that is 
addressed in a moment.
Figure 7.1.3
Labour Force Status: Percentage of Population Aged 15+ Years 
in Each Category, by Sex and Ethnic Classification, 1951-1991
Non-Maori Males
100 y y y y y y y y
Non-Maori Females
100 y  y  y  y  y y y  y  M
Not in the Labour Force
V :■ Employed
1 1 1 c o  c o  t-S 3 I  3
Maori Males
100 y  y  y  y  y  y  y  y  ~
Maori Females
x  x  y  y  y  y  y  y  a
Notes: 1951-1986 denotes Sole/Single Origin Maori; 1991 denotes Maori Ethnic Group.
Non-Maori denotes Total population minus specified Maori classification.
1951-1981 = Full Time only, 1986-1991 = Full Time + Part Time.
Source: Compiled from the Census of Population and Dwellings, various years (see Appendix E.3).
Although the age structure of the Maori female population is slightly older than 
that of Maori males, similar comments must also be applied to trends for females. Whilst 
absolute trends for females have been very different across the period to those for males, 
showing an overall increase in employment for both groups, where Maori females in 
1951 had been almost as likely as non-Maori females to be employed (a ratio of 0.9 
Maori per non-Maori), by 1991 this ratio had fallen to 0.75.
When considered alongside the findings for males, the data reveal that the total 
proportion of all adult Maori (15+ years) not in employment increased from 49 per cent 
in 1951 to 58 per cent in 1991, but for non-Maori it actually declined, from 47 to 45 per 
cent, due to the greater increase in employment for non-Maori than Maori females.
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Importantly, the similarity of the Maori and non-Maori indices for 1951 must be 
emphasised. In 1951, the ratio (Maori to non-Maori proportions not in employment) 
was 1.04; by 1991 it was 1.3.
The increase in this gap has significant implications not only for ethnic inequality 
per se, but also for dependency, typically measured in terms of the proportion of the 
population at the key working ages, 15-64 years, vis-ä-vis those aged 0-14 and 65+ 
years, and not in terms of the proportion who are actually employed. In order to more 
appropriately address this issue, Table 7.1.1 gives an overview of trends for the working 
age population only. Because unemployment data are not available by age for the period 
1956-1971, only trends for 1976-1991 can be reviewed.3 A shift in ethnic classification 
between the forgoing analyses and Table 7.1.1 is also necessitated, from Maori and non- 
Maori to Maori Ethnic Group and European.
Table 7.1.1
Labour Force Status: Percentage of Maori Ethnic Group and European 
Populations Aged 15-64 Years in Each Category, Ratio of Proportions of Maori to 
Non-Maori in Employment and Not in Employment, and Index of Ethnic
Dissimilarity (Standardised and Unstanc ardised), by Sex, 1976-1991
Bhnic Group and MALES Index FEMALES Index
Labour Force Status 1976| 1981| 1986| 1991 1991/1976 1976| 1981| 1986| 1991 1991/1976
EUROPEAN
Full-Time 84.73 82.99 80.04 70.10 0.83 34.71 36.57 41.74 39.59 1.14
Part-Time 1.79 2.59 3.82 5.03 2.81 14.20 17.42 17.28 18.59 1.31
Unemployed 1.12 2.50 3.57 6.87 6.15 0.93 1.99 4.90 5.65 6.08
Notin Labour Force 12.36 11.92 12.57 18.00 1.46 50.15 44.02 36.09 36.18 0.72
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.00
NUMBER 821001 840879 884193 884127 805470 827877 872844 881976
MAORI
Full-Time 80.19 76.21 68.86 47.65 0.59 33.31 33.10 36.43 27.00 0.81
Part-Time 1.16 1.87 5.88 4.71 4.07 7.63 9.73 10.40 9.76 1.28
Unemployed 4.02 9.61 10.19 16.38 4.07 3.60 6.72 11.09 12.11 3.37
Notin Labour Force 14.63 12.31 15.07 31.26 2.14 55.47 50.45 42.08 51.13 0.92
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 1.00
NUMBER 90240 105960 117285 126816 91587 107535 120453 134046
RATIO OF PROPO TTIONS IN EMPLOYMENT (FULL-TIME PLLIS PART-TI ME)
Maori per European 0.94 0.91 0.89 0.70 0.74 0.84 0.79 0.79 0.63 0.76
RATIO OF PROPO RT10NS NOTIN EMPLOYMENT(UNEMPLC)YED PLUJ NOT IN THE LABOUR FORCE)
Maori per European 1.38 1.52 1.56 1.92 1.38 1.16 1.24 1.30 1.51 1.31
Indexof Dissimilar^ 5.18 7.50 11.18 22.78 4.40 7.98 11.16 12.18 21.42 2.68
Notes: Unemployment = Full-time for 1976-1981; Full-time plus part-time for 1986-1991.
Indexof Dissimilarity based on percentage in each individual labour force status. 
Source: Database A
3 The shortcoming means that for the years 1956-1971 it is possible to derive ‘in employment’ and ‘not 
in employment’ data for the population aged 15+ years only
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As would be expected, the shift to the younger, working age population 
increases the proportions of each ethnic group in employment (full-time plus part-time) 
and decreases the proportions not in employment (unemployed plus not in the labour 
force). However, for Maori, the difference is minimal, whereas for European it is 
substantial. The overall result, for both the employed and not employed populations of 
both sexes, is an even greater increase in inequality than occurred for the population 
aged 15+ years. When considered in terms of dependency (albeit with the caveats noted 
in the previous chapters), 55 per cent of all Maori aged 15-64 (males and females 
combined) were not in employment in 1991, compared with 33 per cent of all European, 
a ratio of 1.7. In 1951, these indices had been considerably more similar (39 and 32 per 
cent respectively), a ratio of 1.2.
Table 7.1.1 also gives the proportions working full- and part-time in relation to 
the total. As these data show, a significant change has taken place in the nature of 
employment. For males of both ethnic groups, the proportion of the total who are 
working full-time has steadily declined, although, reflecting the foregoing, considerably 
more so for Maori than for European. The result is a dramatic decline in male full-time 
relativity (Maori compared with European), with the ratio falling from 0.95 Maori per 
European in 1976, to 0.68 in 1991. For males of both ethnic groups there has also been 
a concomitant and significant increase in the proportion of the total in part-time 
employment, a nearly three-fold increase for European— accelerating between 1986- 
1991, and a four-fold increase for Maori, the latter declining slightly during the 1986- 
1991 period. Nevertheless, as implied earlier, the actual proportions of males concerned 
remain relatively small, in the vicinity of 5 per cent of each population.
By contrast, the proportions of the total in full- and part-time employment 
increased overall for European females, albeit with a small decline in the proportion in 
full-time employment between 1986 and 1991. Between 1976 and 1986, the proportions 
in both categories also increased for Maori females. However, these trends then 
reversed, that for full-time employment resulting in an index for Maori females some 19 
per cent lower than it had been in 1976, compared with a 14 per cent increase for 
European females, and resulting—as for males— in a dramatic deterioration in Maori to 
non-Maori full-time relativity, from 0.96 in 1971 to 0.68 in 1991. Importantly, these 
data also reinforce other arguments (e.g. Davies with Jackson 1994:88) that Maori 
female labour force participation has never been cushioned by part-time involvement to 
the same extent as it has been for European females.
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In order to summarise these trends over the long term, indices of dissimilarity for 
both the 15+ and 15-64 year old populations are given in Figure 7.1.4. Set against a 
substantial decline in inequality by sex, they show a sizeable increase in ethnic inequality 
that has significant implications both for those within the working age population, and 
for the youth and elderly populations which the working age populations must support. 
This is not to say that the burden of support for each ethnic group’s dependent members 
must be fully carried by each ethnic group as an individual entity— indeed, the welfare 
state assumes a considerable portion of this role, and the situation is even more complex 
as a result of intermarriage and inter-ethnic partnering. But it is important to 
acknowledge that the sharp deterioration in relative labour force status since 1976, and 
thus the likelihood of Maori being disproportionately dependent on the state, appears to 
reflect factors other than the ‘culture of dependency’ heavily promulgated by the New 
Zealand Government since 1991 (Shipley et al. 1991; ‘Beyond Dependency’ 
Conference, 1997). Supporting this contention is the substantial deterioration in the 
proportion of the total in full-time employment experienced by males of both ethnic 
groups, undoubtedly reflecting the impact of the economic restructuring that began in 
the 1970s.
Figure 7.1.4
Index of Dissimilarity for Labour Force Status: Populations Aged 15+ Years 
(1951-1991) and 15-64 Years (1976-1991), By Sex and Ethnic Classification
I  4 0 -
o> 30 --
g  10 -■
Females —x — Sex Segregation (AH Males/All Females)Males
Notes: (a) Population Aged 15+ Years;
1951-1986 denotes Sole/Single Origin Maori; 1991 denotes Maori Ethnic Group;
Non-Maori denotes Total Population minus specified Maori classification;
1951-1981 = Full Time only, 1986-1991 = Full Time + Part Time;
(b) Population Aged 15-64 Years; Maori Ethnic Group and European; Full-Time + Part-Time. 
Source: (a) Compiled from Census of Population and Dwellings (see Appendix E.3)
(b) Database A (see Table 7.1.1)
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The extent to which ethnic differences in age structure may also be one of these 
factors is implied in the age-standardised indices of dissimilarity given for the 15-64 year 
old Maori Ethnic Group and European populations in Figure 7.1.5. For males these 
indices were slightly lower than their unstandardised equivalents at all observations, 
whilst for females they were slightly higher between 1976 and 1986, and slightly lower 
in 1991. In the case of males the disparities indicate that the Maori age structure has 
been slightly disadvantageous to labour force status, whilst in the case of females it was 
at first advantageous, and then disadvantageous. That said, for males between 1976 and 
1986, the age-standardised indices underwent slightly greater intercensal increases than 
their unstandardised equalivalents, suggesting that the Maori male age structure over 
those years gave some protection against the increase in inequality. That is to say, if the 
Maori and European age structures had been the same, the indices of dissimilarity for 
males would have been lower, but the increase in inequality between 1976 and 1986 
would have been greater. The opposite was the case between 1986 and 1991, suggesting 
that the Maori male age structure by then played a (very) small role in producing the 
increase. By contrast, the Maori female age structure contributed to the intercensal 
increase in inequality at all observations. Thus, overall, it would seem that the Maori age 
structure has become increasingly disadvantageous to labour force status.
Figure 7.1.5
Comparison of Standardised and Unstandardised Indices of Dissimilarity for 
Labour Force Status: Maori Ethnic Group and European Populations Aged 15-64
Years, By Sex, 1976-1991
Males Females
■4—  Unstandardised
—x  — Standardised*
Source: Database A (see Table 7.1.1)
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7.1.1 Component Analysis of Labour Force Status:
As implied in Figure 7.1.6, which presents the results of component analysis, 
age-standardised aggregate indices can be misleading, because they conflate the different 
and sometimes mutually compensating effects that obtain within each category. 
Immediately obvious, for example, is that the age-effects for males in the full-time 
employment and unemployed categories lie on opposite sides of the line denoting unity, 
and thereby largely cancel each other out. (As with the earlier component analysis of 
labour force participation, zero denotes unity between the two ethnic groups; positive 
values denote higher proportions in the category for European, and negative values, for 
Maori. Note also that the scales differ between the employed and not employed 
categories.) Indeed, not only do the effects of age structure differ substantially from 
category to category, but they also do by sex and by year. In some cases, where both 
components lie on the same side of zero, they have an additive effect, augmenting the 
underlying (true) differential (and thereby adding to ethnic stratification), and in others, 
where they lie on different sides (as occurred with the analysis of labour force 
participation per se), a partial offsetting effect, thereby concealing the extent of the 
underlying ‘advantage’ or ‘disadvantage’ and causing ethnic stratification to be less than 
it would be if the two age structures were the same. The former patterns are particularly 
evident for males in full-time employment, females in part-time employment, and the 
unemployed of both sexes. The latter patterns are similarly evident for females in full­
time employment between 1976 and 1986, and not-in-the-labour-force females at all 
observations.
Within these generalities, however, there is considerable variation in terms of 
which population ‘gains’ or ‘loses’ from the effects of age structure. In the categories 
exhibiting additive effects, the European age structure consistently added to the 
proportions— and ostensibly the advantage— of European males in full-time 
employment, and of European females in part-time employment.4 Similarly, the Maori 
age structure consistently added to the proportions— and ostensibly the disadvantage— 
of unemployed Maori of both sexes. In 1976, 1981 and 1991 it also added (very slightly) 
to the proportions of Maori males in the ‘not in the labour force’ category, a finding 
suggestive of a negative interpretation when the lower proportions of Maori undertaking
4 The Maori age structure also conferred a small advantage on Maori males in part-time employment in 
1976, 1981, and 1991, but the category pertained to such small proportions of males that the effects 
must be deemed non-significant.
Figure 7.1.6
Component Analysis of Ethnic Differentials in Labour Force Status, 
Maori and European Populations Aged 15-64 Years, by Sex, 1976-1991
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post-compulsory education are factored in (an issue addressed in Chapter 9). In the two 
categories exhibiting fairly consistent offsetting effects, a feature which primarily 
affected females, age structure conferred, on the one hand, an advantage to the 
proportion of Maori females in full-time employment between 1976 and 1986— thereby 
partially concealing the underlying advantage of European females; and on the other, an 
ostensible disadvantage (if earnings potential is considered an outcome) to the 
proportion of European females who were not in the labour force—thereby partially 
concealing the underlying disadvantage of Maori females.
So too there is considerable variation in the contribution to the observed 
differentials for each category made by the age-effect across time. The peak age-effect in 
the unemployed category, for example, occurred for males in 1986, when age structure 
accounted for 22 per cent of the observed differential, and for females in 1981, when it 
accounted for 28 per cent, whilst by 1991 these proportions had fallen to 17 and 25 per 
cent for males and females respectively. However, these relative proportions are 
seriously affected by changes in the size of the denominators (the observed and/or 
underlying differentials), and can thus be misleading if viewed as functions of age 
structure per se. That is to say, because the age structures of the two populations are 
slowly converging, the expectation would be that, if the underlying differentials 
remained unchanged, the age-effects would show a steady decline. In some cases, 
however, the age structure effects decline because the underlying differentials increase, 
and vice versa. The effects of age structure in each category should thus not be read as 
implying ‘trends’ per se, but rather as indicating the extent to which age structure 
contributes to, or ameliorates, the underlying differential at each individual observation.
This is particularly so in the case of the proportion of males who were employed 
full-time, for whom ethnic differences in age structure in 1976 accounted for nearly one- 
half of the observed differential (of 4.5 percentage points), and in 1991, for just on 10 
per cent, but of a much larger observed differential (of 22.5 percentage points). As 
Figure 7.1.6 shows, the actual percentage points accounted for by age structure in fact 
changed very little across the period, although it should be noted that they did increase 
between 1986 and 1991.
Similarly, for the proportion of females in full-time employment, the effect of age 
structure in 1976 offset the underlying differential (of 4.3 percentage points) by 
approximately two-thirds. By 1986 this effect was less than one-third, but, as above, it 
pertained to a considerably larger underlying differential (of 7.6 percentage points). At
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both observations, therefore, ethnic stratification for females who were employed full­
time was reduced by the effect of age structure, whilst in 1991 the age-effect shifted to a 
small European advantage, thereby deriving a very small (2 per cent) additive effect and 
very slightly adding to ethnic stratification. For females who were not in the labour 
force, the effects of age structure (which accrued to European) similarly reduced ethnic 
stratification between 1976 and 1986 by approximately one-third, and in 1991 by only 4 
per cent, but again of a considerably enlarged underlying differential, which at all 
observations ‘favoured’ Maori.
Whilst there is little about the findings for unemployment per se that is surprising 
(and indeed, that has not already been broadly acknowledged, if seldom quantified), the 
findings in general reveal two important factors. First, it is of interest that the Maori age 
structure until (and including) 1986 conferred an advantage on the proportion of Maori 
females in full-time employment, but not on the proportion of Maori females in part-time 
employment at any observation, where it might have been expected; nor on the 
proportion of Maori males in full-time employment at any observation. These patterns 
suggest that females employed part-time have been, until recently, somewhat older on 
average than those employed full-time, whilst the opposite appears to have been the case 
for males, evidenced by the fact that Maori males gain no advantage from age stmcture 
in relation to the proportion in full-time employment, but a minute advantage in the 
proportion in part-time employment. Thus, although more so for males, these findings 
run counter to the impression— ostensibly reinforced earlier in Figure 7.1.1— that the 
youthful age structure of the Maori population is advantageous to labour force 
participation in general. Instead, for males, that ‘advantage’ has been almost solely due 
to the unemployed component of labour force participation, whilst for females it has 
until recently been a combined effect of unemployment plus full-time employment (even 
though the latter did not result in higher proportions of Maori than European in full-time 
employment per se), but in 1991 it was solely due to unemployment.
Second, as noted, the effects of age structure do not themselves fluctuate in the 
manner implied, and thus their generally declining ‘trends’ highlight changes in the base­
lines against which they are counterpoised. Where, for example, the component due to 
age structure for males in full-time employment declined from one-half of a small 
differential in 1976, to 10 per cent of a much larger differential in 1991, the patterns 
simultaneously reveal a dramatic increase in underlying inequality. Moreover, this 
increase in underlying inequality is evident in all labour force categories.
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7.1.2 Cohort Analysis of Labour Force Status:
These suppositions are confirmed when cohort trends in the age-specific data 
that underlie the foregoing are reviewed. Trends in the proportion of each total age 
group in employment (full-time plus part-time) are given first separately for each ethnic 
group (Figure 7.1.7), and then in terms of ethnic relativities (Figures 7.1.8 and 7.1.9). 
(Trends for the proportion of those not in employment, that is, unemployed plus not in 
the labour force, are the obverse of this index, and are therefore not presented.) 
Importantly, it must be remembered that age-specific/cohort measures essentially 
identify the probability of being in a certain labour force status (or any other category), 
rather than the impact of that finding on each population as a whole, which requires 
concomitant consideration of age structure as in the above component analysis. The 
reason for turning to cohort analysis is that it permits significant changes in intra- and 
inter-cohort experiences across the life cycle to be identified (that is, whether or not the 
above noted trends are universal or cohort-specific). It also permits examination of the 
extent to which trends across the life cycle show evidence of lag effects, whereby, for 
example, low levels of employment at one age (e.g. at 15-24 years, as a result of 
participation in tertiary education) may be made up at a later age.
Figure 7.1.7 shows that there is indeed evidence of an employment-entry lag 
effect between ages 15-19 and 20-24 for all cohorts bom 1957-1966, irrespective of sex 
and ethnicity, but this has been greatly reduced for the European cohorts bom 1967- 
1971, and has not occurred at all for the youngest Maori cohorts. Instead, in a 
significant departure from earlier patterns, the employment to population ratio for 20-24 
year old Maori males bom 1967-1971 remained the same as at 15-19 years, whilst for 
Maori females it declined slightly. Another type of lag effect—this one reflecting the 
effects of childbearing and childrearing— is also evident for females of both ethnic 
groups, although it is considerably dampened down for Maori females. That is to say, 
the ‘M ’-shaped curve typically associated with female labour force participation is much 
less pronounced for Maori, with employment over the labour force entry years much 
lower but more consistent than for European, a probable reflection of the considerably 
earlier childbearing of the former (an issue addressed in Chapter 11), although no 
direction of causality should be inferred.
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Figure 7.1.7
Employment to Population Ratios: Percentage of Each Total Age Group in 
Employment (Full -Time plus Part-Time), 
by Sex, Ethnicity, Cohort and Age, 1976-1991
Notes: For all cohorts with four observations, first observation = 1976, last observation = 1991
Source: Database B (see AppendixE.5.2)
Figure 7.1.7 also shows that the employment to population ratio has fallen for all 
male cohorts when at the same age as their predecessor, irrespective of ethnicity, 
although the effect is considerably more marked for Maori. Furthermore, for males of 
both ethnic groups, the greatest decline occurs across the last age span shown, which 
corresponds to the 1986-1991 period. For females, on the other hand, employment for 
each successively younger cohort is generally higher at each age, although this effect is 
considerably more marked for European.
When these data are re-examined as proportionate ratios (relativity) between 
ethnic groups, as in Figure 7.1.8 for males, a substantial increase in ethnic inequality can 
be seen to have occurred for all cohorts. Especially notable is the fact that this increase 
occurred from near-unity in 1976 (the first data point for each cohort). Furthermore, the
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decline is inversely related to year of birth: the younger the cohort, the greater the 
inequality when at the same age as the predecessor cohort. That said, the universality of 
the trends clearly indicate that the causes are not endogenous to any specific cohort, but 
instead reflect period effects which slowly gathered momentum between 1976 and 1986, 
and accelerated between 1986 and 1991.
Figure 7.1.8
Maori Ethnic Group-European Relativity in Percentage of Each Total Age Group 
in Employment (Full-Time plus Part-Time), by Cohort and Age, Males, 1976-1991
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Figure 7.1.9 shows that trends have been very similar for females, albeit patterns 
over the key childbearing and childrearing years vary accordingly. For example, where 
trends for the cohorts bom 1952-1956 and 1957-1961 show an initial improvement in 
employment relativity as the key childbearing and childrearing years are passed, 
reflecting the patterns for the females of each ethnic group shown in Figure 7.1.7, this 
upward movement is curtailed five years earlier for the latter bom cohort, whilst no 
improvement occurs at all for the cohort bom 1962-1966. Furthermore, with the 
exception of trends at 15-19 years of age, all female cohorts have experienced lower 
employment relativity than their predecessor when at the same age, as was the case for 
males. Aside from the effects of the childbearing and childrearing period, which see the
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highest levels of ethnic inequality for females corresponding with the peak childbearing 
years, the only major difference between the trends for males and females is that for 
females the decline across the life cycle began from a generally lower level of equality 
than for males, and although reaching similar levels of inequality to males in 1991, did 
not, therefore, fall by the same magnitude.
Figure 7.1.9
Maori Ethnic Group-European Relativity in Proportion of Each Total Age Group 
in Employment (Full-Time plus Part-Time), 
by Cohort and Age, Females, 1976-1991
Notes: For all cohorts with four observations, first observation = 1976,
last observation = 1991.
Source: Database A (see Appendix E.5.2)
7.2 EMPLOYMENT STATUS IN RELATION TO THE LABOUR FORCE
The chapter now turns to the analysis of ethnic differentials in employment status 
within the labour force (see Thompson 1985 for a review up to and including 1981), and 
to the role of age structure and cohort trends in these differentials. First, an overview of 
aggregate trends for the period 1951-1991, given in Figure 7.2.1, shows that for both 
ethnic groups and both sexes, the most significant category has been and remains wage 
and salary earner, although a recent and substantial decline in its dominance is also 
immediately apparent, and more so for Maori than non-Maori.5
5 Historical trends in employment status are available only for the Maori and non-Maori populations 
aged 15+ years. Nor was employment status included in Database A or B.
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Figure 7.2.1
Percentage of Labour Force Aged 15+ Years in Each Employment Status, by Sex
and Ethnic Classification, 1951-1991
Non-Maori Males Maori Males
Non-Maori Females Maori Females
Unemployed
Wage and Salary Earners
Own Account Employers
imploy«
Wage and Salary Earners
at
> 40-
EmployersOwn Account
Notes 1951-1981 = De Facto population, 1986-1991 = De Jure population.
1951-1981 = Full Time Labour Force, 1986-1991 = Full Time plus Part Time.
1951-1986 = Sole/Single Origin Maori; 1991 = Maori Ethnic Group.
Non-Maori = Total population minus specified Maori classification.
Source: Compiled from the Census of Population and Dwellings, various years (see Appendix E.6).
In 1951, Maori males were considerably more likely to be wage and salary 
earners than non-Maori males (9 percentage points difference), whilst by the end of the 
period the respective proportions were identical, at 66 per cent. Maori females also 
began the period with higher proportions in this category than non-Maori females, but 
ended 8 percentage points lower. This finding reflects the considerably greater extent to 
which unemployment has eaten into the distribution for Maori in recent years, and the 
considerably greater proportions of non-Maori of both sexes either working on their 
own account (self employed, no employees), or employing others, compared to Maori. 
Furthermore, for non-Maori, the larger of these two categories—working on own 
account— has seen an overall increase for both sexes, whilst for Maori its share has 
declined.
Figure 7.2.2 summarises these trends as indices of dissimilarity, again identifying 
a substantial increase in ethnic inequality set against an equally substantial decline in
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inequality by sex— albeit the latter simultaneously showing an increase between 1981 
and 1991. The increase in ethnic inequality is particularly marked for females, who 
started the period with much lower inequality than males, but ended slightly above. In 
1951, 3.4 per cent of Maori females would have needed to change employment status 
for their distribution to have equated to that of non-Maori females. By 1991 this 
proportion was 15.8 per cent, an almost five-fold (4.6 times) increase. The index for 
males in fact stayed more or less the same across most of the period, but then increased 
substantially between 1981 and 1986. It then declined slightly, but in 1991 remained 
almost one-third higher than in 1951. The overall result, by the end of the period, was 
that total ethnic inequality (all Maori/all non-Maori) had overtaken total sex inequality 
(all males/all females) as the leading form of inequality.
Figure 7.2.2
Indices of Dissimilarity for Employment Status: Maori and Non-Maori Labour
Forces Aged 15+ Years, by Sex and Ethnicity, 1951-1991
Sex
(All Males/All Females)Females
(Maori/Non-Maori
Males
(Maori/Non-Maori)
Ethnicity “
(All Maori/All Non-Maori)
Notes 1951-1981 = De Facto population, 1986-1991 = De Jure population.
1951-1981 = Full Time Labour Force, 1986-1991 = Full Time plus Part Time. 
1951-1986 = Sole/Single Origin Maori; 1991 = Maori Ethnic Group.
Non-Maori = Total Population minus specified Maori classification.
Source: Compiled from Census of Population and Dwellings (see Appendix E.6).
The extent to which the increase in the indices of dissimilarity between 1981 and 
1986 may reflect ethnic differences in age structure, which are examined below, and the 
inclusion of part-time employment in the data from (and including) 1986, must be 
acknowledged. However, at least in terms of the latter, the trend toward greater
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inequality was already well underway prior to 1986. Furthermore, at least for males, the 
inclusion of part-time data, noted above as pertaining to just on 5 per cent of males of 
both ethnic groups, would have made very little difference to the results.
7.2.1 Component Analysis of Employment Status:
In presenting the results of component analysis, Figure 7.2.3 shows that age 
structure has had a generally additive effect within each employment status category. 
That is to say, in almost all cases the observed differentials are greater than the 
underlying differentials, having been inflated by the effects of age structure, and thus 
ethnic stratification has been exacerbated by the latter— albeit in some cases only 
slightly. The only exceptions obtain for females in the ‘own account’, ‘wage and salary’, 
and ‘relative assisting unpaid’ categories in 1951, and for males in the two latter 
categories in 1991, when the effects of age structure acted to offset— or ameliorate—the 
underlying effect of ethnic stratification. (Data for the proportionately very small 
‘relative assisting unpaid’ category are not shown, but in general can be understood to 
derive patterns and trends very similar to those for the ‘wage and salary earner’ 
category. See Appendix E.7).
As in the previous component analysis, there are also substantial period-, sex- 
and category-dependent differences in the ethnic group to which the ‘advantage’ or 
‘disadvantage’ from age structure accrues, and in the magnitude of the age-effect at 
each observation. In the ‘own account’ and ‘employer’ categories, for example, the 
effects of both age structure and underlying differentials favour non-Maori of both sexes 
at all but the one observation noted above (females in 1951), and these effects are 
generally more marked for males than females. In these categories, age structure in 1991 
accounted for 25 and 18 per cent respectively of the observed differentials for males, 
and for 17 per cent of the observed differentials in both categories for females. In each 
case these proportions are slightly greater than they were in 1986— in part because of 
small declines in the underlying differentials—but somewhat smaller than they were in 
1951, when the age-effect for males in the ‘own account’ category was several times 
greater than the tiny underlying differential, and for females in that category had 
completely offset the underlying differential. Similarly, in the ‘employer’ category, age 
structure in 1951 had accounted for more than one-half of the observed differential for 
females and for more than one-fifth of that for males, the underlying differential in the 
former case being half its magnitude in 1991, but in the latter case, slightly larger.
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Figure 7.2.3
Component Analysis of Ethnic Differentials in Employment Status (Selected 
Categories) for Maori and Non-Maori Labour Forces Aged 15+ Years,
by Sex, 1951 and 1976-1991
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By contrast, in the ‘unemployed’ category— essentially reflecting the earlier 
analysis for the population aged 15-64 years6—both the effects of age structure and 
underlying differentials consistently accrued to Maori of both sexes. Age structure in 
1991 accounted for 16 percent of the observed differential for males, and 17 per cent for 
females, in both cases a little greater than in 1951, when the underlying differentials had 
been very much smaller, suggesting a true overall increase in the role of age structure in 
producing the observed differentials. Indeed, in 1951, age structure had no effect on 
ethnic differentials in unemployment for males.
In the ‘wage and salary earner’ category, a different situation obtains for each 
sex, both sets of differentials (underlying and age-structural) tending to favour Maori 
males, but non-Maori females. As above, however, the effects remain generally additive, 
inflating the observed differentials and adding to ethnic stratification, exceptions 
occurring only in 1951 for females, and in 1991 for males. At these observations, the 
effects of age structure either completely offset the relatively small underlying 
differentials (in the case of females), or almost did so (in the case of males). For female 
wage and salary earners in 1951, the net effect (the observed differential) implies a small 
Maori advantage, whereas the underlying differential favours non-Maori. For males in 
1991, the observed differential implies exact unity, whereas the underlying differential 
shows a non-Maori advantage.
Thus, and whilst acknowledging that age structure shows a generally declining 
effect (albeit this magnitude reflecting a changing base-line), its role in producing the 
ethnic differentials in employment status cannot be ignored. Analysis of eth-class in New 
Zealand (e.g. Wilkes, Davis, Tait and Chrisp 1985:25-26) for example, needs to 
acknowledge that close to one-fifth of the ethnic differentials for the Bourgeois and 
Petit-Bourgeois categories are currently accounted for by ethnic differences in age 
structure, and that observed differentials do not always identify the group with the 
underlying advantage. Reliance on the observed differential for ‘own account’ females in 
1951, for example, would conceal the fact that at the time it was Maori females who 
held the advantage. Similarly, continued reliance on that index would conceal the true 
extent to which that advantage has since shifted to non-Maori females. Indeed, the 
finding raises the question as to when and how the advantage was lost. Probably it
6 However, the values differ because the former analysis was concerned with the unemployment- 
population ratio for the Maori Ethnic Group and European populations aged 15-64 years, whilst the 
present analysis is concerned with unemployment as a proportion of the labour force for the Maori and 
non-Maori populations aged 15+ years.
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reflects the more rural and semi-subsistence orientation of Maori in the 1950s, an issue 
that is addressed in the following chapter.
As argued earlier, it is also important to keep in mind the size of the underlying 
differential at each observation. An ostensibly declining contribution from age structure 
may simply occur due to an increase in the underlying differential, a shift that may have 
even more unfavourable implications. For example, although there is a definite decline in 
the underlying differentials in the ‘own account’ and ‘employer’ categories between 
1986 and 1991 for both sexes, for all but male employers the differentials in 1991 were 
considerably greater than they had been in 1951, whilst in the latter case they were only 
fractionally lower. As was the case with labour force status, this increase in underlying 
inequality is similarly evident in all but one other employment status category— that of 
male wage and salary earners. In the male wage and salary earner category, however, an 
additional factor is operating. As explained earlier, this is that the ostensible achievement 
of equality within the category reflects the relatively increased proportions of non-Maori 
males in the own account category, assisted by their lower proportions in the 
unemployed category.
Whilst acknowledging that the various age-effects shown in Figure 7.2.3 become 
conflated when aggregated, Figure 7.2.4 summarises the effect of age structure on the 
indices of dissimilarity for employment status. For both sexes, and at all observations, 
the age-standardised indices are lower than their unstandardised equivalents, indicating 
that the Maori age structure has been disadvantageous to employment status. Trends in 
the two indices also show that this disadvantage increased between 1986 and 1991. 
However, for males until 1986, the intercensal increase in inequality was greater for the 
age-standardised indices than for their unstandardised equivalents, indicating that the 
Maori male age structure initially (in 1951) gave some protection against the underlying 
difference (i.e. it did not contribute to the increase). This protective role was lost 
between 1951 and 1976. Later, between 1986 and 1991, both indices declined, but the
age-standardised indices declined more than their unstandardised equalivelents. For
o
females, by contrast, the intercensal increase in the age-standardised indices was 
generally smaller than for their unstandardised equivalents (the exception being the 
1981-1986 period), the Maori female age structure thus not only becoming increasingly 
disadvantageous, but also contributing to the increase in inequality across the period.
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Figure 7.2.4
Comparison of Standardised and Unstandardised Indices of Dissimilarity for 
Employment Status: Maori and Non-Maori Populations Aged 15+ Years,
By Sex, 1976-1991
FemalesMales
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—X — Standardised
1951-1981  = Full T im e Labour Force, 1986-1991 = Full Time plus Part Tim e. 
1951 -1 9 8 6  = Sole /S in g le  Origin Maori, 1991 = Maori Ethnic Group;
N ores:
Non-Maori = Total Population m inus specified  Maori classification . 
Source: C om piled from Census of Population and Dwellings ( s e e  Appendix E.7).
Turning now to the age-specific differentials underlying these trends, Figure 
7.2.5 shows that the differences between the unemployment rates of Maori and non- 
Maori have increased dramatically over time. This is particularly so at the younger ages 
(albeit with the exception of a reduction for females at 15-19 years of age between 1981 
and 1991), where the differences are, as implied in the component analysis, compounded 
by the considerably greater proportions of Maori at younger ages—in 1991, a 
proportionate ratio of 1.4 Maori per non-Maori at 15-24 years of age (Maori Ethnic 
Group classification, see Appendix D.3). Importantly, that the decline in equality occurs 
from near-unity at all ages in 1951 must be emphasised.
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Figure 7.2.5
Ethnic Differentials (Percentage Point Gap) in Age-Specific Unemployment Rates, 
Maori and Non-Maori Labour Forces Aged 15+ Years,
by Sex, 1951,1981 and 1991
Males Females
■ |  =  -10  - -
•n -15
—X — 1981
♦ — 1991
-25 -
Five Year Age Group
Notes: 1951 and 1981 = i-uii Time Unemployment, 1991 = Full Time plus Part Time.
1951 and 1981 = Sole/Single Origin Maori; 1991 = Maori Ethnic Group; 
Non-Maori = Total Population minus specified Maori classification. 
Source: Compiled from Census of Population and Dwellings (see Appendix E.8).
7.2.2 Cohort Analysis of Employment Status:
Reviewed by cohort for the period 1976-1991, as in Figure 7.2.6, the trend away 
from equality can be seen to have occurred for almost all cohorts and again to be 
inversely related to year of birth: the younger the cohort, the greater the inequality when 
at the same age as the predecessor cohort. For males, the trend can be seen to have 
undergone a general reversal for the age span corresponding to the 1981-1986 period, 
especially for the youngest cohorts, but then to have resumed its downward trend. The 
only male cohort to show an overall improvement across the period as a result of this 
pattern was the cohort bom 1962-1966.
For females, improvements occurred during the 1981-1986 period for the cohort 
bom 1962-1966, and during the 1981-1986 period for the cohorts bom 1947-1961, but 
thereafter also began to decline. For the cohorts bom 1957-1966, the result across the 
period was an overall improvement, but all others experienced the overall decline. Again 
the universality of these trends and patterns strongly indicate the involvement of factors 
exogenous to the individual cohort, and further highlight the reality of both
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unemployment and increasing inequality amongst older cohorts, within which are the 
parents of the youngest cohorts (see Jackson 1994a).
Figure 7.2.6
Ethnic Differentials (Percentage Point Gap) in Age-Specific Unemployment Rates, 
Maori and Non-Maori Labour Forces Aged 15+ Years,
by Sex and Cohort, 1976-1991
Males
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Notes: For all cohorts with four observation points shown, first observation = 1976,
last observation = 1991.
1976-1981 = Full-Time Unemployment, 1986-1991 = Full-Time + Part-Time. 
1976-1986 = Sole/Single Origin Maori; 1991 = Maori Ethnic Group; 
Non-Maori = Total Population minus specified Maori classification.
Source: Compiled from Census of Population and Dwellings (see Appendix E.8).
The obverse of the unemployment situation is evident from Figure 7.2.7, which 
shows differences in the percentage of Maori and non-Maori in the remaining 
employment status categories (note the exclusion of the very small ‘relative assisting 
unpaid’ category, data for which are given in Appendix E.8). Especially notable is that
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Figure 7.2.7
Ethnic Differentials (Percentage Point Gap) in Age-Specific Employment Status 
Rates (Selected Categories), Maori and Non-Maori Labour Forces Aged 15+
Years, by Sex, 1951,1981 and 1991
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Notes: Different Scales.
1951 and 1981 = Full Time Unemployment, 1991 = Full Time plus Part Time. 
1951 and 1981 = Sole/Single Origin Maori; 1991 = Maori Ethnic Group; 
Non-Maori = Total Population minus specified Maori classification.
Compiled from Census of Population and Dwellings (see Appendix E.8).Source:
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the above-noted shift from a Maori to a non-Maori advantage in the ‘own account’ 
category for females occurs quite universally for middle-aged to older persons of both 
sexes; and the fact that whilst the ‘wage and salary earner’ differentials also generally 
favour middle-aged to older Maori, especially in 1981 and 1991, the patterns again need 
to be interpreted in light of those favouring non-Maori in the ‘own account’ and 
‘employer’ categories for the corresponding age groups and years. Clearly, as noted 
earlier, non-Maori at those ages have relatively lower levels of wage and salary earning 
because, in combination with lower levels of unemployment than Maori, they have 
higher levels of working on their own account and/or being employers. Similarly, the 
lower levels of unemployment for young non-Maori vis-ä-vis young Maori shown in 
Figures 7.2.5 and 7.2.6 above correspond with their higher levels in all three categories 
of Figure 7.2.7, a factor that is especially pronounced in 1991.
As suggested earlier, the shift from a Maori to a non-Maori advantage in the , 
‘own account’ category probably reflects the more rural, subsistence-orientation of 
many Maori in the early 1950s. Indeed, that the advantage occurred across so many age 
groups, and has been so definitively lost, is strongly suggestive of a shift from a 
subsistence rather than capitalistic enterprise. However, it may also be a reflection of the 
very small cell sizes of older Maori in 1951, a factor which may also partially explain the 
advantage similarly shown for older Maori females in the ‘employer’ category.
Cohort analysis of ethnic relativities in these remaining employment status 
categories is not presented, due to the fact that the trends and patterns are very similar 
to those for the employed population, shown above in Figures 7.1.7-7.1.9.
7.3 SUMMARY
Within the constraints posed by data collection discontinuities and deficits, this 
chapter examined patterns, trends, and ethnic differentials in labour force status and 
employment status; the effects of ethnic differences in age structure on those factors; 
and the extent to which trends in key indicators such as employment and unemployment 
have been universally experienced by cohorts.
On both indicators, ethnic inequality underwent a substantial increase between 
the mid-1970s and 1991. Where the data permitted a longer-term view, ethnic inequality 
was shown to have either increased steadily across the period from a position of near­
unity in 1951, or to have experienced an initial decline between 1951 and the 1970s, and
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then an increase. Furthermore, ethnic inequality increased against a substantial decline in 
the index of dissimilarity for sex (all males/all females). By 1991, the former overtook 
the latter as the leading form of inequality for employment status, whilst inequality 
between the sexes remained the more important factor for labour force status, but the 
two indices were rapidly approaching convergence.
Component analysis of the labour force and employment categories comprising 
these aggregate indicators showed that ethnic differences in age structure, and in the 
underlying (‘true’) differentials that remain once the effects of age structure have been 
accounted for, were highly sex-, period- and category-dependent. In some instances the 
effects were additive (adding to ethnic stratification), and in others, either partially or 
fully offsetting, on the one hand concealing the true extent to which one or other 
population was ‘advantaged’ or ‘disadvantaged’, but on the other hand, reducing or 
ameliorating ethnic stratification. For example, whilst aggregate labour force 
participation rates appeared a little higher for Maori than non-Maori over much of the 
period, especially for males, almost all of the apparent advantage was a reflection of (a) 
the more youthful age structure of the Maori population, and (b) the age-effect deriving 
from the unemployment category. Indeed, by 1991, the Maori population experienced 
no employment-related advantage from age structure. Taken together, these findings 
also substantially altered an initial perspective that ethnic inequality in labour force status 
was lower amongst females than males.
Component analysis of employment status similarly showed that the younger age 
structure of the Maori population has caused it to have lower levels of being self- 
employed or employers, than would be the case if the Maori population had the same 
age structure as non-Maori. That is to say, in these categories both age structure and 
underlying differentials favoured non-Maori of both sexes at all but one observation— 
females in 1951—when an underlying Maori advantage was a probable reflection of self- 
employment in a semi-subsistence rural economy. In 1991, the non-Maori male age 
structure accounted for 25 per cent of the observed (crude) ethnic differential in the 
‘own account’ category, and for 18 per cent of that in the ‘employer’ category. For non- 
Maori females, the corresponding proportions were 17 per cent for both categories.
By contrast, age-structure had a generally additive (and essentially 
advantageous) effect in the wage and salary earning category for Maori males, inflating 
the underlying differentials which also showed a Maori advantage, whilst for females in 
this category it was non-Maori who generally experienced the additive effects of age
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structure and underlying differentials. However, it must be emphasised that the higher 
underlying levels of Maori male ‘advantage’ in the wage and salary earner category were 
also a reflection of the higher proportions of non-Maori males in the self-employed and 
employer categories, which had in turn reduced participation in the former (the wage 
and salary earner category). A similar admixture was evident for females, although 
because female participation in the self-employed and employer categories was 
somewhat lower than for males, the net result was higher levels of non-Maori than 
Maori females in the wage and salary earning category.
Across the 1976-1991 period, the age-effect within each labour force and 
employment status category tended to fluctuate, but overall showed a general decline. 
However, it must be emphasised that this ‘trend’ was largely a reflection of an increase 
in the underlying differentials in almost every category. When age-standardised indices 
of dissimilarity were compared with their unstandardised equivalents, it was shown that:
the Maori male age structure was on the one hand disadvantageous to both 
labour force status and employment status for Maori males at all observations, 
and on the other, provided a small degree of protection against the intercensal 
increase in inequality in each of these indicators between 1976 and 1986. By 
1991, however, the Maori male age structure also contributed to the increase in 
inequality. (That is to say, if the Maori and European age structures had been the 
same, the indices of dissimilarity would have been lower, whilst the increase in 
inequality between 1976 and 1986 would have been greater, and between 1986 
and 1991, less.);
the Maori female age structure was on the one hand advantageous to Maori 
female labour force status between 1976 and 1986, and in 1991, 
disadvantageous, and on the other, contributed to the intercensal increase in 
inequality at all observations. (That is to say, if the Maori and European age 
structures had been the same, the index of dissimilarity between 1976 and 1986 
would have been greater, and in 1991, lower; whilst the overall increase in 
inequality would have been less.);
the Maori female age structure was disadvantageous to Maori female 
employment status at all observations, and contributed to the intercensal increase 
in inequality at almost all observations. (That is to say, if the Maori and 
European age structures had been the same, the index of dissimilarity would 
have been lower, and the increase in inequality, less.);
However, because these aggregate measures conflate the often mutually- 
compensating age-effects that obtained within each labour force or employment status
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category, these findings must be understood as providing only an approximation of the 
overall effects of age structure. Certainly for policy purposes, it is the effects within each 
category that are the more useful. Indeed, in contrast to the comments made at the 
outset of this chapter, wherein it was proposed that the more youthful age structure of 
Maori would potentially enhance Maori experience in the labour force and its various 
employment categories, it appears that the greatest advantages accrue to the older, 
European population. The findings have implications also for those employ a class-based 
approach to the study of ethnic stratification. As proposed in the introduction to this 
thesis, an older age structure is indeed likely to be associated with higher proportions in 
the employer and self employed {Bourgeois and Petit Bourgeois) categories, meaning 
that class-based studies of ethnic stratification need to centrally acknowledge this factor.
Shifting to cohort analysis, the third key index used in this chapter, showed that 
the overall deterioration in ethnic relativity has affected almost all cohorts, and that the 
magnitude of the deterioration has been generally inverse to year of birth: the younger 
the cohort, the greater the ethnic inequality when at the same age as the predecessor 
cohort. Analysis of the proportion of each age group in employment (full-time plus part- 
time) across the life cycle showed the only exceptions to these trends pertained to the 
female cohorts bom 1947-61, for whom there was an initial improvement in ethnic 
relativity as the key childbearing ages were passed. However, in each case this 
improvement was followed by a deterioration that occurred at an earlier age for each 
successively younger cohort. Similarly, cohort analysis of unemployment identified 
increasing ethnic inequality by successive year of birth for cohorts of both sexes, but also 
showed that all male cohorts experienced either a small improvement or a levelling off in 
ethnic relativity during the age span corresponding to the 1981-1986 period. A similar 
pattern also occurred for younger female cohorts during the 1976-1981 period, in the 
case of both sexes suggesting the involvement of explanatory factors external to the 
cohort, for example, the impact of employment-related factors and policies occurring 
within those five-year periods, rather than a change of, for example, work-ethnic within 
any individual cohort. Indeed, the universality of the trends cannot be seen in isolation 
from the overall deterioration in employment experienced by members of both ethnic 
groups, although for females this deterioration has been more recent in onset.
Overall, these patterns and trends have significant implications for dependency, 
typically measured in relation to the population aged 15-64 years. By 1991, more than 
half (55 per cent) of the Maori population at those ages was not in employment (either
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unemployed or not in the labour force), compared with 33 per cent of the European 
population, a ratio of 1.7 Maori per European. In 1976, these percentages had been 39 
and 32 per cent respectively, a ratio of 1.2. This is not to say that each population is 
responsible for the support of it own non-working members, as indeed, much of this 
responsibility is picked up by the welfare state. Furthermore, given the substantial levels 
of inter-ethnic marriage and/or partnering in New Zealand, it is somewhat inappropriate 
to demarcate such boundaries. However, if attention is focussed on the trends, rather 
than the levels, there can be little doubt that the relative ability of the Maori population 
to support its extra-welfare state dependency is substantially worse than it was in the 
1970s.
The problem is exacerbated by the findings for employment status. In 1991, the 
proportion of non-Maori males of all ages either working on their own account or 
employing others was identical to that in 1951 (24 per cent), whilst for Maori males the 
proportion had fallen by 30 per cent, resulting in a decline in the relativity of Maori to 
non-Maori males in these two categories from 0.5 to 0.4. For non-Maori females the 
relevant proportions increased by 40 per cent, but for Maori females fell by 10 per cent, 
resulting in a decline in relativity from 0.6 to 0.4.
Thus it must be concluded that neither the ‘equality’ of opportunity proposed at 
the outset of this chapter, nor the more youthful age structure of the Maori population 
have assisted in bringing about equality between Maori and non-Maori/European in the 
general area of the labour force. Instead, those gains that were made during the 1950s 
and 1960s were lost in the political-economic restructuring of the 1970s and 1980s, 
whilst the relative youthfulness of the Maori population further contributed to this 
deterioration through its disproportionate exposure to unemployment. By contrast, the 
relative maturity of the non-Maori/European population has further reinforced that 
population’s dominance in the more positive areas of labour force participation, 
especially in full-time employment for males, and in the ‘own account’ and ‘employer’ 
categories for both sexes. Furthermore, the universality of the deterioration in ethnic 
equality across cohorts of all ages, often from positions of near-unity in 1951, is ample 
evidence that the Maori population have disproportionately comprised a reserve army of 
labour, highly employed during the post-war economic boom as proposed, but then 
ejected from the labour force once the period had past.
151
6
ETHNIC DIFFERENTIALS IN 
INDUSTRIAL AND OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION
8.0 INTRODUCTION
Highly inter-related with ethnic differentials in labour force participation and 
composition are ethnic differentials in industrial and occupational distribution. Although 
some attention has been paid to inter-relationships between occupation, age structure, 
and income differentials (MacRae 1976, Brosnan 1985), little has been paid to the 
relationship between age structure and occupational or industrial differentials per se, 
even where the focus has been ethnic concentration or ‘crowding’ (Brosnan 1987).
It is difficult, however, to see how concentration of one or other ethnic group in 
an industry or occupation can be isolated from the fact that both industries and 
occupations (see Davies with Jackson 1994:120-122 on female industrial distribution) 
have distinctive age structures, and that an ethnic group’s age structure may therefore 
predispose it to concentration. Accordingly, this chapter investigates this issue. It 
outlines historical industrial and occupational differentials in turn, provides an age- 
profile of each major industrial and occupational category, and submits each category to 
the decomposition procedures followed in the previous chapter. In this instance the 
process illustrates the role of age structure in ethnic concentration within each industry 
and occupation. That is, where either a Maori or European ‘advantage’ from age 
structure is shown within any industrial or occupational category, and lies in the same 
direction as the underlying (underlying) differential, the relative crowding of the affected 
group is inflated by the effects of age structure; where the two components lie in 
opposite directions, the underlying level of concentration of one group is either partially 
or fully concealed (offset) by the age structure of the other group. Due to the large 
number of categories (8 for industry and 7 for occupation), an age-specific analysis for 
each category is not undertaken.
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8.1 INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION
Along with its OECD counterparts, New Zealand has made a long term shift 
from its quarry/primary sector industrial beginnings to dominance in the tertiary/service 
sector. However, two unique features that separate New Zealand from its counterparts 
(Thompson 1985:115-128. Easton 1996a) are of particular significance for Maori - non- 
Maori industrial relations. The first is that, rather than steadily declining in importance, 
as occurred in other countries, New Zealand’s primary sector increased throughout its 
early history, peaking in 1871 with 56 per cent of the non-Maori work force engaged 
within it. Thereafter its proportion of the total slowly declined, but along the way went 
through a number of boom and bust periods which in the aggregate saw high levels of 
prosperity and capital accumulation for farmers, property owners and their affiliates— 
disproportionately European. By the 1870s, however, as will be recalled from Chapter 6, 
the bulk of highly productive Maori land had already passed into European hands, whilst 
Maori themselves had withdrawn to their remaining rural hinterlands and to subsistence 
production. By the 1920s, and for a considerable period thereafter, as can be seen from 
Figure 8.1.1, significant proportions of the Maori population were engaged in the 
primary sector, but it was a qualitatively different type of engagement, involving small, 
poor quality, mainlv collective holdings, and little more than semi-subsistence 
production and/or employment as labourers. As a result, the Maori population gained 
very little of the accumulatory benefits of primary sector attachment.
The second factor is that New Zealand’s secondary sector never at any time 
became its largest sector, dominance passing straight from the primary to the tertiary 
sector in the early twentieth century. Moreover, despite a relatively long and prosperous 
post-second world war boom in manufacturing, building and construction (the major 
secondary sector industries), the dominance of the tertiary sector was reinforced in the 
late 1960s when New Zealand’s external terms of trade turned negative and large 
numbers of manufacturing enterprises relocated offshore. With considerably larger 
proportions of Maori than non-Maori males in the secondary sector from 1945, and the 
same true for Maori females from the late 1950s, the ensuing restructuring of the 
economy saw Maori disproportionately vulnerable to the changes, not least of which 
was the increasing level of unemployment noted in the previous chapter. This was 
especially so for Maori females, who had previously entered the tertiary sector in large 
numbers, but who had returned to manufacturing during its heyday. That said, it must be
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noted that for Maori females, tertiary sector work at that time was disproportionately in 
the traditional tertiary sector, involving domestic, personal, community and business 
services, whilst for non-Maori it was disproportionately— and increasingly—in the 
modem tertiary sector (financial, insurance, retail). It was not until the 1970s, due at 
least in part to the downsizing of the secondary sector, that the Maori female tertiary 
sector again began to expand.
Figure 8.1.1
Industrial Structure of the Maori and Non-Maori Workforces, Percentage in Each
Sector, by Sex, 1926-1981
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Source: Table 8.1.1
With five caveats, Table 8.1.1 updates (and overlaps) these data for the 1976- 
1991 period. The caveats are a shift: in ethnic classification from Sole/Single Origin 
Maori and non-Maori to Maori Ethnic Group and European; in the industrial categories
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comprising each sector; from the workforce aged 15+ years to that aged 15-64 years; 
from the full-time workforce to full-time plus part-time; and from data which, with the 
exception of 1926, are presumed to exclude ‘industry not specified’ cases, to data that 
do exclude such cases.
Table 8.1.1
Industrial Structure of the Maori and Non-Maori/European Workforces, by Sex
Non-Maori/European Maori
Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary ID
1926 33.4 32.2
MALE
34.4
S (a) 
75.7 16.6 7.7 42.3
1936 32.7 31.4 35.9 64.0 31.0 5.0 31.3
1945 25.6 31.9 42.5 52.1 33.6 14.3 28.2
1951 22.6 36.1 41.3 41.9 40.2 17.9 23.4
1956 20.2 38.0 41.8 34.3 45.2 20.5 21.3
1961 18.2 39.1 42.7 28.6 49.1 22.3 20.4
1966 16.5 41.5 42.0 23.0 53.0 24.0 18.0
1971 14.5 40.7 44.8 18.3 55.1 26.6 18.2
1976 12.7 41.0 46.3 14.0 57.7 28.3 18.0
1981 13.1 38.2 48.7 15.9 51.9 32.2 16.5
1976 13.2 48.0
MALE
38.7
:S (b )
13.9 65.7 20.5 18.3
1981 13.6 43.5 42.9 15.0 57.3 27.7 15.2
1986 13.5 42.5 44.0 14.2 56.5 29.3 14.7
1991 13.2 37.1 49.7 12.5 48.2 39.2 11.2
1926 11.0 24.5
FEMAl
64.5
-ES (a) 
79.7 1.1 19.2 68.7
1936 7.8 19.2 73.0 74.4 1.9 23.7 66.6
1945 6.1 24.5 69.0 38.5 11.1 50.4 32.0
1951 5.1 25.1 69.8 14.6 22.9 62.5 9.5
1956 4.5 23.6 71.9 11.4 22.6 66.0 6.9
1961 4.2 24.3 71.5 9.5 30.9 59.6 11.9
1966 5.1 23.4 71.5 10.1 36.2 53.7 17.8
1971 5.3 22.8 71.9 8.9 39.6 51.5 20.4
1976 5.7 21.1 73.2 6.6 38.6 54.8 18.4
1981 6.9 19.5 73.6 9.3 35.6 55.1 18.5
1976 6.2 24.2
FEMA
69.7
LES (b) 
6.0 41.1 52.8 17.0
1981 7.5 21.9 70.7 7.8 37.1 55.1 15.6
1986 8.3 20.6 71.1 7.9 34.8 57.2 14.2
1991 7.8 16.1 76.1 6.0 24.9 69.1 8.7
Notes: (a) Sole Maori and Non-Maori classification, Full-time workforce aged 15+ years;
Data for 1926 include 'activities not specified'.
(b) Maori Ethnic Group and European classification, Full-time plus Part-time 
workforce aged 15-64 years; 'Not Specified's' excluded.
ID=lndexof Dissimilarity (Non-Maori/European minus specified Maori classification). 
Source: (a) Thompson 1985, Table 263; (b) Database A (see Appendix F.1).
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Despite some substantial differences between the two data sources, especially for 
females in 1991, the overall picture is one of increasing convergence. This is confirmed 
in Figure 8.1.2, which plots the index of dissimilarity (ID) for both datasets. At the rate 
of change experienced between 1986 and 1991, the data imply the achievement of parity 
within approximately 16 years for males and 8 years for females— around 2007 for 
males and 1999 for females. However, it is also important to note that the trend towards 
convergence slowed over the 1960-1980 period, by far the greatest movements 
occurring over the early years. Indeed, where the ID for females had approached zero in 
1956, it widened during the 1960s (Thompson 1985:129) and by 1991 had not returned 
to its earlier low level.
Figure 8.1.2
Index of Ethnic Dissimilarity for the Industrial Structure of the
Maori and Non-Maori Workforces, by Sex, 1926-1991
Females (a) —x — Males (b) —o— Females (b)— Males (a)
£ 50 -
Q 10 --
Census Year
Notes: (a) Sole Maori and Non-Maori classification, Full-time workforce aged 15+ years;
Data for 1926 include 'activities not specified1.
(b) Maori Ethnic Group and European classification, Full-time plus Part-time 
workforce aged 15-64 years; 'Not Specified's' excluded.
Source: Table 8.1.1
8.1.1 Industrial Distribution and Ethnic Differences in Age Structure:
The extent to which ethnic differences in age structure may be involved in these 
trends and patterns is suggested in Figure 8.1.3, which gives an indication of the age- 
profile of each industry (irrespective of ethnicity), showing, by sex, the proportion of 
persons in each industry aged less than 30 years, for 1976 and 1991.
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Figure 8.1.3
Percentage of Total Workforce in Each Industry (Full-time plus Part-time, 
Employed Only, 15-64 Years) Aged Less Than 30 years, by Sex, 1976 and 1991
Fem alesMales
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Industrial Category
Notes: A Agriculture Hunting Forestry Fishing
B Building and Construction 
C Comm unity Social Personal 
D Electricity Gas and Water 
E Finance Insurance Property 
Source: Database A (see  Appendix F.2)
F Manufacturing 
G Mining and Quarrying 
H Transport Storage Communications 
I W holesale Retail and Restaurant
Although the data identify a significant maturation1 of the labour force between 
1976 and 1991, it is very clear that the patterns remain similar between observations. 
For males in 1976, the ‘building and construction’ and ‘manufacturing’ industries had 
the most youthful age structures, whilst in 1991 these were joined— and overtaken by— 
the ‘wholesale, retail, restaurant’ industry. The situation is both different and more 
pronounced for females, the youngest age structure at both observations occurring for 
the ‘finance, insurance, property’ industry, although more markedly so in 1976 than in 
1991. In this instance it is perhaps less confusing to note that in both 1976 and 1991 the 
‘agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing’ industry had the oldest age structure, followed in 
1976 by the ‘wholesale, retail, restaurant’ and ‘manufacturing’ industries, and in 1991 
by the ‘building and construction’ and ‘community, social, personal’ industries. Either 
way, it is clear that different industries have different age structures, and thus that 
differing ethnic group age structures may contribute to industrial crowding. Specifically,
1 The extent to which this maturation is a function of, for example, an increase in the proportion of 
younger persons either unemployed, or undertaking tertiary study, or of employers preferring older or 
more experienced workers is not being assessed here. However, it is not considered to be significantly 
related to population ageing (see Davies with Jackson 1994:119 in relation to the female industrial 
labour force).
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industries with youthful age structures could be expected to have disproportionately 
higher levels of Maori participation, whilst the same could be expected of European 
participation for industries with older age structures.
As Figure 8.1.4— showing data for 1991— demonstrates, this hypothesis 
appears to hold true for Maori males in the ‘manufacturing’ and ‘building and 
construction’ industries, for Maori females in the small ‘mining and quarrying’ industry, 
and for European females in the ‘agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing’ and ‘building and 
construction’ industries. However, for most of the remaining industries, the opposite is 
the case. For example, Maori of both sexes have proportionately higher levels of 
participation in the ‘community, personal, social’ industry, which has one of the oldest 
age structures, a relationship that also holds true for Maori males in the equally mature 
‘electricity, gas, water,’ ‘mining and quarrying’ and ‘transport, storage, 
communications’ industries. Similarly, European males have higher levels of 
participation in the ‘wholesale, retail, restaurant’ industry, which has the youngest age 
structure for males, a situation repeated for European females in the ‘finance, insurance, 
property’ industry. Accordingly, the above hypothesis can be shown to hold true only 
for a few individual industries. Indeed, the correlation between the relative youthfulness 
of each industrial category and the industrial distribution for each ethnic group is higher 
for European (males r=0.67; females r=-0.14) than for Maori (males, r=0.47; females r=- 
0.19), indicating that ethnic group age structure has little to do with overall ethnic 
crowding, especially for females.
Nevertheless, as the exceptions indicate, it remains worth pursuing a more 
detailed age-oriented analysis. It is important, for example, to ascertain the extent of the 
age effect in those industries where it does occur, and also the extent to which observed 
(crude) differentials in any industry are not only the result of these additive effects (age 
structure increasing the concentration of an ethnic group in a given industry), but also of 
offsetting effects, whereby the age structure of one ethnic group conceals (either 
partially or fully) the underlying concentration of the other.
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Figure 8.1.4
Percentage of Total Workforce in Each Industry (Full-time plus Part-time, 
Employed Only, 15-64 Years) Aged Less Than 30 years, and Ratio of Maori to
European in Each Industry, by Sex, 1991
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Component analysis, the results of which are given in Figures 8.1.5 and 8.1.6 
(the former examining the four major industries; the latter, the more minor industries), in 
fact confirms that ethnic differences in age structure have had relatively small effect on 
ethnic differentials in most industries across the 1976-1991 period. However, this is less 
true in the increasingly significant ‘community, social, personal’ industry, which in 1991 
was the largest industry for females of both ethnic groups, accounting for just on 40 per 
cent of Maori females and 38 per cent of European females, and the third largest 
industry for males, accounting for just under 20 per cent of males of both groups. Three 
features stand out. First, the age-effect favoured European females at all observations, 
and European males in 1976, 1986 and 1991, thereby adding to the concentration of 
European in the industry over the 1976-1986 period, although considerably more so for 
females than males. Second, the age-effect was greater in 1991 than in 1976, at least in 
part because the underlying ( ‘true’) differentials had declined. Third, both the observed 
(crude) and underlying differentials shifted between 1986-1991 from a European 
advantage to a Maori advantage, for both sexes.
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Figure 8.1.5
Component Analysis of Industrial Distribution, Selected Major Industries, Maori 
Ethnic Group and European Workforces (Full-time plus Part-time) 
______ Aged 15-64 Years, by Sex, 1976-1991
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In 1986, these patterns resulted in the European age structure accounting for just 
on one-half of the observed differential between Maori and European females in the 
‘community, social personal’ industry, up from 9 per cent in 1976, whilst in 1991 the 
European age structure had the opposite effect, offsetting the underlying differential by 
more than one-third. Although the underlying differential for males in 1991 was 
considerably smaller than that for females, it too was reduced by approximately one- 
third, the effect of the more mature European age structure. In 1976 the age-effect had 
been in the vicinity of 3 per cent. Thus, and whilst both observed and underlying 
differentials in the industry are the smallest of all four categories, and the age-effect 
fluctuated over time, the European age structure first added to the concentration of 
European in the industry, and then contributed to a partial amelioration of ethnic 
stratification, albeit whilst simultaneously concealing the true extent to which the 
underlying differentials had shifted to a Maori advantage.
In the case of the manufacturing industry—the largest industry for males of both 
groups, although followed closely by the ‘wholesale, retail, restaurant’ industry for 
European males, and the ‘community social personal’ industry for Maori males— the 
Maori male age structure has similarly played a small role in the concentration of Maori 
males in that industry (the contribution ranging between 4 and 8 per cent).
Conversely, in the remaining industries within which ethnic differences in age 
structure have a conspicuous— if very small— effect ( ‘wholesale, retail, restaurant’ for 
both sexes, and ‘finance, insurance, property’ for females), the Maori age structure has 
acted to offset the underlying differentials, which favoured European at all observations, 
with the result that the concentration of European in those industries has been partially 
concealed, and ethnic stratification, partially ameliorated. The most significant of these 
effects obtain for females in the ‘wholesale, retail, restaurant’ industry, which in 1991 
was the second largest industry for females, accounting for 24 and 20 per cent of 
European and Maori females respectively, and where, in 1991, the effects reduced the 
observed differential by one-fifth. Furthermore, these effects increased across the period 
(in part because the underlying differentials declined), as they did also for males in this 
industry.
Age effects aside, the trends in Figure 8.1.5 also show that the underlying 
differentials declined overall in all but the ‘finance, insurance, property’ industry. A 
similar pattern is evident from Figure 8.1.6, which presents the results (of component 
analysis) for four of the remaining five industrial categories, these representing both
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proportionately smaller industries, and smaller ethnic differentials within each industry. 
Findings for the very small ‘mining and quarrying’ industry are not presented, but are 
included in Appendix F.4.2.
Figure 8.1.6
Component Analysis of Industrial Distribution, Selected Industries, Maori Ethnic 
Group and European Workforces (Full-time plus Part-time)
Aged 15-64 Years, by Sex, 1976-1991
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Within the reduced scale of Figure 8.1.6, ethnic differences in age structure can 
similarly be seen to have had very little— and a generally declining—effect in the smaller 
industries. The only real exception obtains in the ‘transport, storage, communications’ 
industry for males, where the older European age structure at all observations reduced 
by between 17 and 37 per cent the observed differentials, which show a Maori 
concentration at all observations, and which were the largest differentials in this 
grouping of industries. Pertaining in 1991 to just under 10 per cent of Maori males and 7 
per cent of European males, these effects partially concealed the true extent to which 
Maori males were concentrated in the industry.
By contrast, in both 1986 and 1991 for females, and in 1991 for males, the 
European age structure added to the concentration of European in the slightly larger 
‘agriculture, forestry, hunting, fishing’ industry. Possibly reflecting the structural ageing 
of New Zealand’s fanning population, the effects exacerbate a shift from a small 
underlying concentration of Maori males between 1976-1986, and briefly, in 1981 for 
Maori females, to, by 1991, a substantially larger underlying concentration for European 
of both sexes.
The only other industry to show an overall increase in the underlying differential 
across the 1976-1991 period was the very small ‘electricity, gas, water’ industry for 
males, although that for males in the larger ‘transport, storage, communications’ 
industry also saw a small increase between 1986-1991. In both cases, the underlying 
differentials favoured Maori at all observations, but in neither case was age structure a 
cause of the increase.
Thus it must be concluded that not only have the underlying differentials in most 
industries declined, but that ethnic differences in age structure have played a fairly small 
role in producing those differentials. These findings are summarised in Figure 8.1.7, 
which compares the unstandardised indices of dissimilarity for the period 1976-1991 
with their standardised equivalents. (Note that these IDs differ slightly from those given 
earlier in Figure 8.1.3, which were based on broader sectoral distributions.) The data 
show that, in the aggregate, the Maori male age structure had a slight deflationary (i.e. 
advantageous) effect on the ID at all observations across the 1976-1991 period, whilst 
this occurred for females only in 1991. In addition, the unstandardised indices underwent 
a slightly greater decline across the 1976-1991 period than the standardised indices, for 
both sexes, indicating that the Maori age structure made a very small contribution to the 
improvement. As in the previous chapter, however, it must be emphasised that
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aggregate measures conflate the effects that were shown for each category, and which 
continue to have category-specific implications.
Figure 8.1.7
Comparison of Standardised and Unstandardised Indices of Dissimilarity for the 
Industrial Structures of the Maori and European Workforces Aged 15-64 years,
by Sex, 1976-1991
FemalesMales
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8 e -
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Notes: Data for Maori standardised to age structure of European workforce
Source: Database A (see Appendix F.4.3)
Indeed, three important caveats must be appended to these findings. First, 
despite the fact that the industries with declining underlying differentials pertained in 
1991 to 82 and 86 per cent of the Maori male and female workforces, and to 75 and 78 
per cent of the European male and female workforces, European males remain 
concentrated in three industries ( ‘wholesale, retail, restaurant’, ‘finance, insurance, 
property’, and ‘agriculture, forestry, hunting, fishing’), and Maori males in the remaining 
six. Similarly, European females remain concentrated in four industries (with ‘building 
and construction’ added to the list of these for European males), and Maori females in 
the remaining five. Second, at the aggregate level depicted by the index of dissimilarity, 
the effects of age structure are conflated. That is to say, as Figures 8.1.5 and 8.1.6 
showed, in some industries age structure has an additive effect, and in some, an 
offsetting effect. The results given in Figure 8.1.7 are the net of the two, and should not 
detract attention from the effects in each individual industry. Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, it must be remembered that ethnic differentials in industrial distribution (and 
in occupational distribution, which follows) pertain to those who are employed, the 
unemployed being far less likely to state (or to be asked to state) a ‘usual industry’.
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Declines in the differentials for any industry, or alternatively, improvements to the ID, 
must to some extent be caused by movements out of employment altogether. The 
underlying (raw) data identify that the disproportionate decline in Maori employment 
has occurred in those industries where Maori were most concentrated—the 
manufacturing industry for males, and the manufacturing and ‘wholesale, retail, 
restaurant’ industries for females—resulting in concomitant declines in the respective 
IDs. Similarly, because the fall in employment was also shown in Chapter 7 to have 
disproportionately affected young Maori, the movement out of certain industries by 
those persons will have reduced the effects of age structure in those industries. This is 
particularly likely to have been the case for males in the manufacturing industry, but it is 
equally likely to have occurred in any industry where the ‘advantage’ from age structure 
accrued to Maori.
8.2 OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION
The picture pertaining to trends in occupational ethnic differentials is equally 
complex, as is its analysis. For example, in a study covering the period 1956-1981, 
Brosnan (1987:100) claims that ethnic segregation (dissimilarity) increased, whilst 
Moir’s (1977) study, covering much of the same period, 1956-1971, claims a slight 
decrease. Brosnan ascribes the main difference between his and Moir’s findings to the 
level of disaggregation of the data, his own study using the more refined 2- and 4-digit 
data whilst that of Moir used 1-digit data. There were also differences in the indices 
used, and in the internal consistency of the respective databases, Moir not adjusting for 
census changes in occupational classification. However, it is also worth noting a further 
comment of Brosnan (p.94), which concerns the considerably higher proportion of 
Maori than of non-Maori who failed to state a usual occupation, a probable reflection of 
the former group’s greater unemployment. When this category is included in the 
segregation index, at least some of the ethnic differential is not occupational at all.
2 As noted in chapter 4, this comment is not intended as a criticism— the analyst of the ID is faced with 
a serious dilemma. If the ‘not specifieds’ are different for each group, but are included in the analysis, 
at least part of the resulting differential concerns ‘the proportion who needed to specify their 
occupation’, not the proportion who needed to change it. On the other hand, if the not specified’s are 
excluded and the data re-totalled, the proportions in each category are expanded uniformly by the 
proportion that was not specified. Where the proportion not specified is considerably different between 
the two groups, the result can be an artifactual reduction in the ID.
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Whilst the situation is essentially unresolvable, an impression of the occupational 
distributions for each ethnic and sex group with the ‘not specifieds’ included will assist 
interpretation. These data, drawn from Brosnan’s paper because of their greater 
refinement and internal consistency, are presented in Figure 8.2.1. The historical 
concentration of Maori of both sexes in the manual labour categories is very clear, with 
the greater proportion of these persons being unskilled workers. Naturally the data also 
show the converse: the substantially smaller proportions of Maori of both sexes, but 
most particularly Maori males, in the remaining categories.
Figure 8.2.1
Occupational Structure of the Maori and Non-Maori Workforces Aged 15+ Years 
(Full-time plus Part-time, Employed Only), by Sex, 1926-1981
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Source: Brosnan 1987, Tables 1 and 2 (see AppendixF.5).
Also evident from Figure 8.2.1 is an increase over time in occupational 
differentiation. However, when summarised as indices of dissimilarity, as in Figure 8.2.2 
(data-series a ), it can be seen that very little change occurred across the 1956-1981 
period—the ethnic IDs first increasing slightly for both sexes, and then declining slightly,
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but in 1981 remaining above their 1956 levels. (Note that when the ‘not specified’s’ are 
excluded, the IDs are fractionally lower—less than 1 per cent in 1981—but the trends 
remain identical.)
Also shown in Figure 8.2.2 are a second set of IDs for the 1976-1991 period 
(data-series b), drawn from Database A. Importantly, these data differ from the first set 
by occupational classification, level of data refinement, ethnic classification and the age 
group to which the data pertain, reinforcing Brosnan’s comments regarding the need for 
internal consistency. Nevertheless, the trends do not appear to be grossly inconsistent, 
and in the absence of alternatives it must be concluded that a decline in ethnic 
dissimilarity has recently occurred, accelerating during the 1986-1991 period. Earlier 
comments regarding the likely role of unemployment (or having left the labour force 
altogether) in producing these latter trends should be recalled.
Figure 8.2.2
Index of Ethnic Dissimilarity for the Occupational Structure of the Maori and 
Non-Maori/European Workforces, by Sex and Ethnic Classification, 1956-1991
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(a) Based on 2-digit data; Sole Maori / Non-Maori classification; Workforce 
Aged 15+ Years, Not Specified's included.
Notes:
(b) Based on 1 -digit data; Maori Ethnic Group / European classification; 
Workforce aged 15-64 years; Not Specified's excluded.
Data for Maori standardised to age structure of non-Maori/European workforce. 
Source: (a) Brosnan 1987, Table 3 (see Appendix F.5)
(b) Database A (see Table 8.2.1)
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Detailed comments on trends for each individual category for the period 1956- 
1981 are given in Brosnan (1987) and are thus not elaborated here. However, it should 
be noted that at the end of the period, differences between the proportionate 
distributions for each sex-ethnic group showed that Maori males were slightly more 
likely than non-Maori males to be unskilled manual workers than was the case in 1956, 
and slightly less likely than non-Maori males to be skilled manual workers or supervisors 
than was the case in 1956. Maori females fared slightly better, seeing, for example, a 
small reduction in the difference between the proportions of Maori and non-Maori 
unskilled manual workers, and a small increase in the difference between the proportions 
of Maori and non-Maori skilled manual workers. Nevertheless, for both males and 
females, relative improvements for Maori were confined to the smallest occupational 
categories, with the above result of the small increase in the ID for each sex.
The occupational distributions corresponding to the second data-series (b) in 
Figure 8.2.2 are given in Table 8.2.1. For both sexes, the proportionate ratio (PR) of 
Maori to European (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1) increased in five of the seven 
occupational categories and fell in the remaining two, although the affected categories 
differ slightly by sex. The PR fell for both sexes in the ‘agriculture, forestry, hunting, 
fishing’ occupations (for males from 0.98 to 0.88 and for females from 0.96 to 0.74), for 
males in the ‘production, transport, equipment operators, labourers’ occupations (from 
1.58 to 1.54), and for females in the service worker occupations (from 1.71 to 1.55). 
The greatest increases in the PR occurred for males in the ‘clerical’, ‘service worker’ 
and ‘professional, technical’ occupations, and for females in the ‘administrative, 
managerial’, ‘professional, technical’ and ‘clerical’ occupations.
Reflecting the falling IDs based on these data (although noting that IDs are based 
on absolute differences, which give a different perspective), these trends indicate 
generally positive changes. However, it is important to note that the improved relativity 
for Maori of both sexes in the ‘clerical’ occupations reflects an absolute decline in the 
proportions of European in those occupations, whilst the decline in relativity for Maori 
females in the ‘agriculture, forestry, hunting, fishing’ and ‘service worker’ occupations 
reflects an absolute increase in the proportion of European females in those occupations. 
These trends suggest that the apparent improvements for Maori in these categories 
should not be taken at face value, but rather as reflecting the probable further 
differentiation that would be discernible if more disaggregated (2- or 4-digit) data were
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used. Indeed, the sizeable relative increase in the proportions of Maori males in the 
‘service worker’ occupations is not necessarily a positive trend.
Table 8.2.1
Occupational Structure of the Maori Ethnic Group and European Workforces 
Aged 15-64 Years (Full-time plus Part-time, Employed Only), by Sex and Ethnic 
Classification, and Index of Dissimilarity, by Sex, 1976-1991
MALES Index FEMALES Index
1 9 7 6 | 1 9 8 1 1 1986 | 1991 199 1 /1 9 7 6 1 9 7 6 | 1 9 8 1 1 1986 | 1991 1991 /1 9 7 6
EUROPEAN
Administrative. Ntenagerial 4 .9 7 5.61 7 .8 0 9 .0 4 1.82 0 .7 5 0 .8 4 2 .3 6 3 .3 2 4 .4 3
Agricultural Forestry Workers. Fishermen, Hunters 1 3 .08 13 .72 1 3 .4 0 12 .97 0 .9 9 5 .7 2 6 .9 2 7 .7 4 7 .0 4 1 .23
Clerical 8 .81 8 .4 7 7 .9 9 7 .1 9 0 .8 2 3 4 .5 0 3 3 .5 3 3 3 .9 4 3 2 .6 9 0 .9 5
Production. Transport. Equipment Operators, Labourers 4 5 .0 6 4 2 .5 4 4 0 .5 4 35.91 0 .8 0 12.91 10 .97 9 .7 5 6.91 0 .5 4
Professional. Technical 13 .45 13 .40 1 4 .23 16 .52 1.23 19 .74 19 .98 1 9 .3 2 2 2 .6 0 1 .1 4
Sales Workers 1 0 .26 10 .18 9 .9 6 11.65 1.14 1 2 .93 13 .32 12.51 1 2 .99 1 .0 0
Service Workers 4 .3 7 6 .0 8 6 .0 7 6 .7 3 1.54 1 3 .45 1 4 .43 1 4 .3 8 14.45 1 .0 7
Total 1 0 0 .0 0 100 .00 100 .0 0 10 0 .0 0 1.00 1 0 0 .0 0 1 0 0 .0 0 1 0 0 .0 0 100 .00 1 .0 0
Number 7 0 5 0 1 5 7 0 8 3 9 6 7 3 5 6 7 2 6 5 6 1 4 5 3 9 1 9 8 3 4 4 1 8 4 0 5 1 2 5 6 5 5 0 5428
hbt Specif iedfNot Applicable (Excluded) 5 3 4 3 11208 5802 8142 2 0 4 0 5151 2 5 5 0 7668
MAORI ETHNIC GROUP
Administrative. Managerial 1 .0 5 1.11 1 .54 2 .9 7 2 .8 2 0 .2 9 0 .3 7 0 .7 3 1.96 6 .8 4
Agricultural1 Forestry Workers, Fishermen, Hunters 1 2 .88 14 .22 1 3 .05 11 .36 0 .8 8 5 .4 8 6 .9 2 7 .3 0 5 .2 2 0 .9 5
Ctercal 4 .0 3 4 .4 6 5 .1 6 6 .3 0 1.56 2 0 .6 3 2 1 .1 5 2 2 .6 9 2 6 .5 2 1 .2 9
Production Transport, Equipment Operators Labourers 7 1 .2 9 6 6  17 6 4 .9 4 5 5 .2 7 0 .7 8 3 2  55 2 9 .4 5 2 8 .8 2 1 7 .88 0 .5 5
Professional, Technical 4 .4 0 4 .3 8 5 .1 8 8 .9 6 2 .0 4 1 0 .9 3 1 0 .29 1 0 .7 0 17 .42 1 .5 9
Sales Workers 3 .0 6 3 .4 3 3 .5 5 5 .6 8 1.85 7 .1 6 7 .1 7 6 .6 5 8 .6 8 1.21
Service Workers 3 .2 8 6 .2 3 6 .5 8 9 .4 5 2 .8 8 2 2 .9 6 2 4 .6 6 2 3 .0 9 2 2 .3 3 0 .9 7
Total 1 0 0 .0 0 10 0 .0 0 10 0 .0 0 10 0 .0 0 1.00 1 0 0 .0 0 1 0 0 .0 0 1 0 0 .0 0 100 .00 1 .0 0
Number 7 1 7 1 8 7 9 3 4 7 8 6 0 4 0 64 3 8 6 3 6 7 3 8 4 4 8 7 7 5 5 4 9 4 4 7 5 3 8
Not Specified!Not Applicable (Btcluded) 1686 3 3 8 7 1626 2010 7 5 3 1179 9 1 8 1734
RATIO MAORI PROPORTIONS TO EUROPE/IN PROPORTIONS (PROPORTIONATE RA‘10)
Administrative. Managerial 0 .21 0 .2 0 0 .2 0 0 .3 3 0 .3 8 0 .4 4 0.31 0 .5 9
Agricultural Forestry Workers. Fishermen. Hunters 0 .9 8 1 .04 0 .9 7 0 .8 8 0 .9 6 1 .0 0 0 .9 4 0 .7 4
Clerical 0 .4 6 0 .5 3 0 .6 5 0 .8 8 0 .6 0 0 .6 3 0 .6 7 0.81
P ro d u c tio n , Transport. Equipment O p e r a to r s .  Labourers 1 .5 3 1 .5 6 1 .6 0 1 .5 4 2 .5 2 2 .6 8 2 .9 6 2 .5 9
Professional, Technical 0 .3 3 0 .3 3 0 .3 6 0 .5 4 0 .5 5 0 .5 2 0 .5 5 0 .7 7
Sales Workers 0 .3 0 0 .3 4 0 .3 6 0 .4 9 0 .5 5 0 .5 4 0 .5 3 0 .6 7
Service W orkers 0 .7 5 1 .03 1 .08 1.41 1.71 1.71 1.61 1.55
Total 1 .0 0 1 .00 1.00 1.00 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1.00
INDEX OF DISSIMILARITY 2 6 .2 4 2 4 .2 8 24 .91 2 2 .0 9 0.84 2 9 .1 6 2 8 .7 0 2 7 .7 9 18.85 0 .6 5
Notes: Index of Dissimilarity = European minus Maori, Not Specilied's ercluded.
Source: Database A
8.2.1 Occupational Distribution and Ethnic Differences in Age Structure:
The extent to which ethnic differences in age structure may be involved in these 
patterns and trends is indicated in Figure 8.2.3, which shows the proportion of persons 
aged less than 30 years in each occupational category, for 1976 and 1991. Again the 
patterns suggest the possible involvement of age structure in ethnic crowding.
169
Figure 8.2.3
Percentage of Total Workforce in Each Occupation (Full-time plus Part-time, 
Employed Only, 15-64 Years) Aged Less Than 30 years, by Sex, 1976 and 1991
FemalesMales
I------- 11976
20 -
10 -
Occupational Category
Notes:
Source:
A Administrative Managerial
B Professional Technical
C Clerical
D Sales Workers
E Agricultural/Forestry Workers Fishermen and Hunters
F Production Transport Equipment Operators and Labourers
G Service Workers
Database A (see Appendix F.6)
The argument is to some extent further supported in Figure 8.2.4, which 
compares the same data for 1991 against ratios of the proportions of Maori and 
European in each occupational category. The categories with the youngest age 
structures for males in 1991— ‘service workers’ and ‘production, transport equipment 
operators and labourers’— are clearly those in which Maori males are disproportionately 
represented, whilst non-Maori males are disproportionately represented in the categories 
with the oldest age structures, in particular the ‘administrative, managerial’, 
‘professional technical’, and ‘agricultural’ occupations. A similar pattern is evident for 
females, although the occupations with the very youngest age structures ( ‘clerical’ and 
‘sales’ workers) have higher proportions of European. This exception is also observed 
for males.
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Figure 8.2.4
Percentage of Total Workforce in Each Occupation (Full-time plus Part-time, 
Employed Only, 15-64 Years) Aged Less Than 30 years, and Ratio of Maori to
European in Each Occupation, by Sex, 1991
Males Females
Maori more likely 
to be in Occupation
o 2.0 -
European more likely to be 
in Occupation
]  MaorkEuropean in Each Occupation Aged <30 years in each Occupation
Notes:
Source:
A Administrative Managerial
B Professional Technical
C Clerical
D Sales Workers
E Agricultural/Forestry Workers Fishermen and Hunters
F Production Transport Equipment Operators and Labourers
G Service Workers
Database A (see Appendices F.6 and F.7)
In contrast to the situation for industry, therefore, wherein the relative 
youthfulness of each industrial category and the level of Maori concentration within it 
was weaker for Maori than European, the relationship between the relative youthfulness 
of each occupational category and Maori vis-ä-vis European concentration in it is 
somewhat stronger. This is supported by r ’s of 0.39 and 0.69 for Maori males and 
females, against 0.21 and 0.46 for European males and females.
Nevertheless, Figures 8.2.5 and 8.2.6— which present the results of component 
analysis for ‘white’ and ‘blue collar’ occupations (note different scales for the two 
groupings) show that the Maori age structure is of significance in three occupational 
categories only: ‘clerical’, for females, at all observations; ‘sales workers’ in 1986 and 
1991 for both sexes, and ‘production, transport, equipment operators and labourers’ for 
males, at all observations.
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Figure 8.2.5
Component Analysis of Occupational Distribution in White Collar Employment, 
Maori Ethnic Group and European Workforces Aged 15-64 Years,
by Sex, 1976-1991
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Females
Males
CD 5 COCO 05 CD 5 COCO 5
a  15 t  « a
~  10 - -
Sales Workers
0)05 re
1 oo<5
Q. -5  -1-
Males
T- CD 1—
CO CO O )
05 05 05
Females
tm  n 11
CO 1— CO ■—
CD CO 05
05 05  0 5  05
Administrative / Managerial
I Underlying Differential 1 I Age Structure ■Observed Differential
Source: Database A (se e  Appendix F.8.1)
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Figure 8.2.6
Component Analysis of Occupational Distribution in Blue Collar Employment, 
Maori Ethnic Group and European Workforces Aged 15-64 Years,
by Sex, 1976-1991
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In the clerical occupations, which in 1991 accounted for 33 and 27 per cent 
respectively of European and Maori females, the more youthful Maori female age 
structure at all observations partially offset the underlying differential, which benefited 
European at all observations. The contribution of the age-effect to the observed 
differences saw an overall increase across the period, from 9 per cent in 1976, to 14 per 
cent in 1991, although as in the earlier analysis this increase will be, at least in part, a 
function of simultaneously declining underlying differentials. A similar, though weaker
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effect obtained for both females and males in the proportionately smaller ‘sales worker’ 
category, which in 1991 accounted for 13 and 7 per cent of European and Maori 
females respectively, and for 12 and 6 per cent of European and Maori males. By 
contrast, for males in the extensive ‘production, transport, equipment operators and 
labourers’ occupations, which in 1991 accounted for 36 and 55 per cent of European 
and Maori males respectively, the more youthful Maori age structure had a small— 
though generally declining—additive effect, increasing by just under 5 per cent the 
concentration of Maori males in those occupations.
In all other occupational categories where ethnic differences in age structure had 
a conspicuous effect, the phenomenon gave a European advantage, adding to the 
concentration of European in the ‘professional, technical’ and ‘administrative, 
managerial’ occupations, although for females more in the former, and for males more in 
the latter. In 1991, for example, the European age structure increased the relative 
concentration of European females in the ‘professional, technical’ occupations by 21 per 
cent, and of European males in the ‘administrative, managerial’ occupations by 14 per 
cent. In the former case the effects increased across the period, whilst in the latter they 
reduced, in both cases these ‘trends’ being likely effects of trends in the underlying 
differentials, which in the former case declined, and in the latter, increased.
In terms of adding to ethnic stratification in any substantial form, therefore, the 
Maori age structure does this only for males and only in the ‘production, transport, 
equipment operators and labourers’ occupations, whilst the European age structure does 
this for both males and females in the ‘professional, technical’ occupations, and for 
males in the ‘administrative, managerial’ occupations. In the former and latter cases (the 
‘production, transport, equipment operators and labourers’ and ‘administrative, 
managerial’ occupations) the effect is declining, whilst in the middle case it is increasing. 
In no occupational categories does the Maori female age structure have an additive 
effect of any import. Instead, the Maori female age structure partially conceals the true 
extent of European female concentration in the clerical occupations, whilst the European 
female age structure has a similar effect on the concentration of Maori females in the 
service occupations. In the former case the effect is increasing, whilst in the latter it is 
declining.
Summarising these patterns and trends by comparing the unstandardised index of 
dissimilarity (given earlier in Figure 8.2.2) with its age standardised equivalent confirms 
the overall small effect of age structure on occupational differentials, although the fact
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that these indices conflate the various individual effects must again be emphasised. In the 
case of males, the standardised index falls just below the unstandardised index at all 
observations, identifying that the Maori male age structure has had a slightly inflationary 
(i.e. disadvantageous) effect on the occupational ID, whilst for females the opposite has 
been true. In neither case, however, did ethnic differences in age structure play a role in 
producing the overall decline in these indices. That is to say, in both cases, the 
standardised and unstandardised indices fell by an almost identical magnitude, for males, 
to 84 per cent of their 1976 levels, and for females, to 64 per cent.
Figure 8.2.7
Comparison of Standardised and Unstandardised Indices of Ethnic Dissimilarity 
for the Occupational Structures of the Maori and European Workforces Aged 15-
64 years, by Sex, 1976-1991
FemalesMales
■£ 20 -
4— Unstandardised —x  — Standardiseda> 5 --
Notes: Data for Maori standardised to age  structure of European workforce.
Source: Database A (se e  Appendix F.8.3)
Aside from the effects of age structure, two other features of Figures 8.2.5 and 
8.2.6 are of importance. First, all underlying differentials in the white collar occupations 
(Figure 8.2.5) show a European concentration at all observations and for both sexes, 
whilst in the blue collar occupations (Figure 8.2.6), two of the three categories show a 
Maori concentration at all but one observation, the exception being male service 
workers in 1976. Second, in the white collar occupations, the underlying differentials 
declined across the 1976-1991 period in all but one category, that of the ‘administrative, 
managerial’ occupations, where they saw an increase between 1981 and 1986 for both 
sexes. For females in this category, however, the differentials represent the smallest of
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those for all four white collar occupations, whilst for both males and females they 
declined slightly between 1986-1991. In the blue collar occupations, the underlying 
differentials for the large ‘production, transport, equipment operators and labourers’ 
category similarly declined across the 1976-1991 period for both sexes, as they did also 
for female service workers, but they increased for both male service workers (shifting 
from a small advantage for European to a small advantage for Maori) and those of both 
sexes in the ‘agricultural, forestry, fishing, hunting’ category. Again, however, the latter 
increases pertained to the smallest differentials.
Collectively, the occupational categories in which the underlying differentials 
declined across the 1976-1991 period pertained to 71 and 76 per cent of European and 
Maori males, and 90 and 93 per cent of European and Maori females. The near­
universality of these declines account for both the declines in the (unstandardised) 
indices of dissimilarity, and the sex differences in the rate of these declines. However, as 
noted earlier in the case of industry, they do not show the extent to which the relative 
numerical declines in employment within the key occupational categories (in particular, 
the ‘production, transport, equipment operators and labourers’ occupations) contributed 
to these outcomes, and thus until the proportions of Maori and European actually in 
employment equalise— or move towards equality—there can be little cause for 
complacency. Certainly the lower proportions and relatively greater declines of Maori 
females vis-ä-vis European females in employment may account for the substantially 
greater improvements to the occupational ID for females. Similarly, the comments 
applied earlier to the relatively small effects of age structure in each industrial category 
also apply to the findings for occupation. That is to say, the relatively lower and 
decreasing proportions of young Maori in employment shown in Chapter 7 will have 
simultaneously removed these effects from each occupational category, especially those 
in which the age effect accrued to Maori.
8.3 SUMMARY
Despite the persistence of differences in the aggregate industrial and 
occupational distributions of Maori and non-Maori/European, the overwhelming 
picture— with one important caveat, discussed below—is that of increasing 
convergence. For males, the decline in the (unstandardised) industrial ID to 70 per cent 
of its 1976 level was greater than that for the occupational ID, which fell to 84 per cent
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of its 1976 level, whilst for females both indices fell by approximately the same 
magnitude, to 64 per cent of their 1976 levels.
In the case of industry, the Maori age structure made a small contribution to the 
improvement for both sexes, whilst it had no aggregate effect on the improvement for 
occupation for either sex. Figure 8.3.1 compares these trends (both before and after 
standardisation for age structure), clearly demonstrating that ethnic concentration by 
occupation remains greater than that by industry, for both sexes, although for females 
the gap between the two saw a dramatic shift towards closure between 1986-1991, 
taking the ID for occupation below that of males for the first time.
Figure 8.3.1
Comparison of Industrial and Occupational Indices of Ethnic Dissimilarity 
(Standardised and Unstandardised) for European and Maori Ethnic Group
Workforces aged 15-64 Years, by Sex, 1976-1991
Males Females
—4—  Industry (Unstandardised)
—X — Industry (Standardised)
—• —  Occupation (Unstandardised) 
— —  Occupation (Standardised)
Notes: Data standardised to age structure of European Workforce.
Source: Database A (see Appendices F.4.3 and F.8.3)
That said, however, the extent to which both the recent substantial improvement 
in the occupational ID for females, and recent improvements to the IDs for both sexes in 
general, is likely to be a reflection of the general decline in employment demonstrated in 
Chapter 7, is an issue that was raised and cannot readily be dismissed. Since these data 
pertain to the employed workforce only, since the proportion in employment was 
demonstrated in Chapter 7 to have declined considerably more for Maori than for
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European, and more for Maori females than for European females, and since the 
underlying (raw) data confirm that Maori of both sexes have disproportionately lost 
employment in the key industries and occupations within which they were previously 
concentrated, reliance on trends within industry and occupation as key indicators of 
trends in ethnic stratification is rendered problematic. Indeed, if the recent declines have 
in fact been largely caused by the relative increase in Maori unemployment, the longer 
term trends shown in Figures 8.1.1 and 8.2.2 indicate that there may have been little real 
change in the indices of dissimilarity since the late-1960s.
The caveat also applies to the effects of ethnic differences in age structure. The 
loss of increasingly greater proportions of young Maori than European from 
employment over the 1976-1991 period will have reduced the effects of age structure in 
those industries and occupations where young Maori were previously concentrated. 
Accordingly, the findings of relatively small age effects in the present chapter cannot be 
seen as definitive.
Nevertheless, it remains worthy of note that the Maori age structure at all 
observations added to the concentration of Maori males in both the manufacturing 
industry, in 1991 still the largest industry for all employed males (accounting for 28 per 
cent of Maori and 20 per cent of European), and the giant ‘production, transport, 
equipment operators, and labourers’ occupational category (in 1991 accounting for 55 
and 36 per cent of employed Maori and European respectively). Similarly, the European 
age structure added to the concentration of European of both sexes in the ‘professional, 
technical’ and ‘administrative, managerial’ occupations, albeit minimally so for females 
in the latter; and, between 1976 and 1986, to the concentration of European females in 
the giant ‘community, social, personal’ industry. In each of these cases age structure 
added to ethnic stratification.
By contrast, almost no additive effects were detected for Maori females in any 
industry or occupation. Instead, the Maori female age structure tended to simultaneously 
give a Maori advantage in certain key industries and occupations (for example, the 
‘wholesale, retail, restaurant’ and ‘finance insurance, property’ industries, and the 
‘clerical’ and ‘sales worker’ occupations), but to thereby slightly conceal the true extent 
to which the underlying differentials for those categories favoured European. Similar 
effects also occurred for males in the ‘wholesale, retail, restaurant’ industry, and in the 
‘sales worker’ occupations. In these situations the Maori age structure ameliorated 
ethnic stratification.
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Importantly, as with the component analyses of the previous chapter, it was also 
shown that because the effects of both age structure and the underlying differentials 
differ by category (as well as by sex and period), they derive offsetting effects not only 
within, but also between, categories. These effects become conflated in age-standardised 
IDs, with the result that for policy purposes, ethnic differentials are better examined on a 
category by category basis.
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ETHNIC DIFFERENTIALS IN 
EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
SÜ) INTRODUCTION
Regularly argued as underlying the labour force, employment, industrial and 
occupational differentials outlined in Chapters 7 and 8 are ethnic differences in 
educational qualifications. For example, the unemployed—disproportionately Maori, are 
less likely than their employed counterparts— disproportionately European, to hold 
formal qualifications; professionals and managers— disproportionately European, are 
more likely than Maori to do so. That said, it has also been observed that, despite 
improving qualification levels for Maori, occupational disparities continue to grow 
(Wilson 1979; Messina, Fraga, Rhodebeck and Wright 1992).
Initially, the bulk of educational differences between Maori and European were 
attributed to the lower proportions of Maori entering secondary school (Barrington 
1971; Ramsay 1972; McKenzie 1982). From the 1960s, when these proportions more or 
less equalised, the explanation changed to the lower proportions of Maori remaining 
through to the sixth and seventh forms where the main university pre-requisite 
qualifications are gained (Harker 1970; Davies 1993).1 Different value systems and 
aspirations (Bray 1971), as well as institutional racism, have also been implicated. 
However, not all qualifications are gained in the secondary school and university 
systems, nor in the teens and early twenties (Harker 1970:61-62), and thus it is 
important to review the total qualification distribution, the approach taken in this 
chapter.
It is also important to consider ethnic differences in age structure. Those without 
qualifications can be expected to be disproportionately amongst the oldest members of 
the adult population; those with professional and higher qualifications, 
disproportionately in their twenties to forties. As the relative proportions at each age 
change, so too do the overall qualification distributions. That is to say, with the census 
data typically employed to examine such distributions, each qualification category
1 In New Zealand it is possible to apply for admission to University without ‘secondary school 
qualifications’, on attaining the age of 21 years.
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represents the highest qualification held. This means that as each person vacates, for 
example, the ‘no qualifications’ category and moves into a higher category, only 
younger persons— and some immigrants—take their place. A large influx of young 
Europeans— for example, the arrival of the European baby boom at senior secondary 
school, or later, at the key ages for attaining post-school qualifications— could result in 
relative inflation or reduction in the importance of one or another category vis-ä-vis 
those categories for Maori. In these terms, however, the more youthful age structure of 
the Maori population should translate into a relative advantage. In 1991, for example, 
Maori at age 15-19 represented 11.5 per cent of the total Maori population, compared 
with the corresponding 8.0 per cent for non-Maori, suggesting a positive implication for 
the Maori - non-Maori qualification differential over and above any ‘real’ difference.
This chapter explores these arguments from a number of perspectives. First, an 
historical overview of ethnic qualification differentials since the 1960s is given. As noted 
in the previous chapters, these patterns and trends are the information with which 
policy-makers typically work. Data for the Maori and European populations for the 
period 1981-1991 are then subjected to component analysis, separating the ‘true’ level 
of the ethnic differential at each observation from the component due to ethnic 
differences in age structure. This is followed by a cohort analysis of each qualification 
category, in which differences in the qualification-gathering experiences of Maori and 
European cohorts across the life cycle are investigated. Finally, the qualification data are 
correlated with labour force status, an overview that provides a bridge between the 
findings of Chapter 7 (labour force and employment status differentials), the present 
chapter, and the following chapter on income differentials.
9.1 QUALIFYING THE PAST
Numerous studies have demonstrated longstanding educational differentials 
between the Maori and non-Maori/European populations, but these have invariably 
focussed on enrolment and retention rates. Trends in the total qualification distribution 
have received considerably less attention, due at least in part to a relative lack of data. 
Drawing on those data that are available, Table 9.1.1 provides an overview for the 
1966-1991 period. Because of potentially significant differences in the populations the 
data pertain to, trends for 1966-1971 (which pertain to the labour force only, aged 15+) 
and for 1981-1991 (which pertain to the total population aged 15+) are treated
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separately. Also in 1971, census data were published in tables that make it impossible to 
construct percentage distributions comparable to those for 1966 (i.e. ‘no qualifications’ 
in 1971 meant no school or university qualifications, but included ‘other’ qualifications 
that were not derived from university). As a result it is difficult to make any definitive 
comment about trends for the first period, other than noting that for all groups there 
were declines in the proportions with no qualifications, and increases in the proportions 
with qualifications, that were greater for non-Maori. That is to say, despite absolute 
improvements for Maori in every category, the percentage point gap between Maori and 
non-Maori increased. Between 1981 and 1986, a sizeable improvement in the ethnic 
differential occurred for males in the ‘secondary school qualifications’ category, but no 
such trend was evident in any other category for either males or females. The positive 
trend for males in ‘secondary school qualification’ continued between 1986-1991, joined 
by improvements in the ‘still at school/no qualifications’, and ‘other tertiary 
qualifications’ categories for both males and females.
Figure 9.1.1 summarises these trends as indices of dissimilarity, showing that 
between 1981 and 1991, the indices for both sexes peaked and then fell slightly, the 
figure for males ending the period at 99 per cent of its 1981 level, but that for females at 
107 per cent of its 1981 level. At the rate of change experienced between 1986-1991, 
0.38 of a percentage point per annum for males and 0.22 for females— and assuming 
that this very recent trend towards equality continues—the data imply a period to parity 
of approximately 65 years for Maori males and 95 years for females, all else remaining 
the same. However, they also suggest that a five-year trend is not a good basis for such 
a projection.
Importantly, the declines in the IDs between 1986 and 1991 cannot be seen 
without a caveat that there were increases in ethnic inequality within the ‘still at 
school/no qualifications’ category, by far the largest category for Maori, in 1991 
accounting for more than half of Maori of both sexes. That is to say, in 1981, Maori 
males were proportionately 1.5 times more likely than their European counterparts to be 
in this category, whilst by 1986 and 1991 they were respectively 1.80 and 1.85 times 
more likely (refer Table 9.1.1). Similarly, Maori females in 1981 were 1.4 times more 
likely than their European counterparts to be in this category, in 1986, 1.5 times, and in 
1991, 1.6 times. As implied earlier, this increase may be a function of ethnic differences 
in age structure, to which the analysis now turns.
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Table 9.1.1
Percentage Distribution and Index of Ethnic Dissimilarity for Highest Educational 
Qualification, Maori and Non-Maori/European, 
____________________ by Sex, Selected Years, 1966-1991____________________
M ALES F EM A L ES
1 9 6 6  | 1971 1981 1986 1991 196 6  | 1971 1981 | 1986 1991
(a) (b) (a) (b)
N ON -M A O RI/EU RO PEA N
No Q ualifications/N ot Specified* 7 9 .1 4 7 3 .9 2 46 .79 3 4 .4 7 2 8 .7 9 7 1 .8 0 66.53 5 2 .2 6 4 1 .4 5 3 2 .6 3
S e c o n d a ry  S ch o o l Q ualifications 1 2 .3 3 2 0 .9 9 25 .93 2 6 .1 0 2 6 .6 7 1 9 .3 7 30.91 2 7 .8 7 3 1 .2 9 3 3 .6 3
O th e r Tertiary  Q u a lif ic a tio n s" 4 .7 2 ... 2 1 .6 9 3 1 .9 3 3 6 .3 3 7 .2 0 ... 1 7 .0 9 2 2 .9 2 2 8 .3 2
U niversity Q u a lif ic a tio n s '” 3.81 5 .0 9 5.59 7 .5 0 8 .2 2 1.62 2 .56 2 .7 8 4 .34 5.41
TOTAL 1 0 0 .0 0 100.00 100.00 100 .00 1 00 .00 100 .00 100.00 100 .00 1 00 .00 10 0 .0 0
N um ber 6 9 4 7 3 2 7 3 4 7 8 8 888666 9 7 8 6 5 4 1010703 265931 313069 8 9 9 5 8 9 9 9 8 0 4 9 1 0 5 2556
Not S p ec ified  (E xcluded) ... ... 78192 4 0 6 3 5 2 4 3 6 9 ... ... 98271 6 1 8 3 3 3 6 0 1 2
MAORI
No Q ualifications/N ot Specified* 9 5 .4 3 9 3 .2 8 7 1 .5 3 6 0 .8 9 5 3 .3 0 9 0 .7 3 88.21 7 1 .5 6 6 3 .1 2 5 3 .2 3
S e c o n d a ry  S ch o o l Q ualifications 3 .1 3 6 .2 4 18.68 1 9 .9 7 2 1 .3 4 4 .7 0 11.63 2 1 .4 8 2 4 .1 8 2 5 .7 9
O th e r Tertiary  Q u a lif ic a tio n s" 1 .15 ... 8.84 17 .67 2 3 .4 7 4 .4 5 ... 6.51 11 .7 6 19 .6 0
U niversity Q u a lif ica tio n s"* 0 .2 9 0 .4 9 0.95 1.47 1 .88 0 .1 2 0.15 0 .4 5 0 .9 4 1.39
TOTAL 1 0 0 .0 0 100 .00 100.00 100 .00 100 .00 10 0 .0 0 100.00 1 00 .00 100 .00 1 0 0 .0 0
N um ber 4 3 6 9 9 50103 97899 113577 1254 9 0 14514 20793 9 8 3 6 4 1160 8 5 1 3 2975
Not S p ec ified  (E xcluded) ... ... 12186 7941 6201 ... ... 13602 9 564 7041
P E R C E N T A G E  POINT G A P (Eu ro p ean  m in u s Maori)
No Q ualifications/N ot Specified* -1 6 .3 0 -19 .36 -24 .74 -26 .42 -24 .52 -1 8 .9 3 -21 .68 -19.31 -21 .68 -2 0 .6 0
S e c o n d a ry  S ch o o l Q ualifications 9 .2 0 14 .7 5 7 .24 6 .12 5 .3 2 1 4 .6 7 19.27 6 .3 9 7.11 7 .8 4
O th e r Tertiary  Q u a lif ic a tio n s" 3 .5 7 ... 12.85 1 4 .2 6 12 .8 6 2 .7 5 ... 10 .58 11 .17 8 .7 3
U niversity  Q u alif ica tio n s* " 3 .5 2 4 .6 0 4.64 6 .0 3 6 .3 3 1 .50 2.41 2 .3 3 3 .4 0 4 .0 3
INDEX O F  DISSIMILARITY 1 6 .3 0 1 9 .3 6 24 .74 2 6 .4 2 2 4 .5 2 18 .9 3 21 .6 8 19.31 2 1 .6 8 2 0 .6 0
Notes: (a) Maori and Non-Maori. Labour Force Only (15+ \ears); Includes Qualifications Not Specified.
(b) Maori Ethnic Group and European, Population aged 15+years.
* 1966-71 = No Qualifications plus Qualifications Not Specified; 1981-1991 = No Qualifications/Still at School. 
** 'Other Tertiary1 data for 1971 Included amongst otherthree categories.
***1966-1971 = All UniversityQualifications; 1981-1991 = Bachelors/Post Graduate Qualifications Only. 
Source: (a) Census of Population and Dwellings
(b) Database B
Figure 9.1.1
Index of Ethnic Dissimilarity for Highest Educational Qualification, Maori and 
Non-Maori/European, by Sex, Selected Years, 1966-1991
Females
Males
/ - s  /-N  CD /-S
CO CO fv* jQ  -Q -Q
/-N  CD X
CO CO fv. _Q -Q _Q
CD t -
CD h -
CO
CO |x-
Source and Notes: Table 9.1.1
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9.2 QUALIFICATIONS AND AGE STRUCTURE
Component analysis of data for the period 1981-1991, shown in Figure 9.2.1, 
reveals that the greatest effects from age structure occur in the ‘secondary school 
qualifications’ category. For both males and females, the more youthful Maori age 
structure has a considerable offsetting effect on the underlying (true) differentials (which 
favour European at all observations), causing the observed (crude) differential for males 
in 1991 to be more than 40 per cent lower, and that for females, more than one-third 
lower, than it would be if the two populations had the same age structure. That is to say, 
the more youthful age structure of the Maori population has simultaneously aided the 
observed level of Maori qualifications in this category, whilst concealing the true extent 
of European advantage.
Nevertheless, both the underlying differentials and the effects of age structure (as 
a proportion of the underlying differentials) in the secondary school category declined 
across the period for both sexes, the former more so for males, and the latter more so 
for females. Importantly, the trend in the underlying differentials for females runs 
counter to that implied by the observed differentials, which increased across the period 
by 1.45 percentage points (23 per cent), and which would have been implicated in the 
overall increase in the ID. The trend in the underlying differential for males also falls 
fractionally more than the observed trend. The conclusion must be, therefore, that 
although the underlying differentials for both sexes are somewhat greater than implied 
by the crude measures, Maori of both sexes, but especially females, made greater gains 
in the ‘secondary school qualifications’ category than was otherwise apparent, as a 
result of age structure.
In both the ‘other tertiary’ and ‘bachelors/post-graduate’ categories— although 
more so in the former—European males gained a small advantage from age structure at 
all observations, adding to consistently higher underlying differentials in their favour, 
and slightly inflating the observed differentials. For females, by contrast, a small 
advantage from age structure accrued to Maori, marginally offsetting the underlying 
differentials, which consistently favoured European. These results indicate that there is 
fractionally less underlying inequality between males in each of these categories than is 
apparent from the crude measures, but slightly greater for females, the Maori age 
structure very slightly— although increasingly— aiding Maori female levels of these 
qualifications, whilst simultaneously concealing the true extent of European advantage.
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Figure 9.2.1
Component Analysis of Ethnic Differentials for Highest Educational Qualification, 
Maori and European Populations Aged 15+ Years, 
by Sex, 1981-1991
Secondary School Qualifications Only
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Source: Database B (see AppendixG.1.1)
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For both sexes, the underlying differentials in the ‘other tertiary’ category ended 
the period a little below their 1981 levels, after having increased slightly between 1981 
and 1986. By contrast, the underlying differentials for the bachelors/post-graduate 
category rose across the period, those for males rising some 40 per cent, and those for 
females, 80 per cent.
The role of age structure in producing these trends was complex, that of 
European males, for example, adding to the increase in inequality for males with an 
‘other tertiary’ qualification between 1981 and 1986, but then reducing in effect, thereby 
contributing to the small decline in inequality between 1986 and 1991. However, more 
pertinent than detailing each such perturbation is that the age-advantage accruing to 
European males in both higher qualification categories reduced between 1986 and 1991, 
whilst the offsetting effect arising from the Maori female age structure increased. This 
situation has important implications for interpreting overall trends. Apparently, the 
Maori female age structure, which is younger than that of European females but a little 
older than that of Maori males, is currently optimal (or approaching optimality) for the 
gaining of higher qualifications. These increasingly positive effects can therefore shortly 
be expected to similarly advantage Maori males. That is to say, because the Maori male 
age structure is also slowly maturing, a similar advantage from the age-effect can be 
expected in the near future, over and above any ‘real’ gains.
Interpretation of the ‘still at school/no qualifications’ category is rendered 
somewhat more difficult by the fact that it conflates those still at school— 
overwhelmingly those in the 15-19 year age group, who are disproportionately Maori— 
with those who have no qualifications per se, more likely at the older end of the age 
distribution where European predominate. However, the age-effect shows that whilst 
the older European age structure predisposes European to being in this category, it is 
Maori who experience the higher proportions. The disproportion of Maori in this 
category is thus not due to higher proportions being ‘still at school’, which would have 
shown an age-effect for Maori, but rather, reflects those with no qualifications per se. 
Furthermore, not only has there been very little change in the underlying differentials 
across the period (albeit a small decline), but the true extent of Maori disadvantage is 
partially concealed by the offsetting effects of the European age structure. In 1991, these 
effects reduced the underlying differential for males by more than 11 per cent, and for 
females by almost 23 per cent.
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Also concealed by the effects of age structure in the ‘still at school/no 
qualifications’ category is that where, for females, the observed differentials indicate a 
small (1.3 percentage point) overall increase in ethnic inequality, the underlying 
differentials show a fractional decline. For males, a 0.2 percentage point overall decline 
in the observed differentials is also somewhat smaller than that indicated by the 
underlying differentials, which fell by 2.0 percentage points (7 per cent). Thus it can be 
concluded that whilst ethnic inequality in this category is somewhat greater than 
indicated by the observed values, and more so for females than for males, it is also 
declining at a more rapid rate than would superficially appear to be the case.
As with the component analyses of the previous chapters, the age-effects differ 
by category (as well as by period and sex), and are mutually compensating between 
categories. Because the size of each category is not taken into account, these effects 
become conflated when aggregated. Nevertheless, when age-standardised indices of 
dissimilarity are computed and compared with their unstandardised equivalents, as in 
Figure 9.2.2, it can be seen that the Maori age structure has had a sizeable deflating 
(advantageous) effect on the ethnic differential at each observation. For males, the effect 
ranges between 10 and 16 per cent across the period (15 per cent in 1991), and for 
females, between 23 and 30 per cent (30 per cent in 1991). In addition, between 1986 
and 1991, the unstandardised indices show a slightly greater decline (and hence a 
reduction in the percentage point gap between Maori and European) than the age- 
standardised indices, indicating that the Maori age structure has assisted in producing 
the recent—albeit minute—reduction in Maori and European differences. Indeed, if 
Maori females had had the same age structure as European females, the ID for females 
would have increased between 1986 and 1991.
Overall, these outcomes have occurred because if the Maori population had the 
same age structure as European, the proportion with secondary school qualifications 
would be lower, and the proportion with no qualifications would be higher. That said, 
since qualifications gained reflect a permanent change of status, it is important to note 
they cannot be lost as the age structures of the two populations move towards 
convergence. That is to say, by contrast with the changing ‘shift-share’ effects of labour 
force and employment status, and industrial and occupational distribution, where 
individuals can move in and out of the various categories, the case of qualifications is 
different because the categories are essentially unidirectional in nature: one cannot move 
from a higher category back into a lower one.
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Figure 9.2.2
Comparison of Standardised and Unstandardised Indices of Ethnic Dissimilarity 
for Highest Educational Qualification, Maori and European Populations Aged 154-
Years, by Sex, 1981-1991
Males Females
-♦—  Unstandardised
—x  — Standardised
Notes: Data for Maori standardised to age structure of European population.
Source: Database B (see Table 9.1.1 and Appendix G.1.1)
9.3 QUALIFICATIONS AND COHORT DIFFERENTIALS
The age-specific data underlying the foregoing component analysis are presented 
by cohort in Figures 9.3.1 and 9.3.2. Trends are based on the percentage point gap 
between European and Maori at each age, positive values denoting higher levels of the 
qualification for European, negative values denoting the same for Maori.
At first sight, data for the ‘secondary school qualifications’ category, given in 
Figure 9.3.1, reflect the situation shown above, where small declines in the underlying 
differential for this category were identified for both sexes, and for successive calendar 
years. These data show strong intra-cohort declines in inequality, especially for the more 
recently bom. Similarly, there is a reduction in the gap between Maori and European 
cohorts at each successively older age, for each more recently bom cohort, indicating 
inter-cohort improvements as well.
Although the data are incomplete in terms of the full life-cycle, the patterns and 
trends suggest the existence of a progression to further qualifications. That is to say, 
because each category represents the highest qualification held, secondary school 
qualifications are for many people a transitional category, attained at the younger ages 
and then superseded by the gaining of additional qualifications. However, as a result of 
this phenomenon, a decline in the gap between two populations can occur in one of 
three ways: a faster increase in the proportion gaining of the qualification by the group
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that previously had the lower proportions; a higher rate of transition out of the category 
by the group that previously had the higher proportions; or a combination of the two. In 
fact the major cause of the improvements in this qualification category (with the 
exception of that at 15-19 years) has been a higher rate of transition out of the category 
by European. This is especially true for European males, evidenced in part by increases 
in intra-cohort inequality across the life cycle for many of the cohorts in the two other 
qualification categories shown in Figure 9.3.1 ( ‘other tertiary’ and ‘bachelors/post- 
graduate’), and in part by the absolute trends underlying these relativities (see Appendix 
G.2.2).
Figure 9.3.1
Percentage Point Gap Between European and Maori in Highest Qualification at 
Each Age (Selected Categories), by Cohort and Sex, 1981-1991
Secondary School Qualifications Only, Males Secondary School Qualifications Only, Females
Cohort Bom
---O- -- 1967-71 
----*----1962-66
1 9 ^ 5 6  
1947-51 
----X — 1942-46
Other Tertiary Qualifications, FemalesOther Tertiary Qualifications, Males
Bachelors / Post-Graduate Qualifications, FemalesBachelors/Post-Graduate Qualifications, Males
Source: D atabase B (se e  AppendixG.2.1)
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That said, with regard to the ‘other tertiary qualification’ category it is also 
important to note that for several other cohorts, there have been reductions in both 
intra- and inter-cohort inequality. However, the pattern is somewhat more complex than 
that for the secondary school category, and differs by sex, especially amongst the older 
cohorts. For males, each more recently bom cohort which was bom since the 1940s has 
experienced lower inequality at each age than its predecessor. For males born during the 
1940s and 1950s there is also a clear decline in both intra- and inter-cohort inequality 
across the life cycle, with each more recently bom cohort experiencing lower inequality 
than its predecessor. However, the opposite is true for male cohorts bom 1927-31 and 
1932-36, for which both the highest levels of inequality and a general increase over the 
life cycle are evident.
For females, only the two most recently bom cohorts show clear evidence of an 
improvement over their predecessor at each successive age (a reduction in inter-cohort 
inequality), whilst at the same time showing an overall increase in intra-cohort 
inequality. Each successively earlier bom cohort, on the other hand, has tended to have 
higher levels of inequality than its predecessor, but at the same time to show a decline in 
inequality across its life cycle (a reduction in intra-cohort inequality). Thus, where 
cohort inequality for males in this qualification category is positively related to age, the 
earliest bom cohorts experiencing the greatest inequality, for females inequality is 
greatest for those bom in the 1940s and 1950s.
By contrast, data for the bachelors/post-graduate category show very clearly that 
all cohorts of both sexes bom since the 1940s have experienced greater inequality than 
their predecessors, the most recently bom cohorts (those bom during the 1950s and 
1960s) being far more unequal than the generations to which their parents belong, the 
cohorts bom in the 1920s and 1930s. This increase in both intra- and inter-cohort 
inequality is especially evident for females, for whom—although experiencing lower 
levels of inequality per se than males— not only does the percentage point gap for each 
more recently bom cohort increase at each age, but inequality across the life cycle also 
increases to a greater extent than for males.
The corollary of the above trends is found in the ‘still at school/no qualifications’ 
category, data for which have negative percentage point gaps between European and 
Maori because Maori have the higher proportions in this category, and which are shown 
separately in Figure 9.3.2. Clearly evident is a reduction in the ethnic differential (i.e. it 
becomes less negative) at each successively older age for the most recently bom cohorts
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of both sexes, and across the life cycle for all but the earliest bom cohorts, which show a 
small increase in inequality (i.e. it becomes more negative). Ethnic inequality is greatest 
for males bom in the 1940s and 1950s, and for females bom in the 1950s and early 
1960s. Indeed, perhaps surprisingly, for this category it is the earliest bom cohorts, 
whilst having the highest levels of persons with no qualifications, which also have the 
lowest levels of inequality. This is especially so for females, for whom the more 
universal pursuit of educational qualifications has been a relatively recent phenomenon, 
vis-ä-vis males, supporting sociological arguments that education per se is not a panacea 
for eliminating inequality.
Figure 9.3.2
Percentage Point Gap Between European and Maori Still At School or with No 
Qualifications at Each Age, by Cohort and Sex, 1981-1991
Still at School/No Qualifications, Males Still at School/No Qualifications, Females
Cohort Bom 
1967-71
----* -----1962-66
• - -+ -- 1957-61 
----O---- 1952-56
Source: Database B (see  AppendixG2.1)
9.4 QUALIFICATIONS AND LABOUR FORCE STATUS
Comparing cmde educational qualifications with crude labour force status for 
the population aged 15-64 years suggests that reductions in ethnic inequality in the 
former do not greatly ameliorate ethnic inequalities in the latter. For example, as Table 
9.4.1 shows, Maori males with a bachelors/post-graduate qualification in 1981 were 
slightly less likely than their European counterparts to be unemployed, whilst by 1991 
they were considerably more likely to be so. Similarly, in 1981, Maori males with these 
qualifications were only slightly less likely than their European counterparts to be 
employed full-time, whilst by 1991 they were considerably less likely to be so. 
Furthermore, as Table 9.4.1 shows, the magnitude of deterioration in unemployment for 
Maori vis-ä-vis European males with these qualifications was considerably greater
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(minus 16 per cent) than that for unemployment in any other qualification category. 
Although the more youthful Maori age structure may well be involved in these trends, 
the latter suggests that they have institutional and/or discriminatory, rather than age- 
structural, underpinning’s.
Table 9.4.1
Percentage Point Differential (European minus Maori) in Each ‘Highest 
Qualification by Labour Force Status’ Category, and Index of Ethnic
Dissimilarity, Population Aged 15-64 Years, by Sex, 1981-1991
MALES Index* FEMALES Index*
1981 1986 1991 1991/1981 19811 19861 1991 1991/1981
STILL AT SCHOOL/NO QUALIFICATIONS
Full-Time 5.79 9.66 20.72 3.58 0.23 1.96 9.58 41.18
Part-Time 0.90 -1.94 0.72 0.80 8.09 7.39 9.03 1.12
Unemployed -8.30 -7.73 -9.48 1.14 -5.55 -6.99 -6.32 1.14
Not in the Labour Force 1.61 0.01 -11.97 -7.45 -2.77 -2.36 -12.30 4.45
SECONDARY SCHOC)L QUALIFICATIONS ONLY
Full-Time 1.71 4.16 13.70 8.03 0.28 1.19 7.26 26.31
Part-Time 0.83 -1.41 0.94 1.13 5.09 4.54 6.85 1.35
Unemployed -3.18 -4.12 -7.43 2.33 -3.35 -5.34 -6.37 1.90
Not in the Labour Force 0.65 1.37 -7.21 -11.14 -2.01 -0.40 -7.74 3.85
OTHER TERTIARY QlJALIFICATIONS
Full-Time -0.23 3.42 16.37 -69.77 -8.68 -6.02 7.48 -0.86
Part-Time 0.19 -1.43 -0.40 -2.09 6.29 7.00 8.61 1.37
Unemployed -1.13 -3.28 -10.13 9.01 -2.22 -4.49 -9.00 4.06
Not in the Labour Force 1.17 1.29 -5.83 -4.99 4.60 3.51 -7.09 -1.54
BACHE LORS/POST-C3RADUATE QUALIFICATIONS
Full-Time 3.97 4.26 10.31 2.60 -6.53 -8.22 -0.94 0.14
Part-Time -2.27 -1.19 -0.94 0.42 2.44 6.81 6.57 2.70
Unemployed 0.25 -1.66 -4.17 -16.45 -2.12 -4.15 -2.68 1.26
Not in the Labour Force -1.96 -1.41 -5.20 2.66 6.22 5.56 -2.95 -0.47
INDEX OF DISSIMILA RITY (Percentage European minus percenta ^e Maori)
Still at School/N o Q uals. 8.30 9.67 21.45 2.58 8.32 9.35 18.61 2.24
S eco n d ary  School Q uals. 3.18 5.53 14.64 4.60 5.36 5.73 14.11 2.63
O th er Tertia ry  Quals. 1.36 4.71 16.37 12.04 10.89 10.52 16.09 1.48
B achetors/Fost-G raduate 4.22 4.26 10.31 2.44 8.66 12.38 6.57 0.76
Notes: *1991 Indexed to 1981 (1981=1.00)
Source: Database B (see AppendixG.3.1)
Maori females with a bachelors/post-graduate qualification (who it should be 
recalled, were shown above to be slightly older on average than their male counterparts) 
fared a little better, being considerably more likely than European females to be 
employed full-time in both 1981 and 1986, and remaining just slightly so in 1991. 
Although they also (like their male counterparts) became more likely in 1991 than in 
1981 to be unemployed than European (though less likely than in 1986), the
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deterioration in this index was also not as severe as that for males. On the other hand, 
where, in 1981, Maori females had been considerably less likely than European to be 
outside of the labour force, by 1991 they were somewhat more likely to be so. 
Furthermore, almost all of this latter trend occurred between 1986 and 1991, suggesting 
the involvement of factors such as the ‘discouraged worker’ effect noted in Chapter 7. 
The contention is further supported by a similar trend between 1986 and 1991 for males 
in this qualification category.
For those with a bachelors/post-graduate qualification, the overall result of these 
trends was a more than doubling of the index of dissimilarity for males (from 4.2 to 10.3 
percentage points), most of the increase occurring between 1986 and 1991; against a 24 
per cent decline in the index for females (from 8.6 to 6.6 percentage points), albeit the 
latter having first increased quite dramatically between 1981 and 1986. This category for 
females was, however, the only ‘qualification by labour force status’ category to show 
an overall decline in the index of dissimilarity for either sex, although in no such 
category did that for females increase to the same extent as that for males.
This disparity by sex was particularly evident in the ‘other tertiary qualifications’ 
category, the index of dissimilarity for which saw a 48 per cent increase for females, but 
a massive 12-fold increase for males. Given that the category in 1991 pertained to more 
than one-fifth of Maori males and more than one-third of European males, the 
magnitude of the increase is of considerable significance. Of particular note was a shift 
for Maori males with these qualifications from being slightly more likely than European 
males in 1981 to be in full-time employment, to being substantially less likely to be so in 
1991, whilst the opposite was the case for those not in the labour force (Maori males in 
1981 being slightly less likely than European to be outside of the labour force, and in 
1991, considerably more likely to be so). So too was there a sizeable increase between 
1981 and 1991 in the proportion of Maori of both sexes with this qualification who were 
unemployed. Indeed, Maori with these qualifications experienced higher unemployment 
in 1991 than did Maori in any other qualification category, whereas this had not been the 
case in 1981. The findings thus suggest both a qualitative difference in the type of 
qualifications held within this rather broadly-defined category, and a relative decline in 
demand by employers, for those held by Maori.
The extent to which ethnic differences in age structure played a role in producing 
these differentials and trends is summarised in Figure 9.4.1, which compares age- 
standardised and unstandardised indices of dissimilarity for the entire ‘qualification by
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labour force’ distribution (that is, both qualifications and labour force status have been 
simultaneously standardised for age structure). Although the Maori age structure can be 
seen to have had a small deflating effect on the percentage point gap, and hence an 
advantageous effect on the ethnic differential at each year of observation for both sexes, 
trends in the standardised index show that this effect has also been mitigating against a 
small decline in inequality across the period (the standardised index falling slightly; the 
unstandardised index showing very little change). That is to say, if the Maori working 
age population had the same age structure as its European counterpart, ethnic inequality 
would be slightly higher, but it would also be declining, albeit by a single percentage 
point only across the entire 1981-1991 period. In 1991, almost 28 per cent of males 
(almost 30 per cent when age-standardised), and almost 26 per cent of females (27 per 
cent when standardised), would have needed to change categories in order for the 
qualification by labour force distributions of the two populations to equalise. The 
findings thus extend to 1991 arguments advanced almost two decades ago by Wilson 
(1979), and more recently by Messina et al. (1992:97) who observed patterns to 1980, 
and show that, despite improvements in the relative proportions of Maori with 
qualifications, ethnic disparities in labour force status continue to grow— or at least fail 
to decline substantially.
Figure 9.4.1
Comparison of Standardised and Unstandardised Indices of Ethnic Dissimilarity 
for ‘Highest Qualification by Labour Force Status’, Maori Ethnic Group and 
European Populations Aged 15-64 Years, by Sex, 1981-1991
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Notes: Data for Maori standardised to age structure of European population.
Source: D atabase B (se e  AppendixG.3.2).
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9.5 SUMMARY
Ethnic differentials in New Zealand’s educational qualification distribution (per 
se) are diminishing only very slowly. Between 1966 and 1986, the crude indices of 
dissimilarity for both sexes increased, falling only in the 1986-1991 period, and then by 
only a small proportion. At the end of that period, one quarter of Maori males and one 
fifth of Maori females aged 15+ years would have needed to change qualification 
categories for their qualification distribution to equal that of European. At the rate of 
improvement experienced in the 1986-1991 period, 0.38 of a percentage point per 
annum for males and 0.22 for females, the achievement of parity would appear to be as 
far away as 65 years for males and 95 years for females, all else remaining equal.
However, by way of a caveat to these findings, the Maori age structure was 
shown to have had a sizeable deflating effect on the crude index for each sex (and hence 
an advantageous effect for Maori), causing the index to appear lower than it would if the 
age structures of the two populations were the same, and it also seems to have played a 
small role in producing the decline between 1986 and 1991. In addition, age-effects 
within the higher qualification categories for females suggested that some small gains 
over and above any ‘real’ (underlying) gains can be expected for the Maori male 
population in the near future. Three factors support this contention. First, the age 
structure of the Maori population predisposed it to the gaining of secondary school 
qualifications across the 1981-1991 period, albeit at a decelerating rate, which was 
greater for females than males. Second, European males gained a small advantage from 
age structure in the higher qualification categories (‘bachelors/post-graduate; and ‘other 
tertiary’), but this effect was also declining; whilst for females in these categories it was 
Maori who gained a small advantage from age structure, and this effect was increasing. 
Since the Maori male population is a little younger than that of Maori females, and since 
the findings suggest that the Maori female age structure is currently optimal (or 
approaching optimality) for the gaining of higher qualifications, it can be expected that 
the Maori male age structure will shortly follow suit. Third, the European age structure 
predisposed it to being in the ‘no qualifications’ category, whilst partially concealing the 
true extent to which Maori of both sexes, but particularly females, remain concentrated 
in the category. However, since qualifications gained are essentially permanent gains 
(one does not move from a higher to a lower category), it is unlikely that the relative
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proportion of Maori in the category will increase, despite the fact that the increasing 
maturation of the Maori age structure might suggest such.
Nevertheless, this is not the same as saying that the index of dissimilarity could 
not yet increase further, as it well could, if, for example, Maori find it disproportionately 
more difficult than European to gain access to higher qualifications as a result of the 
recent implementation of ‘user pays’ policies. Cohort analysis showed that such 
qualifications, especially ‘other tertiary qualifications’, are gained not only in the early 
twenties, but also in the thirties and forties, that is, at ages which imply that tertiary 
training is less likely to be paid for by parents, suggesting the need for employment to 
fund that training. As shown in Chapter 7, and reinforced in the present chapter, this 
possibility has deteriorated for Maori more than for European, and for Maori females 
more than for European females. Indeed, the findings that the Maori female population 
gained a small advantage from age structure and that this advantage may shortly be 
experienced by Maori males should not deflect attention from the fact that (a) Maori 
females continue to experience the lowest levels of qualifications of all sex-ethnic 
groups; (b) that the underlying component of ethnic differentials in the arguably- 
important ‘bachelors/post-graduate’ category underwent a substantial increase for both 
sexes, whilst that in the ‘other tertiary qualifications’ category showed only a fractional 
decline; (c) that cohort analysis of these categories showed a substantial increase in 
inequality for more recently bom cohorts; and (d) that a large portion of the main 
contribution to the small decline in ethnic inequality between 1986 and 1991— 
emanating from the secondary school qualifications category— reflected a greater 
transition out of the category by European of both sexes, secondary school qualifications 
in effect being for many a transitional category. That is to say, because each qualification 
category represents the highest qualification held, the gaining of additional qualifications 
over the life cycle mean that the secondary school category is often superseded between 
one census and the next, and this occurred for European more than for Maori. Thus, the 
small improvements to the indices of dissimilarity may be more apparent than real.
This contention was also supported by cohort analysis of the bachelors/post­
graduate category, which showed that for both males and females, ethnic inequality is 
inversely and increasingly correlated with age: the more recently bom the cohort, the 
greater and more rapidly increasing the inequality, both within (intra-cohort) and 
between cohorts. In the ‘other tertiary’ category also, substantial increases in intra­
cohort inequality also occurred for the most recently bom cohorts, similarly showing
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that young European have gained these qualifications at a faster rate than Maori. 
However, in this category, there was also a concomitant improvement in both inter­
cohort inequality for the more recently bom cohorts (the gap between European and 
Maori at each successive age being smaller than for the predecessor cohort), and in 
intra-cohort inequality (inequality across the life cycle) for most middle-aged cohorts. 
Thereafter substantial differences obtained by sex, inequality being highest and 
increasing across the life cycle for each successively earlier bom male cohort, but being 
lower and decreasing across the life cycle for each successively earlier bom female 
cohort.
Using the ‘no qualifications’ category as an indicator of overall inequality at the 
micro-level, the most recently bom cohorts— those bom in the late 1960s and currently 
in their late twenties and early thirties—were shown to have slightly lower levels of 
ethnic inequality than their immediate predecessors (those bom in the 1950s) but 
generally higher levels than their older predecessors, particularly in the case of females. 
This finding offers considerable reinforcement to sociological arguments which hold that 
education is often a cause of inequality (e.g. Nash 1982 on New Zealand). Certainly it 
seems that as qualification levels have increased, so too has ethnic inequality. However, 
it must also be acknowledged that those cohorts showing the highest levels of inequality 
are those bom during the baby boom, and thus the very size of their cohorts will be 
implicated in the maintenance of the index of dissimilarity at a high level. That is to say, 
the large baby boom cohorts with their greater levels of ethnic inequality will account 
for a large portion of the index for each sex. Furthermore, small improvements for the 
most recently bom cohorts in all but the bachelors/post-graduate category suggest a 
very recent improvement for Maori, and imply that it is not education per se that causes 
social differentiation by ethnicity, but differential access to it.
Finally, this suggestion of differential access was given an additional dimension 
when the qualification data were correlated with labour force status. Particularly notable 
were relatively greater declines in the proportion of Maori of both sexes with either a 
‘bachelors/post-graduate’ or ‘other tertiary’ qualification working full-time, and relative 
increases in the proportion of Maori with these qualifications who were unemployed. 
Cmde indices of dissimilarity for these data, which showed almost no change across the 
1981-1991 period, demonstrated that in 1991, more than 28 per cent of males, and 
almost 26 per cent of females, would have needed to change qualification by labour 
force categories for the two distributions to be equal. Age-standardisation increased
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these proportions at all observations, showing, on the one hand, that the Maori age 
structure has had a small deflationary effect on inequality across the 1981-1991 period 
(and hence an advantageous effect for Maori), but on the other, that it has 
simultaneously mitigated against the (very) small declines that would have occurred for 
both sexes if the two populations had had the same age structures. Together they show 
that employment disparities have really not improved despite the improved qualification 
levels of Maori, thus extending to 1991 similar claims made almost two decades ago by 
Wilson (1979), and more recently by Messina et al. (1992) who observed trends to 
1980.
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ETHNIC DIFFERENTIALS IN INCOME
HÜ) INTRODUCTION
Since 1951, when data on Maori incomes first became available, researchers 
have regularly established that Maori mean incomes are lower than those of non- 
Maori/European.1 Among explanations for the disparities are the differing age, labour 
force, occupational and educational distributions outlined in the foregoing chapters, as 
well as racial discrimination (Pierce 1975; Macrae 1976; Douglas and Dyall 1985; 
Spoonley 1978, 1988) and now largely expired differences in levels and rates of 
urbanisation, which exposed Maori and European to different forms of industry (Easton 
1983b:211).
However, when a sufficiently broad range of these factors is controlled for, the 
differences in average income have been shown to disappear (Macrae 1976; Brosnan 
1984). That is to say, Maori and non-Maori/European workers with the same 
characteristics have been shown to declare approximately the same average incomes— at 
least in 1981. This is an enormously important finding, in that, contrary to many popular 
understandings, it points to the achievement of a very significant form of equality— at 
least at the disaggregated level, and for those who comprise the employed labour force, 
a point that will be returned to below.
On the other hand, the relatively few works that examine New Zealand’s ethnic 
income differentials over time record a steady decline in inequality until the late 1970s or 
early 1980s (Brosnan 1987:98; Easton 1983b:210), and an apparent reversal of those 
trends since, although the timing and magnitude of the shift differs by study (Messina et 
al. 1992:101; Johnstone 1996; Easton 1996b: 121; Martin 1997a: 16 and forthcoming2). 
For Messina et al., drawing on total income distributions for the period 1950-1980, the 
reversal occurs between 1970 and 1980, and is ascribed to the failure of the Maori 
educational and occupational distributions to keep apace of those of European. For
1 Butterworth 1974; Macrae 1976; Easton 1983b, 1994, 1996b; Brosnan 1982, 1984, 1987; Gould 1982; 
Brosnan and Hill 1983; Hill and Brosnan 1984; Horsfield and Evans 1988; Butterworth and Mako 
1989:94-102; Messina, Fraga, Rhodebeck and Wright 1992:101; Johnstone 1996; Martin 1997a: 16 and 
forthcoming.
2I gratefully acknowledge Barry Martin’s willingness to inform me of the findings of his doctoral 
research, still in progress at the time of writing, and to provide me with data for the historical overview 
given in Figures 10.1.1 and 10.1.2 below.
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Martin (1997a), the shift begins in the late 1970s-early 1980s, although the precise 
turning point and the magnitude of the change vary according to which sex, employment 
status group and measure of inequality is considered.3 Explanation for the shift is argued 
to lie in globally-extant technological changes which favour ‘high-tech’ industries and 
highly skilled workers, and depress the situation of the low skilled and younger cohorts 
(Martin 1997a: 1, 16-17).4 According to Easton (1996b: 121), drawing on total income 
data for differing classifications of Maori, the shift is more recent again, occurring as late 
as 1986 and only for males, although the findings are dependent on ethnic classification. 
Easton similarly posits the shift as a probable employment effect. There is also the 
possibility that Maori did not gain to the same extent as non-Maori/European from the 
wage and salary bargaining of the 1985-1987 period that followed the lifting of the 
wage-price freeze of 1982-1984. The increase in inequality was not believed by Easton 
to be an age-effect (Easton 1996b: 120), but the issue was not examined empirically in 
Easton’s study due to discontinuities in ethnic classification in the published data.
Accordingly, drawing mainly on Database B (which was explained in Chapter 5 
to have a high degree of internal consistency), this chapter undertakes a time-series 
analysis of ethnic differentials in mean income, examining the effects of age structure, 
labour force status and educational category by sex, and these factors in varying 
combinations, for the period 1981-1991. Unfortunately, because occupation is not 
included in the income database available for this study, the chapter cannot also consider 
the effects of occupational distribution, argued by Brosnan (1987:100) to account for 
the greatest proportion of aggregate income disparity. Nevertheless, the present study 
provides an equally important perspective. Studies such as those by Brosnan et al., 
which focus on occupational structure, tend to exclude those who are not in 
employment, shown in Chapter 7 to account for almost half of all Maori males aged 15- 
64 years in 1991 (against 25 per cent of European males) and almost two-thirds of 
Maori females of the same age (against 42 per cent of European females). As Brosnan 
(1981:60) notes, the similar selective removal of nil-income cases from an earlier study 
may account for the finding that income inequality amongst females over the age of 20 
had shifted between 1951 and 1976 from a non-Maori to a Maori advantage. Although
3 Martin employs five different indices of inequality: the Gini Coefficient, Coefficient of Variation, 
Theil Coefficient, Mean Logarithmic Deviation, and Variance of the Logarithm.
4 Both Johnstone and Martin, located at the Population Studies Centre, University of Waikato, New 
Zealand, drew on the same database, and, not surprisingly, noted similar trends. That database is the 
same one drawn on for much of this thesis, and described in Chapter 5 as Database B.
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similarly focusing on the working-age population only (those aged 15-64 years), the 
present study therefore extends the analysis to the unemployed and those not in the 
labour force, and also takes account of the separate effects of full-and part-time 
employment.
To begin, an overview of historical trends is given. Data for 1981-1991 are then 
standardised and the contributory effects of each variable and combination of variables 
to ethnic differences in mean income are examined. Finally, a cohort analysis of a broad 
range of ‘income by labour force status by qualification’ categories is undertaken, in 
which ethnic differences in the age-income curve across the life cycle for the period 
1981-1991 are examined. As acknowledged in the earlier chapters, three observations 
(1981, 1986, 1991) are scarcely representative of the ‘life cycle’ as such, but, in the 
absence of longer term data, provide a useful indication of trends.
To assist interpretation, two points should be recalled from Chapter 5. First, the 
data include social welfare benefits, meaning that although the analysis pertains to the 
income of individuals, the unemployed and ‘not in the labour force’ categories will 
strongly reflect government payments relating to family type, size and life cycle stage. 
Second, income data by hours worked are neither published by ethnicity, nor included in 
the databases available for this study, and thus this important element of income 
differentials can be dealt with only by inference from the few cross-sectional studies that 
have drawn on unpublished data (e.g. Brosnan 1985, Raney 1990, Harris and Raney 
1991, Harris 1992).
10.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The approximate course of the trends discussed above is plotted in Figure 
10.1.1, which shows Maori mean income as a percentage of non-Maori mean income, 
for the employed (full-time plus part-time) and total populations. These and other similar 
percentage ratios are hereafter referred to as income relativities. A high income 
relativity means that the mean incomes of Maori and non-Maori/European are close, and 
an increase in income relativity means that the mean incomes of Maori and non- 
Maori/European are converging. An improvement in income relativity is therefore the 
same as a reduction in the income differential.
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Of particular note is that until 1986, income relativities for males differed very 
little by whether or not they pertained to the employed or total populations.5 Those for 
females show a much greater— albeit steadily declining— difference, also until 1986, 
when the ratios for the two categories (employed and total populations) almost 
converged. Thereafter there is a clear divergence between the ratios for the employed 
and total populations for both sexes. Since 1986, for both males and females, a marked 
decline in Maori-European income relativities has occurred for the total group, whilst 
relativities for employed females resume their generally upward trend, and those for 
employed males decline only slightly.
Figure 10.1.1
Income Relativity: Maori Mean Income as a Percentage of Non-Maori Mean 
Income, Employed and Total Populations, by Sex, 1951-1991
Males
Fem ales
—X — Employed
1956-
In this and all subsequent Figures and Tables, data have been CPI adjusted to $1991.Notes:
*Data for 1956 interpolated by Martin.
1951 and 1976-1991: Population aged 15-64 years; 1956-1971: Population aged 15-59 years 
Source: Martin 1997, Figure 5 (see  Appendix H.1)
5 Martin (1997a) refers to these populations as the ‘actively engaged’ and total populations. However, 
he notes (p.3) that he has excluded the incomes of the unemployed from those o f the actively engaged 
population, which typically includes employers, the self-employed, wage and salary earners, relatives 
assisting unpaid and the unemployed. For the sake of clarity, Martin’s actively engaged population are 
referred to here as the ‘employed’ population.
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Also of note is that income relativities for the employed population are 
considerably higher for females than for males at all observations, the mean income of 
Maori females in this category in 1991 reaching 94 per cent of that of non-Maori 
females, considerably above the highest income relativity for males, which occurred in 
1981, when the mean income of Maori males reached 78 per cent of that for non-Maori 
males. By contrast, when the total population is considered, income relativities for males 
are higher than for their female counterparts in 1951, 1956, 1966, 1971 and 1981.
It is important that these levels not be confused with the fact that mean income 
for females has been historically, and remains, considerably lower than that for males, 
albeit having gained some ground over the period in question, due at least in part to a 
substantial fall in mean income for males, evident in Figure 10.1.2. Indeed, before 
turning to more disaggregated data, it is extremely important to review the absolute 
trends underlying those in Figure 10.1.1. As Figure 10.1.2 shows, significant reversals in 
the direction of trends for the mean incomes of both Maori and non-Maori have also 
taken place, particularly so for males, and their aetiology—undoubtedly related to the 
structural changes of the past decade and a half6— is also likely to be implicated in the 
general decline in ethnic equality. Between 1981 and 1991, mean incomes for employed 
non-Maori and Maori males fell by 19 and 21 per cent respectively, whilst for females 
the declines were 13 and 10 per cent. For the total population, the mean income of non- 
Maori males declined over the same period by 21 per cent, and that of Maori males by 
31 per cent. By contrast, the mean income of all non-Maori females increased by a 
further 31 per cent between 1981 and 1986, and then levelled off, whilst that of all 
Maori females increased by 46 per cent and then fell slightly, ending the period 38 per 
cent above its 1981 level.
6 See especially Boston and Dalziel (1992); Shirley (1993); Easton 1996b, 1997a, 1997b; Silverstone, 
Bollard and Lattimore 1996.
Figure 10.1.2
Mean Income for Employed and Total Populations,
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Maori and Non-Maori (in $1991), by Sex, 1951-1991
$40,000 t Non-Maori
MaoriMALES$35,000 -
$30,000 -
$25,000 FEMALES
o> $20,000 -
$15,000 jjf Employed
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$5,000 -
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m cd go o>
▼“  T— T— y— T—
in cd h- oo G)
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Notes: ‘ Data for 1956 interpolated by Martin.
1951 and 1976-1991: Population aged 15-64 years; 1956-1971: Population aged 15-59 years 
Source: Martin 1997, Figure 5 (see Appendix H.1)
10.2 INCOME BY LABOUR FORCE STATUS, 1981-1991
Turning to data disaggregated by labour force status for 1981-1991— and also to 
the Maori Ethnic Group and European rather than Sole Maori and non-Maori 
classifications—Figure 10.2.1 shows that the above trends conceal an even more 
complex situation. Reflecting the trends for employed males, Maori-European income 
relativities for males employed full-time show very little— albeit also slightly declining— 
change across the period, whilst those for males who worked part-time first improved 
dramatically (deriving a small Maori advantage in 1986) and then deteriorated, ending 
the period only just above their 1981 levels. However, apparently contradicting the 
situation for employed females shown in Figure 10.1.1, Maori-European income 
relativities for females employed full-time during the 1986-1991 period are not only 
lower than those for each other labour force category, but also show a steady decline 
across the entire 1981-1991 period. Those for females employed part-time show a very 
small improvement overall, having increased between 1981 and 1986, but they too 
experienced a decline between 1986 and 1991.
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Figure 10.2.1
Income Relativity: Maori Mean Income as a Percentage of European Mean 
Income (in $1991), by Labour Force Status and Sex,
Population Aged 15-64 Years, 1981-1991
120 t
Males Females
------♦ ----- Full-Time
— o —  Part-Time
— X —  U n em p loyed
- - - o -  - - Not in th e  Labour F o rce
Source: Database B (see Appendix H.2)
It would seem that this apparent contradiction between trends in income 
relativity for employed Maori and non-Maori/European females shown in Figures 10.1.1 
and 10.2.1 between 1986 and 1991 relates in part to methodological differences, 
amongst which are differing ethnic classifications, and in part to shifts in the full- 
time/part-time balance of female labour force activity towards the latter category, shown 
in Chapter 7 to have been more pronounced for European than for Maori females. That 
is to say, since the European female population has a greater proportion than Maori of 
its numbers employed part-time, and since this proportion underwent a relative increase 
across the period in question, aggregate mean incomes for employed (full-time plus part- 
time) European females will have been slightly lowered by that factor, particularly in 
1991, causing the income difference between employed Maori and European females in 
Figure 10.1.1 to have decreased. By contrast, when separated into their full- and part- 
time components, as in Figure 10.2.1, the true situation can be seen.
For unemployed females, on the other hand, Maori-European income relativities 
not only show a substantial improvement across the 1981-1986 period, but also a shift 
to a Maori advantage (i.e. the ratio exceeds 100 per cent). Income relativity then 
deteriorated across the 1986-1991 period, but only to 100 per cent, and in 1991 
remained well above its 1981 level. Very similar trends are apparent for unemployed
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males, with the exception that income relativities in 1986 did not quite reach 100 per 
cent.
Maori-European income relativities for those not in the labour force also 
improved immensely across the 1981-1991 period, for both sexes, albeit at a 
decelerating rate between 1986-1991. For females, the overall result was a shift from a 
European to a Maori advantage (i.e. more than 100 per cent), whilst for males, income 
relativities for this category showed the greatest change of all four labour force 
categories, but in 1991 still remained the lowest (most unequal).
These latter trends—those for the unemployed and not in the labour force— 
imply an increase in benefit income that was greater for Maori than for European of both 
sexes, and that was especially pronounced during the 1981-1986 period, after which 
time the situation reversed for those who were unemployed and decelerated for those 
not in the labour force. Alternatively, or in addition, there may have been a relative 
increase followed by a relative decrease in the transition of Maori between 
unemployment/not in the labour force and work over the corresponding periods, a 
phenomenon known to economists as ‘churning’. Typically, European gain from this 
situation more than Maori (Easton 1994:209; Fletcher 1995:22-34; Mare, 1995:121), 
but this may not necessarily have been the case at the time of each census. Between the 
late 1970s and 1985, for example, a broad range of training and government assisted 
employment programs were implemented, some of which were specifically directed at 
unemployed Maori, and most of which waxed and waned over time (New Zealand 
Employment Service 1992). A substantial increase in the minimum wage in 1985 would 
also have been likely to disproportionately benefit the 1986 annual income of those 
Maori who had been employed during that period. However, this factor does not appear 
to have also assisted the relative incomes of Maori employed full-time. Maori also spend 
longer on unemployment registers than non-Maori, and Maori are more likely to have 
repeated spells of unemployment than non-Maori. An improvement in relative transition 
rates and any small income advantage from this factor is therefore unlikely to explain the 
relative improvements in unemployment income for Maori over the 1981-1986 period, 
and on to 1991 for those not in the labour force.
More likely, the answer lies in different aspects of the social welfare system, and 
in their articulation with the differing demographic characteristics of the Maori and 
European populations. Young Maori, for example, are more likely than young European 
to be parents and sole parents (Rochford 1993; Jackson and Pool 1994, 1996) and thus
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to receive additional benefit income that reflects assistance for dependent children. As 
noted in Chapter 5, benefit changes across the 1981-1986 period are likely to have 
especially enhanced the 1986 incomes of those with children, whilst those across the 
1986-1991 period would have had the opposite effect on 1991 incomes. So too would 
the August 1986 shift from benefit payments on a couple-basis to an individual-basis 
have negatively affected the 1991 incomes of males who previously received such 
payments on behalf of their female partner, and positively affected those of the relevant 
females. The latter perhaps explains the slightly greater decline in income relativity for 
unemployed males than females between 1986 and 1991.
10.2.1 Standardised vs Unstandardised Indices:
An age standardised index is now used to describe the measure of income 
relativity which is derived when the Maori mean income is standardised to the European 
age structure and then recalculated as a percentage of the European mean income. 
Similarly, an age-qualification standardised index is used to describe the measure of 
income relativity which is derived when the mean Maori income is standardised to the 
age structure and qualification structure of European and then recalculated as a 
percentage of the European mean income. The income relativities discussed in the 
previous section were unstandardised indices, and were calculated from the percentage 
of mean Maori income to mean European income. In the following discussion, these will 
be referred to as income relativities or unstandardised indices, or sometimes as observed 
indices. The term ‘observed income differentials’ also refers to unstandardised data.
The arguments in the above section are supported when the unstandardised 
indices are compared with their age-standardised equivalents, shown in Figure 10.2.2. 
The gap between these two curves indicates the extent to which standardising for age 
structure reduces (or alters) income inequality. On the one hand, the trend in this gap 
makes it clear that ethnic differences in age structure played a declining role in 
producing the observed ethnic income differentials in the unemployed and not in the 
labour force categories at each successive year. In 1981, the Maori age structure 
contributed 7 and 9 percentage points respectively to the unstandardised indices for 
males and females who were unemployed, whilst by 1991 the effect was negligible. For 
those who were not in the labour force, the corresponding effects were 13 and 14 
percentage points in 1981, and similarly were negligible in 1991. On the other hand, the 
fact that the unstandardised indices for the unemployed between 1981 and 1986, and for
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the not in the labour force category between 1981 and 1991, show slightly greater 
improvements than their age-standardised equivalents is evidence that the Maori age 
structure (and implicitly, differences in family formation and structure) simultaneously 
played a small— albeit declining— role in producing the overall improvements. That is to 
say, if the Maori age structure had been the same as that of European, the improvements 
would have been less, especially for those who were not in the labour force.
Figure 10.2.2
Income Relativity: Maori Mean Income as a Percentage of European Mean 
Income (in $1991), Comparison of Unstandardised Indices, and Indices 
Standardised for Age-, and Age-Qualification Distributions, by Labour Force 
Status and Sex, Population Aged 15-64 Years, 1981-1991
Unemployed Not in the Labour Force
Full-Time Employment Part-Time Employment
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Source: Database B (See Appendix H.3)
Also shown in Figure 10.2.2 are indices reflecting simultaneous standardisation 
for age and qualifications. These patterns and trends tell a more complex story, but in 
general show that ethnic differences in qualifications played a larger role than ethnic
208
differences in age structure in producing the observed income differentials at each year, 
especially in the employed labour force (that is, the gap between the indices standardised 
by age and qualifications and the indices standardised by age is greater than the gap 
between the indices standardised by age and the unstandardised indices). For males 
employed full-time, the combined effects of age structure and qualifications did not 
change across the 1981-1991 period, contributing 11 percentage points to the 
unstandardised index at each observation. However, within that combined effect, the 
component due to age structure declined from 4 to 3 percentage points, whilst that due 
to qualifications increased slightly, from 7 to 8 percentage points. For females who were 
employed full-time, the combined effect increased from 10 to 13 percentage points, with 
the component due to age structure declining from 2 to 1 percentage point(s), and that 
due to qualifications increasing from 8 to 12 percentage points. Thus, for both sexes in 
full-time employment, the relative decline in unstandardised income relativity, that is, the 
decline in the mean income of Maori vis-ä-vis European was driven— at least in part— 
by an increase in the component due to qualifications, this trend being somewhat more 
pronounced for females.
Another way of looking at this is to define the gap between 100 per cent (total 
equality) and the age-qualification standardised index as unexplained income inequality. 
Figure 10.2.2 shows that for males in full-time employment, unexplained income 
inequality increased from 12 to 14 percentage points, and for females, from 5 to 8 
percentage points. That is to say, even if the Maori and European populations had had 
the same age and qualification distributions, observed income inequality would have 
increased. Importantly, it is not that the ethnic differentials or their respective increases 
are very large, but rather, that the trends move in the opposite direction to what might 
have been expected, especially given the decline in occupational differences shown in 
Chapter 8. Although it is possible that the trends reflect a relative decline in hours 
worked for Maori, this factor could not be examined here.
The situation of females employed part-time was quite different, with the 
contribution to unstandardised income relativity made by ethnic differences in 
qualifications and ethnic differences in age structure both declining across the 1981- 
1991 period. The effect from age structure fell from 6 to 4 percentage points, and that 
from qualifications, from 11 to 8. In this case, however, simultaneous standardisation for 
age structure and qualifications reveals an ethnic differential that favoured Maori females 
in both 1981 and 1986, and, although this advantage then declined, in 1991 the
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differential sat at 99 per cent. The Maori age and qualification distributions therefore not 
only completely accounted for the whole of the difference in the unstandardised index, 
but if Maori females had had the same age and qualification distributions as European 
females in both 1981 and 1986, they would have had higher mean incomes than 
European.
On the one hand, the recent trends in this category may reflect a type of 
‘correction’. As suggested above, there may have been a relative decline in hours 
worked by Maori. However, on the other hand, when the age- and qualification- 
standardised trend for 1986-1991 is considered in the context of its equivalent in the 
full-time category, there remains a suggestion of a relatively deteriorating situation for 
Maori.
Such a suggestion is reinforced by the patterns and trends in the indices for males 
who worked part-time. In this category, not only did the age- and qualification- 
standardised index show first (between 1981 and 1986) an improvement, to unity, and 
then (between 1986 and 1991) a deterioration of some 14 percentage points, but similar 
age- and qualification distributions for Maori and European would have resulted in a 
slightly greater deterioration in Maori-European income relativities between 1986 and 
1991 than indicated by the unstandardised index. That is to say, in 1986, the fully 
standardised index of income relativity for males in this category was 2 percentage 
points lower than the unstandardised index, whilst by 1991 it was 6 percentage points 
lower.
Simultaneously, however, the latter finding also reveals that Maori males in this 
category have enjoyed a small— and increasing— advantage from their age and 
qualification distributions over their European counterparts. In 1981, ethnic differences 
in qualifications had no effect on the unstandardised index, whilst by 1991 the 
qualifications of Maori offset (reduced) it by 3 percentage points, suggesting that Maori 
males who worked part-time in 1991 were either slightly better qualified than their 
European counterparts, or received a slightly better income for the same qualifications. 
Similarly, in 1981, the Maori age structure contributed 5 percentage points to the 
unstandardised index, at the time accounting for all of the explainable difference. By 
1991, the same factor offset the unstandardised index by a further 3 percentage points. 
Thus, the increase in the unstandardised index between 1986 and 1991 for males in this 
category was not only all due to unexplained factors, but the true extent of the (albeit
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small) increase was concealed by the more advantageous age and qualification structure 
of Maori.
With the exception of the age-effect (which, as discussed above, was negligible 
by 1991), similar comments can be directed at the trends for unemployed males. In 1981 
the qualifications of Maori contributed 3 percentage points to the unstandardised index. 
In 1986 and 1991, however, they reduced it by 1 and 3 percentage point(s), thereby 
concealing between 1986 and 1991 a slightly greater increase in unexplained income 
inequality than implied by the unstandardised index.
The effect of qualifications on unstandardised income relativity for unemployed 
females in both 1986 and 1991 was negligible, and thus is not pursued beyond noting 
that it had played a small role in 1981, and thus had declined across the period.
For those who were not in the labour force, and for whom Maori-European 
income relativities improved substantially across the entire 1981-1991 period, 
qualifications, like age structure (the latter of which was discussed above), played a 
steadily declining role. In 1981, the two components combined improved unstandardised 
income relativity by 21 and 17 percentage points for males and females respectively (age 
structure playing the larger role), whilst by 1991 this contribution had declined to 3 and 
2 percentage points (with qualifications playing the larger role). However, the age- 
qualification standardised trend shows a small increase for males between 1986 and 
1991. That is to say, if the age and qualification distributions of Maori and European 
had been the same, males who were not in the labour force would have experienced an 
increase in unexplained income inequality from 18 to 21 percentage points.
In summary, therefore, the recent reversals in the unstandardised mean income 
relativities outlined earlier appear to have been driven by the incomes of those within the 
labour force, at first (between 1981 and 1986) being partially offset by improving Maori- 
European income relativities in the part-time and unemployed categories, but later 
(between 1986-1991) being exacerbated by declines in both. Although ethnic differences 
in qualifications clearly played a larger role than ethnic differences in age structure in 
producing the unstandardised mean income differentials within each labour force 
category at most observations, in no case would Maori have been protected from the 
recent (1986-1991) deterioration in Maori-European income relativity by having the 
same age and qualification distributions as European. Indeed, in two cases (part-time 
and unemployed males), the age and/or qualification structures of Maori provided a 
small degree of protection against the deteriorating trend. The finding suggests that
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Maori males who worked part-time or were unemployed were either slightly better 
qualified than their European counterparts, and/or received marginally higher income for 
the same qualifications. The opposite was the case for both males and females who 
worked full-time, European (especially females) in this category having either become 
slightly more qualified and/or having experienced a small relative increase in returns for 
qualifications, vis-ä-vis Maori. The recent increase in the unexplained inequality for 
those of both sexes who were employed full-time, and for males employed part-time 
may reflect a relative decline in hours previously worked by Maori (a factor which could 
not be examined here), but it is less likely to reflect ethnic differences in occupational 
distribution, since this factor was shown in Chapter 8 to have declined across the 1986- 
1991 period.
By contrast, unstandardised Maori-European mean income relativities for those 
who were not in the labour force underwent a substantial improvement across the entire 
period, although the trend decelerated sharply between 1986 and 1991. Again, however, 
similar age and qualification distributions would not have protected Maori from this 
deceleration. Indeed, similarity in these factors between 1986 and 1991 would, as for 
those in employment, have resulted in a small increase in unexplained inequality for 
males, and a slightly sharper deceleration in the improvement for females. These trends 
are a likely reflection of ethnic differences in family structure and size vis-ä-vis the social 
welfare benefit structure, which, between 1981 and 1986, appear to have enhanced the 
incomes of Maori vis-ä-vis European, whilst further policy changes, along with a 
declining age-effect between 1986 and 1991, appear to have removed much of this 
advantage. Similar comments apply to trends for the unemployed, although the age- 
effects in both 1986 and 1991 were so small as to suggest the involvement of additional 
factors—perhaps a relative decline in the rate of labour market churning for Maori.7
10.3 INCOME BY QUALIFICATIONS, 1981-1991
Reviewing income data disaggregated by qualification category, Figure 10.3.1 
shows a pattern of generally declining Maori-European income relativities across the
7 Unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate trends beyond 1991, although the issue 
is returned to in Chapter 12. In the interim, it should be recalled that the arguably severe benefit cuts of 
1991, noted in the introductory chapters, were implemented just after the 1991 census, to which the 
present data pertain. See especially Mowbray (1993), Easton (1994, 1995a, 1997a), Waldegrave and 
Frater (1995), and Dalziel and Higgins (1996).
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1981-1991 period. For two categories ( ‘secondary school’ and ‘still at school/no 
qualifications’), however, relativities first rose between 1981 and 1986, and then fell. 
For males in these categories, the trends resulted in an overall deterioration in income 
relativity across the period, whilst for their female counterparts, income relativities in 
1991 were lower than in 1986, but above their 1981 levels.
Figure 10.3.1
Income Relativity: Maori Mean Income as a Percentage of European Mean 
Income (in $1991), by Highest Qualification and Sex,
Population Aged 15-64 Years, 1981-1991
120 t FemalesMales
- - —  Still at School/No Qualifications
— o —  Secondary School Quals. Only 
— X —  Bachelors/Fbst-Graduate Quals. 
----- d-----Other Tertiary Qualifications
Source: Database B (see Appendix H.4)
Disparities aside, however, it should be noted that there is considerably less 
overall income differentiation by educational qualification than Figure 10.2.1 showed 
that there was by labour force status, and this is particularly evident in 1991. Indeed, in 
1991, income relativities within each sex group for those in the ‘still at school/no 
qualifications’, ‘secondary school qualifications only’ and ‘other tertiary qualifications’ 
categories were almost identical, whereas in 1981 they had been quite different. 
Importantly, the underlying (raw) data also show a decline in the absolute incomes of 
European males in all qualification categories, and of European females in two 
categories ( ‘secondary school’ and ‘other tertiary’ qualifications), again supporting the 
argument of a link between structural change and increasing inequality, but in this
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instance also strongly suggesting a decline in the rate of return (financial reward) for 
certain cultural capital (qualifications).
Exploring the latter issue, Figure 10.3.2 shows the effect of standardising the 
data for Maori to the age and labour force status distributions of European. In all but 
one case (that of females with a ‘bachelors/post-graduate’ qualification in 1981 and 
1986, discussed separately below) the unstandardised indices show greater levels of 
inequality than their standardised equalivalents, reinforcing general understandings that 
the age and qualification distributions of Maori would be likely to play a role in 
producing the observed inequality in each year.
Figure 10.3.2
Income Relativity: Maori Mean Income as a Percentage of European Mean 
Income (in $1991), Comparison of Unstandardised Indices, and Indices 
Standardised for Age-, and Age-Labour Force Status Distributions, by Highest
Qualification and Sex, Population Aged 15-64 Years, 1981-1991
Secondary School QualificationsStill at School/No Qualifications
F em alesM ales
S 60 ■■ g 6 0 -
F em a le s—♦— Unstandardised 
—x  — Standardised (1) 
—o— Standardised (2)
Bachelors/Post-Graduate Other Tertiary
F em alesM ales M ales F em a le s
N otes: Standardised (1): Maori standardised to a g e  structure of European.
Standardised (2): Maori standardised to a g e  and labour force distribution of European. 
Source: D atabase B (S e e  Appendix H.5)
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For males in the ‘secondary school qualifications’ category, and for those of both 
sexes with an ‘other tertiary’ qualification, the combined effects of age structure and 
labour force status— of which the latter is generally the larger component and its effect 
increases over time— can also be seen to have revealed a small increase in unexplained 
inequality (the fully-standardised trend moving further away from the line denoting 
equality). Thus, although the increase in income inequality in these categories is a partial 
reflection of the relative deterioration in labour force status shown for Maori in Chapter 
7, there is also the suggestion of a relative decline in the rate of return (financial reward) 
for Maori with these qualifications.
By contrast, the opposite is true for females with a ‘secondary school’ 
qualification, and for those of both sexes in the ‘still at school/no qualifications’ and 
‘bachelors/post-graduate’ categories, the unexplained differences in these categories 
decreasing over time. The findings for the former and latter categories are particularly 
important because they run counter to the trends shown for their unstandardised 
equalivalents, and suggest that at the micro-level there has not been a decline in the 
relative rate of return for Maori with these particular qualifications, as the crude rates 
imply. Instead, the decline in unstandardised mean income relativity between Maori and 
European males in the ‘secondary school’ category is primarily an effect of the 
underlying deterioration in labour force status, whilst in the ‘bachelors/post-graduate’ 
category it is primarily an effect of ethnic differences in age structure. The finding for 
the ‘still at school/no qualifications’ category is rather more difficult to consider in terms 
of returns for qualifications, and may instead reflect the relatively larger proportions of 
such persons who are likely to be in the not in the labour force category, income 
inequality within which was shown above to have substantially reduced.
Because trends in the ‘bachelors/post-graduate’ category might be considered a 
key indicator of ethnic equality, it is worth examining that category in more detail. First, 
as implied, in this category the effects of age structure were larger than the effects of 
labour force status for males at all observations, and for females in 1991. They also 
increased over time. In 1981 the Maori age structure contributed 3 percentage points to 
the unstandardised differential for both males and females with these qualifications, 
whilst by 1991 this was 8 and nearly 4.5 percentage points respectively. By comparison, 
the component due to labour force status in 1991 reduced the unstandardised differential 
for males by 4 percentage points (zero in 1981), and for females by 1.5 percentage 
points (12.5 percentage points in 1981). Thus, although ethnic differences in labour
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force status increased across the period for males and decreased for females, it was 
ethnic differences in age structure—which increasingly favoured European—that were 
the driving force behind the deterioration in unstandardised income relativity in this 
category.
Indeed, for females with a ‘bachelors/post-graduate’ qualification’, 
standardisation for labour force status alone suggests that if the Maori and European 
labour force distributions had been the same, income inequality in 1981 and 1986 would 
have been substantially less equal than indicated by the crude indices (in 1981, by some 
12 percentage points), and in 1991 would have remained fractionally (1.5 percentage 
points) less equal. The finding implies that Maori females with these qualifications have 
experienced a small income advantage from labour force status, but that this factor was 
partially (and by 1991, completely) offset by a less advantageous age structure.
Only in the ‘secondary school’ and ‘other tertiary’ categories for males, 
therefore, and in the latter category to a somewhat lesser extent for females, has there 
been a true increase in unexplained inequality (that not explained by age structure and 
labour force status). By contrast, unexplained inequality reduced—in some cases quite 
substantially—for those of both sexes with a ‘bachelors/post-graduate’ qualification, for 
females with a ‘secondary school’ qualification, and for those of both sexes in the ‘still 
at school/no qualifications’ category. In all but the ‘bachelors/post-graduate’ category, 
ethnic differences in labour force status were the primary cause of the (explainable) 
trends, whilst in the latter category, age structure was the primary cause.
10.4 INCOME BY AGE, 1981-1991
Before considering the combined effects of the foregoing on total income 
inequality, Figure 10.4.1 provides a brief overview of total income relativity by age per 
se. This index is unstandardised. Very clear is that the relative situation of Maori 
compared with European has deteriorated over time for males at every age, and for all 
females above age 25. By contrast, for females below age 25, Maori-European income 
relativities not only improved substantially between 1981 and 1991, but Maori females 
aged 15-19 in both 1986 and 1991 had slightly higher mean earnings than their 
European counterparts. The latter is often attributed to the income-depressing effects of 
the higher levels of European participation in post-compulsory education at these ages, 
and an increase in this factor may well have been implicated in 1986 and 1991.
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However, the relative improvement for Maori females under the age of 25 is also likely 
to be related to the above-noted improvement in the income relativities of the 
unemployed (until 1986) and those not in the labour force, who in 1991 comprised a 
relatively greater proportion of Maori than European females than previously. As noted 
above, this relative improvement may be a reflection of the social welfare benefit 
structure vis-ä-vis ethnic differences in family formation and size, partnering, and sole 
parenting. It is less likely to reflect, for example, the small recent delay in the timing of 
Maori family formation noted in Chapter 3, which is investigated in more detail in the 
following chapter.
Figure 10.4.1
Income Relativity: Maori Mean Total Income as a Percentage of European Mean 
Total Income, by Sex and Age, Population Aged 15-64 Years, 1981-1991
Males Females
- 1 9 8 6  —A— 19911981 — X
c M N o n ^ ^ w i o f f l N w c o n ^ t i n i n i D
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Source: Database B (see Appendix H.6)
Despite the general deterioration in total income relativity for males of all ages, 
the underlying improvements in Maori-European relativities for the unemployed (until 
1986) and not in the labour force populations are also likely to be implicated in the case 
of young males. Certainly it is clear that male income relativities are inversely related to 
age: the younger the age group, the more equal the mean total income. For females, on 
the other hand, the greatest inequalities occur at ages 20-29, and run approximately 
inverse to the well known ‘M-shaped’ curve of female labour force participation, which 
corresponds with the key family formation years. That is to say, the ratio of Maori to
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European mean total income for females is lowest (most unequal) over the years 
normally associated with childbearing and childrearing, implying that the period of 
childbearing and childrearing is a significant cause of ethnic stratification for females. 
This finding suggests that the generally improved income relativities for unemployed and 
not in the labour force Maori females shown above and argued to be due— ostensibly— 
to aspects of the benefit structure vis-ä-vis ethnic differences in family formation, are 
well and truly offset by the higher employment-related earnings of European females 
over these same years. It is an important point to remember because the trends examined 
above are for each labour force and qualification category and do not take into account 
the size of each category, and therefore the contribution made by each, to total income 
inequality.
10.5 THE EFFECT OF AGE STRUCTURE, LABOUR FORCE STATUS AND
QUALIFICATIONS ON MEAN TOTAL INCOME
The effect of standardising Maori mean total income to the European 
distributions for the above range of factors is shown in Table 10.5.1. At all levels of 
disaggregation and at all observations, standardisation reduces the absolute difference 
between Maori and European mean total incomes and substantially improves income 
relativities. As might be expected, therefore, the greatest improvements occur once age 
structure, labour force status and educational qualifications have been simultaneously 
controlled, in 1981, 1986 and 1991 raising Maori-European mean total income 
relativities for males to 86, 87, and 85 per cent respectively, and those for females to 94, 
95, and 94 per cent. That is to say, the fully-standardised data (last row of Table 10.5.1) 
indicate that the declared incomes of persons of the same age and characteristics were 
considerably more similar than the incomes of all persons undifferentiated by those 
characteristics, both supporting Brosnan’s (1984) findings and, at least for females, 
extending them to 1991. That said, a 1991 income relativity for males of 85 per cent 
after standardisation for age structure, labour force status and qualifications is of 
considerable concern. This is especially so given the substantial improvements in income 
relativity demonstrated within the ‘not in the labour force’ and unemployed categories 
(which together comprise the very sizeable ‘not employed’ category, in 1991 accounting 
for approximately half of all Maori males of working age), and points to the serious 
inequities that underly these data. Although standardisation reveals a higher degree of
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micro-level equality than is apparent from crude indices, the Maori population does not 
have the same labour force status, qualifications and age structure as the European 
population. As Chapters 7 and 9 demonstrated, in the first instance the underlying trends 
have deteriorated, and in the second, they have showed almost no change.
Indeed, reflecting the foregoing, the findings simultaneously reveal a small (1 
percentage point) improvement in unexplained income inequality between 1981 and 
1986, and a small deterioration between 1986 and 1991, of 2 percentage points for 
males and 1 percentage point for females. In each case, the resulting level of unexplained 
income inequality was slightly greater in 1991 than in 1981. Reiterating a point made 
throughout the thesis, it is not that the increase per se is large, but rather, that the trends 
run in the opposite direction to what might have been expected.
Table 10.5.1
Ethnic Differences in Mean Total Income and Effect of Standardising Maori 
Mean Total Income to European Age, Labour Force and Qualification 
Distributions, Singly and in Varying Combinations, Population Aged 15-64 Years, 
___________________________ by Sex, 1981-1991___________________________
MALES FEMALES
1981 1986 1991 1981 1986 1991
CRUDE MEAN TOTAL INCOME DIFFERENTIAL*
(European minus Maori) $9,474 $7,872 $10,032 $3,100 $2,236 $3,318
MEAN TOTAL INCOME DIFFER ENTIAL AFTER STANDARDISAT ON FOR:
Age Structure Only $7,700 $6,613 $8,881 $2,536 $1,902 $2,921
Labour Force Status Only $8,305 $6,724 $6,531 $2,479 $2,170 $2,411
Qualifications Only $7,077 $5,625 $7,775 $1,626 $1,185 $2,305
Age Structure and Labour Force Status $6,827 $5,589 $5,854 $1,828 $1,776 $2,228
Age Structure and Qualifications $5,251 $4,530 $6,343 $831 $800 $1,645
Labour Force Status and Qualifications $6,304 $4,836 $4,893 $1,540 $1,113 $1,259
Age, Labour Force Status and Quals. $4,646 $3,689 $3,949 $788 $703 $927
MAORI MEAN TOTAL INCOME AS A PERCENTAGE OF EUROPEAN MEAN TOTAL INCOME
Crude Mean Total Income 72.06 72.80 62.59 77.50 84.42 78.19
Crude Mean Total Income stands rdised for.
Age Structure Only 77.29 77.15 66.89 81.59 86.75 80.80
Labour Force Status Only 75.50 76.77 75.65 82.01 84.88 84.15
Qualifications Only 79.12 80.57 71.01 88.20 91.74 84.85
Age Structure and Labour Force Status 79.86 80.69 78.17 86.73 87.63 85.36
Age Structure and Qualifications 84.51 84.35 76.35 93.97 94.43 89.19
Labour Force Status and Qualifications 81.41 83.29 81.75 88.82 92.25 91.72
Age, Labour Force Status and Quals. 86.30 87.26 85.28 94.28 95.10 93.91
Notes: ’Mean Total Income Differential = European Mean Total Income minus Maori Mean Total Income.
Source: Database B (see Appendix K7)
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Plotting trends for each variable individually, and for the three variables in 
combination, Figure 10.5.1 shows that standardisation for age structure alone raises 
Maori-European income relativities a few percentage points above their crude 
relativities, but at a steadily declining rate for both sexes, and more so for females than 
for males. Furthermore, standardisation for age structure alone does not greatly alter the 
direction of the unstandardised trends, which between 1986 and 1991 move away from 
unity. Standardisation for qualifications alone has a greater effect in terms of magnitude, 
but similarly does not alter the general direction of trends, for either sex. By contrast, for 
both sexes, standardisation for labour force status alone has a relatively small effect in 
both 1981 and 1986, but a considerably greater effect in 1991, and also maintains an 
almost unchanging trajectory across the period.8 This latter pattern, which is more 
pronounced for males, is clearly that reflected in the trend for simultaneous 
standardisation by age structure, labour force status and qualifications. Thus, and whilst 
ethnic differences in qualifications remains the major contributor to the unstandardised 
total mean income differences between Maori and European females, and comprises a 
close second for males, the role of labour force status has become the driving force in 
producing the recent increase in total mean income inequality.
8 The relatively small effect from labour force status per se for females in 1986 compared with 1981 and 
1991 must be acknowledged as somewhat anomalous, but would appear to reflect the findings of 
Chapters 7 and 9 respectively, that the index of dissimilarity for labour force status for females is both 
considerably lower than that for educational qualifications, and underwent a much smaller increase 
between 1981-1986 than did the latter. The magnitude of the fall (28 per cent) between 1981 and 1986 
in the crude income difference between Maori and European females shown in panel (a) o f Table 10.1.1 
will also be implicated.
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Figure 10.5.1
Income Relativity (Maori Mean Total Income as a Percentage of European Mean 
Total Income): Comparison of Unstandardised Income Relativities, and Income 
Relativities After Standardisation for Ethnic Differences in Age Structure, Labour 
Force Status and Qualifications, Singly and in Combination,
Population Aged 15-64 Years, by Sex, 1981-1991
100 T Males
Females
-4 —  Relativity for Crude Mean Income 
- X —  Standardised for Age Structure Only 
- -• - * Standardised for Labour Force Status Only 
- e —  Standardised for Qualifications Only
H i—  Standardised for Age, Labour Force Status and Qualifications Combined
Notes: Data for Maori standardised to specified distribution for European population.
Source: Table 10.5.1.
10.6 COHORT ANALYSIS OF MEAN INCOME
In this section, attention is shifted to cohort analysis, and to the age-income 
curve of cohorts bom between 1927 and 1971. As with the cohort analysis of 
qualifications presented in Chapter 9, data are available for only three observations, and 
thus only a partial analysis of trends across the life cycle can be made. In all cases the 
observations record Maori mean income at each age as a proportion of European mean 
income at that age (age-specific income relativity), for each factor (i.e. labour force by 
qualification category) by sex, and the three observations for each cohort pertain to 
1981, 1986 and 1991 respectively. However, because such a high level of data 
disaggregation results in a number of very small cell sizes, it is inappropriate to present a 
detailed analysis for every such category. Instead, the analysis reviews total trends (all 
labour force statuses and qualification categories combined) by sex; trends for the full­
time labour force by each qualification category by sex; trends for the part-time labour 
force by each qualification category for females only; trends for the unemployed by sex,
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but for two qualification categories only; and trends for the ‘not in the labour force’ 
population by sex, but without regard to qualifications.
Cohort trends in Maori-European income relativities for mean total income (all 
labour force statuses and qualification categories combined) are plotted in Figure 10.6.1, 
and essentially reflect the age-sepcific patterns shown earlier in Figure 10.4.1. As with 
that earlier analysis, the most immediate impression is of substantial differences by sex. 
For most male cohorts, income relativities are generally lower (more unequal) than those 
for females, although the point that absolute incomes for females are substantially lower 
than for males should be recalled. Within each cohort’s experience there is also a general 
decline in equality across the life cycle, this trend being most pronounced for the 
youngest cohorts, and across the age span of each cohort that corresponds with the 
1986-1991 period.
With few exceptions, income relativities decline with each successively older 
age, both for each cohort (intra-cohort inequality), and also for each cohort vis-a-vis its 
predecessor when the latter was at the same age (inter-cohort— or intergenerational— 
inequality). For each successively earlier bom cohort, on the other hand, there is a 
slower decline or a level trend across the first age-span shown, followed by an 
accelerating decline, but one that becomes less pronounced with increasing age. The 
overall result is that for all cohorts, both intra-cohort and inter-cohort inequality in 1991 
was greater than in 1981 (see also Johnstone 1996; Martin 1997a).
The data for females present a rather different scenario, inequality increasing as 
cohorts reach their twenties, but then reducing, undoubtedly a reflection of family 
formation vis-ä-vis formal employment. Within this generality, however, the same 
deterioration that was present for males over the age span that corresponds to the 1986- 
1991 period is present for all but the female cohort bom 1957-1961 (aged 30-34 years in 
1991). The trend is especially pronounced for the most recently bom cohort, and also 
for the cohorts bom 1942-1951, aged 40-49 years in 1991, implying a resumption of 
increasing inequality once the key family formation years are passed. A generally 
deteriorating situation is also evident in the increased inter-cohort inequality for cohorts 
as they reach or pass the same age as their predecessor, especially for the observation 
corresponding to 1991. These are important findings, in that whilst the highest levels of 
ethnic inequality per se for females appear to resonate with childbearing, and the lowest 
with employment, these patterns appear to be becoming even further entrenched. 
Indeed, it is important to re-emphasise that the above suggestions of small advantages to
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Maori females as a result of the benefit structure are well and truly cancelled out over
these ages by— ostensibly—the earnings of employed European females.
Figure 10.6.1
Cohort Income Relativity: Maori Mean Total Income as a Percentage of European 
Mean Total Income, by Sex, Cohort, and Age, 1981-1991
Males
Females
Cohort Bom:
O-.- 1967-71
- k ---- 1962-66
+ -- 1957-61
■Q---- 1952-56
• - - -  1947-51 
■X — 1942-46 
1937-41 
-1932-36  
- 1927-31
Source: Database B (see Appendix H.6)
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10.6.1 Cohort Analysis of Income for the Population in Full-time Employment:
Cohort analysis of Maori-European income relativities for the male population in 
full-time employment, plotted in Figure 10.6.2, offers a considerable refinement to the 
picture given for all males. Primarily, it shows that the general increase in both intra- and 
inter-cohort inequality can be attributed to the ‘other tertiary’ and ‘secondary school’ 
qualification categories, which in 1991 accounted for 51 per cent of Maori males aged 
15-64 years in full-time employment, and 63 per cent of European males (Appendix 
G.3). In each case these findings support the earlier macro-level analysis, which showed 
an increase in unexplained inequality for these categories (see Figure 10.4.2).
By contrast, there was a general improvement across the 1981-1986 period for 
cohorts in the ‘still at school/no qualifications’ category, followed by a levelling off or 
stabilising across the 1986-1991 period for almost all cohorts (the main exception being 
the oldest cohort, bom 1927-1931). A similar improvement occurred across the 1986- 
1991 period for most cohorts in the ‘bachelors/post-graduate’ category, albeit after an 
initial deterioration for several cohorts. Again the findings support the earlier macro­
level analysis, which for these two categories showed a sizeable decline in unexplained 
inequality.
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Figure 10.6.2
Cohort Income Relativity: Maori Mean Income as a Percentage of European 
Mean Income for the Population in Full-Time Employment, 
by Highest Qualification, Cohort and Age, Males, 1981-1991
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Source: Database B (see  AppendixH.8)
Trends for females who were employed full-time are very different (Figure 
10.6.3). In three of the four categories there is clear evidence of higher Maori than 
European incomes (relativities above 100 per cent), affecting several cohorts in the 
‘bachelors/post-graduate’ category, the three earliest bom cohorts in the ‘other tertiary’ 
category, and the earliest bom cohort in the ‘secondary school qualifications’ 
category— although in the latter cases the Maori advantage was either lost or greatly 
diminished after 1986. Indeed, for the earliest bom cohorts in the two latter categories, 
the post-1986 deterioration in equality across the life cycle—which affected all but a few
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isolated cohorts, irrespective of qualification category— is also greater than that for 
cohorts that never experienced a Maori advantage.
Figure 10.6.3
Cohort Income Relativity: Maori Mean Income as a Percentage of European 
Mean Income for the Population in Full-Time Employment, 
by Highest Qualification, Cohort and Age, Females, 1981-1991
Bachelors/Post-Grad. Qualifications Other Tertiary Qualifications
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Also noteworthy for females is the higher variation of income relativities in the 
‘bachelors/post-graduate’ category than for either males or females in any other 
qualification category, albeit the data cluster around the line denoting equality. This 
variation undoubtedly reflects the presence of smaller cell sizes than in the other 
categories, but can still be considered to have a reasonable degree of validity. For 
example, the income relativity not shown for the cohort bom 1967-1971 when aged 15-
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19 years indicated a Maori mean income almost double that of European, and pertained 
to 15 (0.6 per cent) and 99 (0.9 per cent) of Maori and European 15-19 year-old 
females respectively (see Appendix G.3).
Overall, however, Maori-European income relativities in the ‘bachelors/post- 
graduate’ category generally tended to improve and/or to return to unity across the life 
cycle, whilst those for cohorts in the three remaining categories tended to deteriorate, 
especially in the ‘other tertiary’ category, which was shown earlier (Figure 10.4.2) to 
have experienced a small macro-level increase in unexplained inequality (i.e. a shift from 
a Maori to a European advantage). Almost regardless of age, those in the ‘other tertiary’ 
category had experienced the lowest levels of income inequality in 1981, but thereafter 
inequality increased for each successively younger cohort at each successive age, so that 
by 1991 there was very little difference between more recently bom and middle-aged 
cohorts in the ‘other tertiary’, ‘secondary school’ and ‘still at school/no qualifications’ 
categories.
10.6.2 Cohort Analysis of Income for the Population in Part-time Employment:
As noted above, because of small cell sizes, cohort trends for males who worked 
part-time are not shown here. However, those for the ‘secondary school’ and ‘still at 
school/no qualifications’ categories bear a striking resemblance to those for females, and 
thus the following analysis for females, pertaining to Figure 10.6.4, can be read for both 
sexes.
The most immediate impression gained from Figure 10.6.4 is the considerably 
greater variation of income relativities for cohorts in the ‘bachelors/post-graduate’ and 
‘other tertiary’ categories, especially for the earlier bom cohorts, by comparison with 
the near homogeneity for all but the most recently bom and earliest bom cohorts in the 
‘secondary school’ and ‘still at school/no qualifications’ categories; the general 
clustering of cohort trends about the line denoting unity (=100); and the inference of 
higher Maori than European incomes for a large proportion of cohorts in all qualification 
categories. In the ‘bachelors/post-graduate’ and ‘other tertiary’ categories especially, the 
latter suggest a considerably greater degree of income inequality—generally favouring 
Maori females— than was evident for those who worked full-time. That said, the 
patterns are likely to reflect the earlier-noted contention (Raney 1990, Harris 1992) that 
Maori females with higher qualifications tend to work more hours than European. In the 
‘bachelors/post-graduate’ category they are also likely to reflect the fact that few Maori
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females with such qualifications also work part-time, cell sizes in that category (in 1991, 
n=69) being too small to place any great significance on the patterns.
Figure 10.6.4
Cohort Income Relativity: Maori Mean Income as a Percentage of European
Mean Income for the Population in Part-Time Employment, 
by Highest Qualification, Cohort and Age, Females, 1981-1991
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By contrast, in 1981 over 900 Maori females were to be found in the ‘other 
tertiary’ category, and in 1991, over 3,000. There can thus be little question that the 
patterns and trends shown for the more recently bom and middle-aged cohorts in that 
category are meaningful. Whilst generally remaining above unity, they show that the 
earlier proposal of a small increase in unexplained inequality (from a small advantage for
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Maori, to a slightly larger advantage for European) between 1986 and 1991 for females 
with this qualification was almost universally experienced. A similar trend is reflected in 
the age span corresponding to the 1986-1991 period, for several cohorts in the 
‘secondary school’ and ‘still at school/no qualifications’ categories. The trend was 
especially pronounced for the two most recently bom cohorts (bom 1962-1966 and 
1967-1971) which had begun their part-time employment experience with much higher 
income for Maori.
10.6.3 Cohort Analysis of Income for the Unemployed Population:
Figure 10.6.5 shows cohort trends for unemployed males, omitting, as explained 
above, data for those with either a ‘bachelors/post-graduate’ or ‘other tertiary’ 
qualification. In both 1981 and 1986, those categories together accounted for less than 1 
per cent of each sex-ethnic group who were unemployed, and in 1991, for less than 3 
per cent of European males and 4 per cent of Maori males (see Appendix G.3).
Figure 10.6.5
Cohort Income Relativity: Maori Mean Income as a Percentage of European
Mean Income for the Unemployed Population,
by Selected Highest Qualification, Cohort and Age, Males, 1981-1991
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The most immediate impression gained from data for the two remaining 
categories is of greater variation in the income relativities of cohorts with secondary
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school qualifications than with no qualifications, especially amongst middle-aged and 
earlier bom cohorts. As implied earlier, this variation may be a reflection of differing 
rates of transition between unemployment and work for cohorts with ‘some’ 
qualifications as opposed to ‘no’ qualifications. Somewhat paradoxically, the argument 
is supported by the fact that the ‘secondary school’ data also reveal a more substantial 
decline in Maori-European income relativity across the life cycle for many of the cohorts 
in this category than is apparent for those in the ‘still at school/no qualifications’ 
category. The trend is especially evident for cohorts bom 1937-1941 and 1947-1951, 
and aged 40-44 and 50-54 years in 1991, although it is not evident for the cohort bom 
1932-1936 and aged 50-59 in 1991. Nevertheless, both the improvement in Maori- 
European crude income relativity for unemployed males across the 1981-1986 period, 
and the subsequent deterioration between 1986 and 1991 (as shown earlier in Figures
10.2.1 and 10.2.2), can be understood as emanating largely from the secondary school 
qualifications category. That is to say, Maori males who were both unemployed and had 
secondary school qualifications experienced greater deterioration in income relativity 
vis-ä-vis their European counterparts than did those with no qualifications. The 
substantial differences in the trends for the two categories suggest that ethnic differences 
in labour market churning may have more explanatory power for males than ethnic 
differences in family formation vis-ä-vis the benefit stmcture.
In similarity with males, the income relativities of female cohorts with a 
‘secondary school’ qualification also show the most within-group variation, again 
suggesting the likelihood of higher rates of transition between unemployment and work 
(or briefer spells of unemployment) than for those in the ‘still at school/no qualifications’ 
category. There is also— in both categories— evidence of a general reversal in trends 
across the life cycle for most female cohorts. However, in only a few cases do these 
shifts result in greater income inequality. Indeed, with few exceptions, trends 
corresponding to the 1981-1986 period show a shift from a European to a Maori 
advantage or vice versa, whilst those for 1986-1991 show a general return towards or 
just beyond unity. The substantial overall improvement and then small decline to near­
unity in income relativity for unemployed females shown earlier in Figures 10.2.1 and
10.2.2 would therefore appear to have been more universally experienced by females. 
Such trends particularly support the earlier argument that the relative improvements in 
income for unemployed Maori females between 1981 and 1986, and the subsequent 
deterioration between 1986 and 1991, reflect ethnic differences in family formation vis-
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ä-vis the benefit structure, more than they do ethnic differences in labour market 
churning— although an effect from the latter is also clearly indicated.
Figure 10.6.6
Cohort Income Relativity: Maori Mean Income as a Percentage of European 
Mean Income for the Unemployed Population, by Selected Highest Qualification,
Cohort and Age, Females, 1981-1991
Secondary School Qualifications Still At School/No Qualifications
200
Notes: Missing values = no persons declaring income in either one or both populations.
Source: Database B (see AppendixH.8)
10.6.4 Cohort Analysis of Income for the Population Not in the Labour Force:
Finally, trends in income relativity for those not in the labour force are presented 
in Figure 10.6.7. Data for the more recently bom female cohorts show substantial 
evidence of higher Maori than European incomes, whilst the opposite is the case for the 
earliest bom male cohorts, the latter showing higher European than Maori incomes. 
These patterns further support earlier arguments that the relative advantage in mean 
income for younger Maori females who are not in employment is likely to be at least a 
partial function of higher levels of sole parenting and income assistance for children, 
whilst that for older European males is likely to be at least a partial function of earlier 
and more substantial access to private superannuation schemes than for Maori males.
With few exceptions, Maori-European income relativity in this category shows 
first a small improvement, and then a deterioration, for almost all cohorts and for both 
sexes. In the case of males, the pattern generally results in income relativity in 1991 
being slightly below that of 1981, although the trend is considerably more marked for
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the cohort bom 1947-1951 (aged 40-44 years in 1991), which experienced a decisive 
shift from a Maori to a European advantage. Perhaps significantly— and whilst the trend 
looks anomalous—this is the same cohort shown to have experienced a sizeable increase 
in income inequality in the ‘secondary school-unemployed’ income category (Figure 
10.6.5). Given that this cohort will contain a large proportion of the parents of current 
teenagers, the trend is of concern and implies a need for future research.
Figure 10.6.7
Cohort Income Relativity: Maori Mean Income as a Percentage of European 
Mean Income for the Population Not in the Labour Force (All Qualifications 
Combined), by Sex, Cohort, and Age, 1981-1991
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For females, on the other hand, and with the exception of the two most recently 
bom cohorts, the trends between 1981-1986 show a general shift from a European to a 
Maori advantage, and, although these trends then reversed or levelled off, the advantage 
to Maori remained for all but the two earliest bom cohorts. Income relativities for the 
two most recently bom female cohorts, which indicated a considerable Maori advantage 
in 1981, experienced a substantial decline across the period, but also remained above 
unity in 1991. Trends for this labour force category imply both changes to the payment 
structure of benefits, which for both sexes appear to have initially improved the incomes 
of Maori vis-ä-vis European, and the presence of churning between the labour force and 
the non-labour force that was greater for European than Maori. As implied earlier, this is 
not to say that the latter could not also have been a partial cause of the relative
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improvements in income for not in the labour force Maori across the 1981-1986 period, 
but that it is less likely.
10.7 SUMMARY
Despite a long-term movement towards equality in the mean total incomes of 
Maori and European, a small decline has recently taken place. Importantly, the 
deterioration began earlier (around 1981) for the population employed full-time than for 
the part-time and unemployed populations, for whom both crude and standardised (by 
age and qualifications) mean income relativities (Maori mean income as a percentage of 
European mean income) first improved between 1981 and 1986— in the case of 
unemployment, substantially—and then deteriorated. That said, in 1991, both crude and 
standardised mean income relativities for the part-time and unemployed populations 
remained either very close to, or well above, their 1981 levels, whilst those for the 
population in full-time employment had fallen below. By contrast, both crude and 
standardised mean income relativities for those not in the labour force underwent a 
substantial improvement across the entire 1981-1986 period, although the improvement 
decelerated and may even have declined between 1986 and 1991.
In almost all cases, standardisation revealed that if the Maori and European age 
and qualification structures had been the same, Maori would not have been protected 
from the general increase in income inequality between 1986 and 1991. That is to say, in 
some labour force categories (full-time employment for both sexes; part-time 
employment, unemployment and not in the labour force for males) there was an increase 
in unexplained income inequality, whilst in others (unemployment and not in the labour 
force for those of both sexes; part-time employment for males), having the same age 
and/or qualification structures as European would have proved detrimental to Maori 
mean incomes.
The findings are important in a number of ways. In the first instance they reveal 
that the increase in unexplained income inequality between 1986 and 1991 for 
unemployed and part-time employed males was slightly greater than indicated by the 
observed differentials. In the case of unemployed males, either a more advantageous 
qualification structure or a higher income by qualifications margin for Maori, resulted in 
a partial concealment (of 3 percentage points) of the true increase in unexplained income 
inequality, whilst for part-time employed males, the Maori age and qualification
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distribution contributed almost equally to the concealment (in 1991, 3 percentage points 
each). However, the opposite was the case for those of both sexes who worked full­
time, the contribution to the observed mean income differential made by qualifications 
increasing, and that by age structure, decreasing, especially for females. It is possible 
that the small increase in unexplained income inequality that these patterns and trends 
revealed reflected a relative decline in hours worked by Maori, although this factor 
could not be examined in this thesis. It would be unlikely to reflect underlying 
differences in occupational distribution, as this factor was shown in Chapter 8 to have 
declined over the same period.
In the second instance, the findings suggest that in providing benefit incomes, the 
policies of the state vis-ä-vis the demographic structure of each population can seriously 
influence trends in ethnic inequality. Between 1981 and 1986, the relative improvements 
in the observed mean incomes of Maori vis-ä-vis European who were not in the labour 
force (both sexes) appear to have reflected aspects of the benefit structure vis-ä-vis the 
demographic structure (age structure, and implicitly, family size and composition) of 
Maori. Between 1986 and 1991, incremental reductions in benefits, and restrictions in 
eligibility for them, in combination with a decline in the age-effect, may have been 
associated with a deterioration in the previous trends, although it is important to note 
that for females in this category, income inequality in 1991 remained close to unity. So 
too may other factors not examined here, for which age may be a proxy, have been 
involved. There may, for example, have been a relative deterioration in the income­
enhancing effects of labour market churning for Maori between 1986 and 1991 (which 
could not be examined here), as unemployment rose to its peak. Similar comments were 
directed at the increase in unexplained income inequality for unemployed males, 
although the slightly higher ‘income by qualifications’ margin experienced by Maori 
males would appear to suggest otherwise.
Examination of income relativity trends within each qualification category 
revealed a similarly complex situation. However, in these categories, and whilst crude 
income differentials for almost all categories had shown a deterioration between 1981 
and 1991 or 1986 and 1991, age- and labour force-standardised indices showed either 
the reverse, or a lesser deterioration. Indeed, only in the ‘secondary school’ and ‘other 
tertiary5 categories for males, and in the latter category to a lesser extent for females, 
was there an increase in unexplained inequality (one that not explained by age structure 
and labour force status). Instead, unexplained inequality reduced—in some cases quite
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substantially— for both sexes with a ‘bachelors/post-graduate’ qualification, for females 
with a ‘secondary school’ qualification, and for those of both sexes in the ‘still at 
school/no qualifications’ category. In all but the ‘bachelors/post-graduate’ category, 
ethnic differences in labour force status were the primary cause of trends in the crude 
differentials, whilst in the latter category, age structure was the primary cause. The 
findings are important because they demonstrate that although there has indeed been a 
relative decline in the rate of return for some aspects of cultural capital (qualifications) 
for Maori, there has been a relative improvement for some others.
When these findings were considered in terms of their impact on total mean 
income relativities, they revealed substantially greater equality for those with similar 
characteristics than had been apparent from the observed differentials. If the Maori 
population in 1981, 1986 and 1991 had had the same age, labour force and qualification 
distribution as European, the mean total income of Maori females would have been 94, 
95 and 94 per cent respectively of that of European females. For males the 
corresponding indices would have been 86, 87 and 85 per cent. These standardised 
indices would also have undergone substantially less decline across the 1986-1991 
period than was indicated by the observed differentials, which for males declined from 
73 to 63 per cent, and for females, from 84 to 78 per cent.
Of the three components controlled, age structure was shown to have had the 
smallest— and a steadily declining—effect for both sexes. That said, in 1991, age 
structure still accounted for 11-12 per cent of the observed differential for both sexes. 
For males in both 1981 and 1986, ethnic differences in qualifications accounted for the 
largest proportion of the observed differential, whilst by 1991 the dominant factor had 
changed to ethnic differences in labour force status, which in 1981 had been of lesser 
importance than even age structure. For females, the greatest effect at all observations 
came from ethnic differences in qualifications. However, between 1986 and 1991, the 
component of the observed income differential due to labour force status increased 
substantially, whilst that due to qualifications decreased. Thus, for both sexes, the recent 
increase in the crude income differential was driven by the increase in ethnic differentials 
in labour force status. The findings support those of Easton (1996b: 120), who proposed 
that the recent changes were more likely to be employment, rather than age, effects.
These findings and their proposed explanations were further supported by cohort 
analysis, with four important additions. First, whatever factors have driven the recent 
deterioration in Maori-European income relativities for those in the employed labour
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force, they have had an almost universal effect on all cohorts with either a ‘secondary 
school’ or ‘other tertiary’ qualification, irrespective of sex. Second, in the sizeable ‘other 
tertiary’ category, where deterioration in income relativity was especially evident, the 
effect of these unidentified factors increased more or less inversely by year of birth, each 
more recently bom cohort tending to have lower income relativity—greater inequality— 
than its predecessor when at the same age. The finding is important because, whilst the 
more recently bom cohorts in 1991 did not always have the lowest income relativities 
(greatest levels of inequality) per se, the increase in inter-cohort (intergenerational) 
inequality suggests that if the recent trends continue, the more recently bom cohorts 
may shortly become far more unequal than their older predecessors. The findings 
support Pool and Sceats (1990:48), who, amongst others, have argued that in the 
absence of action to reskill and employ these cohorts, they may remain disadvantaged 
with respect to both their European peers and surrounding Maori cohorts, throughout 
their lives.
Third, trends in almost all categories showed substantial evidence of periodicity, 
a finding that reinforces earlier arguments regarding the involvement of period factors, 
such as changes in employment, wages, and income support policy, and in demand for 
certain types of skills and labour force attachment. Such periodicity does not support, 
for example, the Government’s belief that a culture of dependency is the cause of 
demand for income support.
Fourth, cohort analysis of trends in total mean income relativity for all females 
suggested that the years of peak childbearing and childrearing (20-29 years) are 
associated with the highest levels of ethnic inequality for females. Whilst this pattem 
could not be detected in any of the subsequent ‘labour force by qualification’ categories 
examined by cohort, it is important to remember that age-specific/cohort analyses 
control only for age, not age structure (i.e. the proportion of each ethnic group at each 
age). Nor do they reflect the size of each labour force and/or qualification category. 
Thus, it is probable that the phenomenon does exist at the aggregate level, its apparent 
‘invisibility’ at the level of each individual category being a function of size-effects.
Thus it can be concluded that the trends at the macro-level were not due to 
causes endogenous to any specific ethnic group or cohort, but involved a fairly universal 
interaction of population with period factors—policies or events— that saw a relative 
deterioration for Maori in many income categories between 1986 and 1991. The 
argument that period factors have primacy in producing the trends in relative income is
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reinforced by the fact that they have been accompanied by absolute declines in the mean 
incomes of both Maori and European. The extent to which these factors continue to 
influence income trends in the near future will therefore have significant implications for 
ethnic stratification.
11
BIRTH AND FORTUNE IN NEW ZEALAND:
THE EASTERLIN HYPOTHESIS IN AN ETHNIC CONTEXT
237
11.0 INTRODUCTION
In the late-1960s, American economist Richard Easterlin advanced the argument 
that cohort size was a cause of inequality. Large cohorts, he argued, experience greater 
competition for employment than small cohorts, and as a result earn lower incomes than 
small cohorts. Faced with these differing fortunes, large cohorts also delay their family 
formation and have correspondingly smaller family sizes than their small cohort 
predecessors. Together these dynamics create peak and trough waves of population, 
wherein a relatively small cohort is followed a generation later (according to Easterlin, 
around 20 years later) by a relatively large cohort, and so on, creating a self-generating 
cycle of relative equality/inequality.
Despite the rather deterministic nature of the arguments and a number of 
conceptual and methodological limitations outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, the model has 
been widely applied in the American context and substantiated to varying degrees 
(Easterlin 1987a, 1987b; Schultz 1981; Smith and Welch 1981; Schapiro 1988). It does 
not, however, appear to have been applied either in New Zealand (cf. Thomson 1992, 
who looked at policy-capture by different generations), or at the level of the ethnic 
group, the possibilities of which Easterlin (1987a: 161) noted only in passing.
This chapter undertakes a limited study of the arguments in the New Zealand 
setting, illustrating them first with data for the total population, and then applying them 
to data for the Maori and non-Maori/European populations. The overall approach— 
detailed in Chapter A— divides the original hypothesis into two components, the first 
concerning cohort size, employment, and income experience (demographic reproduction 
as an independent variable of inequality), the second concerning the timing of family 
formation, as indicated by the age at which each cohort has experienced its peak age- 
specific fertility rate (ASFR) (demographic reproduction as a dependent variable of 
inequality). Both components are then examined under ‘classic’ and ‘expanded’ versions 
of the hypothesis. The chapter is both exploratory in nature, and unable to be fully
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comprehensive, being severely limited by a lack of age-disaggregated income and 
employment data for Maori between 1956 and 1971.
11.1 THE EASTERLIN HYPOTHESIS: THE CASE OF NEW ZEALAND
As explained in Chapter 4, this analysis takes as its starting point the size of birth 
cohorts around the time of labour market entry (20-24 years), rather than at the time of
birth, thereby permitting the effects of migration (both immigration and emigration) and 
death to be accounted for. The difference is readily apparent from Figure 11.1.1, which 
shows the number of children aged 0-4 years at each five-year observation, lagged by 20 
years, and the number of persons from the same birth cohorts present in New Zealand 
20 years later— albeit not necessarily the self-same individuals. Very clear is a substantial 
decline in numbers by age 20-24, for those bom during the peak baby boom years (late 
1950s-early 1960s), implying a net loss from migration. In the context of Easterlin’s 
arguments, the finding may be of some significance, implying the consequences of severe 
labour market competition, although the desire and potential capacity to undertake 
overseas travel at these ages and during this historical period should not be ignored. 
Either way, the issue (of migration) cannot be pursued further in this analysis, other than 
emphasising at this point its potentially ameliorating effect on competition for 
employment, and the fact that it reflected a sustained trend between 1981 and 1996. A 
similar, though short-lived pattem also appears for those aged 20-24 in 1945,
undoubtedly explained by overseas service during World War Two.
Figure 11.1.1
Number of Children Aged 0-4 Years Lagged by 20 Years, and Number of Persons 
Aged 20-24 Years, by Year When Aged 20-24 Years, Total Population, 1936-1996
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When cohort size is compared with the proportion of 20-24 year old males in 
employment, as in Figure 11.1.2, there is indeed strong evidence of an inverse
correlation between the two, supporting Easterlin’s major contention. Between 1951 
and 1956, when cohort size was both relatively low and declined slightly, there were 
both very high, and increasing, proportions in employment. Trends for the period 1956- 
1971 are more difficult to ascertain, but it is clear that as the first of the large baby boom 
cohorts reached 20-24 years of age in the 1970s, employment rates began to fall, and 
continued to do so for the remainder of the period. The probable role of participation in 
post-compulsory education in the decline in the employment to population ratio is 
discussed below. In the interim, it must also be noted that when the greatest decline in 
employment rates took place, between 1986 and 1991, there was a concomitant decline
in cohort size. Thus, whilst there is considerable support for the Easterlin hypothesis on 
this narrow formulation of the argument, it is more questionable after 1986— unless, of 
course, the accelerated decline in employment rates between 1986 and 1991 is a lagged
effect of the peaking of cohort size in 1986, which may have seen the reaching of a 
saturation point. This is a distinct possibility and a factor which cannot be ruled out until 
data for subsequent years become available.
Figure 11.1.2
Cohort Size at Age 20-24, Percentage of 20-24 Year Olds in Employment 
(Employment to Population Ratio), and Percentage of 20-24 Year Olds in 
Employment Within the Labour Force, Males, by Cohort, 1945-1991
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As implied, the declines in the employment to population ratio shown in Figure 
11.1.2 undoubtedly reflect an increase in the proportions undertaking post-compulsory 
education, a factor which Easterlin (1987a: 152) acknowledges as potentially deriving a 
longer term advantage, but which for large cohorts he does not see as a direct function 
of cohort size. That is to say, by contrast, he proposes that large cohorts will be less 
likely to go to university, in part because competition with siblings for parental resources 
will reduce the possibility, and in part because large cohorts experience lower returns for 
education and therefore the incentive to get a qualification is reduced. Whilst it is 
difficult to compare the situation of students in America and New Zealand in terms of 
these factors, not least because the private cost of attending a tertiary institution has 
only recently (1989) become an issue in New Zealand, it was clearly shown in the 
previous chapter that there has indeed been a recent decline in the rate of return for 
qualifications, and this change corresponds with the arrival in the labour force of the 
post-peak baby boom cohorts. Thus the arguments are certainly areas that would benefit 
from further research by true cohort (e.g. Davies 1993). At the same time, however, 
they highlight some important contradictions in Easterlin’s hypothesis, which was based 
on employment trends within the labour force only.
The latter is an issue of particular pertinence to the situation of females, labour 
force trends for whom are rather more difficult to examine against the hypothesis. For 
those in the labour force, the patterns are very similar to those for males (Figure 11.1.3), 
with the proportion in employment declining from the late 1960s - early 1970s, as 
cohort size increases with the first of the baby boomers reaching age 20-24. As was also 
the case for males, the decline in within-labour force employment (or the increase in 
unemployment) was greatest during the 1986-1991 period, when cohort size fell slightly. 
However, when the relationship between cohort size and the proportion of all 20-24 
years old females in employment (the employment to population ratio) is examined, the 
two trends can be seen to move in unison: as cohort size increases or decreases, so too 
does the proportion in employment. Reflecting a phenomenon experienced for females 
throughout all developed countries, and typically explained by social rather than 
demographic change, these trends run exactly counter to those proposed by Easterlin. 
Again, therefore, there is some, but not unqualified, support for this component of the 
Easterlin hypothesis. Indeed, the slight decline in the employment to population ratio 
between 1951 and 1956 suggests not the effects of cohort size but withdrawal from the 
labour force as the baby boom got under way. Certainly the issue of shifts in the timing
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of family formation and changing levels of secondary school education will also be 
pertinent to the argument, and imply the need for standardisation and/or component 
analysis in order to validly examine the trends.
Figure 11.1.3
Cohort Size at Age 20-24, Percentage of 20-24 Year Olds in Employment 
(Employment to Population Ratio), and Percentage of 20-24 Year Olds in 
Employment Within the Labour Force, Females, by Cohort, 1945-1991
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Similar (though qualitatively different) caveats must be applied to the 
relationship between the cohort size of 20-24 year old males and their income relative to 
that of older males (25-54 years), shown in Figure 11.1.4. As the first of the baby boom 
cohorts reach age 20-24 in 1971, their income relative to that of 25-54 year old males 
begins a dramatic decline. (A similar relationship can be seen between 1945 and 1951, 
when an increase in cohort size corresponds with a small decline in income relativity, 
although the population data for 1945 were undoubtedly affected by the exclusion of 
males serving overseas.) However, between 1956 and 1971, when cohort size first 
begins to increase, income relativity follows suit (undoubtedly reflecting the post-war 
economic boom), and again, between 1981 and 1986, as cohort size approaches its 
peak, there is a small improvement. Similarly contradicting the hypothesis, the 
continuation of the overall decline between 1986 and 1991 corresponds with a decline in 
cohort size. Accordingly, support for the hypothesis on this indicator is somewhat less
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consistent than suggested by the employment data, although in general the argument 
holds true. As implied above, the anomaly suggests the presence of saturation, or 
threshold effects, wherein the passing of an optimal cohort size corresponds with a 
substantial increase in competition. The anomaly is also likely to reflect recent increases 
in post-compulsory education, and/or the increase in part-time work shown in Chapter 
7, both of which could themselves be a reflection of increasing cohort size.1
Figure 11.1.4
Cohort Size at Age 20-24 and Mean Income of Males Aged 20-24 as a Percentage 
of Mean Income of Males Aged 25-54, by Cohort, 1945-1991
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Source: Population data: Census of Population and Dwellings (see Appendices D3 and D5)
Income: Easton 1997b, Table A6 (see  Appendix I.2)
When the income relativities of 20-24 year old females are considered— again as 
a proportion of the incomes of 25-54 year old males2— there is almost no support for the 
hypothesis. Indeed, by contrast, the small decline in cohort size between 1945 and 1956, 
shown in Figure 11.1.5, is accompanied by a small decline in income relativity (which
1 It should also be noted that income data for the 1981-1991 period are given separately in Figure 11.1.4 
by both market and total income aggregations, the latter of which includes social security benefit 
income. The trends in relativity are identical, implying that they are not a function of labour force 
status.
2 The income of males is used as the denominator for this index because that of 25-54 year old females 
will have been affected by similar trends to that of 20-24 year old females, and thus may not provide a 
meaningful trend.
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may, as implied above, reflect an initial withdrawal from the labour market as males 
returned from the war and reclaimed their jobs. It may also reflect the beginnings of the 
baby boom). Thereafter, until 1986, both indicators increase in unison. The only vestige 
of support occurs during the period 1986-1991, when a small decline in cohort size is 
accompanied by a slight acceleration in the income of young females relative to 25-54 
year old males. Nevertheless, at least for this indicator, the evidence is clearly 
insufficient. Accordingly, in the case of female cohort size and income relativity, the 
hypothesis cannot be upheld. That said, it must be noted (and recalled from Chapter 10) 
that the relative increase in female incomes vis-ä-vis those of males has occurred in large 
part because of the absolute decline in male incomes. This factor has important 
implications for the analysis of changes in the timing of family formation, to which the 
focus now turns.
Figure 11.1.5
Cohort Size at Age 20-24, and Mean Income of Females Aged 20-24 as a 
Percentage of Mean Income of Males Aged 25-54, by Cohort, 1945-1991
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Income: Easton 1997b, Table A.6 (see Appendix I.2)
The second component of Easterlin’s argument (albeit not fully elaborated by 
him) concerns the relationship between cohort size and the timing of family formation,
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demonstrated in Figure 11.1.6 by the age at which each cohort experienced its peak age- 
specific fertility rate.3 Clearly, the relatively smaller cohorts bom between 1921 and 
1946, and aged 20-24 years between 1945 and 1966, experienced a decline in the age at 
which family formation occurred, whilst the largest cohorts, bom in the late 1940s 
through to the early 1960s, and aged 20-24 years during the 1960s and 1970s, initially 
experienced no decline but then suddenly delayed their childbearing. As is well known, 
these two groups represent the baby boom parents and their offspring, and not only 
support the Easterlin hypothesis, but were the principles upon which it was established. 
Nevertheless, also supporting the hypothesis of lower competition leading to accelerated 
childbearing for small cohorts, and vice versa, are the high and increasing proportions 
employed within the labour force shown above for those belonging to the pre- and 
earliest bom baby boom cohorts, and the declining levels for the later and peak baby 
boom cohorts, for both males and females. (This is not to say that large cohort size is 
the cause of high unemployment, but its possible involvement cannot be dismissed.)
Figure 11.1.6
Cohort Size at Age 20-24 (Males and Females Separately) and Age At Which Each 
Cohort Experienced Peak Childbearing, By Cohort, 1945-1986
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Source: Population data: Census of Population and Dwellings (see Appendix I.3)
Fertility data: Cheung, Jackson and Pool 1994 (see Appendix I.3)
3 As explained in Chapter 4, this is the index of choice because it gives an indication of the experience 
of true cohorts, yet does not require completed fertility data. It is also preferable to that of median age at 
childbearing, because the latter is affected by changes and ethnic differences in age structure.
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So too do the income data for males (shown in Figure 11.1.7) support the 
hypothesis. Indeed, the correlation between the mean income of 20-24 year old males 
relative to that of males aged 25-54 years, and the age at peak childbearing for each 
cohort across the 1945-1986 period, is strongly negatively correlated (r=-0.68), 
denoting that as the relative incomes of 20-24 year old males increase, age at 
childbearing declines, and vice versa. The correlation for females, on the other hand, is 
strongly positive (r=0.73), their increasing income relative to that of 25-54 year old 
males and increasing age at childbearing going hand in hand, and suggesting— intuitively 
correctly— that relatively low income for females is a consequence of early childbearing, 
and vice versa. However, as noted above, the improved relative income of females is 
largely a function of the declining incomes of males shown in the previous chapter, and 
thus, in terms of joint family formation, the fortunes of both must be seen together. 
Accordingly, it would seem that the hypothesis can still be supported, even given the 
improved relative incomes of females.
Figure 11.1.7
Mean Income of Males and Females at 20-24 Years as a Percentage of Mean 
Income of Males Aged 25-54 Years, and Age at which each Cohort experienced
Peak Childbearing, by Cohort, 1945-1991
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Source: Income: Easton 1997b, Tables A.4 and A6 (see Appendix 12 )
Fertility data: Cheung, Jackson and Pool 1994 (see Appendix I.3)
The central tenets of the Easterlin hypothesis thus appear to hold generally true 
in relation to the within-labour force employment experience of both males and females,
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the income of males, the employment-population ratio for males, and the timing of 
childbearing, but are questionable in relation to income and the employment-population 
ratio for females. They also indicate that both threshold and lag effects may be involved, 
the former delaying the onset of decline in employment or income relativity until a 
certain level of cohort size is exceeded, and the latter extending the effects to at least the 
first of the smaller cohorts following a very large one— possibly because the first smaller 
cohort is to some extent competing with the immediately preceding larger cohort. Such 
exceptions, of course, only assist in ‘proving’ the theory, and for validity require re­
examination against contemporary and future data, when these become available. Along 
with questions about participation in tertiary education, it would also appear that such 
an examination would benefit from standardisation and/or component analysis.
In the interim, the potential relevance of the arguments for ethnic stratification 
cannot be ignored. In particular, it is important to ascertain whether the large baby boom 
cohorts, which were European in origin— as explained in Chapter 6, the Maori 
population did not experience a baby boom per se—were encountered by large or small 
Maori cohorts, and thereby whether or not the declining labour force and income 
relativities identified for Maori in Chapters 7 and 10 could be explained by this factor.
11.2 THE EASTERLIN HYPOTHESIS IN AN ETHNIC CONTEXT
Figure 11.2.1 shows the absolute size of cohorts when aged 20-24 years, for 
both the Maori and non-Maori, and Maori Ethnic Group and European populations, and 
the ratios of Maori to non-Maori/European. Except for the dip in 1956 for non-Maori, 
the former cohort size data identify a generally consistent upward trend for both ethnic 
groups until 1986, when births from the peak and immediate post-peak of the baby 
boom (1962-1966) reached 20-24 years of age. Thereafter cohort size declined for both 
groups. The latter ratio data show that, with the exception of cohorts bom 1942-1951, 
at the beginning of the baby boom, each successive Maori cohort when aged 20-24 years 
has comprised a greater proportion of its total cohort than its predecessor, and this also 
occurs for the post-peak cohorts bom 1966-1971, which saw an absolute decline in size. 
By contrast, for those bom at the beginning of the baby boom, the result was a short­
term reduction in the proportion of Maori in each cohort, indicated by the dip in the 
trend line between 1961 and 1976.
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Figure 11.2.1
Cohort Size of Maori and Non-Maori/European and Ratio of Maori to Non- 
Maori/European, by Ethnic Classification, Year when Cohort Aged 20-24 Years, 
and Year of Birth of Cohort, Males and Females Combined, 1945-1991
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The implications of these trends for competition between Maori and non-Maori 
in each cohort are ambiguous. Under a strict interpretation of the Easterlin hypothesis, 
the key dynamic determining competition is the size of the total cohort, in which case 
those of either group bom around the peak of the non-Maori baby boom would be 
expected to have experienced greater levels of competition than their respective 
predecessors. The same could also be argued for each ethnic group per se, those bom 
into large cohorts experiencing greater competition than their smaller predecessors, and 
vice-versa. However, from an internal colonialism perspective, a successive increase in 
the proportion of Maori in each cohort could also be theorised as engendering a 
potential increase in resistance on the part of its non-Maori/European counterpart,
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whilst for those Maori cohorts which showed a proportionate decline (those bom 
around the beginning of the non-Maori baby boom) the same argument would imply less 
resistance. That is to say, non-Maori/European in total cohorts containing increased 
proportions of Maori would be likely to experience an increase in competition for 
resources, and vice-versa. Accordingly, and whilst data limitations make such an analysis 
very difficult, this section explores the original tenets under the auspices of the ‘classic’ 
hypothesis, carrying out the analysis at the level of the ethnic group; and the latter 
proposition under the auspices of the ‘expanded’ hypothesis, as explained in Chapter 4. 
Where data are available, particular attention is paid to the experience of the smaller 
Maori cohorts relative to non-Maori bom 1942-1951, and aged 20-24 years between 
1966-1971, vis-ä-vis the experience of the larger Maori cohorts relative to non-Maori 
bom since, especially those bom during the peak of the baby boom (1962).
Beginning with the classic hypothesis at the level of each ethnic group, Figure 
11.2.2 shows that the relationship between the proportion employed within the labour 
force and cohort size has indeed been negative for both ethnic groups and both sexes. 
That is to say, when cohort size was relatively low, in 1951, the proportion employed 
within the labour force was very high, for all groups. Between 1976 and 1986, as cohort 
size increased to its peak, the proportion employed fell, supporting the hypothesis. 
Indeed, that it did so to a considerably greater extent for Maori (for example, a 10 per 
cent decline in the proportion employed within the labour force for Maori males; a 4 per 
cent decline for European males) may reflect the fact that the increase in cohort size was 
also considerably greater for Maori (40 per cent, compared with 5 per cent for 
European).
However, for all groups, the decline in the proportion employed within the 
labour force accelerated between 1986 and 1991, when cohort size fell (rate for males 
falling a further 20 per cent for Maori, compared with 9 per cent for European), trends 
that run counter to the hypothesis and suggest the involvement of factors external to the 
cohort. So too, as argued earlier for all females, do trends for females of both ethnic 
groups when the initially positive trends in their respective employment to population 
ratios are considered. That said, as also proposed above, the possibility of a lag effect 
operating after 1986, whereby smaller cohorts bom immediately after the peak cohort 
continue to experience the saturation-effects of the latter, is plausible. Alternatively, the 
classic hypothesis cannot be sustained after 1986.
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Figure 11.2.2
Cohort Size at Age 20-24, Percentage of 20-24 Year Olds in Employment 
(Employment to Population Ratio), and Percentage of 20-24 Year Olds in 
Employment within the Labour Force, by Sex, Ethnic Classification and Cohort,
1951 and 1976-1991
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The argument that cohort size is not the only factor operating is also strongly 
suggested in Figure 11.2.3, which examines trends in proportions employed (full-time 
plus part-time) within the labour force across the life cycle, for the period 1976-1991.4 
This approach permits a review of the experience at older ages of the cohorts missed 
from Figure 11.2.2.
4 These data differ from those given in Chapter 7, Figure 7.1.6, which pertained to the employment- 
population ratio, whereas those in Figure 11.2.3 pertain to the labour force, the index that Easterlin was 
primarily concerned with.
Figure 11.2.3
Proportion of each Age Group in Employment within the Labour Force, 
by Sex, Ethnicity, Cohort, and Age, 1976-1991
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Source:
For all cohorts with four observations, first observation = 1976, last observation = 1991 
Database B (see Appendix E.5.2)
First and most obvious from Figure 11.2.3 is a decline in the proportions in 
employment across the life cycle for almost all cohorts; the fact that inequality is greatest 
for the youngest cohorts (albeit with one exception noted below); and the considerably 
greater magnitude of the trends for Maori. The two latter points provide some support 
for the classic hypothesis. So too does the experience of the post-peak European cohort 
(both sexes), bom 1967-1971, which saw an absolute decline in size, and whose 
employment experience is positive, running counter to the trends for all others. 
However, for males of both ethnic groups, the age-span which corresponds to the 1981- 
1986 period shows a general improvement across that period irrespective o f cohort. A 
similar improvement occurs for the female cohorts bom 1957-1966, across the age span 
corresponding to the 1976-1981 period. If cohort size per se was the cause of the 
overall decline vis-ä-vis older cohorts, such a universally-experienced improvement
251
would not be expected. Nor would the universality of the overall deterioration per se be 
expected. That is to say, the older, smaller cohorts would not also be expected to show 
such a decline. From the perspective of cohort analysis, therefore, and although the 
hypothesis can be neither accepted nor rejected, it would seem that the trends reflect 
factors (such as changes in demand, and policy changes) that are largely external to the 
cohort.
Turning to the expanded hypothesis, Figure 11.2.4 compares relative cohort size 
with the relative employment experience of Maori Ethnic Group and European male 
cohorts when aged 20-24 years. Again, unfortunately, no age data for the all-important 
1956-1971 period exist. Either side of this period, however, it can be seen that when the 
ratios of cohort size were at their lowest, in 1951, the ratios of the proportions in 
employment were near unity (=1.00), irrespective of the denominator of the index (that 
is, whether labour force- or population-based). By contrast, as the ratios of cohort size 
increased between 1976 and 1991, the ratios of the proportions in employment fell, and 
did so particularly for the cohorts bom 1967-1971. The latter are the cohorts which saw 
absolute declines in size, but a continued increase in the ratio of Maori to non- 
Maori/European cohort size. Accordingly, it can be concluded— on the limited evidence 
available—that the expanded Easterlin hypothesis (that increased inter-ethnic 
competition correlates with a decline in the ratio of the proportion of Maori to European 
in employment) is more strongly supported than the classic hypothesis, at least for 
males.
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Figure 11.2.4
Relative Cohort Size at Age 20-24 (Maori to Non-Maori/European), Ratio of 
Maori to Non-Maori/European in Employment (Employment to Population Ratio) 
when Cohort Aged 20-24, and Ratio of Maori to Non-Maori/European in 
Employment Within the Labour Force when Cohort Aged 20-24,
Males, Selected Years, 1951-1991
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Figure 11.2.5 shows that trends for females have been very similar, albeit with 
the exception that the ratio of the proportion of the population in employment is much 
lower for females, denoting greater ethnic inequality amongst females. As with males, 
when the ratios of Maori to non-Maori cohort size were at their lowest, in 1951, the 
ratios of the proportions in employment within the labour force were near unity. As the 
ratios of cohort size increased, between 1976 and 1991, the ratios of proportions in 
employment fell, and did so by a similar magnitude to that for males. Thus the expanded 
hypothesis on this indicator also holds true for females.
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Figure 11.2.5
Relative Cohort Size at Age 20-24 (Maori to Non-Maori/European), Ratio of 
Maori to Non-Maori/European in Employment (Employment to Population Ratio) 
when Cohort Aged 20-24, and Ratio of Maori to Non-Maori/European in 
Employment Within the Labour Force when Cohort Aged 20-24,
Females, Selected Years, 1951-1991
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Because the data limitations prevent an examination of trends at age 20-24 for 
the older, relatively smaller cohorts, Figure 11.2.6 again employs conventional cohort 
analysis to show the relativity ratios of the proportion of the Maori Ethnic Group and 
European labour forces who are in employment (unity=1.00), across the life cycle, for 
the 1976-1991 period. Immediately obvious is an overall increase in ethnic inequality 
across the life cycle for almost all cohorts; a general improvement or levelling off during 
the age-span corresponding to the 1981-1986 period (as noted above for males of each 
ethnic group); and the fact that level of inequality is positively related to cohort birth 
year: the more recent the year of birth, and hence higher birth year, the greater the 
inequality. That is to say, with the sole exception of the observations that correspond to 
1986 for each cohort, each more recently bom cohort has experienced lower relative 
employment than its predecessor cohort, when at the same age. As above, the latter
254
fincing provides general support for the expanded hypothesis. However, the initial 
improvement in the relative employment of Maori vis-ä-vis European for the cohort 
bom over the peak and immediate post-peak of the baby boom (1962-1966) should also 
be noted. Corresponding with the 1981-1986 period, the trend again supports the 
argument that factors other than— or additional to— cohort size were operating, a 
contention reinforced by the subsequent deterioration during the 1986-1991 period for 
tha: cohort, and by the general universality of the trends for all other cohorts.
Figure 11.2.6
Ratios of Proportion of Maori to European in Employment Within the Labour 
Force in Each Age Group, by Cohort and Age, Males, 1976-1991
Notes: Scale does not begin at zero
Source: Database B (see Appendix 1.6)
Trends across the life cycle for females, shown in Figure 11.2.7, are very similar 
to those for males, including the initial improvement in the ratio of proportions of Maori 
to European in employment for the cohort bom 1962-1966, over the peak of the baby 
boom, the greatest levels of inequality for the most recently bom cohorts, and the lowest 
levels for the earlier bom cohorts. However, where the trends for males showed a 
general improvement across the age-span corresponding to the 1981-1986 period, the 
same period was one of substantial deterioration for all females bom prior to 1961. 
Conversely, where the period 1976-1981 had shown a general decline for males, it 
showed a general improvement for females, especially for the cohorts bom 1952-1966. 
Again these trends imply the presence of factors other than cohort size. Furthermore, the 
deterioration in equality for each of the more recently bom cohorts when at the same
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age as their predecessor, is also— almost without exception— greater than that for 
males, as is the level of inequality for the cohort bom 1962-66. Thus, whilst there is 
again some support for the expanded hypothesis, it is not unqualified support, and 
suggests the significant involvement of factors both external to cohort size, and specific 
to sex.
Figure 11.2.7
Ratios of Proportion of Maori to European in Employment Within the Labour 
Force in Each Age Group, by Cohort and Age, Females, 1976-1991
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11.2.1 Cohort Size and Income:
Turning to the relationship between cohort size and income under the classic 
hypothesis (which holds that large cohorts experience declining mean incomes, and vice- 
versa), Figure 11.2.8 shows that, with the exception of mean total income for Maori 
females, trends between 1981 and 1986 generally support the hypothesis, whilst those 
between 1986 and 1991 again suggest the presence of a lag effect, or refute the 
hypothesis. That is to say, with the exception of mean total income for Maori females, 
for whom the trend stays level, mean income between 1981 and 1986 for all other 
groups declines as cohort size increases. Between 1986 and 1991, however, mean 
income continues to decline as cohort size also begins to decline.
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Figure 11.2.8
Cohort Size at Age 20-24, Mean Total Income of 20-24 Year Olds, and Mean Total 
Income of 20-24 Year Olds in Full-Time Employment, 
by Sex, Ethnic Classification and Cohort, 1951 and 1976-1991
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When the full-time income data (which was the indicator used by Easterlin) are 
reviewed in terms of the ratio of Maori mean income to European mean income (income 
relativity) across the life cycle, as in Figure 11.2.9 for males, a substantial decline in this 
ratio is shown for almost all cohorts. As with the cohort analysis of employment 
relativities, inequality is generally positively related to year of birth: the more recent 
(higher) the birth year of the cohort, the greater the level of inequality when at the same 
age as its predecessor. Indeed, whilst the level of inequality per se at the last observation 
shown here (1991) is greatest amongst the earliest bom cohorts, those bom prior to and 
in the early years of the baby boom, when the proportion of Maori in each cohort was 
relatively low, the declines across the life cycle are by far the greatest for those bom
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since the 1950s, during the peak baby boom years, when the proportion of Maori in each 
cohort also increased to its peak.
Figure 11.2.9
Income Relativity: Maori Ethnic Group Mean Income as a Percentage of 
European Mean Income for those in Full-Time Employment, Males, 
by Cohort and Age, 1981-1991
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Source: Database B (see Appendix I.8)
Under the expanded hypothesis, these patterns suggest that the existence of 
relatively low proportions of Maori in the earliest bom cohorts has not in fact resulted in 
greater income equality for those cohorts, although this cannot really be determined until 
additional data for the most recently bom cohorts become available. Nevertheless, these 
factors may, on the other hand, have prevented or ameliorated the decline that has been 
experienced by the most recently bom cohorts. By contrast, the decline in equality 
experienced by the most recently bom cohorts, with their greater proportions of Maori, 
give strong support to the hypothesis. Accordingly, on this indicator, the expanded 
hypothesis can be neither fully supported nor rejected.
Patterns for females (Figure 11.2.10) differ quite substantially, although the 
general decline in ethnic equality across the life cycle for male cohorts is equally 
apparent for females, as is the fact that the decline in inequality is greatest for the most 
recently bom cohorts (those bom around the peak of the baby boom), whilst the 
relatively small cohorts bom during the 1930s have experienced the lowest levels of 
deterioration across the life cycle. For females, however, inequality per se is also lowest
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at the oldest ages—where for males it was highest— and greatest as cohorts passed 
through their late twenties and early thirties. Thereafter the cohorts bom in the late 
1940s to early 1950s experience a small improvement, but, at least for the cohort bom 
1947-1951, the gain was short-lived. Also for all female cohorts bom prior to 1961, 
there is considerably greater difference between cohorts (inter-cohort inequality), when 
at the same age as the predecessor cohort.
Figure 11.2.10
Income Relativity: Maori Ethnic Group Mean Income as a Percentage of 
European Mean Income for those in Full-Time Employment, Females, 
by Cohort and Age, 1981-1991
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Source: Database B (see Appendix I.8)
In contrast to the earlier findings for all females, which were based on their 
income relative to that of males, this experience of females more fully supports the 
Easterlin hypothesis. That is to say, ethnic inequality is both lowest, and experiences the 
smallest increase across time, for those bom prior to and during the early years of the 
baby boom, when the proportions of Maori in each total cohort were relatively small. By 
contrast, inequality is greatest and increases the most for those bom during the peak 
years of the baby boom, when the proportion of Maori in each cohort was much greater. 
Importantly, the patterns are very similar—though less pronounced— when total income, 
rather than income from full-time employment only is used (see Chapter 10, Figure 
10.3.1), the former perhaps the more valid indicator in the case of females. The main
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difference in the total income trends pertains to the cohorts bom 1952-1961, for whom 
an overall improvement in ethnic equality occurred over the peak childbearing years. As 
implied in Chapter 10, that improvement may reflect ethnic differences in childbearing 
patterns, to which the chapter now turns, or alternatively, the relative improvement in 
the incomes of those not in the labour force and/or without qualifications, vis-ä-vis those 
in employment and with qualifications, rather than being an effect of cohort size per se.
11.3 BIRTH, FORTUNE AND ETHNIC DIFFERENTIALS IN THE TIMING 
OF CHILDBEARING
The relationship between family size, female labour force participation and 
female earnings is well recognised and has been broadly studied. Considerably less 
attention, however, has been paid to the relationship between ethnic differences in the 
timing of family formation, and the relative material well-being of the Maori and 
European populations. As explained in Chapters 4 and 5, the problems of undertaking 
such an analysis are many-fold, reflecting a lack of micro-level data; serious data 
discontinuities (fertility data being collected on a biological—blood fraction— basis, and 
census data on a changing mixture of biological and cultural criteria); and, not least, the 
fact that conjugal partners often come from different ethnic groups. The analysis that 
follows is highly subject to these same shortcomings. In general, it means shifting 
between period and cohort measures and differing ethnic classifications, and 
acknowledging that the trends and patterns can be broadly indicative only.
First, Figure 11.3.1 provides an indication of changes in the timing of fertility 
between Maori and non-Maori women. Importantly, as explained in Chapters 4 and 5, 
the data show the ratio of births classified Maori or non-Maori, to women of matching 
ethnic classification, and are thus not technically correct measures of the reproductive 
behaviour o f women (i.e. rates).5 Nevertheless, the ratio and rate data differ only 
minimally (Jackson 1995b), and in the absence of appropriate single-year-of-age data 
with which to construct ‘true’ behavioural rates for the period prior to 1981, provide a 
reasonably accurate view of longer-term trends.
5 As explained in chapters 4 and 5, the numerators that have been historically used for the construction 
of fertility rates reflect the ethnicity of the child, constructed from the combined blood fraction of the 
parents. In some cases this has meant that births to Maori or non-Maori women have been assigned to 
the opposite group, with the result that the resulting ‘rates’ do not accurately reflect the reproductive 
behaviour of the women involved. The problem is detailed in Jackson 1995b.
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Most immediately apparent from Figure 11.3.1 is the substantial decline in 
fertility levels between 1962, the peak of the baby boom (the first year that detailed 
Maori data were collected), and 1991. However, it is not the levels, but the timing of 
fertility that this section is concerned with. In 1962, only two years separated the period 
peak ASFRs of Sole/Single Origin Maori and non-Maori women, whilst by 1992 this 
gap had increased to more than seven years (see also Jackson, Pool and Cheung 1994).
Figure 11.3.1
Age-Specific Fertility Ratios, Sole/Single Origin Maori and Non-Maori Females,
1962 and 1991
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Turning first to the classic hypothesis, Figure 11.3.2 shows the relationship 
between cohort size and the timing of peak fertility for Sole/Single Origin Maori and 
non-Maori cohorts separately. The correlation for non-Maori (r=0.68) is quite strong, 
but negative for Maori (r=-0.40), suggesting that if the classic hypothesis holds true— 
that successively larger cohorts delay their childbearing vis-ä-vis their smaller 
predecessors, it does so only for non-Maori. That is to say, age at peak childbearing 
increased for non-Maori as cohort size increased, but saw an overall decline for Maori. 
However, the possibility of a lag/threshold effect cannot be ruled out, with age at peak 
childbearing increasing for Maori as peak cohort size was passed.
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Figure 11.3.2
Family Formation and Cohort Size: Age at which Peak Age-Specific Fertility 
Ratio has Occurred for Cohorts Born 1937-1971, and Cohort Size when Cohort 
Aged 20-24 Years, Sole/Single Origin Maori and Non-Maori Females
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Direct comparison of the fertility data, shown in Figure 11.3.3, identifies that the 
gap between Maori and non-Maori in peak age at childbearing increased from 0-1 year 
for cohorts bom in the late-1930s and beginning their reproductive careers around 1960, 
to 8 years for cohorts bom 1958-1961, beginning their reproductive careers in the late 
1970s - early 1980s. However, for those cohorts which have more recently passed then- 
peak childbearing, thus those bom in the years immediately after the peak of the baby 
boom, when the proportion of Sole/Single origin Maori in each cohort was at its 
greatest, and when Maori age at peak childbearing became slightly older, the gap 
declined to around 6 years. Thus there is some evidence that the expanded hypothesis 
holds true. That is to say, as inter-ethnic competition increased, age at peak childbearing 
underwent an upward shift for Maori. Furthermore, the patterns differ very little by the 
two different ethnic classifications of Maori shown in Figure 11.3.3, although the more 
recent gap is a slightly smaller between the Maori Ethnic Group and non-Maori, as 
opposed to that for the Sole/Single Origin Maori and non-Maori, populations. That said, 
it can also be seen that Maori cohorts bom 1965-1971 have already passed their peak 
childbearing, having done so around age 21-23, whilst data to 1991 indicate that the 
peak has not yet been passed for their non-Maori counterparts, meaning that in the 
short-term, the gap will remain approximately as it is.
Figure 11.3.3
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Age at which Peak Age-Specific Fertility Ratio/Rate has Occurred for Female 
Cohorts Born 1937-71, by Ethnic Classification and Year of Birth of Cohort
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Figure 11.3.4 shows the extent to which ethnic differences in the timing of family 
formation correlate with ethnic differences in female labour force participation, and in 
employment within the labour force. Unfortunately, the labour force/employment data 
are not available by single year of age, and there is thus some loss of refinement when 
the corresponding age at peak childbearing is given by five-year cohort, not least that 
the recent (and small) increase in age at peak childbearing for Maori females is 
dampened down. This shortcoming acknowledged, the relationship between age at peak 
childbearing and labour force participation shows a very strong positive correlation 
(r=0.97) for non-Maori cohorts bom 1952-1966— up to and over the peak of the baby 
boom—but very slight negative correlation (r=-0.16) for Maori. That is to say, whilst 
labour force participation improved for females of both groups over most of the period, 
its increase saw a concomitant increase in peak age at childbearing for non-Maori, 
and/or vice versa, but not for Maori, at least over most of the period. Data for the 
cohort bom 1967-1971 are shown separately, due to their slightly inconsistent ethnic 
classification, but were they to be added, the correlation would change very little (non- 
Maori, r=0.97; Maori, r=-0.07), albeit giving a little more weight to the recent upward 
shift in age at peak childbearing for Maori.
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Figure 11.3.4
Family Formation and Employment: Age at which Peak Age-Specific Fertility 
Ratio/Rate has Occurred for Cohorts Born 1927-1971, Labour Force Participation 
and Employment Rates of Cohorts when Aged 20-24 Years, by Ethnic
Classification, Females
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In terms of the Easterlin hypothesis, however, the key variable is employment 
within the labour force, and it would seem that at least some of the above disparity lies
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in the difference between this index and the labour force participation rate.6 
Unfortunately, as Figure 11.3.4 shows, data limitations prevent little more than a 
rudimentary analysis. Nevertheless, those data that are available— albeit these being for 
the more recent period, during which time Maori age at peak childbearing showed its 
upward shift— show that for cohorts of both ethnic groups bom 1952-1966, the 
relationship between employment within the labour force and timing of childbearing is 
strongly negative for both groups (non-Maori r=-0.87; Maori r=-0.88). That is to say, 
age at peak childbearing increases as the employment rate falls (i.e. as the 
unemployment rate increases), thus supporting the classic Easterlin hypothesis. At least 
for the Maori Ethnic Group, this finding is further strongly supported by recourse to 
period data for 1991, which identify an age at peak childbearing of 25 years (see 
Appendix 1.9.2).
Despite the latter, however, the aggregated fertility data show an increase in the 
gap in age at peak childbearing between the two populations— that is, the recent upward 
shift for Maori, which appears to correspond with a decline in proportions employed, is 
largely concealed. Since this shortcoming would undoubtedly bias the extent to which 
the data would be likely to support or refute the expanded hypothesis, the latter analysis 
is not attempted here. Suffice it to say that under the hypothesis, the decline in the 
relative proportions employed of Maori to European females shown above in Figures 
11.2.4 and 11.2.6, and the recent reduction in the gap in the age at peak childbearing, 
are suggestive of a positive correlation: as the ratio of Maori to European females in 
employment falls, the gap in age at childbearing between Maori and non-Maori falls.
Finally, Figure 11.3.5 shows the relationship between ethnic differences in the 
timing of family formation and the ratio of Maori to European mean income for both 
males and females when cohorts were aged 20-24 years. Again because of data 
limitations, only the 1981-1991 period can be reviewed. Furthermore, the analysis 
compares income data for the European and Maori Ethnic Group populations, against 
fertility data for the non-Maori and Maori Ethnic Group populations. The discrepancy is 
not a substantial shortcoming, as the mean incomes of European and non-Maori are 
almost identical. Nevertheless, the limitation should be kept in mind. In addition, it is 
centrally acknowledged that the analysis treats the two ethnic groups as ‘closed’
6 It is acknowledged that factors occurring within the labour force do not pertain to all women, whilst 
the potential for childbearing does, but neither can an employment to population ratio account for 
differences between the unemployed and those who choose to remain outside the labour force. Both 
measures are in fact used, see below.
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populations, when in fact persons of each group often inter-marry or cohabit. In Chapter 
4, for example, it was shown that in approximately half o f all families in which one 
partner claims Maori ethnicity, the other partner claims European ethnicity, and this 
proportion was ostensibly higher amongst the younger population. Thus whilst the 
following analysis considers each group separately, this very important shortcoming 
should be kept in mind.
Figure 11.3.5
Family Formation and Income: Age at which Peak Age-Specific Fertility Rate has 
Occurred for Cohorts Born 1957-1971, and Mean Income of Cohorts in Full-Time 
Employment when Cohort Aged 20-24 Years, by Sex and Ethnic Classification
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For the three observational points and cohorts for whom data can be examined, 
age at peak childbearing increased as the mean income o f 20-24 year olds declined, for 
both sexes and both ethnic groups, thus supporting the classic Easterlin hypothesis. The 
same therefore holds true for inter-ethnic relationships— at least at this level of 
aggregation: age at childbearing increased for all women; mean income declined for all 
persons of both sexes. If the analysis had been based on total income (all income groups 
combined), the finding would also have held true for all but M aori females, for whom 
total income increased over the period. Nevertheless, because Maori age at peak
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childbearing increased as male incomes of both ethnic groups fell, it will be argued that 
the data still essentially support the hypothesis.
Because of the confounding effect of the limitations imposed by the use of 
aggregate data, the expanded hypothesis is not investigated. Under its tenets, however, 
it could be surmised that the recent decline in the ethnic gap in age at peak childbearing 
could be associated with the fall in the income relativity of Maori to European identified 
in Figures 11.2.7-11.2.9, and thus that future research with single year of age data 
would be pertinent.
11.4 SUMMARY
This chapter undertook a limited and somewhat modified exploration of the 
Easterlin hypothesis in a New Zealand setting, applying it to data for the total, Maori 
and non-Maori/European populations. Where the original tenets of the hypothesis held 
that— since the 1940s— large cohorts would (a) experience greater competition than 
small cohorts for resources, such as jobs and income, and as a result would have lower 
relative employment and mean income, causing them to (b) delay their childbearing; the 
modifications tested (i) whether the same principles would hold at the level of the ethnic 
group, that is, within the group, and (ii) whether they would hold between ethnic 
groups. The former (i) was examined under the auspices of the ‘classic’ hypothesis, at 
both total population and ethnic group level; the latter (ii) under the auspices of an 
‘expanded’ hypothesis, the key question being whether an increase in the proportion of 
Maori in each total cohort resulted in an increase in ethnic inequality.
Importantly, the analysis focused directly on the experience of 20-24 year olds, 
instead of the relative experience of 15-29 vis-ä-vis 30-54 year olds, as employed by 
Easterlin for much of his original exposition of the argument; it employed longitudinal 
cohort analysis, where Easterlin’s analysis did not follow cohorts over the life cycle; and 
it paid special attention to the experience of females, data for whom were examined only 
superficially by Easterlin. However, also importantly, data limitations restricted the 
analysis by ethnicity to a very brief period, insufficient to explore an argument that 
requires a much longer view.
Overall, and within the limitations imposed by the data, the findings gave 
considerable—though by no means unqualified— support to both the classic and 
expanded hypotheses, resulting in a general finding of neither total acceptance nor total
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rejection of either. Supporting the premises, both the proportions employed (whether 
within the labour force or as a ratio of employment to population) and mean income 
tended to fall as absolute cohort size increased (with some important differences for 
females, noted below), as did ethnic relativity in the proportions employed and mean 
income fall as the proportion of Maori in each cohort increased (again with differences 
by sex). So too did the timing of childbearing increase as the proportion of both sexes 
employed, and the mean income of males, declined, at both population and ethnic group 
level.
However, contradicting the classic hypothesis was the fact that both the 
proportions employed and mean income continued to fall during the 1986-1991 period, 
when cohort size had also begun to decline. Furthermore, where data were available for 
the total population for a longer period, it was also shown that there were periods where 
both proportions employed and cohort size, and mean income and cohort size, increased 
or declined in unison. It was proposed that the former (a concomitant increase) may 
reflect a threshold effect, whereby proportions employed or mean income does not begin 
to decline until a certain cohort size, or level of saturation, is reached. Similarly, the 
latter (a concomitant decline) may reflect a lag effect, whereby cohorts bom immediately 
after the peak of the baby boom continue to experience the saturation effects caused by 
the large cohorts that preceded them. Both possibilities are plausible and cannot be 
dismissed. Certainly the proposals will be testable as future data come to hand.
Nevertheless, there was also sufficient evidence to suggest that factors external 
to the cohort have been significantly involved in the general increase in inequality 
experienced by the younger and largest cohorts. Primarily, this information came from 
examination of cohort experience across the life cycle. If cohort size was the only factor 
involved, it would be expected that large or small cohorts would experience the effects 
consistently across time. As it turned out, period factors appeared to have had the 
greater influence at certain times, at least in terms of employment. For example, almost 
all male cohorts experienced a small absolute improvement in the proportion in 
employment within the labour force across the age span corresponding to the 1981-1986 
period, followed by a substantial decline across the age span corresponding to the 1986- 
1991 period, each of which was more marked for Maori than European. These trends 
were mirrored by a relative improvement in the ratio of Maori to European in 
employment within the labour force across the age span corresponding to the 1981-1986 
period, followed by an equally consistent decline in ethnic relativity across the age span
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corresponding to the 1986-1991 period. Similar phenomena occurred for females across 
the 1976-1981 and 1981-1991 periods (i.e. the former showing an improving 
employment situation, the latter, a deterioration). That said, there is no doubt that the 
greatest effects of the relative deterioration between Maori and European in employment 
have been experienced by the younger cohorts, with their increased size and larger 
proportions of Maori, and thus generally support both classic and expanded variants of 
the hypothesis.
The situation for females requires separate comment, in that the variables 
employed by Easterlin (employment within the labour force; full-time income) are not 
necessarily the most valid for examining the experience of females. For example, 
although the employment of 20-24 year old females within the labour force was shown 
here to have declined steadily during the 1976-1991 period, the employment to 
population ratio showed a steady increase until 1986, falling only during the 1986-1991 
period. These trends occurred for females of both ethnic groups. Given that trends 
within the labour force are for females affected by more complex factors than for males, 
such as family size and fertility control, it would seem that the employment to 
population index is the more useful for examining the experience of females. Indeed this 
may equally well be the more valid indicator for males also. It is, however, seriously 
affected by the proportion of the cohort undertaking tertiary education, and thus to be 
really meaningful would require standardisation and/or decomposition to control for or 
separate out these factors.
Similarly questionable as an indicator for females is relativities in mean full-time 
income between younger and older persons, shown in this chapter to have increased as 
cohort size increased, thereby offering an outright rejection of the classic hypothesis. (In 
this chapter, the incomes of 20-24 year old females were compared with those of older 
males. Importantly, Martin (1997a) indicates that the same finding would have occurred 
if the index had been the relative mean income of younger to older females.) Rejection 
of the hypothesis would therefore extend to the relationship between female incomes 
and changes in the timing of family formation. However, it was also noted that whilst 
female mean incomes have indeed improved vis-ä-vis males (as shown in Chapter 10), 
the relative improvement is in large part a function of the falling incomes and 
employment experience of males. Since family formation and family incomes are 
(usually) a joint exercise, it was proposed that the findings essentially support the classic 
hypothesis. That is to say, as the employment and income situation of males deteriorates,
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childbearing is delayed. Whether it is delayed because female partners attempt to 
increase their employment and mean income in order to make up the shortfall, or, by 
delaying childbearing, female employment and mean incomes increase— an age-old 
question— requires a more sophisticated analysis than undertaken either here or by 
Easterlin. However, the recent decline in both female employment and incomes, against 
the continuing increase in the peak age at childbearing—especially for the cohorts bom 
around and just beyond the peak of the baby boom, and for both Maori and 
European/non-Maori alike— strongly suggests the former. Either way, an answer should 
be forthcoming as future data become available.
The findings have at least four contradictory implications. (1) Under the classic 
hypothesis, those pertaining to employment and income per se suggest that both the 
current level of socio-economic inequality between younger Maori and European, and 
its recently increasing trend, may begin to subside in the near future, as cohort size 
continues to decline. This will occur if a ‘lag effect’ is currently operating. (2) By 
contrast, under the expanded hypothesis, where Maori comprise an increasingly larger 
proportion of each cohort, a trend that will continue for many years yet, the findings 
suggest— ceterus paribus—increasing levels of inequality between younger Maori and 
non-Maori/European. (3) If, on the other hand, the recent trends are either independent 
of, or additional to, cohort size—that is to say, if, as seems likely, they also reflect 
period effects— then future trends will also be dependent upon these factors. (4) Lastly, 
if the timing of childbearing increases because individuals perceive themselves as unable 
to afford a family at younger ages, there are implications for conventional 
understandings of demographic change. In Chapter 6, it was suggested that the relatively 
early (European) childbearing of the baby boom, and the sustained high fertility for 
Maori over the same period, may have reflected a period of improving material well­
being for both ethnic groups. By contrast, the findings for recent years imply the 
opposite, that increasing age at childbearing (and implicitly, decreasing family size) 
reflects a deteriorating socio-economic situation— whether or not this is caused by 
cohort size— and, as Easterlin argued, an effort by couples to address that situation by 
altering their fertility strategy. Accordingly, there is a strong suggestion that ‘second 
demographic transition’ understandings that age at childbearing increases and family size 
declines as material well-being increases, may need to be re-considered.
SUMMARY and implications
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SUMMING UP:
ETHNIC STRATIFICATION FROM A  TOTAL SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION PERSPECTIVE
There are no laws o f behaviour which are not descriptions o f  the arrow 
o f time (Wallerstein 1992:6).
The total social production approach to ethnic stratification has illustrated a 
number of areas in which the pursuit of subsistence (production) and the replacement of 
the species (reproduction) interact. However, because these arguments and findings 
have been developed over eleven chapters, it is useful to begin this summation with a 
review of the main points of each.
The thesis began with the argument that since populations must both produce 
and reproduce in order to survive, studies of ethnic stratification that consider only the 
productive dimension fail to come to grips with the complexities of human existence. As 
a result, such studies have limited use for those who might attempt to address the 
situation, and/or to consider the extent to which a given period factor (for example, an 
historical event, a change in an opportunity structure, or a policy) may interact with 
demographic factors to further exacerbate ethnic inequality. An alternative ‘total social 
production’ perspective (Cordell et al. 1994:23-24), which holds that the pursuit of 
subsistence (production) and the reproduction of the species (reproduction) are 
fundamentally interdependent, was proposed.
Contrary to ‘melting pot’ assumptions about eventual assimilation or integration 
between previously colonised indigenous groups and their colonisers, a review of the 
stratification literature in Chapter 2 found strong support for the neo-Weberian 
argument that socio-economic differences between such populations are likely to be self- 
sustaining over the longer term, and to engender increasingly reactive responses from 
the subordinate population. In particular, Michel Hechter’s (1975) theory of internal 
colonialism (already substantiated in the New Zealand setting by Pearson and Thoms 
1983; Pearson 1988, although supported across time with minimal empirical data), with
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its central concept of a cultural division of labour, was seen as a useful framework 
through which to examine recently increasing tensions between Maori and European.
Under the auspices of total social production, Chapter 3 developed the argument 
that if demographic factors such as age structure, cohort size, and the timing of family 
formation have the potential to become independent variables of inequality (Easterlin 
1987a), then ethnic differences in these factors are similarly likely to do so, and vice 
versa. The argument was supported with a review of both conventional and ‘revisionist’ 
understandings of demographic change, and of the associated development of ethnic 
demographic differentials.
In Chapter 4, a methodology was developed which sought to examine 
demographic differences between Maori and European as both dependent and 
independent variables of socio-economic inequality, in the context of a society initially 
established on the basis of colonisation. This task simultaneously demanded the 
availability of an empirical profile of ethnic stratification across a broad range of socio­
economic indicators, and the expansion of the so-termed ‘Easterlin hypothesis’ for 
application at the level of the ethnic group.
A review of the data sources available for the thesis, the topic of Chapter 5, 
revealed a major problem with data discontinuities and deficits, uppermost amongst 
which were the inter-related issues of ethnic classification and inter-ethnic 
marriage/partnering, and a lack of consistent or appropriate data for much of the 
historical period. These limitations necessitated a secondary focus on the development 
and explication of the thesis database.
The first substantive chapter, Chapter 6, explored the historical development of 
socio-economic and demographic differentials between Maori and European. Substantial 
support was found for the argument that the material well-being and the age structure of 
each population has been largely interlocked with the other. During the nineteenth 
century, the underlying dynamics reflected the infliction on Maori of disease and war, 
and the associated appropriation by European of Maori land and resources. In the 
twentieth century they reflected the incremental—although highly paternalistic— 
extension to Maori of the welfare-related benefits derived from these resources. Prior to 
the 1940s, the interaction of these dynamics with, ostensibly, cultural mores, caused the 
age structures of the two populations to diverge. Thereafter they began to converge, at 
first because the European baby boom caused the European population to become 
structurally younger, like that of Maori, but later (from the early 1960s) because the
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fertility of both populations fell in tandem, albeit at differing rates, causing both to 
become structurally older. A suggestion also emerged that the sustained high Maori 
fertility of the 1940s and 1950s may have reflected a perception of improving material 
well-being, vis-ä-vis European. In combination with the falling infant mortality of the 
era, which reflected the earlier delay for Maori in gaining access to its determinants, the 
two factors are reflected in the current relatively youthful age structure of Maori.
With the addition of some important caveats, ethnic differentials as measured by 
crude indices of dissimilarity between Maori and European/non-Maori were found in 
Chapters 7-10 to have undergone an overall increase in three key socio-economic 
indicators, and to have decreased in three others. Those showing overall increases were 
labour force status, employment status, and qualifications; those showing overall 
decreases were industrial distribution, occupational distribution, and mean total income. 
Within these overall trends, however, the indices for qualifications showed slight 
decreases (improvements) in ethnic inequality between 1986 and 1991, whilst those for 
mean total income showed small increases (deterioration) in ethnic inequality during the 
same period. Importantly also, whilst the indices for industrial and occupational status 
showed overall trends towards greater equality, trends between 1976 and 1991 reflected 
the disproportionate removal of many Maori from the analysis, as a result of their 
disproportionately low level of employment over that period. Taken together, there was 
a strong suggestion that the situation of Maori vis-ä-vis European/non-Maori has either 
deteriorated in recent years, or has not improved substantially since the 1970s.
Ethnic differences in age structure played a complex role in producing these 
crude differentials at each observation, in some cases adding to ethnic inequality, and in 
others, reducing it. However, because the effects for each indicator were often mutually 
compensating between categories, and because the indices of dissimilarity were 
unweighted by the size of each category, age-standardisation of the indices of 
dissimilarity for each indicator could give little more than an approximation of the 
overall role of age structure. These findings indicated that:
the Maori male age structure was on the one hand disadvantageous to both 
labour force status and employment status for Maori males at all observations, 
and on the other, provided a small degree of protection against the intercensal 
increase in inequality in each of these indicators between 1976 and 1986. By 
1991, however, the Maori male age structure also contributed to the increase in 
inequality. (That is to say, if the Maori and European age structures had been the 
same, the indices of dissimilarity would have been slightly lower, whilst the
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increase in inequality between 1976 and 1986 would have been slightly greater, 
and between 1986 and 1991, slightly less.);
the Maori female age structure was advantageous to Maori female labour force 
status between 1976 and 1986, and in 1991, disadvantageous, but contributed to 
the intercensal increase in inequality at all observations. (That is to say, if the 
Maori and European age structures had been the same, the index of dissimilarity 
between 1976 and 1986 would have been slightly greater, and in 1991, slightly 
lower, whilst the overall increase in inequality would have been slightly less.);
the Maori female age structure was disadvantageous to Maori female 
employment status at all observations, and contributed to the intercensal increase 
in inequality at almost all observations. (That is to say, if the Maori and 
European age structures had been the same, the index of dissimilarity would 
have been slightly lower, and the increase in inequality, slightly less.);
the Maori male age structure was advantageous to the Maori male industrial 
distribution at all observations, and contributed to the intercensal decrease in 
inequality at all observations. (That is to say, if the Maori and European age 
structures had been the same, the index of dissimilarity would have been slightly 
greater, and the decrease in inequality, slightly less.);
the Maori female age structure was on the one hand disadvantageous to the 
Maori female industrial distribution between 1976 and 1986, and then 
advantageous, and on the other, contributed to the intercensal decrease in 
inequality at all observations. (That is to say, if the Maori and European age 
structures had been the same, the index of dissimilarity between 1976 and 1986 
would have been slightly lower, and in 1991, slightly greater, whilst the decrease 
in inequality would have been slightly less.);
the Maori male age structure was disadvantageous to the Maori male 
occupational distribution at all observations, and played essentially no role in 
producing the intercensal decrease in inequality at any observation. (That is to 
say, if the Maori and European age structures had been the same, the index of 
dissimilarity would have been slightly lower, whilst the decrease in inequality 
would have been the same.);
the Maori female age structure was advantageous to the Maori female 
occupational distribution at all observations, but played essentially no role in 
producing the intercensal decrease in inequality at any observation. (That is to 
say, if the Maori and European age structures had been the same, the index of 
dissimilarity would have been slightly greater, whilst the decrease in inequality 
would have been the same.);
the Maori age structure was on the one hand advantageous to the Maori 
qualification distribution at all observations and for both sexes, but on the other, 
contributed to the small intercensal increase in inequality between 1981 and 
1986. It then contributed to the small decline in inequality between 1986 and 
1991. (That is to say, if the Maori and European age structures had been the 
same, the indices of dissimilarity would have been somewhat greater at all 
observations, whilst both the increase in inequality between 1981 and 1986, and
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the decrease in inequality between 1986 and 1991, would have been slightly 
less.);
the Maori age structure was disadvantageous to Maori total mean income at all 
observations for both sexes, but made a very small contribution to the intercensal 
decrease in inequality between 1981 and 1986. It did not contribute to the 
intercensal increase in inequality between 1986 and 1991. (That is to say, if the 
Maori and European age structures had been the same, the indices of 
dissimilarity would have been slightly greater at all observations, whilst the 
decrease in inequality between 1981 and 1986 would have been slightly less, and 
the increase in inequality between 1986 and 1991, the same.) Instead, the 
primary factor driving the increase in income inequality between 1986 and 1991 
was ethnic differences in labour force status.
Indeed, the contribution made to equality or inequality by age structure at each 
observation and across time for each indicator was relatively small, whilst that due to 
underlying or unexplained factors (and, in the case of total mean income, to labour force 
status and qualifications) was somewhat larger. This interpretation was supported by the 
various cohort analyses, which showed that trends were, on the one hand, generally 
positively related to year of birth: the more recently bom the cohort (i.e. the higher the 
birth year), the greater the inequality or equality when at the same age as the 
predecessor cohort; but, on the other hand, highly period-specific, in that inequality 
increased across some periods, and decreased across others, similarly for almost all 
cohorts, irrespective of the age-span that the period pertained to. The significant 
periodicity evidenced by these findings suggested that the negative trends were largely 
caused by period factors, such as economic restructuring, changes in the opportunity 
structure, and changes in wage and income support policies, that had disproportionately 
disadvantaged Maori, and not by factors endogenous to any specific cohort or ethnic 
group, such as an increase in a ‘culture of dependency’. Similarly, the positive trends 
suggested period changes in these factors that disproportionately advantaged Maori. For 
females, cohort analysis also showed ethnic inequality to be especially high over the key 
childbearing and childrearing years.
Finally, Chapter 11 found considerable— although by no means unqualified— 
support for both the classic Easterlin hypothesis and its expanded version. Supporting 
the classic hypothesis, both employment and full-time earnings were shown to have 
fallen as cohort size increased; and, as employment and earnings fell, age at peak 
childbearing increased. The findings applied to both ethnic groups, suggesting that (a) 
cohort size is a cause of inequality and that (b) conventional ‘second demographic
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transition’ understandings that age at childbearing increases and family size decreases as 
material well-being increases, may need to be re-evaluated. Contradicting the 
hypothesis, however, were the findings that employment and earnings continued to fall 
as cohort size passed its peak, suggesting the presence of lag effects (whereby 
immediately post-peak cohorts have continued to experience the ‘saturation’ effects 
caused by the large cohorts that preceded them); and that the trends in the employment 
and earnings experience of each cohort showed significant periodicity, suggesting, as in 
Chapters 7-10, the primacy of factors exogenous to the cohort.
Under the expanded version of the hypothesis, the employment and earnings 
experience of Maori vis-ä-vis European deteriorated, and Maori age at peak 
childbearing increased, as the proportion of Maori in each total cohort increased. The 
findings indicated that (a) an increase in intra-cohort competition from Maori generated 
an increase in socio-economic inequality, and that (b) the increase in socio-economic 
inequality generated a small increase in age at childbearing for Maori, and thus a small 
move towards convergence in the childbearing patterns of Maori and non-Maori. As 
with the findings under the classic hypothesis, however, a substantial degree of 
universality and periodicity was revealed by cohort analysis, suggesting that factors 
exogenous to the cohort were also involved.
12.1 SYNTHESIS OF KEY ARGUMENTS
The central questions of the thesis were whether or not trends in ethnic 
differentials for economic production and demographic reproduction have tended 
towards convergence or divergence over the long term, whether or not these trends 
appear to be linked, both within and between ethnic groups, and whether or not 
demographic reproduction has played a role in the maintenance of ethnic stratification.
As regards the question of whether or not trends in economic production have 
tended towards convergence or divergence, it is clear that the recent deterioration in the 
age-standardised indices of dissimilarity for labour force status, employment status, and 
income run counter to what might have been expected. Importantly, however, these 
trends also run counter to those that obtained between the 1950s and the late 1960s- 
1980s (depending on the indicator), during which time ethnic inequality on these counts 
decreased. Together they suggest that a cultural division of labour as articulated by 
Hechter (1975), Pearson and Thoms (1983) and Pearson (1988) does indeed operate in
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New Zealand, but that its grip lessened substantially over the period of the post-war 
economic boom. The claim is reinforced, paradoxically, by the recent improvements in 
the indices of dissimilarity for industry and occupation, which are in all probability 
reflections of the disproportionate decrease in Maori employment, and not real 
improvements at all; and by the fact that the general improvements in all of these 
indicators between the 1950s and the 1970s coincided with the extremely rapid 
urbanisation of Maori. At least some of the improvements will have been a function of 
this mass urbanisation (a proposition noted by Easton 1983:211), itself largely a 
response to the full employment of the period, and not of improvements in equality per 
se. The claim is also reinforced by the finding that the recent increase in inequality in 
labour force status has occurred despite a recent, relative increase in qualifications for 
Maori, thereby extending to 1991 similar arguments by Wilson (1979) and Messina et al. 
(1992).
As regards the question of whether or not trends in demographic reproduction 
have tended towards convergence or divergence, it will be recalled that the finding for 
age structure was for divergence prior to the 1940s, and for convergence since (at first 
because of the European baby boom, and later because of falling fertility for both 
groups); and the finding for the timing of family formation was for divergence between 
the late 1940s and late 1970s-early 1980s (primarily because the age at peak fertility 
became younger for Maori than for European), and for a very slow if somewhat erratic 
convergence since.
When considered in the light of trends in the productive dimension (which begins 
to address the question of whether or not trends in the two dimensions are linked), these 
findings appear somewhat contradictory. Dominant demographic understandings would 
hold that the sustained high fertility of Maori over the 1950s reflected little change in the 
productive dimension, when in fact there was a sizeable improvement in labour force 
status and income; and that the 1960s fall in (Maori) fertility and the 1980s onset of an 
increase in the timing o f (Maori) family formation reflected an increasing improvement 
in the productive dimension for Maori, which was ostensibly true at the beginning of the 
period, but not towards the end. Although it would require micro-level research to 
explore these dynamics further, it is possible that the contradictions may be at least in 
part explained by the Easterlin hypothesis, which holds that, contrary to conventional 
demographic understandings (which are based largely on the employment and earnings 
experience of females only), fertility increases when times are good, and falls when times
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are bad, particularly when these phenomena affect males. Under this proposition, it is 
plausible that the fertility of both Maori and European was high over the 1940s and 
1950s because, for both populations (and for males and females alike), there was a 
general improvement in the productive dimension. The lack of data by age over the 
1960s make it impractical to comment further on possible productive-reproductive 
relationships over that period, but it is clear that when the employment and earnings 
experience of the young males of both populations began to seriously deteriorate in the 
early 1980s, Maori began to delay the timing of family formation, as their European 
counterparts had done a decade earlier. These speculations do not, of course, explain 
why European began to delay their childbearing earlier than Maori, nor why the fertility 
of both Maori and European declined simultaneously in 1961, when the material 
wellbeing of both populations was ostensibly relatively high. However (and 
remembering that extensive inter-ethnic partnering reduces the validity of some of these 
findings), they suggest avenues for future research. It may be, for example, that the 
fertility of each ethnic group simultaneously declined and/or was delayed at different 
points for different reasons, such as differing ethnic experience of the massive social 
change associated with women’s liberation during the 1960s and since.
One potential reason, which was not able to be conclusively determined in this 
thesis, was the extent to which these patterns and trends may have reflected incremental 
increases in cohort size, and thus in inter-ethnic competition, driven by both the 
European baby boom, and an increase in the proportion of Maori within each successive 
cohort. On the one hand, the increases in employment and earnings inequality, which 
were especially pronounced for the most recently bom cohorts, suggested that cohort 
size has, at the very least, increased competition between young Maori and European, 
the largest cohorts of both populations arriving at the door of the labour market just as 
economic restructuring began. On the other hand, the universality and periodicity of the 
trends suggested that period factors, rather than cohort size, had primacy. That is to say, 
if the increases in ethnic inequality were solely a function of increasing cohort size, the 
general direction of both intra- and inter-cohort trends would have been expected to 
remain fairly consistent across time, and not to show the significant temporal reversals 
that they did.
Nevertheless, the question of whether or not demographic reproduction has 
played a role in the maintenance of ethnic stratification must be generally answered in 
the affirmative: ethnic differences in age structure contributed to ethnic stratification at
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almost all observations. However, the findings require a qualification to be added to the 
hypothesis, namely, that demographic reproduction both contributed to and ameliorated 
ethnic stratification, depending upon the category or indicator under investigation. This 
is not to say that demographic factors were by any means the key contributors to, or 
ameliorators of, ethnic stratification, either at each observation or across time, as this 
was patently not so, but rather, that these complex interactions have implications that 
demand more consideration by policy makers and analysts of ethnic stratification than is 
currently the case. Three examples, one pertaining to labour force status and its 
associated employment status categories, one to qualifications, and one to income, will 
illustrate.
12.1.1 Age Structure and Ethnic Differentials in Labour Force and Employment
Status:
Reflecting a generally well understood—if seldom quantitatively demonstrated 
feature of ethnic inequality in New Zealand—the youthful age structure of the Maori 
population was found to account for a sizeable proportion of the crude (observed) 
unemployment differential at each observation—in 1991, 17 per cent of that for males, 
and 25 per cent of that for females. Any policy pertaining to unemployment in 1991, 
such as the raising of the age of eligibility for the adult rate of unemployment benefit 
from 20 to 25 years, will therefore have had what will be termed here an age-neutral, 
and an age-discriminatory, effect. The age-neutral effect will have pertained to the total 
proportion of Maori who were unemployed less the proportion of the crude differential 
that was accounted for by age structure; the age-discriminatory effect, to the proportion 
of the crude unemployment differential that was accounted for by age structure. In 
practice, the proportion involved was generally not large, in 1991 accounting for 1.6 per 
cent each of all Maori males and females aged 15-64 years. However, and although the 
effect had declined across the period in relative terms (that is, in terms of the proportion 
of the crude differential accounted for by age structure at each observation), it had 
increased in absolute terms (that is, in terms of the proportion of the Maori population 
exposed to any potential age-discriminatory effect).
Importantly, it is not that such policies (or their indirect effects) 
disproportionately advantage or disadvantage the individuals within these categories. 
Individuals are, of course, affected by such policies, but the effect on each individual
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(within each category) is essentially the same. The distinction is critical because, as 
argued in the introductory chapters, the age-effect is typically presented as a 
methodological problem that affects comparison, and not as having effect in and of 
itself. Also importantly, the term ‘age-discriminatory’ should not be taken as implying 
that any effect will necessarily be negative. Had the above policy, for example, raised 
the youth rate of unemployment benefit, it would have disproportionately advantaged 
the Maori population through the same age-effect. The point is that the potential of 
policy to advantage or disadvantage one or another population through an age-effect 
needs to be understood, as does the fact that this effect differs to that which is 
experienced by individuals.
In this regard, the complex sex-, period-, and category-specific nature of the age- 
effect revealed by the findings of the thesis provides a basis both for understanding some 
of the dynamics of past and present inequalities, and for indicating where future 
inequalities could occur. In 1991, for example, the Maori age structure gave no 
employment-related advantage to Maori (with the exception of a minute effect for the 
small proportion of Maori males who worked part-time). Instead, the European age 
structure conferred a small advantage on both European males and females in full-time 
employment, and on European females in part-time employment. Similarly, the 
European age structure conferred a small advantage on European female wage and 
salary earners, and on European of both sexes in the ‘own account’ and ‘employer’ 
categories. In some cases these age-effects had declined over time, in some, increased, 
and in yet others, had shifted from a Maori to a European advantage. In all cases, 
however, the age-effects in 1991 added to the underlying/unexplained advantage for 
European in these categories (which, with one exception— that of male employers—had 
increased over time). Policies that in 1991 had an impact in these categories, whether 
directly or indirectly, would therefore have had a small age-discriminatory effect for 
European, which in some cases may have been advantageous, and in others, 
disadvantageous. The effect would have been additional to any advantageous or 
disadvantageous effect also accruing to European as a result of their higher unexplained 
proportions in these categories.
By contrast, for females at all observations, the European age structure 
predisposed European females to being in the ‘not in the labour force’ category, whilst it 
was Maori females who actually experienced the greater (underlying) proportions. Prior 
to 1991, a similar situation had occurred for females who were employed full-time, only
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in this case it was the Maori age structure adding to the presence of Maori females in the 
category, but European females experiencing the greater (underlying) proportions. In 
each case the age-effects in these categories offset (reduced) the underlying differentials 
at each observation. Any policy that had an impact in either labour force category would 
therefore have had an age-neutral effect for the population experiencing the unexplained 
differential, and an age-discriminatory effect for the population experiencing the 
component due to age structure.
Important also was the finding that the various contributions made by age 
structure within each category (relative to the observed difference) tended to fluctuate 
across the period. Because age structure itself does not fluctuate in this manner, the 
‘trends’ must be understood as reflecting at least two factors. First, when considered as 
a proportion of either the observed or underlying/unexplained differential (therefore in 
relative terms), they may reflect fluctuations in these base-lines. A decline in the relative 
age effect in a given category may be a function of an increase in the observed 
differential, and vice versa. Second, they suggest fluctuations in supply (perhaps of 
certain skills) and demand (perhaps in job-creation and training schemes), that at times 
favoured younger persons, and at times favoured older. In 1986, for example, the crude 
difference between the proportions of Maori and European males who were unemployed 
was lower than in either 1981 or 1991, but age structure had its largest relative effect, 
implying that the employment and/or job creation and training schemes of the time had 
advantaged older European males (thereby removing them from the unemployment 
category, and increasing the age effect for Maori). Thus, as implied earlier, it is 
misleading to attach too much importance to ‘trends’ in the relative age-effect. Instead, 
policy-makers (and analysts of ethnic stratification) need to assess the contribution to 
the crude differential for each category made by each individual age-effect, and to 
develop or assess the potential impact of policies accordingly.
12.1.2 Age Structure and Ethnic Differentials in Qualifications:
However, to complicate matters slightly, trends in the age-effect have 
considerable significance when they pertain to ethnic differentials in qualifications. The 
explanation for this contradiction is that qualification categories (which reflect the 
highest qualification held) are essentially unilineal in order—people cannot move from 
higher categories back into lower ones, whereas in the case of labour force status and/or 
employment status, people can move between statuses. (These comments ignore the
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possible effects caused by migration.) As a result, the age effect within each qualification 
category tends to reflect age differences per se between the two populations, and to 
provide an indication of future effects.
For example, for both males and females for whom a secondary school 
qualification was the highest qualification, the age-effect, which favoured Maori at each 
observation, reduced over time. For males with either an ‘other tertiary’ or a 
‘bachelors/post-graduate’ qualification, the age-effect, which favoured European at all 
observations, also reduced over time. For females with these higher qualifications, 
however, the age-effect, which favoured Maori at all observations, increased over time. 
Because we know that (a) the Maori female age structure is slightly older than that of 
Maori males, but slightly younger than that of European females, and that (b) the Maori 
male age structure is slowly maturing, the findings suggest that (c) the Maori female age 
structure is currently a little more optimal for the gaining of higher qualifications than 
either the European female or the Maori male age structures, and that (d) this situation 
is therefore likely to occur for Maori males in the near future. That is to say, Maori 
males should shortly make some small gains in the higher qualification categories over 
and above any ‘real’ gains.
The proposition is supported by the declining advantage from age structure for 
European males in these categories (in 1991 the age-effect had fallen to zero in the 
‘bachelors/post-graduate’ category), and by the similarly declining age-advantage for 
Maori of both sexes with a ‘secondary school’ qualification. In both cases, the trends in 
the age-effect would appear to reflect the slowly converging age structures of the two 
populations. As implied earlier, age-standardised indices of dissimilarity conflate the 
various age-effects that obtain in each individual qualification category. Nevertheless, 
they too provided substantial evidence that the small declines in ethnic inequality 
between 1986 and 1991 were due to the age structure of the Maori population, which, 
in relation to the gaining of qualifications, was relatively advantageous.
However, these positive and potentially positive effects of the Maori age 
structure on the crude ethnic differentials for qualifications must not be confused with 
the reality of substantially higher unexplained differentials favouring European of both 
sexes in all but the essentially negative ‘still at school/no qualifications’ category, nor 
with the fact that the unexplained differentials in the arguably important ‘bachelors/post­
graduate’ category increased for both sexes. The findings point to the imperative of not 
only remaining vigilant about equality of access to higher qualifications for Maori
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individuals, but of taking action to ensure that the recent shift to ‘user pays’ tertiary 
education will not unduly disadvantage the Maori population at the group level, which, 
as argued, is nearing the optimal age structure for the gaining of such qualifications.
Indeed, in 1991, 37.5 per cent of the Maori population were aged less than 15 
years, incrementally approaching the age of tertiary education, against 21 per cent of the 
non-Maori/European population. Given the shift to user pays tertiary education, this 
substantial demographic differential contains significant potential for an increase in 
ethnic inequality in qualifications. One way of addressing this issue may be to provide a 
number of special scholarships for Maori, equal in number to the age-discriminatory 
effect. For example, if the age discriminatory effect for those enrolled at a tertiary 
institution (not investigated here) was equivalent to 4 percentage points (as it is 
currently for those with a secondary school qualification), a number of scholarships 
reflecting this proportion could be provided, in order to equalise the potential access of 
each population. This is a very different proposition to the idea that all Maori should be 
treated differently, perhaps by reducing fees for Maori students, which would be 
inequitable at the level of the individual.
12.1.3 Age Structure and Ethnic Differentials in Mean Income:
Although ethnic differences in age structure contributed to crude ethnic 
differentials in mean total income at all observations, they did not cause the recent 
(1986-1991) increase in inequality in this indicator, for either sex. Instead, the key factor 
driving the increase was labour force status, with qualifications playing a secondary role. 
The finding, which supports Easton’s (1996b: 120) suggestion that the increase was 
more likely to be an employment-effect than an age-effect, is returned to in the following 
section.
Similar findings obtained for those of both sexes in either full- or part-time 
employment, with the caveat that the increase in income inequality (which for those in 
full-time employment occurred steadily across the entire 1981-1991 period, and for 
those in part-time employment occurred between 1986 and 1991) in these categories 
was primarily a qualification-effect than an age-effect. Indeed, in the case of both males 
and females employed full-time, and of females employed part-time, the Maori age 
structure played a small role in protecting against the increase in income inequality. That 
is to say, whilst Maori-European income relativities would have been slightly greater 
(more equal) if the age structures of the two populations had been the same, the
284
increases in inequality would also have been slightly greater: in no case would Maori 
have been protected against the declines in income relativity by having the same age 
structure as European. The findings are important because the age-effect, and thus its 
protective role, had fallen to near-negligible in 1991.
The Maori age structure (and by proxy, other demographic differences between 
Maori and European, such as family type and size) also played a small role in producing 
an improvement in income equality for those of both sexes who were either unemployed 
or not in the labour force between 1981 and 1986, and a small role in protecting against 
a relative deterioration in income for Maori in these categories between 1986 and 1991. 
That is to say, trends across the first period suggested an interaction between 
demographic factors and income support (and other) policies that disproportionately 
advantaged Maori (the improvements being greater for the crude indices than for the 
age-standardised indices, indicating that if the age structures of the two populations had 
been the same, the improvements would have been less). Trends between 1986 and 1991 
suggested the opposite—that income support policies vis-ä-vis demographic factors 
disproportionately disadvantaged Maori, although it must be emphasised that in only one 
case (that of unemployed males) did the latter result in an increase in income inequality. 
These seemingly paradoxical outcomes reflect the fact that for unemployed females, 
trends (both age-standardised and unstandardised) between 1981 and 1986 had lifted 
Maori mean incomes above those of European (i.e. an income above unity), whilst 
trends between 1986 and 1991 merely returned those income relativities to, or closer to, 
unity. For males and females who were not in the labour force, they reflected the fact 
that Maori-European income relativities showed a constant improvement across the 
entire 1981-1991 period, albeit at a decelerating rate between 1986 and 1991. However, 
if the Maori and European age structures had been the same, the latter— decelerated— 
improvement between 1986 and 1991 would not have occurred, but rather, income 
relativity would have remained at its 1986 level, for both sexes.
For each of these periods (1981-1986, and 1986-1991) the latter findings 
suggested the role of income support policy vis-ä-vis demographic factors in influencing 
trends in ethnic income differentials. Although the role of age structure was in each case 
very small, and in 1991, negligible, the findings are important because many of the 
changes to the income support structure that occurred after the 1991 Census (i.e. after 
the last observation examined here) either explicitly or implicitly targeted certain age 
groups. As noted above, the raising of the age of eligibility for the adult rate of
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unemployment benefit from 20 to 25 years (along with a substantial reduction in its 
dollar value) will have disproportionately affected the Maori population by virtue of the 
age-discriminatory effect obtaining in the unemployment labour force status category. It 
can therefore be expected that this policy change will have generated a concomitant 
increase in the age-effect in the income-unemployment category, a proposition that will 
be testable when data from the 1996 Census become available.
12.2 ETHNIC DIFFERENTIALS IN MEAN INCOME AND OTHER 
EXPLANATORY FACTORS
Whilst the above discussion has suggested some mechanisms by which ethnic 
differences in age structure may contribute to the reproduction of ethnic differentials in 
the future, perhaps more important are recent trends in unexplained inequality, and, in 
relation to total mean income, in other factors controlled for, such as labour force status 
and qualifications. For example, standardisation showed that if the proportions of Maori 
within each labour force status and/or qualification category were the same as European, 
inequality in mean total income (and inequality within most income categories) would 
have been somewhat lower. However, at neither the level of mean total income, nor 
within those income categories where income inequality increased, would the same 
labour force status and qualification distributions as European have protected Maori 
against the negative trends. Furthermore, as the underlying levels and trends in labour 
force status and qualifications per se illustrated, the likelihood of Maori achieving the 
same distributions as European in the near future is highly improbable.
These arguments were strongly supported by cohort analysis, which showed that 
both intra- and inter-cohort inequality increased in several ‘income by labour force by 
qualification’ categories. Especially notable were the large ‘full-time employment by 
other tertiary qualifications’ and ‘full-time employment by secondary school 
qualifications’ categories, wherein the mean incomes of Maori relative to European were 
lower in 1991 than in 1981, for almost every cohort, for both sexes. The findings both 
extend to 1991 earlier arguments by Brosnan (1982, 1984), that rates of return for 
cultural capital are lower for Maori than for European, and show that rates of return for 
these particular qualifications have become increasingly negative for Maori.
However, partially offsetting these trends were those for cohorts in the equally 
large ‘still at school/no qualifications’ category, wherein the mean incomes of Maori
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relative to European were, for males, generally higher in 1991 than in 1981, and for 
females, almost the same as in 1981— although in only a few cases did these trends place 
Maori incomes above those of European. Importantly, these comparatively positive 
trends obtained irrespective of labour force status, suggesting, on the one hand, the role 
of increases in the minimum wage for those in employment (which are likely to have 
disproportionately advantaged Maori), and on the other, the role of income support 
policies. Also offsetting the negative trends were those for cohorts in the 
‘bachelors/post-graduate’ category, wherein the mean incomes of Maori relative to 
European were generally higher in 1991 than in 1981, although the small size of the 
category meant that these trends had very little impact on overall trends. Indeed, as 
implied above, the positive trends, which tended to pertain to smaller proportions of the 
Maori population, were insufficient to fully offset the negative trends, resulting in the 
overall increase in total mean income inequality.
12.3 THE ARROW OF TIME
The current age structures of the Maori and European populations reflect not 
only temporal differences between the two populations in the onset and velocity of 
demographic transition, but temporal differences in access to its determinants. There is 
therefore an obligation on the part of the State to concern itself with the current 
resource needs of the youthful Maori population, in equal measure to the attention being 
given to the future resource needs of an overall ageing (and primarily European) 
population. That is to say, the current bulge near the base of the Maori age structure, 
which derives from the relative lateness of Maori demographic transition—by and large 
a function of earlier ethnic inequalities— is comparable to the bulge higher up in the 
European age structure, which was derived from the births of the European baby boom. 
When those baby boom births occurred, the State centrally concerned itself with the 
needs of its young families, undertaking substantial investment in education, health and 
housing, as well as implicitly supporting families through its full-employment policies. 
The measures extended to such features as capitalisation of the then-universal ‘Family 
Benefit’, a weekly per-child payment which, when capitalised (as could be done from 
1958), provided many young families with the deposit for a home. By contrast, all such 
universal benefits, capitalisation facilities, free tertiary education, free health care, and 
low-cost state housing, were rescinded by 1991, and, although means-tested family
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Support measures continue to provide a safety net for families in need, they contain no 
such investment facilities. As a result, the families of the earlier era, and the populations 
to which they belonged, gained immeasurable contributions to both their individual and 
aggregate well-being that are no longer available to the disproportion of young Maori 
families, and thus to the bulk of the Maori population, today.
To restate the situation, under the economic rationalism that has accompanied 
the demise of the universal, relatively benevolent welfare state and the full-employment 
policies of the earlier era, there is no facility to accommodate the demographic 
differentials that have arisen from past inequalities. These differentials, only one side of 
which (that of the overall ageing—and primarily European—population) appear to be of 
significant concern to the State, make it disproportionately difficult for Maori to 
participate in the ‘self-sufficient’ environment that is the vision of contemporary New 
Zealand governments and their key policy-makers and lobbyists (Shipley 1991, Shipley 
et al. 1991; Conference on ‘Beyond Dependency’, 1997), and contain the potential to 
further exacerbate ethnic inequality, and ethnic tensions.
Indeed, the findings of this thesis provide a useful perspective for understanding 
increasing tensions between Maori and European, particularly the increasing militancy of 
younger Maori. New Zealand’s currently-young Maori have entered a very different 
world to that experienced by their parental generation as young people, for whom trends 
in most indicators were moving in the positive direction. This is not to say that the 
situation has not also recently deteriorated for the latter, but rather, that the trend 
towards greater inequality is generally less pronounced, the more distant the year of 
birth. For those Maori (from relatively small cohorts) who urbanised and entered the 
capitalist economy during the high labour intensive demand years of the 1940s and 
1950s, the future, by comparison with that of their own parental generation (for whom 
cohort size was essentially irrelevant because they were largely outside the capitalist 
economy), must have appeared golden and bright. By contrast, for those who entered it 
in the 1980s and early 1990s, the arrow of time has brought with it ever-larger cohorts, 
but simultaneously, an economy that no longer has need of them.
These young Maori cohorts, and those currently approaching the age of labour 
market entry, will for some time to come comprise ever-larger proportions of the labour 
force, and of those whose taxes will be needed to support an overall ageing—  
predominantly European—population. In 1981, 15-19 year old Maori accounted for 19 
per cent of all 15-19 year olds, and in 1991, for 21 per cent. Undoubtedly it will be a far
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more materially-enriched and harmonious future if those of both ethnic groups are able 
to actively participate, rather than one group (Maori) disproportionately adding to the 
dependency burden. If not, the third scenario posited by Hechter (1975), that of 
incrementally greater militancy and ethnic tensions, is almost certainly assured.

APPENDIX A
289
APPENDIX A
Index of Dissimilarity (additional notes):
To counteract the effects of the situation whereby the occupational structure 
may itself may artifactually influence the amount of occupational differentiation, Gibbs 
(1965:163) proposed the use of a standardised index in which differences in the size of 
each occupational category would be controlled for by assigning 1,000 persons to each 
category, with the same racial ratio in each category as actually obtains in the census 
data. He explains:
..if the occupational structure is such that only a few persons of either race are in the professions, the 
structure itself operates to reduce the amount of occupational differentiation. Specifically, if the number 
of persons in occupational category “Professional, technical, and kindred workers” was made larger 
relative to other categories, the result would be an increase in occupational differentiation because the 
races are highly differentiated in that category and an expansion of the category would contribute more 
to the overall amount of occupational differentiation. The same is also true for the category “Private 
household workers.”
The formula that yields the number of males of ethnic group X that would be in a 
given occupational category is: Xc = (Xa/Za)/1,000; where Xc is the hypothetical number 
of males of ethnic group X; Xa is the actual number of males in ethnic group X; and Za is 
the total number of persons of ethnic groups X and Y in the occupational category. The 
corresponding formula for ethnic group Y is: Yc = (Ya/Za) 1,000. When the Xc and Yc 
figures are converted into percentages of their respective totals, the resulting Xd and Yd 
values are comparable to Xb and Yb, except they are now not influenced by differences 
in the size of the occupational categories (Gibbs 1965:164). Summing the ratios of the 
Xd and Yd pairs across all occupational categories derives a standardised measure of 
differentiation (SMD), the formula for which is: SMD = ( [Xd - Yd])/2. Where SMD 
values are higher than ID values, the occupational structure is such that it reduces the 
amount of occupational differentiation.
The second— and closely related—issue concerns the argument that if the 
workforce were to be redistributed in the manner implied by the conventional ID, there 
would be consequential changes in the occupational structure. In order to address this 
shortcoming, Karmel and MacLachlan (1988:188; see also Fargher and Maani 1993 for 
a similar argument concerning gender) similarly proposed the use of a weighted index, in 
this case one that would give a constant occupational structure and identical 
distributions of male and female labour forces.
Jones (1992), however, argues that such weighted indices represent not indices 
of dissimilarity but of replacement, and that in controlling for group or category size, 
analysis may be rendered unsatisfactory and potentially misleading. In moderating the 
degree of segregation between groups by their relative size, for example, the weighted 
index implies that the smaller the group, the less its degree of pure segregation matters. 
Jones’ example (1992:109) is illustrative:
Suppose we wish to compare the occupational distributions of two ethnic groups in different places 
(cities or countries), with relative job distributions that are exactly the same everywhere. But the groups 
themselves differ in size from one place to the next. The (unweighted) Index of Dissimilarity would 
show exactly the same degree of ethnic segregation in each case, but the weighted index favoured by 
Karmel and MacLachlan would not.
Jones concludes that there is in fact no general or decisive theoretical basis for 
preferring a weighted to a non-weighted index, but agrees that for conceptual clarity 
there is a need to distinguish pure segregation from group size (1992:110). In terms of
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this thesis, however, the key question is whether it is desired to know the extent to 
which ethnic (or gender) groups are dissimilarly—or similarly— distributed throughout 
the existing occupational structure, and trends in this factor; or the extent to which the 
occupational structure would need to be altered for it to be equally distributed amongst 
a society’s ethnic and/or gender groups. Both questions are important, the latter having 
the more important policy implications if the objective is the complete elimination of 
occupational segregation (Jones 1992:107). Nevertheless, it is the former with which 
this thesis is concerned, and thus the conventional formulation of the ID is seen as the 
most appropriate.
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APPENDIX B
Component Analysis (additional notes):
Underlying Carmichael’s equation for decomposition (equations 3 and 4) are the 
following processes:
M (l) - M(2) = [M (l) - Msl(2)] + [Msl(2) - M(2)]
Where
M (l) = Measure 1, relating to Population 1
M(2) = Measure 2, relating to Population 2
Msi(2) = Measure 2 Standardised to Population 1
This process splits the difference between summary measures M (l) and M(2)
into two components. The first, M (l) - Msi(2), ‘measures that part of the overall 
difference which is attributable to differences in measures specific for compositional 
categories, since it measures the difference between the summary measures with 
differences in composition controlled (directly standardised) for’ (Carmichael 1995:51). 
The second component, Msi(2) - M(2), measures that part of the overall difference 
which is left after controlling for differences in composition. It is thus the component 
which is attributable to compositional differences.
If, on the other hand, population 2 is chosen as the standard population, and 
equivalent procedure yields:
M (l) - M(2) = [M (l) - Ms2(1)] + [Ms2(1) - M(2)]
where, in addition to the above notations,
Ms2(1) = Measure 1 Standardised to Population 2
and Ms2(1) - M (2) and M (1) - Ms2(l)  are alternative expressions for the components of 
the difference M (1) - M (2) due to differences in measures specific for compositional 
categories and in composition, respectively. As these measures tend to differ slightly 
from those obtained when population 1 is the standard population, the suggested 
practice is to take averages, the equations for which are given in chapter 4. Importantly, 
the final sum of the two components should always equal the original difference between 
the two summary measures being decomposed.
APPENDIX C
2 *  3.
CM
cr>
r —4
£
1 '
s
</}
•S"5
O'!
"2
<u
13
S i
§ 5
•5 w
c n
IZZ 0)
Q  1Ü
* 1  
CL CL <D _  O 05 
C  c  
O  ‘i=
o  üw  <D 
o  5= 
c  <  
•C (/) ■*-* z:
c - i
C/5 o  
<D • -
o > ~  
c  w  
ra £  
j c  i 2 
Ü Ü
s
•co
£
<n
£
•o £
s  §
£1
öd;g
=1 «
<3 6
.is .
f  5  cO' O 1
S | 2
s | ?
O tn 
*p cn n:
111 
2  £ JC 
c &JS 
•S« “CT3 £
Ö g * 
S - c £  
- S »  
3 2 - S
5  •
S s f
£§2 
o»w •—
I n
o  o  ’ f- c c
o  s 
SÜT3 G.tu c  o
^  o 5.* -OlU
I'll
m
u
rc O 
«  £ 
c ^
P £ .
S ^ J  
l3 's  <c
T j : £  Jj
| g s
L  O  I/)
«pTs "=
C -C T3
ui <  <Uc ^ tc
111 
C-  re u
fc
'5c
-T3
i j
5X>
C ‘G
c  o
£ f
‘s i
Ö 2
« 5
i l l
I l l l l l l l l
Ife-g. CT- r—. O
O  £  G X i
* 5 «  §3
. s  ^  e t  *  “
| § 2 S £ - 2 > - 5
, - '  O f V  5  Ol re —  —  L.
.X2 JC 3  
on£  f c x ‘5! S'C uW 
£-2  oo :  b
s | S ^ - S I ^ ‘g Sl l i l s s i t s
c cL°
£ 2 7 :-  D n
a> U_J • —
I I I
i - H f
0  u  1 
c  C  C  b — rcU Qj
Ct3 g. 
0« O G  
^  O 3  X>UU
1 £ c
g - § ^
s |8
WX>
N
Z
6 ^  
S ’-* c  6 0
o-£
ü l»—« U
o ^ c  
C  3  -2
C-° S L'-o c tu c >>
^  ° o  j  ^eu 
' c  >  rsi 
.2
S ‘ip7  
= S-nZ '^ o
N
0,2
I S
^ to  c c
C l f
r- -W (u O 3 t=
8-gcs
<?!!
• „ s oa?
P 5 l
.a S . S « c
C  6CfO C  C U cr-b
Ill'll 11
l|«2Ü3l
-F lllllf
o ^ o ^ o d ^
s t | - r ' S  I S  3
£  O  C u 2 0 w ±  Cl.
gg
<N O.Q.
- 2 S  .
PM
Hit
■ s - g s g
idS?
v ° L =
IPI
ISS7
s _  C  —
c . 2  •
§ST§cr> ir rc
a! "5s  , t N
'c -g Z
7  „ 2
2 ^o-^
£N
u  4  
O <N 
r s  \
r  Mi
. ' l j c ; |  ° l
|s il istj C ^ . h  tu <u
1111 .I
f i l l  o“ ! |
|~:|i lie;
e-rge! PÖ7
cr>CT)
I
S 't-O
3tug
CZ
tu
•"2
v5
t3C
cs
vO
(N
T 3
C
<1)CL
CL
<
O)
O)
m
05
W
0 >
c
a>
Q
T 3
CCD
Co
3
CL
O
Q_
>4—o
c/>
3
i f )
cCD
O
&>-2r  «> in <u
%  -cQ o _ 60
.2 -5 
«  U
l l
o.a>o  u
8  § co u
1g'gssg"
l l j f t l
: | i - | S |
S m  c 2  §  o o
7 ; ^  o =  <c r  ui
t E r S £ 2 w  S
2
8..li
£ JC
E 3•c cr
cn
l o
■ tu ■
c  £ .£  
6060 60 ■g-S'g
.a
! . g g
■C =
2 ^  'S
I  | l l
fla il
U w  t S 3 S
^  'S
O .2
a _  e1^=OJ G 3
D 2 S
^  c .
° re C  \
C - r  re ro
g g ? 2 L . - g . ;  c
b i l l l i j l
:p -o 'S i= f
l u l l s ’l l5 so
£
a .
II
£ JC a= o •c cr
£ £
•c
re-
1
o
5 ^  5 S
p  ^£
^  'S
o  . 2
a _  ei: X3 \
boo —
Q-» O  3
Q S £
f—< \£) r—« SO r—<
i n i n v o t O N  
ON On On On On
t—* r—< ?—* I—* r—«
cn
l o  
• 01 • 
C  £  C
’5o& 5)•g-s?
u*p G £5 cd o
-C v CD
S ' o S
-o 
N cV  L  • ——^• QJi i l |
- i i i i i i i i  m m
iA
l o  
■ tu . C O c 
'öb&öb
■g-S'g
u >NT— 
•p  C ^
I ' " 3 s
S ' o S
£  
r  
•c 
 ^ °
5  c
^  n:^ Q>
£  S=! o> c
• ö ä f l f i l-pm n
o ' 2 o
I f  S l |
• Ö C ^ I
b <6 g y
3 3 ' o o ^ S '  e o J - S S
-s i'g
a t c 6 5  =
18
•p c
I S'Ul o
2 3  3
O'
rsi
cr,
O'!
■s
1 -on
1
6
tn
§
<-T>
X!
_5
2:
Sf
1 *on
1
£
C<
.0
•£
-a
-S
£
4j
p
oo<N
T3 W 
C o
CD ■•—
w -
5  ro o —j
--</)
CO
— CD 
CD -C 
Q .22
■3 3  
Q-Q_ 
<D
O CD 
C  C  
O  ~
O °  W 0 
0 5 =
c <
—’ Ji:
c !
C/) o
® FCD*—C w§ g
-CIS
O O
CD
O)
LO
CD
CD
CD
C
0
a
TJ
c
TO
T=)Q3
=3
-S•*—
oo
c
O
T O
3
Q.
O
CL
TD
C
0
Q_
Q.
<
O
CD
3
CD
C
0o
e^y:
I  "^2 U U
.§> <« m ü
« X Q o _ 60 
o Ä 
»5 U
3 1O' g
u s 
*55 £nj O 
CO U
u  >c• ^  <U
C P£N
Ill'll-?!
d.
l i
S-
5 3 ^ S c-pSi al:^ £
Dto c -p *C ^ u s's>o o* e ts'-s 
.s'g‘gio.3Jg.
c c
4 1
rsi
. t  *-«
gwiSs
- .5  •
s rs
Si
£'2(^.5
f l i t
oö2  =
i B l
£ “ i 2
• n  r ,
£ >~ 
£ C-N
£ N
Z.Z
C fN
.* ° s.y 
£‘4 gi.lics
2 o^-r
5 J 5 -
c1 Z
l I S |
O u i f
3 tS
■gsg-g3 Ijl
! ? t =
I.*?
l lc------
.•i
. £  c
Oof"
S-J5
I!*!Po7
;.•_= * 5 s =
1 1 | z L z | £ ö?
x =7
C  reu i-  . <e • rc o  ■ — <f
i l J I f l l l
£
£c
c£c
■g-Si
■p cX
£** S
u c 2
?!
I C 
1*2 -5x-g £ •- c  MiJp c g2'g
S t i l l
Ill s lits is ö j l lg .  
■g pl-Jp c-^  SP&il'SSasi-  i ;  y  fc I t  3 '3 i  UWNIO^ ZUÖ
O C 
&;&
S*g
i t— X
Xg
15 x
*S|
o
£
0 *p S§
g^O-5
S i l l  
16 gf
L l | i |
llfls
■^S5  S£
cfCC;a.
•5
“ z I:»
f i ' l ?
=:|l§.°e =
III!
2 .
se'E
C K
[ZpZ
?■§
s=3 s 
S i t s
.  C d (
£±B
ill!*Ui
S o SOa. « 
p.£ «•§
i-ii
.2 o'o aP 
l^§ S
■3 g
ce| ^  
J2-C1  g
ff ll I
•Q re C 
^  g  rc
§ 0;
£ZofcS• - c.£ Ls'bbo^  
■C b o
Ot3 ®
aJ -t:£ OlS
P.2 o
s
%
s s i rS£
o | x 4  a 
h ^ £ 5
Jll-gtt
S c 2 U  g f 2 £
I I I  l i p s
u^äI I zuö
t § 1
'§-|s !.u.s£<x £
•p cS’Eb•S'c
JS £
a  Io a> o
S -^ 5  g
g e i l
S tf
._§ c gw
g'§?!..
ai o o x -aS-tegsl
i i i 6
s l ^ S
2|
f i
*r=
cU
cut:
■g-s
c/
-  §" 
o £c t>0 h u
Ss
c lo t:
IS.S d  * £■O ro P 5  *- 
c
n  C u  n  qj
-■si- I
Bn s S I
l |  a. •«
^ § g £
a>
i 2;
c J c
 ^S g £
! i l t l3 «-a 5 i-W c c
ZHSf  S
JS P i  jp
ig li -S
£ ? 5 | 1
Sfo=
l j 4cu-£^; o
.  w 41 £  m
i 8
DU
" ® a &
ä ä g l ,
111= I
S£H£ ,2
2J i
.5 o .a
111
l i l
S - - x
I p
:|li-=° 4 l
p | z £
O'E d.
LfcOG  ^bO
ue *i|
l l i f
£n£
o tc  £ 5?oo fcOf
z x u c
2 s*
1  c £ N t | l '3  ^.  c^*i3G:-
g - p p | s .
s
® f 8 .
£ x7
S- .
l l  i l l
PS-5 2 5
7  w d o  p  s'-s'7 zgg-g.2-0 S c^oizx 
■gl S-g c'2  eg'
U N i-g i ls
ätSItS^lluö
D. " O 
§ .§  1  II
3  ^  U^O ^  JC 
w  g  (D cn t :  ^
.a cx
i i
APPENDIX D
294
APPENDIX D.l
The Treaty of Waitangi
The Treaty of Waitangi, signed on 6th February, 1840, was drafted in two 
versions, English and Maori. In addition to the relative brevity of the Maori version, 
which omitted highly significant wording and concepts, significant differences exist in 
the translation of the Maori version. Uppermost amongst the disputed passages are 
those which, in the following English version, refer to the cession of ‘sovereignty’ 
(Article the First), and the ‘full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession of ... properties’ 
(Article the Second). In the Maori version, the use of the terms kawangatanga 
(governorship) in the First Article, and Rangatiratanga (chieftainship) in the Second 
Article, implied that what Maori were ceding was governorship (Royal Commission on 
Social Policy 1987, Discussion Booklet N o.l; Sinclair 1992). As Sinclair (1992:81) and 
many others have claimed, there is sufficient reason to believe that the shortcomings in 
translation were deliberate.
Article the First:
The chiefs of the Confederation of the united tribes of New Zealand, and the 
separate and independent chiefs who have not become members of the confederation, 
cede to Her Majesty Queen of England, absolutely and without reservation, all the rights 
and powers of sovereignty which the said confederation of individual chiefs, respectively 
exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise, over their respective territories as 
the sole sovereigns thereof.
Article the Second:
Her Majesty, the Queen of England, confirms and guarantees to the chiefs and 
tribes of New Zealand, and to the respective families and individuals thereof, the full, 
exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates, Forests, Fisheries and 
other properties which they may collectively or individually possess, so long as it is then- 
wish to retain the same in their possession; but the chiefs of the united tribes and the 
individual chiefs yield to Her Majesty the exclusive right of pre-emption over such lands 
as the proprietors thereof may be disposed to alienate, at such prices as may be agreed 
upon between the respective proprietors and persons appointed by Her Majesty to treat 
with them on that behalf.
Article the Third:
In consideration thereof Her Majesty, the Queen of England, extends to the 
natives of New Zealand her Royal protection, and imparts to them all the Rights and 
Privileges of British subjects.
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APPENDIX D.2
CHRONOLOGY OF 19th CENTURY MAORI LAND ALIENATION
YEAR KEY EVENT/LEGISLATION OBJECTIVES
1825 First New Zealand Company founded in 
England
Purchase of Maori land and its sale to 
settlers
1838 Edwin Gibbon Wakefield’s New Zealand 
Company founded, replacing earlier 
company
Purchase of Maori land and its sale to 
capitalists; portion of purchase price to be 
used to assist passage of labourers to NZ
1839 NZ territory acquired by Crown included 
in the colony of New South Wales
Jurisdiction of NSW courts over British 
settlers in NZ since 1820, extended to land
1840 Sydney Land Act; 
Treaty of Waitangi;
No land title valid unless confirmed 
through Crown grant;
Sovereignty to the Crown; Pre-emptive 
right over all land purchases to the 
Crown;
Aid to church schools for European 
children; Maori schools established
1841 New Zealand declared a Crown Colony; 
Land Claims Ordinance (No.l);
Office of Protector of Aborigines;
Right of pre-emption waived over much of 
Wellington, Manawatu, Taranaki
Independence from NSW;
All pre-treaty purchases declared null and 
void until investigated;
Paid official to be present at all land sales 
to ensure lawful and reasonable sales 
Promotion of direct settler purchase of 
Maori land
1842 Australasian Land Sales Act Minimum upset price for sale of Crown 
land (land purchased by the Crown from 
Maori) fixed at 1 pound Stirling per acre.
1844 Pre-emption waived Further promotion of land sales; Fitzroy 
lowers grant fee to 10 shillings per acre 
plus 10% of land conveyed to Crown for 
native reserves; In October grant fee 
lowered to 1 penny per acre
1846 Office of the Commissioner for the 
Extinction of Native Title;
Pre-emption reinstated
Replaced Office of Protector of
Aborigines, objective to transfer
communally held Maori land into
individual title for purposes of sale
1847 New Zealand Company given entire and 
exclusive disposal of all Crown lands and 
the exercise of the Crown’s right of pre­
emption of lands in the South Island
Land purchase and settlement under the 
Wakefield Plan, intended to establish New 
Zealand as an aristocratic ‘new Old 
England’ society
1852 Constitution Act, Country divided into six 
provinces;
Voting rights to adult males with 
individual land titles or property rights, 
No Maori representation
1853 Provincial Land Policies; 
General Land Regulations Act
Grey reduces upset price on rural land in 
order to assist less financially endowed 
settlers to purchase, especially Wairarapa 
and Hawkes Bay
(Continued)
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1858 Waste Lands Act Validation of earlier Waste Land Acts 
(1854) which had been disallowed, 
provides for disposal (sale) of Crown land 
by provincial councils
1860 Large-scale Land Wars begin in Taranaki
1862 Native Land Act Encouragement for Maori owners to 
individualise land holdings for purpose of 
expediting sale to settlers; Crown’s right 
of pre-emption waived
1863 Land Settlements Act Grants of free land for military settlers in 
districts where Maori resistance highest
Suppression of Rebellion Act Land confiscation from rebellious tribes 
(those which resisted land sales)
1865 Native Land Act Evidence of ownership of traditional lands 
required by land court, involved 
prohibitive survey and related costs
1867 Native Representation Act Four Maori seats established (72 European 
seats);
Native Schools Act Department of Native Affairs take over 
Maori schools
1870 Vogel Plan Major borrowing from Britain for 
establishment of NZ infrastructure
1876 Provincial institutions abolished
1877 Lands Act repealed; Land policy centralised
Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington Treaty declared a nullity
1885 Lands Act Small grazing-run leases established
1886 Native Lands Administration Act Maori land control turned over to small
groups of trustees with the right of sale; 
Leasehold system further developed______
1892 Lands Act Lease-in-perpetuity introduced
1893 Native Land Purchase and Acquisition Act Reintroduces Crown as sole purchaser of 
Maori lands; empowered to acquire any 
land suitable for settlement
Source: Compiled from Sutch 1956; Condliffe 1959; Department of Social Welfare 1988; Rice 1992
By beginning the chronology of Maori land alienation with the founding of the 
New Zealand Company prior to the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, important aspects 
of the Treaty itself and many of the events that followed can be more readily 
understood. The company, founded by Edwin Gibbon Wakefield in 1838, was the 
second of two speculative ventures undertaken by a small group of capitalists for the 
purpose of buying up Maori land and selling it on at profit, not only to potential settlers 
but also to absentee landlords who would remain in Britain or Australia. However, 
although claiming by 1839 to have purchased almost one third of New Zealand’s land 
mass— 20 million acres ‘purchased’ at a rate of approximately 10 acres per penny 
Stirling— Wakefield’s Company was in fact pre-selling large tracts of land that it did not 
legitimately own (Sutch 1942:18). Tensions arising between settlers trying to take 
possession, and Maori refusing to hand over the land, were highly instrumental in the 
formulating of the Treaty. Indeed it remains to the Crown’s credit that as part of the 
Treaty negotiations all transactions prior to 1840 were declared null and void until they
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could be investigated, the subsequent inquiry awarding to the New Zealand Company 
only 283,000 acres (Sutch 1942:18).'
A mitigating factor in the eventual escalation of tensions and outbreak of war in 
1863, however, was that the British Government demanded that the new colony was not 
to be a drain on the British taxpayer, but self-supporting through duties on land sales 
and customs. This was to be achieved in large part via a pre-emptive right over all Maori 
land conceded to the colonial Government. Acknowledging Maori customary title, only 
land regarded as surplus to tribal requirements could be offered for sale by Maori, and 
then it could be purchased only by government agents, who would sell it on to settlers. 
The resulting funds would be used to bring to New Zealand a continuing flow of British 
immigrants, and to assist in the establishment of a market-oriented infrastructure.1 2
Despite its apparent disfavour with the Crown over the earlier land transactions, 
the role of the New Zealand Company and its associated Wakefield Plan was of 
consummate significance to these plans. Indeed, in the same year the Treaty was signed, 
the New Zealand Company was accepted by the Crown as the official promoter of 
settlement in New Zealand. The Wakefield Plan, which envisaged the establishment of 
New Zealand society along the elitist lines of British society, proposed to settle New 
Zealand according to systematic principles whereby ‘a proper balance would be achieved 
between land [the purchase of which would be restricted to capitalists], capital, and 
labour’ (Gardner 1992:59). Deploring both what he saw as emergent socialist tendencies 
in Britain, and the fact that in the American colonies it was difficult for capitalists to find 
labourers and so accumulate capital because there ‘men acquired land easily, supported 
themselves by their own labour, built their own houses, and made their own soap and 
shoes and clothes’ (Sutch 1942:14), Wakefield determined that New Zealand should 
follow a very different path. Although committed to the idea of a rigid two-class 
capitalist system (owners and labourers), an important element of the plan was the 
suggestion that potential social mobility awaited immigrants. In essence, the proposal 
was that
the ruling authority should put a high price on virgin land so that the labourer would have to work a 
considerable time before he [sic] could save enough to become a landowner.... the ruling authority 
would take part of the wages of workers in exchange for the land priced above its value. This money 
would go into a fund and be used to import other wage workers so that the labour market would always 
be well supplied... [E]very labourer who left off working for wages and became a landowner would, by 
purchasing land, provide a fund for bringing fresh labour to the colony (Sutch 1942:15).
Despite clear indications of the direction that the colonisation of New Zealand 
under such conditions would take, the fact that Britain viewed New Zealand as a 
significant settler colony was never communicated to Maori during the Treaty 
negotiations (Gardner 1992:58). Nor was the possibility of eventual Pakeha (non-Maori) 
dominance in any way obvious. At the time, Maori outnumbered Pakeha by
1 It must be noted that the New Zealand Company was not the only group claiming significant 
landholdings and resale rights. An Australian syndicate (founded by an Australian stateman, 
Wentworth) claimed at the time to have purchased a further third of New Zealand (Sutch 1942:19).
2 It is important to acknowledge here the social and economic context in which both the New Zealand 
Companies and the Treaty of Waitangi were established. The labouring classes of Britain and Ireland, 
from within which the majority of New Zealand’s first immigrants came, were at the time suffering 
impoverished social conditions due to the machinations of land enclosure, the onset of the industrial 
revolution, and the Poor Laws. Consequently, a number of interpretations have been placed on the 
decision to colonise and settle New Zealand, not least the possibility of ameliorating the threat of social 
revolution. However, the argument that ‘the sending of men and capital to the colonies and the 
development of subsequent international trade [would help] the trade of the mother country’ (Sutch 
1942:12-14) was also undoubtedly involved.
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approximately 40:1. Furthermore, not only were Maori becoming highly prosperous 
from trade with settlers, but approximately half the Maori population attended the 
mission schools and had a higher level of literacy than the settler population (Sutch 
1942:33, 1959:68-69).3
To be fair, and as implied above, the Treaty’s pre-emption clause was also 
ostensiblv concerned with protecting Maori from unscrupulous transactions. As the 
chronological table shows, one of Hobson’s first acts as New Zealand’s first governor 
was to establish the Office of Protector of the Aborigines (1841), a paid public official 
whose duty was to be present at all land sales and to ensure that such transactions were 
lawful and reasonable (Temm 1989:2). Although the pre-emption clause was 
intermittently waived over the next few years in order to encourage land sales, the early 
1840s can be seen as a period during which the fledging colonial Government, whilst 
simultaneously attempting to become self-supporting, also attempted to observe the 
underlying principles of the Treaty.4
By 1845, however, the impossibility of the self-supporting principle was evident 
and the colonial Government, by then under the charge of Governor Fitzroy, was in 
deep financial trouble. The New Zealand Company, which had initially guaranteed 
employment to immigrants - and later, in lieu of employment, financial support - had not 
only failed to ensure a working balance between employers and labourers5 but had also, 
in 1844, stopped paying any relief at all (Sutch 1924:23). In many areas starving families 
were kept alive only by the produce and goodwill of Maori. On the other hand, Maori 
themselves were beginning to demand fairer prices for the land they were willing to sell, 
and the amount of land coming available was reducing. As a result, the Government was 
under heavy pressure from both individual settlers desperately in need of land for 
subsistence purposes, and from the New Zealand Company which still believed the 
answer lay in attracting more capitalists. With one of the major hindrances to the sale of 
land the fact that the different Maori tribes held that land in communal title, government 
agents began to use and foster tribal discord in order to promote land purchases 
(Gardner 1992:59, see also Sorrenson 1956:81).
In 1846, Fitzroy’s successor, Governor George Grey, responded to these 
pressures by abolishing the Office of Protector of the Aborigines and replacing it with 
the Office of the Commissioner for the Extinction of Native Title (Temm 1989:3). Its 
sole objective was the transference of communally held Maori land into individual title. 
Although strongly opposed to certain aspects of the Wakefield Plan, the following year 
Grey also gave the New Zealand Company the entire and exclusive disposal of all 
Crown lands, and exercise of the Crown’s right of pre-emption of land in the South 
Island. This innovation came to an abrupt end with the surrender of the Company’s
3In large part this prosperity came about through the articulation of the Maori communal mode of 
production with that of the market economy. It was also reflective of how rapidly Maori adapted to 
Pakeha ideas. As a government official of the time wrote “[Maori] have now wise men among 
themselves to calculate the cubic contents of a heap of firewood, the area of a plot of ground, the live 
weight of a pig and the value at threepence a pound, sinking a fifth as o ffa l... the relative merits o f two 
mill sites [and] over- or under-shot wheels ... (Miller 1940:79-80, cited in Sutch 1941:34).
4 Hobson’s resistance to the rapacious demands of the New Zealand Company and the settlers, coupled 
with his responsibilities to the Crown were possibly instrumental in his early death in office in 
September 1842 (Dalziel 1992:89).
5 This failure was the weakest point of the Wakefield Plan, and largely led to its eventual downfall. The 
imbalance can be gleaned from the settlement of Nelson, where at no time did more than 80 landowners 
(75 per cent of the original Nelson capitalists and absentee owners combined) ever take charge of their 
estates, while the Company sent 3,100 men, women and children of the labouring class (Sutch 1942:20- 
21). An additional problem was that pastoral farming, the major industry of the period, was for the most 
part not very labour intensive.
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charter in 1850. However, by concomitant virtue of a significant injection of funds from 
the Crown, within seven years the change of emphasis had permitted Grey and his chief 
purchasing officer to obtain around 32 million acres, almost half of the land area of New 
Zealand (Gardner 1992:61).
Whilst ostensibly still recognising the primacy of the Treaty principles, and 
indeed being constantly reminded of the solemnity of the contract by the Crown (Temm 
1989:3-4), it is clear that the contradiction between the Treaty and the Crown’s 
directives was leading to one outcome only: a society dominated by Pakeha ideas and 
institutions, and ultimately, war. For example, the Constitution Act of 1852, which gave 
voting rights to adult males holding land in individual title only, carried no opportunity 
for Maori representation, whilst it simultaneously gave enormous political and economic 
power to the wealthy land owners of the South Island. In 1853, with sufficient land in 
hand, Grey endeavoured to counter some of the more inegalitarian effects of the 
Wakefield Plan by introducing legislation designed to assist less financially endowed 
settlers (Sutch 1942:36-7). However, through the use of various devices, not least 
encumbent positions on Provincial Councils, the wealthy, and especially the larger land­
owning settlers, were able to capture these opportunities for themselves and keep the 
small farmer out (Condliffe 1930:103). From the mid 1850s a series of Waste Lands 
Acts, designed to further assist in the disposal (resale) of Crown lands - also by the 
incumbents of Provincial Councils; and of Native Land Acts, designed to further 
facilitate the extinction of native title and so free more Maori land for sale, were 
instituted.
By 1856 the whole of the South Island and more than 6 million acres of the 
North had passed into Pakeha hands (Sutch 1942:33). Large grants for the purchase of 
Maori land were available for the North Island, with particular attention focused on the 
Taranaki region and the fertile plains of the Waikato. The affected tribes, however, 
highly prosperous from their trade with the early settlers, seriously resisted pressure to 
sell. The eventual outcome was war, ordered in 1863 by Governor George Grey (Temm 
1989:8). However, not content with the disproportionately high loss of Maori lives, nor 
the fact that the wars were in deliberate violation of Article II of the Treaty, the 
Suppression of Rebellion Act (1863) and the Land Settlements Act (1863) were quickly 
passed to provide for the confiscation of the sought-after land from rebellious tribes. As 
Scott (1975:19, cited by Bedggood, p.27) explains, the process by which Maori land 
was taken at this point was breathtaking in its simplicity: Maori land was wrongfully 
seized; Maori resisted; the land was confiscated. Moreover, where Maori resistance was 
highest, the Land Settlements Act provided for free grants of confiscated land to military 
settlers (Condliffe 1959), essentially ensuring a continuance of the tensions.
At the end of the wars the Native Land Court (1865) and a new Native Lands 
Act (1865) were also instituted, further facilitating the conversion of Maori land to 
individual title, though by this time for the purpose of its direct sale to settlers. From this 
point, however, a new condition was added. Evidence of ownership of traditional lands 
was now required, a change which involved prohibitive survey and legal costs. Drawn 
into debt in order to prove ownership, the land was often impounded by way of 
discharging the debt.
The consequences of the foregoing begin with Chapter 6.
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APPENDIX D.4
3 02
Births, Crude Birth Rates and Total Fertility Rates, Maori, Non-Maori and Total Populations, 1844-1995
Birth Numbers 
Non-Maori Maori Total
Crude Birth Rate 
Non-Maori Maori Total
Total Fertility Rate 
Non-Maori Maori Total
1844 4.5
1857/8 4.9
1866 8466 42.9
1871 10592 40.6 6.66
1874 12844 40.3
1876 16168 41.7 6.6
1878 17770 42.0 5.5
1881 18372 38.0 6.2
1886 19299 33.2 5.3 6.1
1891 18273 29.0 4.6 5.7
1896 18612 26.3 4.0 5.7
1901 20491 23.3 42 3.56 5.9
1906 24252 27.1 3.3
1911 26354 26.0 40 3.2 5.7 3.33
1916 28509 25.94 3.19
1921 28567 29623 23.36 42 23.24 2.95 6.1 3.08
1926 28473 1536 29904 21.06 25.27 21.15 2.72 6.7 2.88
1931 26622 2312 28867 18.45 33.74 19.06 2.38 2.56
1936 24765 3630 28395 16.64 43.79 18.03 2.11 6.9 2.30
1941 35036 4134 39170 22.81 44.77 24.02 2.81 2.93
1945 36890 4644 41534 23.22 46.10 24.51 3.26 6.5 3.10
1951 44568 5238 49806 24.39 44.97 25.57 3.40 6.7 3.60
1956 50368 6163 56531 24.66 44.63 25.90 3.79 6.9 3.98
1961 57620 7770 65390 25.53 46.39 26.95 4.15 6.9 4.31
1962 57405 7609 65014 24.86 43.41 26.16 4.04 6.18 4.19
1963 56495 8032 64527 23.99 44.06 25.44 3.87 6.28 4.05
1964 54421 7881 62302 22.68 41.63 24.06 3.62 5.96 3.80
1965 52271 7776 60047 21.43 39.63 22.79 3.36 5.71 3.54
1966 52260 7743 60003 21.07 38.25 22.37 3.23 5.54 3.41
1967 53026 7996 61022 21.04 38.47 22.37 3.17 5.57 3.35
1968 54023 8089 62112 21.27 37.96 22.56 3.16 5.46 3.34
1969 54199 8161 62360 21.16 37.41 22.43 3.11 5.35 3.28
1970 53857 8193 62050 20.74 36.68 22.01 2.99 5.18 3.17
1971 56096 8364 64460 21.29 36.49 22.51 3.01 5.05 3.18
1972 55345 7870 63215 20.66 33.32 21.68 2.86 4.51 3.00
1973 53343 7384 60727 19.51 30.45 20 40 2.65 4.01 2.76
1974 52353 6983 59336 18.74 28.16 19.51 2.49 3.58 2.58
1975 49861 6778 56639 17.52 26.72 18.27 2.28 3.28 2.37
1976 48479 6626 55105 16.87 25.59 17.60 2.18 3.08 2.27
1977 47394 6785 54179 16.46 25.74 17.24 2.13 2.98 2.21
1978 44449 6580 51029 15.46 24.50 16.23 1.99 2.75 2.07
1979 45625 6654 52279 15.93 24.30 16.66 2.06 2.65 2.12
1980 44122 6420 50542 15.39 23.16 16.08 1.98 2.43 2.03
1981 44189 6605 50794 15.36 23.61 16.09 1.95 2.47 2.01
1982 43722 6216 49938 15.08 21.97 15.70 1.90 2.27 1.95
1983 44203 6271 50474 15.04 21.90 15.67 1.87 2.23 1.92
1984 44891 6745 51636 15.13 23.27 15.87 1.87 2.34 1.93
1985 45329 6469 51798 15.22 22.07 15.83 1.88 2.20 1.93
1986 46310 6513 52823 15.53 21.94 16.12 1.93 2.14 1.96
1987 48272 6982 55254 16.04 23.05 16.73 1.99 2.26 2.03
1988 50779 6767 57546 16.79 21.94 17.35 2.08 2.17 2.10
1989 51124 6967 58091 16.82 22.22 17.44 2.10 2.21 2.12
1990 53206 6947 60153 21.77 17.89 2.17 2.19 2.18
1991 53055 6946 60001 21.45 17.62 2.15 2.19 2.16
1992 52028 7238 59266 22.17 17.22 2.10 2.29 2.12
1993 51735 7132 58867 21.66 16.91 2.07 2.29 2.10
1994 50382 7053 57435 21.28 16.2S 2.29 2.04
1995 50559 7239 57798 21.67 16.14 2.38 2.04
Notes: Italics denote estimates: Data are for December year populations;
Data above ruled line = five-year observations, that below line = single year.
The Crude Birth Rate is the number of births per 1,000 mean population.
The Total Fertility Rate is the average number of live births a woman would have over her life-time if she 
were to experience the age-specific fertility rates occurring in a particular reference year.
Source: Birth Numbers: Vital Statistics, Demographic Trends, various years.
Non-Maori CBRs prior to 1921, reconstructed from Sceats and Pool 1985, Figure 25 (estimates) 
Non-Maori CBRs 1921-1961, Jain (no date)
Non-Maori CBRs and TFRs 1962-1993, Cheung, Pool and Jackson 1994 
Total CBRs and TFRs, 1911-1961, Khawaja 1986.
Maori CBRs and TFRs prior to 1962, Pool 1991, Tables 5.3 and 6.2 (estimates)
Maori and Total CBRs and TFRs, 1962-1993, Demographic Trends 1994, Table 2.8
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APPENDIX D.5
Life Expectancy at Birth, Maori and European/Non-Maori,
by Sex, 1840-1995
Non-Maori Maori
Male Female Male Female
1840 31.0 32.0 31.0 32.0
1856 22.0
1876 52.0 54.2
1881 52.8 56.3
1886 54.0 57.2 ...
1891 55.3 58.1 22.0
1896 57.4 60.0 22.0 24.0
1901 58.1 60.6 30.0
1906 59.2 61.8 31.0
1911 61.0 63.5 32.5
1916 60.6 64.2 37.0
1921 62.8 65.4 ... 40.0
1926 63.7 66.3 46.6 44.7
1931 65.1 67.7 46.5 45.4
1936 65.5 68.5 46.3 46.0
1941 65.5 69.1 47.5 46.7
1946 67.2 70.6 48.8 48.0
1951 68.3 72.4 54.0 55.9
1956 68.9 73.9 57.2 58.7
1961 69.2 74.5 59.1 61.4
1966 68.7 74.8 61.4 64.8
1971 69.1 75.2 61.0 65.0
1976 69.4 75.9 63.4 67.8
1981 70.5 76.4 65.2 68.3
1986 71.1 77.1 67.4 72.3
1991 72.9 78.7 68.0 73.0
Notes: Until 1926, Maori data based on indirect estimation
techniques.
Sources: Prior to 1926: Pool 1985 Figure 31;
Post-1926: Pool 1985, Tables 116 and 124; Pool 1990:41; 
Demographic Trends 1993, Table 4.9
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APPENDIX E
APPENDIX E.1
Population, Labour Force Numbers and Full-time Labour Force 
Participation Rates (LFPR) for Sole/Single Origin Maori and Non-Maori 
Populations Aged 15+ Years, 1911-1991___________________________
Population Labour Force LFPR
Year Males Females Males Females Males Females
NON-MAORI
1911 370829 320944 355676 87638 95.9 27.3
1916 365892 368193 341617 95250 93.4 25.9
1921 428001 407251 399179 109135 93.3 26.8
1926 479935 460009 444401 111789 92.6 24.3
1936 560857 548571 504633 138584 90.0 25.3
1945 571533 617776 495477 167263 86.7 27.1
1951 650677 654749 542539 164626 83.4 25.1
1956 706274 710005 590787 185460 83.6 26.1
1961 761873 769348 633621 213924 83.2 27.8
1966 846794 857834 701896 265930 82.9 31.0
1971 907904 929245 734864 313073 80.9 33.7
1976 1014379 1039125 803525 379079 79.2 36.5
1981 1047213 1082010 806754 421407 77.0 38.9
1986 1114143 1160055 805269 424803 72.3 36.6
1991 1155906 1218279 750186 427692 64.9 35.1
SOL E/SINGLE ORIGIN M /VORI
1926 19154 16953 11602 2838 60.6 16.7
1936 23967 21204 21940 3035 91.5 14.3
1945 26826 25832
1951 31884 29921 25816 6724 81.0 22.5
1956 37102 35457 31348 8418 84.5 23.7
1961 43252 41569 36885 10933 85.3 26.3
1966 50681 49211 43699 14514 86.2 29.5
1971 58440 57419 50105 20793 85.7 36.2
1976 73521 74153 61573 28156 83.7 38.0
1981 83127 84354 69852 34329 84.0 40.7
1986 96246 97857 71748 39096 74.5 40.0
1991 106182 109920 62766 35649 59.1 32.4
Notes: 1911-1976 = De Facto population, 1981-1991 = De Jure population
Source: 1911-1945: Reconstructed from Zodgekar 1985, Tables 241,242 and 253, and
results applied to Census populations.
1951-1991: Census of Population and Dwellings, various years.
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APPENDIX E.2.2
Age Specific Labour Force Participation Rates, by Sex and Ethnic Classification, Males, 1951-1991
19511 1956| 19611 1966| 19711 1976I 19811 19861 1991
NON-M AORI
15-19* 72.5 68.5 65.5 62.5 56.1 55.3 55.2 52.5 34.9
20-24 96.1 95.9 94.4 93.4 90.6 90.8 90.4 85.8 76.1
25-34 98.0 98.6 98.6 98.6 98.3 98.0 97.2 92.2 86.2
35-44 97.8 98.3 98.4 99.0 98.8 98.6 97.8 93.7 88.4
45-54 95.8 97.1 97.5 97.6 97.4 97.1 96.4 91.8 86.5
55-64** 75.8 80.6 82.1 83.6 81.8 75.1 70.1 60.2 26.1
65+ 26.7 25.2 22.1 23.6 21.3 16.2 11.2 7.1 ...
Total 83.4 83.6 83.2 82.9 80.9 79.2 77.0 72.3 64.9
Standardised 87.4 87.4 87.5 86.5 84.2 82.6 81.7 78.5 68.9
MAORI
15-19* 61.2 64.7 64.9 66.2 67.1 64.4 67.4 59.4 34.6
20-24 93.4 96.8 95.7 96.0 95.5 94.8 96.1 83.9 67.2
25-34 94.3 97.3 97.2 97.7 97.2 96.9 96.4 84.8 72.8
35-44 93.3 96.0 96.3 97.4 97.3 96.4 95.6 85.5 75.2
45-54 87.7 91.9 92.5 94.2 93.5 92.4 91.4 80.7 70.7
55-64** 63.8 70.6 69.3 76.9 75.0 69.8 65.9 53.7 27.6
65+ 18.0 18.7 19.1 22.1 19.8 14.4 10.7 6.3 ...
Total 81.0 84.5 85.3 86.2 85.7 83.7 84.0 74.6 60.0
Standardised 76.6 79.8 79.8 81.7 80.9 78.8 77.6 67.5 56.9
Age Specific Labour Force Participation Rates, by Sex and Ethnic Classification, Females, 1951-1991
19511 1956I 19611 1966| 19711 1976I 19811 19861 1991
NON-M AORI
15-19* 67.2 66.2 65.6 63.1 56.9 51.4 49.3 46.0 29.2
20-24 54.4 52.1 51.3 54.3 56.0 60.7 66.2 67.0 61.0
25-34 22.8 22.2 21.1 23.9 29.6 36.0 41.5 41.9 43.9
35-44 21.0 23.1 25.7 29.7 37.7 46.5 52.3 46.3 47.7
45-54 21.2 25.2 28.9 32.5 38.0 43.9 49.0 45.7 49.2
55-64** 12.2 15.3 18.0 20.6 22.0 21.7 22.4 18.2 7.5
65+ 3.3 3.6 3.4 3.7 3.5 2.7 1.9 1.3 ...
Total 25.1 26.1 27.8 31.0 33.7 36.5 38.9 36.6 35.0
Standardised 35.1 35.4 35.3 37.4 40.4 44.0 47.3 44.9 41.2
MAORI
15-19* 39.0 40.0 46.8 48.5 57.0 48.4 50.5 46.2 26.1
20-24 33.0 35.8 35.4 36.6 41.5 40.4 43.8 45.7 40.4
25-34 17.6 17.9 19.2 22.2 28.6 33.6 36.4 38.8 34.7
35-44 14.9 15.8 20.0 26.2 34.7 43.0 47.0 46.0 44.1
45-54 14.1 15.5 21.6 25.4 31.4 37.5 42.2 41.7 40.9
55-64** 9.4 10.5 9.9 14.3 17.8 19.6 20.5 19.8 11.5
65+ 1.8 2.7 1.6 2.9 2.2 3.0 2.3 1.6 ...
Total 22.5 23.7 26.3 29.5 36.2 38.0 40.7 40.0 33.8
Standardised 16.7 17.7 20.4 24.4 29.6 31.7 33.8 33.4 30.3
Notes: ‘ Data for 1951 and 1956 refer to population aged less than 20 years.
"D ata for 1991 refer to population aged 55+ years.
1951-1976= De Facto population, 1981-1991 = De Jure population.
1951-1986 = Sole/Single Origin Maori; 1991 = Maori Ethnic Group.
Non-Maori = Total Population minus specific Maori classification.
Maori data standardised to Non-Maori age structure, by sex, and vice-versa 
Source: Compiled from Census of Population and Dwellings, various years (see Appendix E.2.3)
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APPENDIX E.2.3
2.3.1: Labour Force (Numbers at Each Age , by Ethnic Classification, Males, 1951-1991
19511 1956| 1961 1966| 19711 1976| 19811 1986| 1991
NON-MAORI
15-19* 44032 49132 57373 72002 67854 75635 76269 70668 41883
20-24 63909 60641 68846 84049 99911 108535 111375 107970 87653
25-34 131366 146880 142319 146358 162012 205630 211935 212220 199902
35-44 125995 132874 142771 155894 147949 152850 164058 188034 192171
45-54 97958 114139 126883 132024 139875 149728 139278 133776 137595
55-64** 57097 64512 75626 89556 95632 92305 89601 82680 74658
65+ 22182 22609 19803 22013 21631 18842 14244 9906 ...
Total 542539 590787 633621 701896 734864 803525 806760 805254 733862
MAORI
15-19* 3817 4716 5023 6667 8119 10706 12522 10875 8640
20-24 4865 5766 6836 7106 8775 11494 13704 14478 13965
25-34 6895 8748 10809 12759 13545 16157 18555 20814 25335
35-44 5376 5946 6920 8598 10236 12156 12603 12993 17085
45-54 3192 4119 4947 5421 5991 7471 8802 8967 10206
55-64** 1392 1727 2000 2692 2978 3180 3321 3411 3864
65+ 279 326 350 456 461 409 342 219 ...
Total 25816 31348 36885 43699 50105 61573 69849 71757 79095
2.3.2: Labour Force (Numbers at Each Age ), by Ethnic Classification, Females, 1951-1991
19511 1956| 1961 1966| 19711 1976| 19811 1986| 1991
NON-MAORI
15-19* 38731 46042 54639 69651 65942 67324 65097 59661 33606
20-24 34672 31477 36357 46563 59517 70311 77766 82245 69006
25-34 30570 31042 28446 34007 47692 73724 90798 97497 105063
35-44 26462 31589 36901 44220 53576 69546 86646 92556 104835
45-54 21169 28287 36902 44652 54682 65055 67575 65274 77790
55-64** 9973 13269 16795 22152 26800 28788 30123 25044 25734
65+ 3049 3754 3884 4685 4864 4331 3396 2532 ...
Total 164626 185460 213924 265930 313073 379079 421401 424809 416034
MAORI
15-19* 2316 2847 3585 4707 6656 7971 9039 8124 6498
20-24 1709 2157 2527 2758 3850 4895 6462 7818 8916
25-34 1296 1616 2140 2868 3995 5773 7278 9924 13455
35-44 780 969 1416 2325 3630 5456 6405 7203 10593
45-54 435 579 1006 1390 1980 3085 3993 4665 6066
55-64** 163 211 235 414 636 888 1083 1296 1776
65+ 25 39 24 52 46 88 75 66 ...
Total 6724 8418 10933 14514 20793 28156 34335 39096 47304
Notes: "Data for 1951 and 1956 refer to population aged less than 20 years.
"D ata  for 1991 refer to population aged 55+ years.
1951-1976= De Facto population, 1981-1991 = De Jure population. 
1951-1986 = Sole/Single Origin Maori; 1991 = Maori Ethnic Group. 
Non-Maori = Total Population minus specific Maori classification. 
Source: Compiled from Census of Population and Dwellings, various years
APPENDIX E.2.3 (continued)
2.3.3: Population Age Structure (Numbers at Each Age), by Ethnic Classification, Males, 1951-1991
19511 1956 19611 19661 19711 1976| 19811 19861 1991
NON-MAORI
15-19* 60697 71692 87587 115255 121016 136706 138243 134625 120015
20-24 66508 63225 72897 89990 110257 119517 123162 125790 115182
25-34 134075 148965 144403 148392 164871 209842 218052 230253 231990
35-44 128775 135191 145072 157469 149729 155012 167772 200664 217491
45-54 102222 117555 130162 135297 143614 154244 144528 145653 159075
55-64** 75338 80089 92112 107095 116891 122916 127827 137454 286593
65+ 83062 89557 89640 93296 101526 116142 127632 139707 ...
Total 650677 706274 761873 846794 907904 1014379 1047216 1114146 1130346
MAORI
15-19* 6234 7293 7737 10071 12100 16629 18573 18300 24987
20-24 5208 5955 7146 7404 9190 12127 14262 17262 20796
25-34 7310 8987 11120 13064 13932 16673 19245 24534 34824
35-44 5760 6194 7184 8827 10519 12604 13188 15195 22719
45-54 3638 4482 5348 5753 6406 8083 9630 11118 14430
55-64** 2183 2446 2885 3501 3970 4555 5040 6348 13980
65+ 1551 1745 1832 2061 2323 2850 3189 3489 ...
Total 31884 37102 43252 50681 58440 73521 83127 96246 131736
2.3.4: Population Age Structure (Numbers at Each Age), by Ethnic Classification, Females, 1951-1991
I 19511 1956[ 19611 19661 19711 1976| 19811 19861 1991
NON-MAORI
15-19* 57644 69550 83228 110334 115991 130930 131913 129570 115065
20-24 63781 60474 70878 85715 106226 115823 117450 122730 113058
25-34 134110 139832 134982 142253 161220 204920 218745 232686 239151
35-44 126304 136490 143546 148911 142161 149430 165804 199938 219885
45-54 99807 112212 127476 137274 143833 148030 137814 142737 158202
55-64** 81639 86606 93555 107405 121606 132404 134640 137637 342774
65+ 91464 104841 115683 125942 138208 157588 175650 194751 ...
Total 654749 710005 769348 857834 929245 1039125 1082016 1160049 1188135
MAORI
15-19* 5939 7110 7667 9707 11682 16472 17904 17598 24921
20-24 5176 6017 7142 7543 9286 12108 14769 17112 22059
25-34 7357 9031 11167 12933 13979 17203 19977 25599 38736
35-44 5252 6121 7064 8862 10476 12682 13635 15663 24033
45-54 3075 3724 4650 5468 6313 8222 9471 11178 14844
55-64** 1740 2002 2385 2904 3573 4539 5277 6546 15471
65+ 1382 1452 1494 1794 2110 2927 3318 4161 ...
Total 29921 35457 41569 49211 57419 74153 84351 97857 140064
Notes: 'Data for 1951 and 1956 refer to population aged less than 20 years.
'D a ta  for 1991 refer to population aged 55+ years.
1951-1976 = De Facto population, 1981-1991 = De Jure population. 
1951-1986 = Sole/Single Origin Maori; 1991 = Maori Ethnic Group. 
Non-Maori = Total Population minus specific Maori classification. 
Source: Compiled from Census of Population and Dwellings, various years
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APPENDIX E.3
Labour Force Status: Percentage of Population Aged 15 + Years in Each Category, 
by Sex and Ethnic Classification, and Index of Ethnic Dissimilarity, 1951-1991.
1951| 1956| 1961| 1966| 1971| 1976| 1981| 1986| 1991
MALES
NON-MAORI
Employed 82.19 83.06 82.59 82.23 79.93 77.83 74.18 73.37 63.76
Unemployed 1.12 0.64 0.50 0.53 0.77 1.11 2.47 3.44 6.19
Not in Labour Force 16.69 16.30 16.90 17.24 19.30 21.06 23.35 23.18 30.06
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number 650677 706274 761873 846794 907904 1014379 1048215 1114155 1130346
Not Employed 17.81 16.94 17.41 17.77 20.07 22.17 25.82 26.63 36.24
MAORI
Employed 78.85 81.71 83.04 84.64 82.20 79.16 74.25 71.35 49.62
Unemployed 2.01 2.77 1.96 1.25 3.01 4.25 10.51 10.30 15.79
Not in Labour Force 19.14 15.52 15.00 14.11 14.79 16.58 15.25 18.35 34.59
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number 31884 37102 43252 50681 58440 73521 82125 96246 131739
Not Employed 21.15 18.29 16.96 15.36 17.80 20.84 25.75 28.65 50.38
FEMALES
NON-MAORI
Employed 24.87 25.84 27.55 30.54 33.02 35.51 36.96 48.65 46.26
Unemployed 0.24 0.29 0.25 0.38 0.59 0.88 1.83 4.32 4.78
Not in Labour Force 74.89 73.86 72.21 69.07 66.38 63.61 61.21 47.03 48.96
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number 654749 710005 769348 857834 929245 1039125 1082937 1160052 1188138
Not Employed 75.13 74.16 72.45 69.46 66.98 64.49 63.04 51.35 53.74
MAORI
Employed 21.98 22.84 25.49 27.79 32.67 34.12 33.85 42.96 34.54
Unemployed 0.42 0.89 0.76 1.40 3.32 3.78 7.15 11.00 11.60
Not in Labour Force 77.60 76.26 73.75 70.81 64.01 62.10 59.00 46.04 53.85
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number 29921 35457 41569 49211 57419 74153 83430 97857 140061
Not Employed 78.02 77.16 74.51 72.21 67.33 65.88 66.15 57.04 65.46
INDEX OF DISSIMILARITY
Males 3.34 2.13 1.90 3.13 4.51 4.47 8.11 6.86 14.13
Females 2.89 3.00 2.06 2.75 2.72 2.90 5.32 6.68 11.71
Notes: 1951-1986 denotes Sole/Single Origin Maori; 1991 denotes Maori Ethnic Group.
Non-Maori denotes total population minus specific Maori classification. 
1951-1981 = Full Time only, 1986-1991 = Full Time + Part Time. 
Source: Compiled from the Census of Population and Dwellings, various years.
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APPENDIX E.4
Component Analysis of Ethnic Differentials in Labour Force Status, Maori and European Populations 
Aged 15-64 Years, by Sex, 1976-1991_________________________________________________________
MALES FEMALES
1976 1981 1986 1991 1976 1981 1986 1991
FULL TIME
European 84.73 82.99 80.04 70.10 34.71 36.57 41.74 39.59
Maori 80.19 76.21 68.86 47.65 33.31 33.10 36.43 27.00
European (Standardised*) 82.12 80.84 78.82 67.63 38.51 40.56 45.22 40.32
Maori (Standardised*) 81.72 77.76 69.59 49.75 31.45 31.88 35.40 28.06
Component of observed d fference (European minus Maori) due to:
Underlying Differential 2.47 4.93 10.21 20.17 4.26 6.08 7.58 12.34
Age Structure 2.08 1.85 0.97 2.28 -2.85 -2.61 -2.28 0.25
Observed Differential 4.55 6.78 11.18 22.46 1.41 3.47 5.31 12.59
PART TIME
European 1.79 2.59 3.82 5.03 14.20 17.42 17.28 18.59
Maori 1.16 1.87 5.88 4.71 7.63 9.73 10.40 9.76
European (Standardised*) 2.04 2.95 4.02 5.48 13.28 16.01 15.84 17.55
Maori (Standardised*) 1.13 1.78 6.02 4.72 8.00 10.28 10.96 10.30
Component of observed d fference (European minus Maori) due to:
Underlying Differential 0.77 0.94 -2.03 0.54 5.90 6.69 5.84 8.03
Age Structure -0.14 -0.22 -0.03 -0.22 0.67 1.00 1.04 0.80
Observed Differential 0.63 0.72 -2.07 0.32 6.57 7.69 6.88 8.83
U N E M P LO Y E D
European 1.12 2.50 3.57 6.87 0.93 1.99 4.90 5.65
Maori 4.02 9.61 10.19 16.38 3.60 6.72 11.09 12.11
European (Standardised*) 1.30 2.98 4.57 8.12 1.26 2.67 5.93 6.89
Maori (Standardised*) 3.38 7.94 8.34 14.49 2.48 4.74 9.14 10.23
Component of observed difference (European minus Maori) due to:
Underlying Differential -2.49 -6.03 -5.19 -7.94 -1.94 -3.38 -4.67 -4.87
Age Structure -0.41 -1.07 -1.43 -1.57 -0.73 -1.35 -1.52 -1.60
Observed Differential -2.91 -7.11 -6.62 -9.52 -2.67 -4.73 -6.19 -6.47
NOT IN THE LABOUR FORCE
European 12.36 11.92 12.57 18.00 50.15 44.02 36.09 36.18
Maori 14.63 12.31 15.07 31.26 55.47 50.45 42.08 51.13
European (Standardised*) 14.54 13.23 12.59 18.76 46.96 40.77 33.01 35.23
Maori (Standardised*) 13.76 12.51 16.05 31.04 58.07 53.09 44.50 51.41
Component of observed cifference (European minus Maori) due to:
Underlying Differential -0.75 0.16 -2.98 -12.77 -8.22 -9.39 -8.75 -15.50
Age Structure -1.52 -0.55 0.49 -0.49 2.91 2.96 2.76 0.55
Observed Differential -2.28 -0.39 -2.49 -13.26 -5.32 -6.43 -5.99 -14.95
Notes: 'M aori standardised to age structure of European population aged 15-64 years, and vice-versa.
Source: Database A (see Appendix E.5)
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5.1.1: Full-Time Employment, by Sex, Ethnicity and Age, 1976-1991
MALES FEMALES
1976 1981 1986 1991 1976 i 1981 1986 1991
EUROPEAN
15-19 63708 61893 55839 30918 55371 49545 46332 24081
20-24 91491 93279 91626 69069 57771 63087 69903 55569
25-29 98706 89151 95022 79485 30336 34323 47469 48348
30-34 82074 95142 91251 87063 20802 28056 35577 37716
35-39 73158 78636 94701 83292 23367 28311 42750 41058
40-44 64527 69585 77145 85611 23067 29346 39591 50340
45-49 71358 62175 66321 68652 24894 25311 34293 40836
50-54 66384 66270 57723 55812 22413 22809 25110 29550
55-59 53382 57756 56334 41904 14901 16401 17673 16407
60-64 30879 23964 21771 17979 6696 5553 5616 5262
Total 695667 697851 707733 619785 279618 302742 364314 349167
MAORI E TtHNIC GROUP
15-19 11826 12384 10857 4929 8064 7737 8241 3594
20-24 13830 16056 15915 9642 5859 7434 8919 6381
25-29 11328 12588 13596 10089 3447 4143 6216 5247
30-34 8424 10452 10617 9447 2838 3777 5019 4980
35-39 7986 7734 8769 7815 3180 3543 4704 4749
40-44 6234 7266 6591 6564 2646 3393 3759 4284
45-49 5229 5769 5946 4764 2103 2589 3318 3066
50-54 3675 4446 4431 3999 1350 1767 2139 2313
55-59 2562 2964 3093 2445 717 945 1245 1230
60-64 1266 1092 951 729 300 261 324 348
Total 72360 80751 80766 60423 30504 35589 43884 36192
5.1.2: Full-Time Employment as Percentage of Population, by Sex, Ethnicity and Age, 1976-1991
MALES FEMALES
1976 1981 1986 1991 1976 1981 1986 1991
EUROPEAN
15-19 51.70 50.52 47.52 28.91 47.12 42.63 41.33 23.55
20-24 86.85 85.64 82.99 67.59 56.34 60.98 65.58 56.13
25-29 94.56 93.14 89.97 79.36 29.47 35.46 45.05 46.83
30-34 96.15 95.31 91.90 83.31 24.89 28.07 35.20 35.27
35-39 96.58 95.85 93.16 84.88 31.57 34.74 41.97 40.98
40-44 96.34 95.96 93.43 86.27 35.89 40.88 48.45 50.50
45-49 95.94 95.15 92.69 85.82 35.98 40.26 48.38 51.42
50-54 94.37 93.06 90.13 81.73 32.42 34.00 40.47 43.21
55-59 88.75 85.78 82.13 68.99 23.60 24.52 26.93 27.50
60-64 56.05 43.21 34.58 28.11 11.32 9.05 8.57 8.32
Total 84.73 82.99 80.04 70.10 34.71 36.57 41.74 39.59
S tan d ard ised 82.12 80.84 78.82 67.63 38.51 40.56 45.22 40.32
MAORI ETFHNIC GROUP
15-19 54.10 48.81 43.67 19.70 36.94 31.24 33.58 14.41
20-24 86.62 82.48 72.42 46.35 36.12 36.83 39.79 28.92
25-29 91.30 87.18 77.87 53.70 26.91 27.76 33.27 25.27
30-34 92.46 89.45 79.82 58.90 30.21 31.74 35.99 27.74
35-39 92.85 89.70 81.88 62.07 36.41 39.05 42.48 35.41
40-44 92.40 89.97 81.98 64.70 38.79 41.73 44.93 40.37
45-49 91.59 87.65 80.41 63.22 36.04 40.05 43.91 38.90
50-54 86.88 84.35 75.20 58.18 31.32 33.09 36.14 33.22
55-59 81.88 77.80 67.92 46.60 22.42 24.16 26.52 22.79
60-64 51.03 41.41 30.72 19.29 12.32 9.21 9.95 8.54
Total 80.19 76.21 68.86 47.65 33.31 33.10 36.43 27.00
S tan d ard ised 81.72 77.76 69.59 49.75 31.45 31.88 35.40 28.06
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5.1.3: Part-Time Employment, by Sex, Ethnicity and Age, 1976-1991
MALES FEMALES
1976 1981 1986 1991 1976 1981 1986 1991
EUROPEAN
15-19 5970 8943 9003 13149 6630 10128 10470 15354
20-24 1890 2244 3564 4191 6555 7089 7092 7983
25-29 1062 1287 3051 3351 14145 15348 15516 14157
30-34 564 1092 2736 3324 17847 25734 24429 25050
35-39 387 792 2544 3240 18225 23613 28371 27366
40-44 360 609 2010 3183 15036 19509 21150 25239
45-49 456 630 1929 2802 13836 15057 16647 18267
50-54 606 987 1962 2841 10935 13617 12738 14955
55-59 1002 1527 2724 3372 7260 9543 9909 10248
60-64 2394 3642 4218 5049 3936 4611 4479 5310
Total 14691 21753 33741 44502 114405 144249 150801 163929
MAORI ETI-1NIC GROUP
15-19 456 861 1452 1527 666 1290 1638 1968
20-24 180 285 1131 822 816 1200 1359 1278
25-29 75 162 987 714 1191 1689 2049 1794
30-34 51 141 762 672 1128 1884 2034 2118
35-39 51 111 657 543 1128 1380 1779 1812
40-44 45 102 456 483 843 1176 1269 1428
45-49 33 90 516 357 555 861 1104 1065
50-54 39 75 438 384 378 537 753 858
55-59 39 60 348 297 198 330 411 534
60-64 75 96 153 174 84 120 132 225
Total 1044 1983 6900 5973 6987 10467 12528 13080
5.1.4: Part-Time Employment as Percentage ot Population, by Sex, Ethnicity and Age, 1976-1991
MALES FEMALES
1976 1981 1986 1991 1976 1981 1986 1991
EUROPEAN
15-19 4.84 7.30 7.66 12.30 5.64 8.71 9.34 15.01
20-24 1.79 2.06 3.23 4.10 6.39 6.85 6.65 8.06
25-29 1.02 1.34 2.89 3.35 13.74 15.86 14.73 13.71
30-34 0.66 1.09 2.76 3.18 21.35 25.75 24.17 23.43
35-39 0.51 0.97 2.50 3.30 24.62 28.98 27.85 27.31
40-44 0.54 0.84 2.43 3.21 23.39 27.18 25.88 25.32
45-49 0.61 0.96 2.70 3.50 20.00 23.95 23.49 23.00
50-54 0.86 1.39 3.06 4.16 15.82 20.30 20.53 21.87
55-59 1.67 2.27 3.97 5.55 11.50 14.27 15.10 17.18
60-64 4.35 6.57 6.70 7.90 6.65 7.51 6.83 8.40
Total 1.79 2.59 3.82 5.03 14.20 17.42 17.28 18.59
S tandard ised 2.04 2.95 4.02 5.48 13.28 16.01 15.84 17.55
MAORI ETh1NIC GROUP
15-19 2.09 3.39 5.84 6.10 3.05 5.21 6.67 7.89
20-24 1.13 1.46 5.15 3.95 5.03 5.94 6.06 5.79
25-29 0.60 1.12 5.65 3.80 9.30 11.32 10.97 8.64
30-34 0.56 1.21 5.73 4.19 12.01 15.83 14.58 11.80
35-39 0.59 1.29 6.13 4.31 12.92 15.21 16.07 13.51
40-44 0.67 1.26 5.67 4.76 12.36 14.46 15.17 13.46
45-49 0.58 1.37 6.98 4.74 9.51 13.32 14.61 13.51
50-54 0.92 1.42 7.43 5.59 8.77 10.06 12.72 12.32
55-59 1.25 1.57 7.64 5.66 6.19 8.44 8.75 9.89
60-64 3.02 3.64 4.94 4.60 3.45 4.23 4.06 5.52
Total 1.16 1.87 5.88 4.71 7.63 9.73 10.40 9.76
Standard ised 1.13 1.78 6.02 4.72 8.00 10.28 10.96 10.30
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5.1.5: Unemployment, by Sex, Ethnicity and Age, 1976-1991
MALES FEMALES
1976 1981 1986 1991 1976 1981 1986 1991
EUROPEAN
15-19 2331 5397 12270 12789 3384 6834 13041 12831
20-24 2109 4842 6411 12885 1785 3771 6747 10026
25-29 1272 2889 3399 8694 771 1629 5118 6411
30-34 708 1878 2118 6537 369 990 4896 5433
35-39 477 1179 1635 5061 285 741 4416 4632
40-44 465 1029 1191 4491 255 702 2946 3990
45-49 579 1017 1017 3429 258 729 2226 2886
50-54 606 1257 1068 3264 222 615 1710 2127
55-59 489 1392 1599 2949 126 384 1203 1221
60-64 138 138 828 621 24 48 432 237
Total 9174 21018 31536 60720 7479 16443 42735 49794
MAORI ETtHNIC GROUP
15-19 1569 4029 4623 4623 2253 4515 4614 4338
20-24 792 2403 2952 4797 618 1452 3069 3696
25-29 372 1305 1584 3684 216 480 2049 2817
30-34 252 747 906 2637 60 261 1347 2100
35-39 177 480 564 1719 57 159 861 1311
40-44 132 414 432 1218 36 153 537 864
45-49 135 315 303 858 21 96 426 576
50-54 114 285 300 726 21 54 273 348
55-59 78 189 210 444 6 54 144 165
60-64 9 12 75 72 6 0 39 24
Total 3630 10179 11949 20778 3294 7224 13359 16239
5.1.6: Unemployment as Percentage of Population, by Sex, Ethnicity and Age, 1976-1991
MALES FEMALES
1976 1981 1986 1991 1976 1981 1986 1991
EUROPEAN
15-19 1.89 4.41 10.44 11.96 2.88 5.88 11.63 12.55
20-24 2.00 4.45 5.81 12.61 1.74 3.65 6.33 10.13
25-29 1.22 3.02 3.22 8.68 0.75 1.68 4.86 6.21
30-34 0.83 1.88 2.13 6.26 0.44 0.99 4.84 5.08
35-39 0.63 1.44 1.61 5.16 0.39 0.91 4.34 4.62
40-44 0.69 1.42 1.44 4.53 0.40 0.98 3.60 4.00
45-49 0.78 1.56 1.42 4.29 0.37 1.16 3.14 3.63
50-54 0.86 1.77 1.67 4.78 0.32 0.92 2.76 3.11
55-59 0.81 2.07 2.33 4.86 0.20 0.57 1.83 2.05
60-64 0.25 0.25 1.32 0.97 0.04 0.08 0.66 0.37
Total 1.12 2.50 3.57 6.87 0.93 1.99 4.90 5.65
Standardised 1.30 2.98 4.57 8.12 1.26 2.67 5.93 6.89
MAORI E T \HNIC GROUP
15-19 7.18 15.88 18.60 18.48 10.32 18.23 18.80 17.40
20-24 4.96 12.34 13.43 23.06 3.81 7.19 13.69 16.75
25-29 3.00 9.04 9.07 19.61 1.69 3.22 10.97 13.57
30-34 2.77 6.39 6.81 16.44 0.64 2.19 9.66 11.70
35-39 2.06 5.57 5.27 13.65 0.65 1.75 7.78 9.78
40-44 1.96 5.13 5.37 12.00 0.53 1.88 6.42 8.14
45-49 2.36 4.79 4.10 11.39 0.36 1.48 5.64 7.31
50-54 2.70 5.41 5.09 10.56 0.49 1.01 4.61 5.00
55-59 2.49 4.96 4.61 8.46 0.19 1.38 3.07 3.06
60-64 0.36 0.46 2.42 1.90 0.25 0.00 1.20 0.59
Total 4.02 9.61 10.19 16.38 3.60 6.72 11.09 12.11
Standardised 3.38 7.94 8.34 14.49 2.48 4.74 9.14 10.23
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5.1.7: Not in the Labour Force, by Sex, Ethnicity and Age, 1976-1991
MALES FEMALES
1976 1981 1986 1991 1976 1981 1986 1991
EUROPEAN
15-19 51219 46284 40398 50076 52134 49722 42270 50001
20-24 9849 8559 8808 16044 36438 29508 22851 25416
25-29 3339 2388 4149 8631 57684 45489 37266 34326
30-34 2016 1707 3186 7578 44556 45171 36159 38724
35-39 1725 1437 2778 6537 32136 28818 26328 27135
40-44 1629 1290 2220 5955 25917 22230 18036 20106
45-49 1986 1524 2283 5109 30192 21774 17715 17424
50-54 2751 2700 3288 6375 35559 30036 22488 21759
55-59 5277 6654 7938 12513 40863 40548 36846 31776
60-64 21678 27714 36135 40302 48489 51147 55035 52419
Total 101469 100257 111183 159120 403968 364443 314994 319086
MAORI ETHINIC GROUP
15-19 8007 8097 7929 13935 10845 11226 10050 15033
20-24 1164 723 1977 5541 8928 10101 9066 10707
25-29 633 384 1293 4302 7956 8613 8370 10902
30-34 384 345 1017 3282 5367 5979 5547 8757
35-39 387 297 720 2514 4368 3990 3729 5538
40-44 336 294 561 1881 3297 3408 2802 4035
45-49 312 408 630 1557 3156 2919 2709 3174
50-54 402 465 723 1764 2562 2982 2754 3444
55-59 450 597 903 2061 2277 2583 2895 3468
60-64 1131 1437 1917 2805 2046 2454 2760 3477
Total 13206 13047 17670 39642 50802 54255 50682 68535
5.1.8 Not in the Labour Force as Percentage ot Population, by Sex, Ethnicity and Age, 1976-1991
MALES FEMALES
1976 1981 1986 1991 1976 1981 1986 1991
EUROPEAN
15-19 41.56 37.78 34.38 46.83 44.36 42.78 37.70 48.89
20-24 9.35 7.86 7.98 15.70 35.53 28.52 21.44 25.67
25-29 3.20 2.49 3.93 8.62 56.04 47.00 35.37 33.25
30-34 2.36 1.71 3.21 7.25 53.31 45.19 35.78 36.22
35-39 2.28 1.75 2.73 6.66 43.42 35.37 25.85 27.08
40-44 2.43 1.78 2.69 6.00 40.32 30.97 22.07 20.17
45-49 2.67 2.33 3.19 6.39 43.64 34.63 24.99 21.94
50-54 3.91 3.79 5.13 9.33 51.44 44.78 36.24 31.82
55-59 8.77 9.88 11.57 20.60 64.71 60.63 56.14 53.27
60-64 39.35 49.97 57.40 63.02 81.98 83.36 83.94 82.90
Total 12.36 11.92 12.57 18.00 50.15 44.02 36.09 36.18
Standard ised 14.54 13.23 12.59 18.76 46.96 40.77 33.01 35.23
MAORI EThINIC GROUP
15-19 36.63 31.91 31.89 55.71 49.68 45.32 40.95 60.29
20-24 7.29 3.71 9.00 26.64 55.04 50.04 40.45 48.53
25-29 5.10 2.66 7.41 22.90 62.11 57.71 44.80 52.51
30-34 4.21 2.95 7.65 20.46 57.14 50.24 39.77 48.77
35-39 4.50 3.44 6.72 19.97 50.02 43.98 33.68 41.30
40-44 4.98 3.64 6.98 18.54 48.33 41.92 33.49 38.03
45-49 5.47 6.20 8.52 20.66 54.09 45.15 35.85 40.27
50-54 9.50 8.82 12.27 25.67 59.43 55.84 46.53 49.46
55-59 14.38 15.67 19.83 39.28 71.20 66.03 61.66 64.26
60-64 45.59 54.49 61.92 74.21 83.99 86.56 84.79 85.35
Total 14.63 12.31 15.07 31.26 55.47 50.45 42.08 51.13
Standard ised 13.76 12.51 16.05 31.04 58.07 53.09 44.50 51.41
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5.1.9: Population, by Sex, Ethnicity and Age, 1976-1991
MALES
1976 1981 1986 1991 1976 1981 1986 1991
EUROPEAN
15-19 123228 122517 117510 106932 117519 116229 112113 102267
20-24 105339 108924 110409 102189 102549 103455 106593 98994
25-29 104379 95715 105621 100161 102936 96789 105369 103242
30-34 85362 99819 99291 104502 83574 99951 101061 106923
35-39 75747 82044 101658 98130 74013 81483 101865 100191
40-44 66981 72513 82566 99240 64275 71787 81723 99675
45-49 74379 65346 71550 79992 69180 62871 70881 79413
50-54 70347 71214 64041 68292 69129 67077 62046 68391
55-59 60150 67329 68595 60738 63150 66876 65631 59652
60-64 55089 55458 62952 63951 59145 61359 65562 63228
Total 821001 840879 884193 884127 805470 827877 872844 881976
MAORI ETHNIC GROUP
15-19 21858 25371 24861 25014 21828 24768 24543 24933
20-24 15966 19467 21975 20802 16221 20187 22413 22062
25-29 12408 14439 17460 18789 12810 14925 18684 20760
30-34 9111 11685 13302 16038 9393 11901 13947 17955
35-39 8601 8622 10710 12591 8733 9072 11073 13410
40-44 6747 8076 8040 10146 6822 8130 8367 10611
45-49 5709 6582 7395 7536 5835 6465 7557 7881
50-54 4230 5271 5892 6873 4311 5340 5919 6963
55-59 3129 3810 4554 5247 3198 3912 4695 5397
60-64 2481 2637 3096 3780 2436 2835 3255 4074
Total 90240 105960 117285 126816 91587 107535 120453 134046
5.1.10: Population Age Structure, by Sex, Ethnicity and Age, 1976-1991
MALES FEMALES
1976 1981 1986 1991 1976 1981 1986 1991
FEMALES
EUROPEAN
15-19 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12
20-24 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11
25-29 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12
30-34 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12
35-39 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.11
40-44 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.11
45-49 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09
50-54 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08
55-59 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
60-64 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
MAORI ETHNIC GROUP
15-19 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.19
20-24 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.16
25-29 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.15
30-34 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13
35-39 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10
40-44 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
45-49 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
50-54 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
55-59 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
60-64 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
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APPENDIX E.5.2
5.2.1: Employment, by Sex, Ethnicity and Age, 1976-1991
MALES FEMALES
1976 1981 1986 1991 1976 1981 1986 1991
EUROPEAN
15-19 69678 70836 64842 44067 62001 59673 56802 39435
20-24 93381 95523 95190 73260 64326 70176 76995 63552
25-29 99768 90438 98073 82836 44481 49671 62985 62505
30-34 82638 96234 93987 90387 38649 53790 60006 62766
35-39 73545 79428 97245 86532 41592 51924 71121 68424
40-44 64887 70194 79155 88794 38103 48855 60741 75579
45-49 71814 62805 68250 71454 38730 40368 50940 59103
50-54 66990 67257 59685 58653 33348 36426 37848 44505
55-59 54384 59283 59058 45276 22161 25944 27582 26655
60-64 33273 27606 25989 23028 10632 10164 10095 10572
Total 710358 719604 741474 664287 394023 446991 515115 513096
MAORI ETHNIC GROUP
15-19 12282 13245 12309 6456 8730 9027 9879 5562
20-24 14010 16341 17046 10464 6675 8634 10278 7659
25-29 11403 12750 14583 10803 4638 5832 8265 7041
30-34 8475 10593 11379 10119 3966 5661 7053 7098
35-39 8037 7845 9426 8358 4308 4923 6483 6561
40-44 6279 7368 7047 7047 3489 4569 5028 5712
45-49 5262 5859 6462 5121 2658 3450 4422 4131
50-54 3714 4521 4869 4383 1728 2304 2892 3171
55-59 2601 3024 3441 2742 915 1275 1656 1764
60-64 1341 1188 1104 903 384 381 456 573
Total 73404 82734 87666 66396 37491 46056 56412 49272
5.2.2: Employment as Percentage of Labour Force, by Sex, Ethnicity and Age, 1976-1991
MALES FEMALES
1976 1981 1986 1991 1976 1981 1986 1991
EUROPEAN
15-19 96.76 92.92 84.09 77.51 94.82 89.72 81.33 75.45
20-24 97.79 95.18 93.69 85.04 97.30 94.90 91.94 86.37
25-29 98.74 96.90 96.65 90.50 98.30 96.82 92.48 90.70
30-34 99.15 98.09 97.80 93.26 99.05 98.19 92.46 92.03
35-39 99.36 98.54 98.35 94.47 99.32 98.59 94.15 93.66
40-44 99.29 98.56 98.52 95.19 99.34 98.58 95.37 94.99
45-49 99.20 98.41 98.53 95.42 99.34 98.23 95.81 95.34
50-54 99.10 98.17 98.24 94.73 99.34 98.34 95.68 95.44
55-59 99.11 97.71 97.36 93.88 99.43 98.54 95.82 95.62
60-64 99.59 99.50 96.91 97.37 99.77 99.53 95.90 97.81
Total 98.73 97.16 95.92 91.62 98.14 96.45 92.34 91.15
MAORI ET HNIC GROUP
15-19 88.67 76.68 72.70 58.27 79.49 66.66 68.16 56.18
20-24 94.65 87.18 85.24 68.57 91.53 85.60 77.01 67.45
25-29 96.84 90.72 90.20 74.57 95.55 92.40 80.13 71.42
30-34 97.11 93.41 92.63 79.33 98.51 95.59 83.96 77.17
35-39 97.85 94.23 94.35 82.94 98.69 96.87 88.28 83.35
40-44 97.94 94.68 94.22 85.26 98.98 96.76 90.35 86.86
45-49 97.50 94.90 95.52 85.65 99.22 97.29 91.21 87.76
50-54 97.02 94.07 94.20 85.79 98.80 97.71 91.37 90.11
55-59 97.09 94.12 94.25 86.06 99.35 95.94 92.00 91.45
60-64 99.33 99.00 93.64 92.62 98.46 100.00 92.12 95.98
Total 95.29 89.04 88.00 76.16 91.92 86.44 80.85 75.21
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APPENDIX E.6
Percentage of Labour Force Aged 15+ Years in Each Employment Status, by Sex and Ethnic Classification, 1951-1991
1951| 1956| 1961| 1966| 1971| 1976| 1981| 1986| 1991 1991/1951
MALES
NON-MAORI
Own Account (No employees) 12.7 11.8 9.5 8.6 8.3 9.3 9.2 12.4 14.1 1.11
Employer 11.6 11.2 9.7 9.3 8.0 8.7 7.8 9.6 9.9 0.86
Wage Earner 74.1 76.1 80.1 81.4 82.7 80.5 79.6 73.0 66.4 0.90
Unemployed 1.3 0.8 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.4 3.2 4.5 8.8 6.60
Relative Assisting Unpaid 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 2.63
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.00
Number 542066 591163 633085 700784 732707 800798 803430 855848 790569
Not Specified (Excluded) 1009 189 536 1112 2157 2727 3324 3852 7683
MAORI
Own Account (No employees) 9.8 7.5 4.9 3.6 3.0 3.3 2.7 4.2 5.9 0.60
Employer 3.0 2.7 2.2 2.6 1.9 2.3 1.8 1.8 2.8 0.94
Wage Earner 83.4 85.6 90.0 92.3 91.5 89.1 82.9 81.0 66.3 0.80
Unemployed 2.5 3.3 2.3 1.5 3.5 5.1 12.4 12.6 24.1 9.71
Relative Assisting Unpaid 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.64
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.00
Number 25781 31343 36764 43530 49799 61328 69603 78586 86169
Not Specified (Excluded) 107 63 121 169 306 245 249 324 1353
FEMALES
NON-MAORI
Own Account (No employees) 4.5 4.1 2.8 2 .9 3 .2 3.8 4.0 6.1 6.8 1.51
Employer 3.6 3.2 2.2 2.7 2.6 3.2 3.3 4.0 4.4 1.22
Wage Earner 90.2 91.1 93.6 93.0 92.4 89.7 86.8 79.6 77.4 0.86
Unemployed 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.8 2.4 4.7 8.2 9.4 9.62
Relative Assisting Unpaid 0.7 0.5 0.5 0 .2 0.1 0.8 1.1 2.1 2.1 2.90
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.00
Number 164409 185560 213838 265298 312368 378153 420084 614520 606432
Not Specified (Excluded) 387 95 186 632 705 926 1329 2463 6228
MAORI
Own Account (No employees) 3.6 2.5 1.0 0.8 0 .7 1.0 0.9 1.5 2.5 0.69
Employer 1.0 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.6 1.53
Wage Earner 92.4 92.0 95.1 93.7 89.2 87.6 80.4 76.2 69.3 0.75
Unemployed 1.9 3.8 2.9 4.8 9.2 10.0 17.4 20.4 25.1 13.48
Relative Assisting Unpaid 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.9 1.4 1.33
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.00
Number 6701 8416 10910 14363 20664 28101 34209 52806 64638
Not Specified (Excluded) 36 23 23 151 129 55 117 216 1098
INDEX OF DISSIMILARITY
Males 11.4 12.7 12.0 11.8 11.5 12.4 12.6 16.2 15.2 1.34
Females 3.4 3.7 3.4 4.3 7.6 7.5 12.7 12.2 15.8 4.63
All Males/All Females 16.2 15.2 13.7 11.8 10.1 10.4 9.2 11.2 12.0 0.74
All Maori/All Non-Maori 9.3 10.4 9.7 9.6 9.3 10.1 10.4 13.1 15.5 1.66
Notes 1951-1981 = De Facto population, 1986-1991 = De Jure population.
1951-1981 = Full Time Labour Force, 1986-1991 = Full Time plus Part Time.
1951-1986 = Sole/Single Origin Maori; 1991 = Maori Ethnic Group. 
Non-Maori = Total Population minus specified Maori classification. 
Compiled from Census of Population and Dwellings, various years.Source:
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APPENDIX E.7
Component Analysis of Ethnic Differentials in Employment Status for Maori and Non-Maori Labour Forces Aged 15+ Years, 
by Sex, 1951 and 1976-1991______________________________________________________________________________________
M ALES FE M A LE S
1951| 1976| 1981| 1986| 1991 1951| 1976| 1981| 1986| 1991
O W N  A C C O U N T  (SELF E M P LO Y E D , NO E M P LO Y E ES )
Non-M aori 12.67 9.33 9.21 12.43 14.06 4.52 3.83 4.04 6.06 6.84
M aori 9.87 3.29 2.70 4.23 5.89 3.65 1.01 0.89 1.46 2.52
Non-Maori (Standardised*) 10.76 8.11 7.77 10.47 11.57 2.95 3.35 3.42 5.16 5.79
Maori (Standardised*) 12.84 4.16 3.47 5.27 7.41 6.11 1.25 1.10 1.72 2.97
C om ponen t o f observed difl e rence (Non-M aori m inus M aori) due to:
U nderly ing  D ifferential 0.36 4.99 5.40 6.70 6.17 -1.15 2.46 2.74 4.02 3.57
A ge S truc tu re 2.45 1.05 1.10 1.50 2.00 2.02 0.36 0.42 0.58 0.75
O bserved Differential 2.81 6.04 6.50 8.20 8.17 0.87 2.82 3.16 4.60 4.32
E M P LO Y E R
Non-M aori 11.59 8.69 7.85 9.64 9.91 3.56 3.23 3.28 4.04 4.36
Maori 3.02 2.33 1.82 1.80 2.83 1.05 1.00 0.87 1.05 1.61
Non-Maori (Standardised*) 8.98 7.21 6.34 7.76 7.93 2.04 2.81 2.77 3.40 3.66
Maori (Standardised*) 4.17 2.93 2.28 2.09 3.40 2.28 1.26 1.06 1.18 1.85
C om ponen t o f observed dil ference (Non-M aori m inus M aori) due to:
U nderly ing  D ifferential 6.69 5.32 5.04 6.75 5.81 1.14 1.89 2.06 2.61 2.28
A ge S truc tu re 1.88 1.04 0.99 1.09 1.27 1.38 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.47
O bserved D ifferential 8 .56 6.35 6.03 7.84 7.09 2.51 2.24 2.41 2.99 2.75
W A G E  A N D  S A LA R Y  EAI =INER 0.15
N on-M aori 74 .10 80.50 79.55 72.95 66.39 90.22 89.71 86 .82 79 .62 77 .36
Maori 83 .35 89.13 82.94 80.98 66.33 92.39 87 .62 80.44 76 .22 69.35
Non-Maori (Standardised*) 78 .60 82.86 81.67 75.71 69.24 93.36 90.11 86 .88 80.24 77 .58
Maori (Standardised*) 79 .53 88.64 84.21 81.46 67.13 88.90 89.39 84.14 78 .08 71 .95
C om ponen t o f observed di ference (Non-M aori m inus M aori) due to:
U nderly ing  D ifferential -5 .08 -7.20 -2.97 -6.89 1.08 1.15 1.40 4.56 2.78 6.82
A ge  S truc tu re -4 .16 -1.42 -0 .42 -1.14 -1.02 -3.32 0.68 1.82 0.62 1.19
O bse rved D ifferential -9 .25 -8.62 -3.39 -8.03 0.05 -2.17 2.09 6.38 3.40 8.01
R E LA T IV E  A S S IS T IN G  U N PAID
N on-M aori 0.30 0.07 0.17 0.50 0.79 0.72 0.82 1.15 2.12 2.08
Maori 1.28 0.15 0.15 0.36 0.82 1.05 0.41 0.36 0.90 1.38
Non-Maori (Standardised*) 0.38 0.08 0.16 0.41 0.62 0.64 0.74 0.99 1.83 1.78
Maori (Standardised*) 1.04 0.13 0.13 0.46 1.06 1.05 0.44 0.39 1.07 1.59
C om ponen t o f observed d ffe rence (Non-M aori m inus M aori) due to:
U nderly ing  D ifferential -0 .82 -0.06 0.02 0.04 -0.23 -0.37 0.35 0.70 0.99 0.44
A ge  S truc tu re -0.16 -0.01 0.00 0.10 0.21 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.23 0.25
O bserved D ifferential -0 .98 -0.08 0.03 0.14 -0.03 -0.33 0.40 0.79 1.22 0.70
U N E M P LO Y E D
N on-M aori 1.34 1.41 3.22 4.48 8.84 0.97 2.42 4.71 8.16 9.37
M aori 2 .49 5.10 12.39 12.63 24.13 1.87 9.96 17.44 20.37 25.14
D ifferentia l -1 .15 -3.69 -9.17 -8.15 -15.29 -0.89 -7.55 -12.73 -12.21 -15.78
Non-Maori (Standardised*) 1.28 1.75 4.07 5.66 10.64 1.01 2.98 5.94 9.37 11.19
Maori (Standardised*) 2.42 4.14 9.91 10.71 21.01 1.67 7.65 13.31 17.95 21.64
C om ponen t of observed d ffe rence (Non-M aori m inus M aori) due to:
U nderly ing  D ifferentia l -1 .15 -3.04 -7.50 -6.60 -12.83 -0.78 -6.11 -10.06 -10.39 -13.11
A ge S truc tu re 0.00 -0.65 -1.67 -1 .55 -2.46 -0.12 -1.44 -2.68 -1.82 -2.66
O bserved D ifferential -1 .15 -3.69 -9.17 -8.15 -15.2S -0.89 -7.55 -12.73 -12.21 -15.78
IN D E X  O F  DISSIM ILARI1"Y (European m inus M aori)
U nstandard ised 11.4 12.4 12.6 16.2 15.3 3.4 7.5 12.7 12.2 15.8
S tandard ised 7.4 10.9 11.3 14.7 13.2 2.6 5.2 8.6 9.8 12.3
Notes: 1951-1981 = De Facto population, 1986-1991 = De Jure population.
1951-1981 = Full Time Labour Force, 1986-1991 = Full Time plus Part Time Labour Force.
1951-1986 = Sole/Single Origin Maori, 1991 = Maori Ethnic Group; Non-Maori = Total Population minus specified Maori classification. 
'Maori standardised to age structure of non-Maori Labour Force, and vice-versa.
Source: Compiled from Census of Population and Dwellings (see Appendix E.8).
APPENDIX E.8
E.8.1: Percentage of Age Group in Each Employment Status, Labour Force Aged 15+ Years, by Age and Sex,
MALES FEMALES
19511 19761 19811 19861 1991 19511 19761 19811 19861 1991
OWN ACCOUNT (NO EMPLOYEES)
15-19# 2.28 0.42 0.53 0.43 0.61 0.39 0.11 0.07 0.20 0.19
20-24 3.26 1.41 0.99 1.71 1.74 0.82 0.51 0.37 0.70 0.86
25-29 6.61 2.71 2.24 3.82 4.08 2.49 1.10 1.37 1.53 2.28
30-34 10.31 3.90 3.42 5.59 6.54 5.12 1.61 1.27 2.22 3.12
35-39 11.82 4.82 4.01 6.82 8.93 8.52 1.58 1.48 2.07 3.67
40-44 15.56 5.40 4.36 6.87 9.41 11.60 1.65 1.34 2.25 3.95
45-49 17.44 5.39 4.65 7.02 9.81 12.40 1.76 1.36 2.18 4.08
50-54 20.17 5.81 4.80 6.68 10.22 15.61 1.65 2.32 2.25 4.35
55-59 24.38 6.04 4.66 5.99 11.39 17.39 2.93 1.06 2.10 4.78
60-64A 26.65 7.42 7.24 8.25 18.71 34.04 4.07 1.33 4.62 5.41
65+ 25.63 14.46 15.04 25.00 ... 20.00 3.41 9.09 9.09 ...
TOTAL 9.87 3.29 2.70 4.23 5.89 3.65 1.01- 0.89 1.46 2.52
S ta n d a rd is e d ’ 12.84 4.16 3.47 5.27 7.41 6.11 1.25 1.10 1.72 2.97
EMPLOYER OF OTHERS
15-19# 0.42 0.24 0.24 0.41 0.58 0.13 0.05 0.10 0.23 0.49
20-24 0.91 0.70 0.59 0.75 0.68 0.24 0.35 0.33 0.61 0.56
25-29 2.01 1.57 1.51 1.51 1.79 0.25 0.91 0.80 1.03 1.26
30-34 3.69 3.14 2.02 2.59 3.15 1.43 1.27 1.19 1.52 1.93
35-39 3.17 3.94 2.78 3.26 4.87 0.87 1.72 1.66 1.70 2.51
40-44 4.94 3.97 3.73 3.11 5.44 2.82 2.26 1.72 1.57 2.70
45-49 5.11 4.39 3.38 2.92 4.93 1.55 1.98 1.85 1.71 2.59
50-54 5.50 3.82 3.54 2.18 4.36 4.62 2.31 1.35 1.54 2.26
55-59 6.69 4.50 2.82 2.13 3.83 9.57 1.95 1.41 0.84 2.23
60-64A 10.79 4.24 3.45 2.97 4.85 23.40 1.48 2.67 1.54 2.70
65+ 14.08 8.82 7.08 2.59 ... 28.00 10.23 4.55 2.27 ...
TOTAL 3.02 2.33 1.82 1.80 2.83 1.05 1.00 0.87 1.05 1.61
S ta n d a rd is e d * 4.17 2.93 2.28 2.09 3.40 2.28 1.26 1.06 1.18 1.85
WAGE AND SALARY EARNERS
15-19# 90.36 86.32 71.48 70.10 55.26 96.61 75.28 58.12 65.27 53.82
20-24 91.61 92.14 83.80 81.58 65.12 95.30 88.34 80.61 72.90 64.87
25-29 88.20 91.98 85.44 83.68 67.85 94.77 91.81 86.89 74.78 66.37
30-34 83.72 89.72 86.50 83.40 68.77 90.78 94.70 91.11 77.93 70.06
35-39 82.19 88.99 86.90 83.40 68.16 86.90 94.78 91.69 82.18 75.40
40-44 76.89 88.32 85.76 83.20 69.38 84.33 94.16 92.45 84.16 78.44
45-49 74.27 87.18 86.16 84.93 69.97 83.33 94.39 93.09 85.53 78.85
50-54 70.44 86.73 85.20 84.19 69.81 78.03 94.07 92.84 85.88 81.20
55-59 66.24 86.13 85.89 85.08 69.09 70.43 93.17 92.58 86.55 82.32
60-64A 59.25 87.28 87.24 79.21 63.05 42.55 92.96 93.33 83.08 80.31
65+ 56.32 75.74 76.99 53.45 ... 52.00 84.09 81.82 70.45 ...
TOTAL 83.35 89.13 82.94 80.98 66.33 92.39 87.62 80.44 76.22 69.35
S ta n d a rd is e d * 79.53 88.64 84.21 81.46 67.13 88.90 89.39 84.14 78.08 71.95
RELATIVE /ASSISTING UNPAID
15-19# 4.23 0.41 0.31 0.46 1.02 1.00 0.34 0.13 0.26 0.80
20-24 1.46 0.14 0.15 0.29 0.56 0.94 0.33 0.28 0.40 0.70
25-29 0.73 0.11 0.06 0.21 0.48 1.12 0.42 0.56 1.03 1.14
30-34 0.45 0.04 0.07 0.28 0.57 1.02 0.41 0.51 1.15 1.63
35-39 0.55 0.01 0.14 0.19 0.70 1.53 0.44 0.55 1.17 1.54
40-44 0.29 0.07 0.05 0.35 0.85 1.25 0.40 0.48 1.43 1.58
45-49 0.32 0.07 0.12 0.32 0.71 0.78 0.59 0.49 0.93 2.07
50-54 0.38 0.13 0.16 0.56 1.14 1.73 0.74 0.39 1.54 2.09
55-59 0.76 0.19 0.12 0.41 1.53 0.87 0.49 0.00 2.10 2.07
60-64A 1.54 0.10 0.34 1.98 6.47 0.00 1.11 1.33 2.31 6.56
65+ 2.53 0.25 0.00 5.17 ... 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.82 ...
TOTAL 1.28 0.15 0.15 0.36 0.82 1.05 0.41 0.36 0.90 1.38
S ta n d a rd is e d * 1.04 0.13 0.13 0.46 1.06 1.05 0.44 0.39 1.07 1.59
UNEMPLO\'ED
15-19# 2.70 12.61 27.43 28.61 42.53 1.87 24.22 41.58 34.03 44.70
20-24 2.76 5.62 14.47 15.67 31.91 2.70 10.47 18.41 25.40 33.01
25-29 2.44 3.63 10.75 10.78 25.80 1.37 5.76 10.38 21.62 28.95
30-34 1.83 3.21 7.99 8.15 20.96 1.64 2.02 5.93 17.17 23.26
35-39 2.27 2.24 6.17 6.33 17.34 2.18 1.48 4.62 12.87 16.88
40-44 2.33 2.23 6.10 6.47 14.93 0.00 1.53 4.01 10.58 13.34
45-49 2.85 2.97 5.68 4.81 14.58 1.94 1.28 3.21 9.65 12.42
50-54 3.51 3.52 6.30 6.39 14.47 0.00 1.24 3.09 8.78 10.10
55-59 1.94 3.14 6.50 6.40 14.16 1.74 1.46 4.95 8.40 8.60
60-64A 1.76 0.96 1.72 7.59 6.93 0.00 0.37 1.33 8.46 5.02
65+ 1.44 0.74 0.88 13.79 ... 0.00 2.27 4.55 11.36 ...
TOTAL 2.49 5.10 12.39 12.63 24.13 1.87 9.96 17.44 20.37 25.14
S ta n d a rd is e d * 2.42 4.14 9.91 10.71 21.01 1.67 7.65 13.31 17.95 21.64
(con tinued  over)
E.8.1 (Continued): Percentage of Age Group in Each Employment Status, Labour Force Aged 15+ Years, by Age 
and Sex, MAORI, 1951,1976-1991________________________________________________________________________
MALES FEMALES
19511 19761 19811 19861 1991 19511 19761 19811 19861 1991
EMPLOYMENT AS PERCENTAGE O F LABOUR FORCE
15-19# 97.30 87.39 72.57 71.39 57.47 98.13 75.78 58.42 65.97 55.30
20-24 97.24 94.38 85.53 84.33 68.09 97.30 89.53 81.59 74.60 66.99
25-29 97.56 96.37 89.25 89.22 74.20 98.63 94.24 89.62 78.38 71.05
30-34 98.17 96 79 92.01 91.85 79.04 98.36 97.98 94.07 82.83 76.74
35-39 97.73 97.76 93.83 93.67 82.66 97.82 98.52 95.38 87.13 83.12
40-44 97.67 97.77 93.90 93.53 85.07 100.00 98.47 95.99 89.42 86.66
45-49 97.15 97.03 94.32 95.19 85.42 98.06 98.72 96.79 90.35 87.58
50-54 96.49 96.48 93.70 93.61 85.53 100.00 98.76 96.91 91.22 89.90
55-59 98.06 96.86 93.50 93.60 85.84 98.26 98.54 95.05 91.60 91.40
60-64A 98.24 99.04 98.28 92.41 93.07 100.00 99.63 98.67 91.54 94.98
65+ 98.56 99.26 99.12 86.21 ... 100.00 97.73 95.45 88.64 ...
TO TAL 97.51 94.90 87.61 87.37 75.87 98.13 90.04 82.56 79.63 74.86
E.8.2: Age Structure of the Maori Labour Force, Numbers and Percentages at Each Age, by Sex, 1951,1976-1991
MALES FEMALES
19511 19761 19811 19861 1991 19511 19761 19811 19861 1991
NUMBER
15-19# 3808 10633 12456 12510 10863 2302 7945 8976 10296 9711
20-24 4851 11451 13665 15600 15033 1702 4881 6435 9840 11196
25-29 3976 9136 10158 12717 14277 803 3089 3729 7827 9741
30-34 2899 6982 8334 9720 12564 488 2677 3543 6498 9027
35-39 2903 6782 6366 7917 9912 458 2971 3249 5640 7767
40-44 2449 5334 6192 6072 8160 319 2481 3141 4395 6456
45-49 1858 4416 4965 5553 5904 258 1870 2430 3855 4638
50-54 1309 3014 3810 4269 5019 173 1214 1551 2529 3447
55-59 927 2134 2445 2955 3135 115 615 849 1428 1884
60-64A 454 1038 870 909 1299 47 270 225 390 777
65+ 277 408 339 348 ... 25 88 66 132 ...
TO TAL 25711 61328 69600 78570 86166 6690 28101 34194 52830 64644
Not Specified 107 245 249 324 1353 36 55 117 216 1098
PERCENTAGE AT EACH AGE
15-19# 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.34 0.28 0.26 0.19 0.15
20-24 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.25 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.17
25-29 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.15
30-34 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.14
35-39 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12
40-44 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.10
45-49 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
50-54 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
55-59 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
60-64* 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
65+ 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 ... 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 ...
TO TA L 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Notes: 1951-1981 = De Facto population. 1986-1991 = De Jure population.
1951-1981 = Full Time Labour Force. 1986-1991 = Full Time plus Part Time Labour Force (excludes labour force status not specified) 
1951-1986 = Sole/Single Origin Maori, 1991 = Maori Ethnic Groip; Non-Maori = Total Population minus specified Maori classification 
#Data for 1951 refer to population aged less than 20 years.
''Data for 1991 refer to population aged 60+ years.
"Maori standardised to age structure of non-Maori Labour Force, and vice-versa 
Source: Compiled from Census ol Population and Dwellings, various years.
APPENDIX E.8 (Continued)
E.8.3: Percentage of Age Group in Each Employment Status, Labour Force Aged 15+ Years, by Age and Sex, 
NON-MAORI, 1951,1976-1991
MALES FEMALES
19511 19761 19811 19861 1991 19511 19761 19811 19861 1991
OWN ACCOUNT (NO EMPLOYEES)
15-19# 1.13 0.91 0.92 0.85 0.97 0.39 0.25 0.19 0.31 0.41
20-24 5.33 4.52 4.39 5.13 4.30 1.34 1.29 1.28 1.96 1.75
25-29 10.93 9.03 8.76 11.36 9.97 2.84 4.30 4.22 5.43 5.01
30-34 15.28 11.47 10.83 14.53 13.99 4.77 6.98 7.00 8.18 8.35
35-39 16.52 12.40 11.83 15.51 16.07 6.68 6.54 6.46 8.48 8.53
40-44 15.83 12.26 11.89 15.88 17.38 7.20 5.56 5.78 8.22 8.24
45-49 14.92 11.49 11.25 15.86 18.03 8.70 5.09 5.22 7.99 8.60
50-54 13.59 10.60 10.86 15.25 18.65 10.23 4.65 5.16 8.22 9.38
55-59 14.15 10.46 10.22 15.07 19.49 12.21 4.90 4.73 8.55 10.83
60-64A 16.06 11.30 12.94 19.80 32.17 15.58 6.33 6.58 10.81 18.60
65+ 21.71 17.15 22.10 31.67 ... 18.18 10.86 14.30 17.77 ...
TOTAL 12.67 9.33 9.21 12.43 14.06 4.52 3.83 4.04 6.06 6.84
S ta n d a rd is e d - 10.76 8.11 7.77 10.47 11.57 2.95 3.35 3.42 5.16 5.79
EMPLOYER OF OTHERS
15-19# 0.31 0.24 0.29 0.21 0.27 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.28
20-24 2.23 1.93 1.67 1.52 1.05 0.44 0.75 0.70 0.79 0.72
25-29 6.64 6.38 5.45 5.75 4.43 1.36 3.15 2.85 3.02 2.55
30-34 11.64 10.45 9.16 10.96 9.72 3.24 5.41 5.32 5.41 5.23
35-39 14.06 12.46 11.18 14.14 13.29 4.92 5.77 5.86 6.16 5.92
40-44 15.06 12.89 12.09 15.79 14.85 6.08 5.45 5.42 6.46 6.20
45-49 15.69 13.09 11.74 15.37 15.43 6.79 5.18 4.94 6.15 6.19
50-54 15.94 11.79 10.91 13.48 14.59 8.46 4.41 4.43 5.56 6.30
55-59 16.54 10.25 9.15 11.60 12.82 10.46 4.09 3.69 4.97 5.97
60-64A 18.87 11.01 10.61 14.11 16.93 14.62 4.80 4.58 6.11 7.69
65+ 25 46 15.40 16.03 17.13 ... 25.33 7.24 7.69 8.04 ...
TOTAL 11.59 8.69 7.85 9.64 9.91 3.56 3.23 3.28 4.04 4.36
S ta n d a rd is e d * 8.98 7.21 6.34 7.76 7.93 2.04 2.81 2.77 3.40 3.66
WAGE AND SALARY EARNERS
15-19# 95.98 94.83 89.49 81.49 74.19 98.17 93.24 86.36 79.59 73.04
20-24 90.85 90.94 88.40 86.19 78.43 96.54 94.37 91.71 87.86 82.52
25-29 81.20 83.14 82.18 78.95 75.08 93.81 89.17 87.49 81.34 80.86
30-34 71.84 77.11 77.73 71.73 68.59 89.90 84.77 83.08 75.39 75.20
35-39 68.07 74.40 75.20 68.13 63.98 86.52 85.54 84.04 76.40 76.40
40-44 67.58 74.04 74.33 66.28 61.89 84.97 87.06 85.47 77.92 78.06
45-49 67.72 74.57 75.22 66.68 60.77 82.59 87.97 86.27 78.93 77.96
50-54 68.46 76.64 76.16 68.84 60.34 79.36 89.19 86.84 79.30 76.84
55-59 67.23 78.27 78.02 70.03 60.39 75.78 89.25 88.24 79.45 75.52
60-64A 63.14 77.10 75.19 60.95 43.85 68.24 87.56 85.96 73.93 63.57
65+ 51.06 66.74 59.40 42.99 55.50 80.18 74.08 60.91 ...
TOTAL 74.10 80.50 79.55 72.95 66.39 90.22 89.71 86.82 79.62 77.36
S ta n d a rd is e d - 78.60 82.86 81.67 75.71 69.24 93.36 90.11 86.88 80.24 77.58
RELATIVE SSISTING UNPAID
15-19# 1.44 0.23 0.31 0.56 0.88 0.43 0.18 0.24 0.34 0.54
20-24 0.35 0.06 0.16 0.27 0.39 0.40 0.34 0.42 0.61 0.50
25-29 0.17 0.04 0.11 0.25 0.37 0.77 1.10 1.24 2.04 1.56
30-34 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.30 0.41 1.09 1.51 1.99 3.13 2.71
35-39 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.35 0.55 1.15 1.23 1.72 2.94 2.42
40-44 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.39 0.62 1.06 1.08 1.42 2.63 2.18
45-49 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.42 0.71 1.02 0.97 1.34 2.53 2.32
50-54 0.27 0.03 0.08 0.51 0.80 0.98 0.94 1.46 2.44 2.64
55-59 0.31 0.06 0.17 0.55 0.96 0.70 1.07 1.42 2.66 3.12
60-64* 0.35 0.18 0.70 1.96 4.69 0.85 1.01 2.19 4.87 8.03
65+ 0.51 0.56 2.18 4.25 ... 0.46 1.53 3.31 7.71 ...
TOTAL 0.30 0.07 0.17 0.50 0.79 0.72 0.82 1.15 2.12 2.08
S ta n d a rd is e d - 0.38 0.08 0.16 0.41 0.62 0.64 0.74 0.99 1.83 1.78
UNEMPLOY ED
15-19# 1.15 3.79 8.99 16.89 23.70 0.88 6.23 13.08 19.58 25.73
20-24 1.24 2.54 5.38 6.89 15.83 1.27 3.25 5.88 8.78 14.52
25-29 1.06 1.41 3.51 3.69 10.16 1.21 2.28 4.19 8.17 10.02
30-34 1.11 0.95 2.22 2.47 7.29 1.00 1.33 2.61 7.90 8.52
35-39 1.27 0.73 1.71 1.87 6.10 0.72 0.92 1.92 6.03 6.74
40-44 1.42 0.78 1.64 1.66 5.27 0.69 0.85 1.92 4.78 5.32
45-49 1.57 0.84 1.75 1.66 5.06 0.90 0.79 2.23 4.39 4.92
50-54 1.73 0.93 1.98 1.92 5.63 0.97 0.81 2.10 4.48 4.84
55-59 1.77 0.96 2.45 2.75 6.34 0.84 0.68 1.93 4.37 4.57
60-64A 1.58 0.42 0.56 3.18 2.35 0.71 0.30 0.69 4.29 2.12
65+ 1.26 0.14 0.30 3.96 ... 0.53 0.19 0.63 5.58 ...
TOTAL 1.34 1.41 3.22 4.48 8.84 0.97 2.42 4.71 8.16 9.37
S ta n d a rd is e d - 1.28 1.75 4.07 5.66 10.64 1.01 2.98 5.94 9.37 11.19
(co n tin u ed  over)
E.8.3 (Continued): Percentage of Age Group in Each Employment Status, Labour Force Aged 15+ Years, by Age 
and Sex, NON-MAORI, 1951,1976-1991_______________________________________________________________
MALES FEMALES
19511 19761 19811 19861 1991 19511 19761 19811 19861 1991
EMPLOYMENT AS PERCENTAGE O F LABOUR FORCE
15-19’ 98.85 96.21 91.01 83.11 76.30 99.12 93.77 86.92 80.42 74.27
20-24 98.76 97.46 94.62 93.11 84.17 98.73 96.75 94.12 91.22 85.48
25-29 98.94 98.59 96.49 96.31 89.84 98.79 97.72 95.81 91.83 89.98
30-34 98.89 99.05 97.78 97.53 92.71 99.00 98.67 97.39 92.10 91.48
35-39 98.73 99.27 98.29 98.13 93.90 99.28 99.08 98.08 93.97 93.26
40-44 98.58 99.22 98.36 98.34 94.73 99.31 99.15 98.08 95.22 94.68
45-49 98.43 99.16 98.25 98.34 94.94 99.10 99.21 97.77 95.61 95.08
50-54 98.27 99.07 98.02 98.08 94.37 99.03 99.19 97.90 95.52 95.16
55-59 98.23 99.04 97.55 97.25 93.66 99.16 99.32 98.07 95.63 95.43
60-64” 98.42 99.58 99.44 96.82 97.65 99.29 99.70 99.31 95.71 97.88
65+ 98.74 99.86 99.70 96.04 99.47 99.81 99.37 94.42 ...
TO TAL 98.66 98.59 96.78 95.52 91.16 99.03 97.58 95.29 91.84 90.63
E.8.4: Age Structure of the Non-Maori Labour Force, Numbers and Percentages at Each Age, by Sex, 1951,1976-1991
MALES FEMALES
19511 19761 19811 19861 1991 19511 19761 19811 19861 1991
NUMBER
15-19# 44001 75473 75945 86580 59913 38697 67211 64914 78798 55377
20-24 63857 108192 110796 113778 93483 34615 70104 77577 93882 80349
25-29 68499 113005 103878 112773 100974 17471 41301 46797 76218 76263
30-34 62759 91947 107097 106116 105843 13032 32240 43647 71688 74370
35-39 64762 81313 86850 106923 99249 13306 35735 43563 81342 78420
40-44 61088 70955 76425 85794 99054 13092 33678 42789 67974 83673
45-49 53821 77476 67569 73863 78561 11822 34706 35802 56529 64659
50-54 43980 71670 71352 63933 64341 9302 30190 31602 41661 48156
55-59 33102 57831 62403 62928 49467 6395 19766 22215 30000 28599
60-64A 23826 34137 26943 27654 39684 3542 8914 7797 10908 16551
65+ 22082 18799 14187 15534 ... 3036 4308 3357 5487 ...
TO TAL 541777 800798 803445 855876 790569 164310 378153 420060 614487 606417
Not Specified 1009 2727 3324 3852 7683 387 926 1329 2463 6228
PERCENTAGE AT EACH AGE
15-19’ 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.24 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.09
20-24 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.13
25-29 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13
30-34 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.12
35-39 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.13
40-44 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.14
45-49 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11
50-54 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08
55-59 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
60-64” 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
65+ 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 ... 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 ...
TO TAL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Notes: 1951-1981 = De Facto population. 1986-1991 = De Jure population
1951-1981 = Full Time Labour Force, 1986-1991 = Full Time plus Part Time Labour Force (excludes labour force status not specified). 
1951-1986 = Sole/Single Origin Maori, 1991 = Maori Ethnic Gnoip; Non-Maori = Total Population minus specified Maori classification. 
#Data for 1951 refer to population aged less than 20 years.
AData for 1991 refer to population aged 60+ years.
'Maori standardised to age structure of non-Maori Labour Force, and vice-versa.
Source: Compiled from Census of Population and Dwellings. various years.
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APPENDIX F.4.1
Component Analysis of Industrial Distribution, Major Industries, Maori Ethnic Group and European 
Workforces (Full-time plus Part-time, Employed Only) Aged 15-64 Years, by Sex, 1976-1991_______
MALES FEM ALES
1976 1981 1986 1991 1976 1981 1986 1991
C O M M U N IT Y , P ER S O N ; 
European
kL, SO CIAL  
15.55 19.31 17.86 18.71 35 .44 36 .94 34.50 37 .88
Maori 9.02 15.62 15.06 19.69 29.81 32.11 32.00 40 .22
European (Standardised*) 15.28 19.08 17.26 18.08 35 .63 36 .56 33.34 36 .66
Maori (Standardised*) 9.14 15.23 14.88 20.06 30 .88 33 .43 33.46 41 .85
Component of observed diffe 
Underlying Differential
‘rence (European minus Maori) due to: 
6 .34  3 .77  2 .59 -1 .48 5 .19 3.98 1.19 -3 .77
Age Structure 0.20 -0 .08 0.21 0.50 0.44 0.85 1.31 1.42
Observed Differential 6.54 3 .69 2 .79 -0 .98 5.63 4 .83 2.51 -2 .34
Effect of Age StructureA 3.14 -2.21 7.95 -33.75 8 .49 21 .46 110.17 -37 .80
M A N U FA C TUR IN G
European 25 .08 24 .44 23 .10 19.54 17.21 15 .42 13.74 10.28
Maori 36 .34 34.21 32 .82 27 .46 32.01 28 .26 25.97 17 .79
European (Standardised*) 25 .35 24 .69 23 .55 19.90 16.76 15 .16 13.79 10.27
Maori (Standardised*) 34 .93 33 .62 32 .06 27.15 31 .72 27 .95 25.61 17.78
Component of observed difff 
Underlying Differential
jrence (European minus Maori) due to: 
-10 .42  -9 .35  -9.11 -7 .59 -14.88 -12 .82 -12.03 -7.51
Age Structure -0 .84 -0 .42 -0.61 -0 .34 0.08 -0 .02 -0 .20 0.00
Observed Differential -11 .26 -9 .77 -9 .72 -7 .93 -14 .80 -12 .84 -12.23 -7.51
Effect of Age Structure7' 8 .02 4 .49 6 .69 4.52 -0 .54 0.18 1.68 0.02
W H O LE S A LE , RETAIL, 
European
RESTAURANT
15.79 15.64 17.25 19.08 24 .97 23 .84 25.00 23 .56
Maori 7 .70 8.04 9.55 12.76 19.32 18.67 19.87 20 .20
European (Standardised*) 15.77 15.87 17.84 20.05 24.41 23 .83 25 .48 24 .43
Maori (Standardised*) 7 .32 7.54 8.77 11.69 19.36 18 .29 19.15 19.14
Component of observed diff 
Underlying Differential
erence (European minus Maori) due to: 
8 .27  7 .97  8 .3 9 7.34 5.35 5.35 5.73 4.33
Age Structure -0 .19 -0 .37 -0 .68 -1.02 0.30 -0 .18 -0.61 -0 .97
Observed Differential 8.08 7.60 7.71 6.32 5.65 5 .17 5.12 3.36
Effect of Age Structure7' -2 .24 -4.61 -8 .15 -13.90 5.65 -3.41 -10.58 -2 2 .39
F INA N C E, INSURANCE  
European
P R O P E R TY
5.77 6.33 7 .33 10.76 8.86 9 .59 11.25 14.36
Maori 1.57 1.83 2 .43 4.89 3.44 4 .08 5.12 8.45
European (Standardised*) 5.75 6.22 7 .22 10.55 9.68 10.43 12.33 15.04
Maori (Standardised*) 1.53 1.80 2 .40 4.85 2.95 3 .67 4.49 7 .86
Component of observed diff 
Underlying Differential
erence (European minus Maori) due to: 
4.21 4 .47  4 .85 5.79 6.08 6 .13 6.99 6.55
Age Structure -0.01 0.04 0 .04 0.08 -0 .65 -0 .62 -0.85 -0 .64
Observed Differential 4.20 4.51 4 .89 5.87 5.42 5.51 6.13 5.91
Effect of Age Structure7' -0 .34 0 .86 0 .82 1.42 -10.77 -1 0 .17 -12.22 -9 .76
Notes: ‘ Maori standardised to age structure of European workforce, and vice-versa.
A Percentage of Underlying Differential. Positive value denotes additive effect: Negative value denotes offsetting effect. 
Industry Not Specified excluded.
Source: Database A (see Appendix F.3)
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APPENDIX F.4.2
Component Analysis of Industrial Distribution, Selected (Remaining) Industries, Maori Ethnic Group and 
European Workforces (Full-time plus Part-time, Employed Only) Aged 15-64 Years, by Sex, 1976-1991
MALES FEMALES
1976 1981 1986 1991 1976 1981 1986 1991
AGRICULTURE, FORES'FRY, HUNTING AND FISHING
European 12.70 13.17 12.93 12.65 6.14 7.39 8.22 7.70
Maori 12.86 14.14 13.11 11.60 5.97 7.74 7.78 5.91
European (Standardised*) 12.63 13.35 12.83 12.31 5.90 7.09 7.65 7.24
Maori (Standardised*) 13.24 13.96 13.13 11.68 6.01 7.49 7.85 5.94
Component of observed diffe rence (European minus Maori) due to:
Underlying Differential -0.38 -0.79 -0.24 0.84 0.03 -0.37 0.12 1.54
Age Structure 0.23 -0.18 0.06 0.21 0.14 0.03 0.32 0.24
Observed Differential -0.16 -0.97 -0.18 1.05 0.17 -0.34 0.44 1.79
Effect of Age Structure7' -59.00 22.95 -24.14 25.64 531.27 -7.42 254.77 15.80
BUILDING AND CONSTFAUCTION
European 12.75 9.44 10.55 10.10 1.63 1.32 1.63 1.57
Maori 16.41 11.64 13.50 11.23 0.78 0.79 1.26 0.99
European (Standardised*) 13.36 9.58 10.77 10.23 1.64 1.29 1.57 1.53
Maori (Standardised*) 16.74 12.03 13.77 11.36 0.73 0.80 1.22 0.97
Component of observed diffejrence (European minus Maori) due to:
Underlying Differential -3.52 -2.32 -2.97 -1.13 0.88 0.51 0.36 0.57
Age Structure -0.14 0.12 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
Observed Differential -3.66 -2.20 -2.95 -1.13 0.85 0.53 0.37 0.57
Effect of Age Structure7' 3.94 -5.34 -0.70 -0.26 -3.44 4.63 2.57 1.15
TRANSPORT, STORAGI E, COMMUNICATIONS
European 10.19 9.59 8.83 7.45 5.32 5.13 5.24 4.28
Maori 12.90 11.43 10.21 9.56 8.36 8.03 7.60 6.07
European (Standardised*) 9.81 9.19 8.41 7.22 5.53 5.29 5.40 4.44
Maori (Standardised*) 13.78 12.56 11.41 10.19 8.06 8.04 7.79 6.11
Component of observed diff erence (European minus Maori) due to:
Underlying Differential -3.34 -2.61 -2.19 -2.54 -2.79 -2.83 -2.38 -1.73
Age Structure 0.63 0.77 0.81 0.44 -0.26 -0.07 0.01 -0.06
Observed Differential -2.72 -1.84 -1.38 -2.10 -3.04 -2.90 -2.36 -1.79
Effect of Age Structure7' -18.74 -29.42 -36.87 -17.19 9.29 2.56 -0.59 3.37
ELECTRICITY, GAS AN D WATER
European 1.64 1.61 1.56 1.20 0.38 0.29 0.33 0.30
Maori 2.20 2.20 2.23 1.90 0.26 0.22 0.24 0.23
European (Standardised*) 1.56 1.55 1.51 1.15 0.39 0.30 0.34 0.30
Maori (Standardised*) 2.23 2.29 2.39 2.02 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.21
Component of observed difference (European minus Maori) due to:
Underlying Differential -0.61 -0.67 -0.77 -0.79 0.14 0.07 0.08 0.08
Age Structure 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Observed Differential -0.56 -0.60 -0.67 -0.71 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.07
Effect of Age Structure7' -8.48 -10.91 -13.19 -10.25 -13.92 0.65 4.63 -11.08
MINING AND QUARRYIfMG
European 0.52 0.48 0.59 0.52 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.08
Maori 0.99 0.90 1.08 0.91 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.13
European (Standardised*) 0.49 0.46 0.59 0.51 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.08
Maori (Standardised*) 1.10 0.97 1.20 1.00 0.04 0.10 0.17 0.14
Component of observed difference (European minus Maori) due to:
Underlying Differential -0.54 -0.47 -0.55 -0.44 0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06
Age Structure 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observed Differential -0.47 -0.42 -0.49 -0.39 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05
Effect of Age Structure7' -13.06 -10.46 -10.97 -10.66 -35.28 10.67 -6.55 -2.77
Notes: 'Maori standardised to age structure of European workforce, and vice-versa.
A Percentage of Underlying Differential. Positive value denotes additive effect; Negative value denotes offsetting effect. 
Industry Not Specified excluded.
Source: Database A (see Appendix F.3)
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APPENDIX F.5
Occupational Structure of the Maori and Non-Maori Workforces (Full-time plus Part-time, Employed 
Only), by Sex, 1956-1981___________________________________________________________________
1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 Ratio (a)
M ALES
N O N -M A O R I
Adm inistrative/M anagerial 6.4 7.4 7.5 8.0 8.6 8.8 1.4
C lerical workers 7.5 7.9 8.3 6.8 5.9 5.4 0.7
Professionals 7.4 7.9 8.6 11.0 12.8 12.5 1.7
Sales workers 6.9 6.9 7.2 7.1 6.8 6.9 1.0
Supervisors 0.8 0.7 0.7 4.2 4.4 3.9 4.9
Skilled m anual workers 37.7 36.7 36.7 31.3 31.3 31.2 0.8
Unskilled m anual workers 33.0 32.3 30.6 30.9 28.6 28.2 0.9
Not Specified 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.9 1.6 3.0 10.0
T O T A L 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.2 100.0 99.9 1.0
Num ber 591352 633621 701896 734864 803525 806751
MAORI
Adm inistrative/M anagerial 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.0 1.4 1.3 3.3
C lerical workers 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.3
Professionals 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.3 3.0 2.7 1.7
Sales workers 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.4 2.0
Supervisors 1.1 0.5 0.7 1.5 2.2 2.2 2.0
Skilled m anual workers 24.3 24.5 25.7 20.1 21.0 19.3 0.8
Unskilled m anual workers 68.9 68.8 66.9 68.4 63.4 60.9 0.9
Not Specified 1.6 1.4 1.3 3.5 5.4 10.2 6.4
T O T A L 100.1 100.0 100.1 99.9 99.9 100.0 1.0
Num ber 31406 36885 43699 50105 61573 69852
FEM ALES
N O N -M A O R I
Adm in/M anagers 1.7 2.0 2.7 2.2 2.8 3.2 1.9
C lerical workers 27.9 29.4 30.2 32.0 32.3 31.3 1.1
Professionals 16.4 16.7 17.0 17.9 18.9 18.6 1.1
Sales w orkers 13.6 13.5 12.3 11.1 11.2 10.7 0.8
Supervisors 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.2 1.4 14.0
Skilled m anual workers 14.6 13.2 12.8 11.8 11.0 10.8 0.7
Unskilled m anual workers 25.4 25.0 24.4 23.3 20.9 21.0 0.8
NS 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.8 3.2 10.7
T O T A L 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.1 100.1 100.2 1.0
Num ber 185665 213924 265930 313073 379080 421398
M AORI
Adm in/M anagers 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.0 2.0
C lerical w orkers 7.3 7.4 8.0 10.7 12.9 12.2 1.7
Professionals 10.6 9.9 8.8 7.4 8.3 7.1 0.7
Sales w orkers 2.9 3.4 3.6 3.7 4.8 4.0 1.4
Supervisors 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.0 0.9 9.0
Skilled m anual workers 13.5 15.5 16.0 15.9 15.4 13.0 1.0
Unskilled m anual workers 63.5 61.8 59.1 53.9 47.7 48.3 0.8
NS 1.8 1.5 3.9 7.5 9.0 13.5 7.5
T O T A L 100.2 99.9 99.9 100.0 100.1 100.0 1.0
Num ber 8439 10933 14514 20793 28155 34329
IN D EX OF D ISS IM ILAR ITY (Not specified 's included)
Males 36.8 37.7 37.3 40.1 38.6 39.0 1.1
Females 39.6 40.4 41.3 41.2 38.4 39.8 1.0
Notes: (a) Percentage for 1981 Indexed to 1956 (1956=1.00)
Source: Brosnan 1985, Tables 1 ,2  and 3.
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APPENDIX F.8.1
Component Analysis of Occupational Distribution in White Collar Employment, Maori Ethnic Group and 
European Workforces (Full-time plus Part-time, Employed Only) Aged 15-64 Years, by Sex, 1976-1991
MALES FEMALES
1976 1981 1986 1991 1976 1981 1986 1991
CLERICAL WORKERS
European 8.81 8.47 7.99 7.19 34.50 33.53 33.94 32.69
Maori 4.03 4.46 5.16 6.30 20.63 21.15 22.69 26.52
European (Standardised*) 8.45 8.25 7.95 7.22 35.75 34.49 35.18 33.22
Maori (Standardised*) 4.19 4.62 5.28 6.23 19.07 19.87 21.08 24.99
Component of observed difference (European minus Maori) due to:
Underlying Differential 4.52 3.83 2.75 0.94 15.28 13.50 12.67 7.20
Age Structure 0.26 0.19 0.08 -0.05 -1.40 -1.12 -1.43 -1.03
Observed Differential 4.78 4.02 2.83 0.89 13.88 12.38 11.24 6.17
Effect of Age StructureA 5.86 4.98 2.81 -5.47 -9.18 -8.27 -11.27 -14.34
PROFESSIONAL AND Tl ECHNICAL
European 13.45 13.40 14.23 16.52 19.74 19.98 19.32 22.60
Maori 4.40 4.38 5.18 8.96 10.93 10.29 10.70 17.42
European (Standardised*) 13.35 12.84 13.41 15.83 20.54 20.29 18.71 22.01
Maori (Standardised*) 4.45 4.65 5.54 9.55 11.00 10.76 11.69 18.65
Component of observed diffe rence (European minus Maori) due to:
Underlying Differential 8.98 8.61 8.46 6.92 9.18 9.61 7.82 4.27
Age Structure 0.07 0.41 0.59 0.64 -0.37 0.08 0.80 0.91
Observed Differential 9.05 9.02 9.05 7.56 8.81 9.69 8.62 5.18
Effect of Age StructureA 0.82 4.78 6.99 9.29 -4.04 0.81 10.26 21.29
SALES WORKERS
European 10.26 10.18 9.96 11.65 12.93 13.32 12.51 12.99
Maori 3.06 3.43 3.55 5.68 7.16 7.17 6.65 8.68
European (Standardised*) 9.84 9.94 9.91 11.92 12.34 13.07 12.58 13.33
Maori (Standardised*) 3.05 3.35 3.38 5.31 7.10 6.92 6.19 8.07
Component of observed diff arence (European minus Maori) due to:
Underlying Differential 7.00 6.67 6.47 6.29 5.51 6.15 6.12 4.79
Age Structure 0.20 0.08 -0.05 -0.32 0.27 0.00 -0.27 -0.47
Observed Differential 7.20 6.76 6.42 5.97 5.77 6.15 5.86 4.32
Effect of Age Structure7' 2.91 1.23 -0.84 -5.07 4.85 0.01 -4.33 -9.89
ADMINISTRATIVE / MAf\IAGERIAL
European 4.97 5.61 7.80 9.04 0.75 0.84 2.36 3.32
Maori 1.05 1.11 1.54 2.97 0.29 0.37 0.73 1.96
European (Standardised*) 4.12 4.63 6.47 7.95 0.66 0.76 2.15 3.16
Maori (Standardised*) 1.29 1.32 1.83 3.33 0.32 0.41 0.79 2.08
Component of observed difference (European minus Maori) due to:
Underlying Differential 3.38 3.90 5.45 5.34 0.40 0.41 1.50 1.22
Age Structure 0.54 0.60 0.81 0.73 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.14
Observed Differential 3.92 4.49 6.26 6.07 0.46 0.47 1.63 1.36
Effect of Age Structure7' 16.11 15.27 14.89 13.65 16.42 16.11 9.10 11.57
Notes: * Maori data standardised to age structure of European workforce, and vice versa.
A Percentage of Observed Differential. Positive value denotes additive effect; Negative value denotes offsetting effect. 
Occupation Not Specified excluded.
Source: Database A (see Appendix F.7)
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APPENDIX F.8.2
Component Analysis of Occupational Distribution in Blue Collar Employment, Maori Ethnic Group and 
European Workforces (Full-time plus Part-time, Employed Only) Aged 15-64 Years, by Sex, 1976-1991
MALES FEMALES
1976 1981 1986 1991 1976 1981 1986 1991
PRODUCTION, TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT OPERATORS AND LABOURERS
Eu ro pean 45.06 42.54 40.54 35.91 12.91 10.97 9.75 6.91
M aori 71.29 66.17 64.94 55.27 32.55 29.45 28.82 17.88
E u ro pean  (S tandard ised*) 47.09 44.28 42.73 37.48 12.41 10.81 9.90 6.96
M aori (S tandard ised*) 70.22 65.91 64.63 55.14 32.34 28.94 28.21 17.88
C o m p onent of observed  diffe rence (E uropean m inus M aori) due  to:
Underly ing D ifferential -24.68 -22.63 -23.15 -18.51 -19.78 -18.30 -18.69 -10.95
A g e  Structure -1.56 -1.00 -1.25 -0.85 0.14 -0.17 -0.38 -0.02
Observed Differential -26.24 -23.63 -24.40 -19.37 -19.64 -18.47 -19.07 -10.97
Effect of Age StructureA 6.30 4.43 5.40 4.61 -0.71 0.94 2.03 0.21
SERVICE WORKERS
E u ro pean 4.37 6.08 6.07 6.73 13.45 14.43 14.38 14.45
M aori 3.28 6.23 6.58 9.45 22.96 24.66 23.09 22.33
E u ro p ean  (S tandard ised*) 4.22 6.20 6.24 7.00 12.79 13.92 14.23 14.66
M aori (S tandard ised*) 3.49 6.11 6.39 8.96 24.68 26.42 24.77 23.14
C o m p o n en t of observed  diff«srence (E uropean m inus M aori) d u e  to:
Underly ing D ifferential 0.91 -0.03 -0.33 -2.34 -10.70 -11.37 -9.63 -8.18
A g e  Structure 0.18 -0.12 -0.18 -0.39 1.18 1.14 0.91 0.30
Observed Differential 1.09 -0.15 -0.51 -2.73 -9.52 -10.23 -8.71 -7.88
Effect of Age Structure'' 19.35 385.89 55.04 16.46 -11.06 -10.01 -9.49 -3.64
AGRICULTURAL, FORE STRY, FISHING WORKERS AND HUNTERS
Eu ro pean 13.08 13.72 13.40 12.97 5.72 6.92 7.74 7.04
M aori 12.88 14.22 13.05 11.36 5.48 6.92 7.30 5.22
E u ro pean  (S tandard ised*) 12.93 13.85 13.29 12.61 5.51 6.67 7.25 6.66
M aori (S tandard ised*) 13.32 14.04 12.95 11.48 5.50 6.68 7.26 5.20
C o m p onent of observed  diff erence (European  m inus M aori) due  to:
Underly ing D ifferential -0.09 -0.34 0.34 1.37 0.12 0.00 0.21 1.64
A g e  Structure 0.29 -0.16 0.00 0.24 0.12 0.01 0.22 0.18
Observed Differential 0.20 -0.50 0.35 1.61 0.24 0.01 0.43 1.82
Effect of Age Structure'' -309.83 45.35 0.69 17.38 94.40 -722.06 104.84 11.00
Notes: * Maori data standardised to age structure of European workforce, and vice versa.
A Percentage of Observed Differential. Positive value denotes additive effect; Negative value denotes offsetting effect. 
Occupation Not Specified excluded.
Source: Database A (see Appendix F.7)
CO
CO
LL
><QZLUCL
Q.<
o>05
TJ"
CD
N.05
T“
CO
>.
JQ
W0)o
o
c
n0)a
oi_3LU
TJcCO
o
CO2
3
3
isCO
75c
o
Toa3a
o
LO CO 
CO CO
00 05
05 IT5 h- OO 
h- CO 
CM CM
O  CO05
CO 05 
CM CM
CO CO 1- CO
05 Ö  
CM CO
05 CO 
O  -M- 
CM 1- 
CM CM
05
CM CM
CO CM 
CM h-
^  CO 
CM CM
"O' O  CM Tf
CO CO 
CM CM
t
E
Wi
o
c
X
a>T3c
cu
T3 3
o
■D 
a> «  c o  - a
'S % 
-o 'Sc  c c  co ~o
s  IZ> 03
CM
06
LL■ a
CO
5
ul
</)8
1Q-
<
CD1<
©<0JO
iS
» 8
I  sZ  CO
APPENDIX G
APPENDIX G.1.1
Component Analysis of Ethnie Differentials for Highest Educational Qualification, 
Maori and European Populations Aged 15+ Years, by Sex, 1981-1991___________
MALES FEM ALES
1981 1986 1991 1981 1986 1991
SECO NDARY SCHOOL Q UALIFICATIO NS ONLY
European (observed) 25.93 26.10 26.67 27.87 31.29 33.63
Maori (observed) 18.68 19.97 21.34 21.48 24.18 25.79
European (standardised*) 32.71 31.02 30.63 36.39 37.59 37.43
Maori (standardised*) 14.58 16.91 17.94 16.14 19.69 21.65
Component of observed differe nee (European minus Maori) due to:
Underlying Differential 12.69 10.11 9.01 13.32 12.50 11.81
Aqe Structure -5.44 -3.99 -3.69 -6.93 -5.39 -3.97
Observed Differential 7.24 6.12 5.32 6.39 7.11 7.84
Effect of Age StructureA -42.91 -39.45 -40.92 -52.00 -43.10 -33.58
OTHER TERTIARY QUALIF ICATIONS
European (observed) 21.69 31.93 36.33 17.09 22.92 28.32
Maori (observed) 8.84 17.67 23.47 6.51 11.76 19.60
European (standardised*) 20.92 29.87 34.91 17.80 23.51 29.79
Maori (standardised*) 8.86 17.99 23.21 6.21 11.34 17.80
Component of observed differenee (European minus Maori) due to:
Underlying Differential 12.45 13.07 12.28 11.09 11.67 10.36
Aqe Structure 0.40 1.19 0.59 -0.51 -0.50 -1.63
Observed Differential 12.85 14.26 12.86 10.58 11.17 8.73
Effect of Age Structure'' 3.19 9.11 4.77 -4.57 -4.31 -15.76
BACHELO RS /  POST G RAt3UATE QUALIFICATIONS
European (observed) 5.59 7.50 8.22 2.78 4.34 5.41
Maori (observed) 0.95 1.47 1.88 0.45 0.94 1.39
European (standardised*) 5.40 7.33 8.17 3.03 4.80 6.15
Maori (standardised*) 1.04 1.56 1.90 0.42 0.86 1.24
Component of observed differejnce (European minus Maori) due to:
Underlying Differential 4.50 5.90 6.30 2.47 3.67 4.46
Aqe Structure 0.14 0.13 0.03 -0.14 -0.27 -0.44
Observed Differential 4.64 6.03 6.33 2.33 3.40 4.03
Effect of Age Structure7' 3.11 2.23 0.48 -5.53 -7.35 -9.81
STILL AT S C H O O L /N O  Q UALIFICATIONS
European (observed) 46.79 34.47 28.79 52.26 41.45 32.63
Maori (observed) 71.53 60.89 53.30 71.56 63.12 53.23
European (standardised*) 40.97 31.79 26.29 42.78 34.10 26.64
Maori (standardised*) 75.52 63.54 56.95 77.22 68.10 59.30
Component of observed difference (European minus Maori) due to:
Underlying Differential -29.64 -29.08 -27.59 -26.88 -27.84 -26.63
Aqe Structure 4.91 2.67 3.07 7.57 6.16 6.04
Observed Differential -24.74 -26.42 -24.52 -19.31 -21.68 -20.60
Effect of Age Structure7' -16.56 -9.17 -11.13 -28.17 -22.13 -22.66
INDEX OF DISSIMILARITY** 28.73 29.07 28.16 24.97 26.66 26.68
Notes: 'Data for Maori standardised to age structure of European population, and vice versa.
APercentage of Underlying Differential. Positive value denotes additive effect; 
"Data for Maori standardised to age structure of European population. 
Negative value denotes offsetting effect.
Source: Database B (see Appendix G.1.2)
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APPENDIX G.1.3
Highest Qualification: Percentage of Age Group Not Specifying a Qualification 
(Population Aged 15+ Years), by Sex and Ethnicity, 1981-1991_______________
MALES FEMALES
1981 1986 1991 1981 1986 1991
EUROPEAN
15-19 4.15 2.31 2.63 3.23 1.84 2.30
20-24 3.97 1.54 1.27 3.62 1.26 1.01
25-29 4.15 1.59 1.23 4.76 1.43 1.05
30-34 5.38 1.76 1.14 7.04 2.10 1.07
35-39 6.78 2.21 1.28 8.71 3.25 1.41
40-44 7.83 2.71 1.51 9.67 4.12 2.12
45-49 8.78 3.28 1.79 11.08 4.82 2.74
50-54 10.16 3.66 2.17 12.45 5.42 3.36
55-59 11.30 4.63 2.56 13.81 7.56 4.09
60-64 13.56 7.10 3.57 15.90 10.73 5.91
65-69 14.60 9.61 4.42 17.41 13.79 6.48
70-74 16.03 11.66 5.14 18.71 15.24 7.37
75+ 18.62 14.28 6.94 19.02 17.34 9.08
TOTAL 8.09 3.99 2.35 9.85 5.83 3.31
NUMBER 78192 40635 24369 98271 61833 36012
MAORI ET HNIC GROUP
15-19 8.31 6.53 6.86 8.02 6.00 5.81
20-24 8.16 4.29 3.31 8.49 4.01 2.91
25-29 9.40 4.25 3.15 10.63 4.25 2.91
30-34 10.86 4.71 3.23 13.53 6.08 3.58
35-39 12.91 5.62 3.69 16.10 7.94 4.25
40-44 14.16 6.93 3.92 16.03 10.48 5.48
45-49 14.96 8.64 4.43 16.28 11.42 6.49
50-54 15.78 9.40 5.80 18.07 12.23 7.32
55-59 16.78 11.71 6.59 16.65 15.47 8.66
60-64 16.69 12.94 7.12 17.43 16.34 9.82
65-69 15.53 14.13 8.48 17.79 16.86 10.55
70-74 17.32 17.96 9.62 17.69 18.90 11.03
75+ 19.46 19.90 11.84 16.49 20.00 11.93
TOTAL 11.07 6.53 4.71 12.15 7.61 5.03
NUMBER 12186 7941 6201 13602 9564 7041
APPENDIX G.2.1
Percentage Point Gap Between European and Maori In Highest Qualification at Each Age, by Cohort and Sex, 1981-1991
SECONDARY SCHOOL QUALIFICATIONS ONLY
Cohort Born: 15-19 | 20-24 | 25-29 | 30-34 | 35-39 | 40-44 | 45-49 | 50-54 | 55-59 | 60-64
MALES
1967-71 25.35 9.08
1962-66 26.44 12.15 5.00
1957-61 15.26 6.25 5.19
1952-56 11.10 7.66 6.95
1947-51 9.26 7.01 6.42
1942-46 8.90 5.19 5.72
1937-41 6.78 2.04 2.99
1932-36 6.46 2.64 3.36
1927-31 7.32 3.92 5.88
FEMALES
1967-71 26.01 12.13
1962-66 27.61 16.07 11.07
1957-61 16.56 9.59 8.80
1952-56 11.27 8.74 7.77
1947-51 10.83 8.17 6.50
1942-46 11.20 8.16 7.89
1937-41 7.70 5.21 5.94
1932-36 6.80 6.13 7.24
1927-31 7.23 7.32 12.03
OTHER TERTIARY QUALIFICATIONS
Cohort Bom: 15-19 | 20-24 | 25-29 | 30-34 ] 35-39 | 40-44 | 45-49 | 50-54 | 55-59 | 60-64
MALES
1967-71 0.08 10.58
1962-66 1.35 12.52 14.03
1957-61 14.64 15.83 14.98
1952-56 15.74 14.47 12.80
1947-51 15.56 13.51 12.31
1942-46 17.62 17.37 16.10
1937-41 18.20 18.83 17.67
1932-36 17.04 18.35 19.38
1927-31 16.60 19.81 19.75
FEMALES
1967-71 2.01 9.38
1962-66 2.87 13.06 12.22
1957-61 15.32 17.94 15.74
1952-56 16.85 17.33 14.73
1947-51 15.40 15.05 14.27
1942-46 14.55 14.12 13.78
1937-41 14.17 11.92 10.72
1932-36 11.12 9.83 9.43
1927-31 9.85 9.04 9.35
(continued over)
APPENDIX G.2.1 (continued)
Percentage Point Gap Between European and Maori in Highest Qualification at Each Age, by Cohort and Sex, 1981*1991
BACHELORS/POST-GRADUATE QUALIFICATIONS
Cohort Born: 15-19 | 20-24  | 25-29 | 30-34 | 35-39 | 40-44 | 45-49 | 50-54 | 55-59  | 60-64
MALES
1967-71 0.09 6.38
1962-66 0.01 5.75 8.35
1957-61 4.95 9.08 9.82
1952-56 8.21 9.79 10.08
1947-51 8.53 9.85 9.84
1942-46 6.57 7.67 7.35
1937-41 5.02 6.22 5.63
1932-36 4.07 4.70 4.39
1927-31 3.70 4.49 3.76
FEMALES
1967-71 0.00 6.40
1962-66 0.03 5.11 7.58
1957-61 4 .03 6.62 7.36
1952-56 5.19 6.54 6.89
1947-51 3.95 5.22 5.34
1942-46 3.16 3.77 3.67
1937-41 2.31 3.01 2.72
1932-36 1.87 2.42 2.53
1927-31 1.91 2.21 2.22
STILL AT SCHOOL/NO QUALIFICATIONS
Cohort Bom: 15-19 | 20-24  | 25-29 | 30-34 | 35-39 | 40-44 | 45-49 | 50-54 | 55-59 I 60-64
MALES
1967-71 -25.52 -26.05
1962-66 -27.80 -30.43 -27.37
1957-61 -34.85 -31.16 -29.99
1952-56 -35.04 -31.92 -29.82
1947-51 -33.35 -30.38 -28.57
1942-46 -33.10 -30.23 -29.17
1937-41 -29.99 -27.09 -26.29
1932-36 -27.58 -25.69 -27.14
1927-31 -27.62 -28.23 -29.40
FEMALES
1967-71 -28.02 -27.91
1962-66 -30.50 -34.23 -30.87
1957-61 -35.92 -34.14 -31.90
1952-56 -33.31 -32.61 -29.39
1947-51 -30.19 -28.43 -26.12
1942-46 -28.90 -26.05 -25.34
1937-41 -24.19 -20.14 -19.39
1932-36 -19.78 -18.38 -19.20
1927-31 -18.99 -18.57 -23.60
Source: Database B (see Appendix G. 1.2)
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APPENDIX G.2.2
G.2.2.1: Percentage of Population at Each Age with Secondary School Qualifications as Highest Qualification, 
by Cohort and Ethnicity, Males, 1981-1991
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APPENDIX G.2.2 (continued)
G.2.2.2: Percentage of Population at Each Age with Secondary School Qualifications as Highest Qualification, 
by Cohort and Ethnicity, Females, 1981-1991
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APPENDIX G.2.2 (continued) Source: Database B (see Appendix G.1.2)
G.2.2.3: Percentage of Population at Each Age with Other Tertiary Qualifications as Highest Qualification, 
by Cohort and Ethnicity, Males, 1981-1991
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APPENDIX G.2.2 (continued)
G.2.2.4: Percentage of Population at Each Age with Other Tertiary Qualifications as Highest Qualification, 
by Cohort and Ethnicity, Females, 1981-1991
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APPENDIX G.2.2 (continued)
G.2.2.5: Percentage of Population at Each Age with Bachelors/Post-Graduate Qualifications as Highest 
Qualification, by Cohort and Ethnicity, Males, 1981-1991
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APPENDIX G.2.2 (continued)
G.2.2.6: Percentage of Population at Each Age with Bachelors/Post-Graduate Qualifications as Highest 
Qualification, by Cohort and Ethnicity, Females, 1981-1991
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APPENDIX G.2.2 (continued)
G.2.2.7: Percentage of Population at Each Age Still at School/No Qualifications as Highest Qualification, 
by Cohort and Ethnicity, Males, 1981-1991
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APPENDIX G.2.2 (continued)
G.2.2.8: Percentage of Population at Each Age Still at School/No Qualifications as Highest Qualification, 
by Cohort and Ethnicity, Females, 1981-1991
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APPENDIX G.3.1
Highest Qualification by Labour Force Status and Sex (Percentage in Each 
Category), Population Aged 15-64 Years, Maori and European, 1981-1991
STILL AT SCHOOUNO QUALIFICATIONS
MALES FEMALES
1981 I 1986 | 1991 1981 1986 | 1991
EUROPEAN
Full-Time 79.66 74.29 61.57 28.02 32.44 29.28
Part-Time 2.54 4.55 5.11 17.01 17.33 17.34
Unemployed 3.28 4.66 8.44 1.97 5.04 5.00
Not in the Labour Force 14.52 16.51 24.88 52.99 45.19 48.37
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number 340278 280044 239700 360621 314409 256566
MAORI ETHNIC GROlJP
Full-Time 73.87 64.64 40.85 27.79 30.48 19.70
Part-Time 1.63 6.49 4.38 8.92 9.94 8.31
Unemployed 11.58 12.38 17.92 7.53 12.03 11.32
Not in the Labour Force 12.92 16.49 36.85 55.76 47.55 60.67
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number 66858 66414 63792 66981 69750 66798
INDEX OF DISSIMILARITY- 8.30 9.67 21.45 8.32 9.35 18.61
SECONDARY SCHOOL QUALIFICATIONS ONLY
MALES FEMALES
1981 i 1986 I 1991 1981 1986 | 1991
EUROPEAN
Full-Time 77.78 74.76 62.35 43.34 44.52 37.76
Part-Time 3.66 4.48 7.03 15.67 15.70 18.57
Unemployed 2.48 5.10 7.91 2.35 6.05 6.40
Not in the Labour Force 16.09 15.66 22.71 38.64 33.73 37.27
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number 219090 229236 228024 238251 278403 285693
MAORI ETHNIC GROlJP
Full-Time 76.07 70.60 48.65 43.06 43.32 30.49
Part-Time 2.83 5.89 6.10 10.58 11.16 11.72
Unemployed 5.66 9.22 15.34 5.71 11.39 12.77
Not in the Labour Force 15.44 14.29 29.92 40.65 34.13 45.01
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number 18129 22299 26136 20976 27657 33450
INDEX OF DISSIMILARITY^ 3.18 5.53 14.64 5.36 5.73 14.11
OTHER TERTIARY QUALIFICATIONS
MALES FEMALES
1981 \ 1986 ) 1991 1981 1 1986 i 1991
EUROPEAN
Full-Time 94.02 89.30 79.74 46.77 51.14 48.84
Part-Time 1.46 2.72 3.85 21.12 19.83 20.42
Unemployed 1.24 1.65 5.66 1.49 3.54 5.72
Not in the Labour Force 3.28 6.33 10.75 30.62 25.49 25.01
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number 180861 282387 324396 141831 206742 266223
MAORI ETHNIC GROlJP
Full-Time 94.26 85.88 63.37 55.44 57.16 41.37
Part-Time 1.27 4.15 4.25 14.84 12.82 11.81
Unemployed 2.36 4.93 15.79 3.71 8.03 14.72
Not in the Labour Force 2.11 5.04 16.58 26.01 21.98 32.10
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number 8514 19647 28707 6309 13404 25572
INDEX OF DISSIMILARITY- 1.36 4.71 16.37 10.89 10.52 16.09
BACHELORS/POST-GRADUATE QUALIFICATIONS
MALES FEMALES
1981 I 1986 | 1991 1981 I 1986 | 1991
EUROPEAN
Full-Time 89.45 89.34 83.98 52.91 58.72 58.40
Part-Time 3.34 3.04 4.12 18.52 17.37 17.72
Unemployed 1.57 2.02 4.26 2.77 3.90 5.02
Not in the Labour Force 5.63 5.59 7.65 25.80 20.01 18.86
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number 45948 67806 76242 23373 40647 53754
MAORI ETHNIC GROlJP
Full-Time 85.48 85.08 73.67 59.44 66.94 59.34
Part-Time 5.61 4.24 5.06 16.08 10.56 11.15
Unemployed 1.32 3.68 8.43 4.90 8.06 7.70
Not in the Labour Force 7.59 7.00 12.84 19.58 14.44 21.80
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number 909 1629 2313 429 1080 1830
INDEX OF DISSIMILARITY" 4.22 4.26 10.31 8.66 12.38 6.57
Notes: Excludes Qualifications Not Specified
'Percentage European minus percentage Maori. 
Source: Database B
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APPENDIX H
APPENDIX H.1
Mean Income (in $1991), Maori and Non-Maori, by Sex, 1951-1991
MALES FEMALES
Dollars Per Cent Dollars Per Cent
Non-Maori Maori Maori/N-M Non-Maori Maori Maori/N-M
ACTIVELY ENGAGED
1951 21,848 13,705 62.73 10,501 8,024 76.41
1956 27,722 16,600 59.88 11,716 9,397 80.21
1961 28,971 19,127 66.02 12,532 11,561 92.25
1966 30,253 21,160 69.94 13,923 11,303 81.18
1971 32,054 23,164 72.27 15,388 12,287 79.85
1976 37,145 27,189 73.20 18,553 16,846 90.80
1981 39,407 30,836 78.25 21,310 19,327 90.69
1986 33,520 25,829 77.06 19,555 17,316 88.55
1991 31,892 24,209 75.91 18,498 17,384 93.98
TOTAL (Aclive ly  Engaged plus Not Actively Engaged)
1951 18,807 11,659 61.99 3,534 2,119 59.96
1956* 21,833 14,050 64.35 4,054 2,600 64.13
1961 24,958 16,441 65.87 4,573 3,082 67.40
1966 26,047 18,478 70.94 5,571 3,602 64.66
1971 27,191 19,687 72.40 6,709 4,766 71.04
1976 30,751 22,148 72.02 9,211 6,644 72.13
1981 31,546 24,215 76.76 11,216 8,609 76.76
1986 28,296 21,585 76.28 14,668 12,557 85.61
1991 24,978 16,669 66.73 14,639 11,890 81.22
Notes: ‘ Data for 1956 interpolated by Martin.
All data CPI adjusted to $1991 (see Chapter 5).
Maori/N-M = Maori incomes as percentage of Non-Maori Incomes 
Martin 1997, Figure 5 (Data kindly provided by Martin).Source:
APPENDIX H.2
Mean Income (in $1991), by Labour Force Status, Sex and Ethnicity, Crude Mean 
Income Differential, and Maori Mean Income as a Percentage of European Mean 
Income, by Labour Force Status and Sex, Population Aged 15-64 Years, 1981-1991
MALES FEMALES
1981 1986 1991 1981 1986 1991
EUROPEAN
Full-Time 38,485 32,973 33,331 24,428 22,018 23,651
Part-Time 16,141 19,612 16,066 11,937 11,052 11,843
Unemployed 9,960 9,170 10,184 7,096 6,379 8,082
Not in the Labour Force 8,917 10,468 9,766 5,376 7,377 8,026
TOTAL 33,903 28,945 26,819 13,775 14,355 15,213
Income not specified (%)* 5.6 2.4 2.2 8.3 5.8 5.4
MAORI ETHNIC GRO UP
Full-Time 29,597 25,258 25,158 20,792 17,817 18,815
Part-Time 13,467 20,113 14,805 10,292 10,166 10,316
Unemployed 6,463 8,572 8,290 3,991 7,086 8,151
Not in the Labour Force 4,475 7,392 7,433 4,131 7,326 8,224
TOTAL 24,429 21,073 16,786 10,676 12,119 11,894
Income not specified (%)* 12.2 7.0 6.8 15.8 14.1 10.4
INCOME DIFFERENTIAL (European Mean Income Minus Maori Mean Income)
Full-Time 8,888 7,715 8,172 3,636 4,200 4,837
Part-Time 2,674 -501 1,262 1,645 886 1,527
Unemployed 3,497 599 1,894 3,105 -706 -70
Not in the Labour Force 4,442 3,076 2,333 1,245 51 -198
TOTAL 9,474 7,872 10,032 3,100 2,236 3,318
MAORI INCOME AS FPERCENTAGE OF EUROPEAN I MCOME (Income Relativity)
Full-Time 76.91 76.60 75.48 85.12 80.92 79.55
Part-Time 83.44 102.55 92.15 86.22 91.98 87.11
Unemployed 64.89 93.47 81.40 56.24 111.07 100.86
Not in the Labour Force 50.19 70.61 76.11 76.84 99.31 102.47
TOTAL 72.06 72.80 62.59 77.50 84.42 78.19
Notes: * As a percentage of all persons not specifying an income.
Source: Database B
APPENDIX H. 3
Maori Mean Income (in $1991) Standardised to European Age Structure, and to 
European Age-Qualification Structure, by Labour Force Status and Sex; 
Standardised Mean Income Differentials; and Standardised Mean Income
Relativities (Maori Mean Income as a Percentage of European Mean Income), 
by Labour Force Status and Sex, Population Aged 15-64 Years, 1981-1991
MALES FEMALES
1981 1986 1991 1981 1986 1991
MAORI (Standardised to
Full-Time
Part-Time
Unemployed
Not in the  Labour Force
r Age)
31,164 26,633 26,138
14,327 19,199 14,364
7,115 8,531 8,339
5,643 7,952 7,487
21,279 18,273 19,053
11,062 10,611 10,753
4,601 7,111 8,068
4,873 7,676 8,258
TOTAL 26,204 22,332 17,938 11,239 12,454 12,292
MAORI (Standardised fc
Full-Time
Part-Time
Unemployed
Not in the  Labour Force
r Age and Qualifications)
33,690 28,887 28,676
14,307 19,692 13,852
7,421 8,416 7,990
6,308 8,599 7,715
23,282 20431 21,778
12,379 11557 11,689
4,894 6980 8,201
5,037 7717 8,369
TOTAL 28,652 24,415 20,475 12,945 13,556 13,568
ETHNIC DIFFERENTIAL
Full-Time
Part-Time
Unemployed
Not in the  Labour Force
. (1) European Mean Income mint 
7,321 6,340 7,193
1,814 414 1,702
2,845 639 1,844
3,274 2,516 2,279
s Maori Mean Income
3,149 3,745 4,598
875 440 1,090
2,496 -731 13
503 -299 -232
TOTAL 7,700 6,613 8,881 2,536 1,902 2,921
ETHNIC DIFFERENTIA
Full-Time
Part-Time
Unemployed
Not in the  Labour Force
L (2) European Mean Income min 
4,795 4,086 4,655
1,834 -79 2,214
2,539 754 2,194
2,609 1,869 2,051
us Maori Mean Income
1,146 1,587 1,873
-442 -505 154
2,202 -601 -119
339 -340 -344
TOTAL 5,251 4,530 6,343 831 800 1,645
MAORI MEAN INCOME AS PERCENTAGE OF EUROPEAN MEAN INCOME (1)
Full-Time 80.98 80.77 78.42 87.11 82.99 80.56
Part-Time 88.76 97.89 89.41 92.67 96.02 90.79
Unemployed 71.44 93.03 81.89 64.83 111.47 99.83
Not in the Labour Force 63.29 75.97 76.66 90.65 104.06 102.89
TOTAL 77.29 77.15 66.89 81.59 86.75 80.80
MAORI MEAN INCOME AS PERCENTAGE OF EUROPEAN MEAN INCOME (2)
Full-Time 87.54 87.61 86.03 95.31 92.79 92.08
Part-Time 88.64 100.40 86.22 103.70 104.57 98.70
Unemployed 74.51 91.78 78.46 68.97 109.41 101.48
Not in the Labour Force 70.75 82.15 79.00 93.70 104.62 104.28
TOTAL 84.51 84.35 76.35 93.97 94.43 89.19
Notes: (1) Standardised to European Age Structure
(2) Standardised to European A^e and Qualification Structure
Database BSource:
APPENDIX H. 1+
Mean Income (in $1991), by Highest Qualification, Sex and Ethnicity; Crude Mean 
Income Differential; and Maori Mean Income as a Percentage of European Mean 
Income, by Highest Qualification and Sex, Population Aged 15-64 Years, 1981-1991
MALES FEMALES
1981 1986 1991 1981 1986 1991
EUROPEAN
Still at School/No Qualifications 30,569 23,534 20,321 10,993 11,412 11,681
Secondary School Quals. Only 28,644 24,025 21,768 13,403 13,224 13,160
Bachelors/Post-Graduate Quals. 54,486 48,477 48,620 24,598 23,834 26,282
Other Tertiary Qualifications 40,767 33,663 29,977 18,721 17,682 17,908
Qualifications Not Specified 32,067 22,686 17,773 12,709 11,979 11,476
TOTAL 33,903 28,945 26,819 13,775 14,355 15,213
Income not specified (%)* 5.6 2.4 2.2 8.3 5.8 5.4
MAORI ETHNIC GROUP 
Still at School/No Qualifications 22,324 18,545 14,128 8,834 10,296 10,203
Secondary School Quals. Only 23,252 19,864 15,222 11,991 12,095 11,347
Bachelors/Post-Graduate Quals. 46,139 37,753 37,226 25,244 23,783 24,484
Other Tertiary Qualifications 35,385 27,927 21,399 19,504 17,311 15,051
Qualifications Not Specified 24,753 17,230 12,751 10,445 10,565 10,206
TOTAL 24,429 21,073 16,786 10,676 12,119 11,894
Income not specified (%)* 12.2 7.0 6.8 15.8 14.1 10.4
INCOME DIFFERENTIAL (European Mean Income Minus Maori Mean Income)
Still at School/No Qualifications 8,245 4,989 6,193 2,159 1,116 1,478
Secondary School Quals. Only 5,392 4,161 6,546 1,413 1,129 1,813
Bachelors/Post-Graduate Quals. 8,347 10,724 11,394 -646 51 1,797
Other Tertiary Qualifications 5,381 5,736 8,579 -783 371 2,857
Qualifications Not Specified 7,313 5,456 5,022 2,264 1,414 1,270
TOTAL 9,474 7,872 10,032 3,100 2,236 3,318
MAORI INCOME AS PERCENTAGE OF EUROPEAN INCOME (Income Relativity)
Still at School/No Qualifications 73.03 78.80 69.53 80.36 90.22 87.35
Secondary School Quals. Only 81.17 82.68 69.93 89.46 91.46 86.23
Bachelors/Post-Graduate Quals. 84.68 77.88 76.57 102.63 99.79 93.16
Other Tertiary Qualifications 86.80 82.96 71.38 104.18 97.90 84.05
Qualifications Not Specified 77.19 75.95 71.74 82.18 88.20 88.93
TOTAL 72.06 72.80 62.59 77.50 84.42 78.19
Notes: ’ As a percentage of all persons.
Source: Database B
APPENDIX H.5
Maori Mean Income (in $1991) Standardised to European Age Structure, and to European 
Age-Labour Force Structure, by Highest Qualification and Sex; Standardised Mean Income 
Differentials, and Standardised Mean Income Relativities (Maori Mean Income as a 
Percentage of European Mean Income), by Highest Qualification and Sex, Population 
Aged 15-64 Years, 1981-1991______________________________________________________
MALES FEM ALES
1981 1986 1991 1981 1986 1991
MAORI (S tandardised for Age) 
Still at Schoo l/N o Q ualifications 
S econdary School Quals. Only 
Bacheiors/P ost-G raduate  Quals. 
O ther Tertia ry Q ualifications
24,174 19,766 15,086
25,684 20,829 16,640
48,004 39,965 41,218
36,633 28,765 22,635
9,732 10,706 10,393
12,572 12,245 11,939
25,959 24,340 25,641
20,476 17,985 16,202
TOTAL* 26,204 22,332 17,938 11,239 12,454 12,292
MAORI (S tandardised fo r Age anc 
Still at S choo l/N o Q ualifications 
Secondary School Quals. Only 
Bache lors/P ost-G raduate  Quals. 
O ther Tertia ry Q ualifications
Labour Force Status)
25,298 20,838 17,790
25,653 21,430 18,526
47,887 40,947 43,117
36,994 29,488 25,304
10,198 11,061 11,177
12,905 12,652 12,755
22,882 22,610 25,245
19,142 17,578 16,983
TOTAL* 27,076 23,356 20,965 11,948 12,579 12,985
ETHNIC  D IFFE R EN TIA L (1) Euro 
Still at Schoo l/N o Q ualifications 
Secondary School Quals. Only 
Bachelors/P ost-G raduate  Quals. 
O ther Tertia ry Q ualifications
pean Mean Incom e m inus Maori f 
6,395  3 ,768 5,235
2,961 3,196 5,128
6,482 8,512 7,402
4,134 4,898 7,343
lean Incom e
1,261 707 1,288
832 978 1,221
-1,362 -506 641
-1,755 -303 1,707
TOTAL* 7,700 6,613 8,881 2,536 1,902 2,921
ETHNIC D IFFER EN TIAL (2)
Still at S choo l/N o Q ualifica tions 
Secondary School Quals. Only 
Bache lors/P ost-G raduate  Quals. 
O ther Tertia ry  Q ualifications
5,271 2,696 2,531
2,991 2,595 3,242
6,599 7,530 5,504
3,773 4,175 4,674
795 352 504
498 571 405
1,716 1,224 1,037
-421 104 925
TOTAL* 6,827 5,589 5,854 1,828 1,776 2,228
MAORI M EAN INCOME AS A PE 
Still at Schoo l/N o Q ualifica tions 
Secondary School Quals. Only 
Bache lors/P ost-G raduate  Quals. 
O ther Tertia ry Q ualifications
RCENTAGE OF EURO PEAN M E / 
79.08 83.99 74.24
89.66 86.70 76.44
88.10 82.44 84.78
89.86 85.45 75.51
kN INCOM E (1)
88.53 93.81 88.97
93.79 92.60 90.72
105.54 102.12 97.56
109.37 1 01.71 90.47
TOTAL* 77.29 77.15 66.89 81.59 86.75 80.80
MAORI M EAN INCOME AS A PE 
Still at S choo l/N o Q ualifica tions 
S econdary School Quals. Only 
Bache lors/P ost-G raduate  Quals. 
O ther Tertia ry  Q ualifications
RCENTAGE OF EUROPEAN M E/ 
82.76 88.54 87.55
89.56 89.20 85.11
87.89 84.47 88.68
90.74 87.60 84.41
^N INCOM E (2)
92.77 96.92 95.68
96.28 95.68 96.92
93.03 94.86 96.05
102.25 99.41 94.84
TOTAL* 79.86 80.69 78.17 86.73 87.63 85.36
Notes: (1) Standardised to European Age Structure
(2) Standardised to European Age and Labour Force Structure 
Total includes Income for those who did not specify their qualifications. 
Database BSource:
3*°i
APPENDIX H.6
Mean Total Income (in $1991), by Age, Sex and Ethnicity, and Maori 
Mean Total Income as a Percentage of European Mean Total Income, 
by Sex and Age, Population Aged 15-64 Years, 1981-1991__________
MALES FEMALES
Age Group 1981 1986 1991 1981 1986 1991
EUROPEAN
15-19 9,232 8,202 5,553 7,487 7,182 5,052
20-24 25,071 21,848 17,727 17,314 16,990 15,448
25-29 34,402 29,211 26,227 14,255 16,166 17,921
30-34 41,523 33,784 31,853 13,312 14,231 16,466
35-39 44,466 37,458 34,937 15,432 15,502 17,246
40-44 45,015 38,370 36,768 16,479 16,691 18,650
45-49 43,527 37,465 35,853 15,598 16,355 18,229
50-54 41,952 35,089 33,073 13,881 14,608 16,042
55-59 38,562 32,714 28,238 11,920 12,822 13,301
60-64 31,058 24,834 20,797 14,089 14,028 13,167
Total 33,903 28,945 26,819 13,775 14,355 15,213
MAORI ETH NIC GROUP
15-19 9,295 8,658 5,230 6,094 7,379 5,254
20-24 22,391 18,940 13,640 11,042 13,092 12,476
25-29 28,539 23,642 18,095 10,604 12,989 13,285
30-34 32,110 26,302 21,240 12,046 13,154 13,737
35-39 32,987 28,135 23,173 13,713 14,099 14,602
40-44 33,916 27,687 23,925 14,150 14,289 14,687
45-49 32,027 27,876 22,958 13,553 14,252 13,869
50-54 30,106 25,701 21,382 11,912 13,155 12,869
55-59 27,689 23,891 17,990 10,799 11,640 11,275
60-64 22,827 17,520 13,084 11,765 11,516 10,236
Total 24,429 21,073 16,786 10,676 12,119 11,894
MAORI INCOME AS PERCENTAGE OF EUROPEAN INCOME (Income Relativity)
15-19 100.68 105.56 94.19 81.40 102.74 104.00
20-24 89.31 86.69 76.95 63.78 77.06 80.76
25-29 82.96 80.94 68.99 74.39 80.34 74.13
30-34 77.33 77.85 66.68 90.49 92.43 83.43
35-39 74.18 75.11 66.33 88.86 90.95 84.67
40-44 75.34 72.16 65.07 85.87 85.60 78.75
45-49 73.58 74.41 64.03 86.89 87.14 76.08
50-54 71.76 73.24 64.65 85.81 90.05 80.22
55-59 71.80 73.03 63.71 90.59 90.78 84.76
60-64 73.50 70.55 62.91 83.51 82.10 77.74
Total 72.06 72.80 62.59 77.50 84.42 78.19
Source: Database B
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APPENDIX I
APPENDIX 1.1
Cohort Size at Age 20-24, Percentage of 20-24 Year Olds in Employment 
(Employment to Population Ratio), and Percentage of 20-24 Year Olds in 
Employment Within the Labour Force, by Sex and Cohort, 1945-1991
Year of Observation MALES
and Year Number Employment as Percentage of
of Birth of Cohort Aged 20-24 Years Population* Labour Force*
1945 (Born 1921-25) 50223
1951 (Bom 1927-31) 71716 93.28 98.65
1956 (Bom 1932-36) 69180 94.81 98.77
1961 (Bom 1937-41) 80043
1966 (Bom 1942-46) 97394 92.79 99.15
1971 (Bom 1947-51) 119447
1976 (Born 1952-56) 131644 89.81 97.17
1981 (Born 1957-61) 137424 88.01 93.62
1986 (Bom 1962-66) 143052 87.42 92.05
1991 (Bom 1967-71) 135978 69.35 81.94
Year of Observation FEMALES
and Year Number Employment as Percentage of
of Birth of Cohort Aged 20-24 Years Population* Labour Force*
1945 (Born 1921-25) 70718
1951 (Bom 1927-31) 68957 52.38 98.66
1956 (Born 1932-36) 66491 49.73 98.34
1961 (Born 1937-41) 78020
1966 (Bom 1942-46) 93258 51.72 97.79
1971 (Bom 1947-51) 115512
1976 (Bom 1952-56) 127931 58.07 96.28
1981 (Born 1957-61) 132219 62.08 93.16
1986 (Bom 1962-66) 139842 67.49 89.64
1991 (Born 1967-71) 135117 58.94 83.22
Notes: ’ at 20-24 Years of age.
Source: Census of Population and Dwellings, various years
4APPENDIX 1.2
Cohort Size at Age 20-24, and Mean Income at Age 20-24 as a Percentage of 
Mean Income of Males Aged 25-54, by Sex and Cohort, 1945-1991__________
Y e a r o f O bse rva tion  
and Year 
o f B irth  o f C ohort
M ALES
N um ber
A ged 20-24  Years
Incom e R e la tive  to  2 5 -5 4  Y e a r O ld  M ales
M arke t Incom e T o ta l Incom e
1945 (Born 1921-25) 50223 64.9
1951 (B om  1927-31) 71716 63.4
1956 (B om  1932-36) 69180 62.7
1961 (B om  1937-41) 80043 64.7
1966 (B om  1942-46) 97394 73.7
1971 (B om  1947-51) 119447 80.3
1976 (B om  1952-56) 131644 69.7
1981 (B om  1957-61) 137424 59.9 60.2
1986 (Bom  1962-66) 143052 61.8 62.1
1991 (Bom  1967-71) 135978 54.7 55
Y e a r o f O bse rva tion FE M A LE S
and Y ear N um ber Incom e R e la tive  to 2 5 -5 4  Y e a r O ld  M ales
o f B irth  o f C oho rt Aged 20-24  Years M arke t Incom e T o ta l Incom e
1945 (B om  1921-25) 70718 48.5
1951 (Born 1927-31) 68957 36.4
1956 (Born 1932-36) 66491 35.2
1961 (B om  1937-41) 78020 35.7
1966 (B om  1942-46) 93258 40.7
1971 (B om  1947-51) 115512 45.0
1976 (B om  1952-56) 127931 55.1
1981 (Born 1957-61) 132219 65.6 68.8
1986 (B om  1962-66) 139842 72.8 76.5
1991 (B om  1967-71) 135117 83.5 87.6
Notes: Market Income = Income excluding Income Support;
Total Income = Income including Income Support
Population data: Census of Population and Dwellings, various years
Income: Easton 1997b, Tables A.4 and A.6
Source:
APPENDIX 1.3
Cohort Size at Age 20-24 (Males and Females Separately) and Age At Which
Each Female Cohort Experienced Peak Childbearing, by Cohort, 1945-1986
Y e a r o f O bse rva tion / 
Y e a r o f B irth  o f C ohort
N um ber at A ge  20-24
A ge  a t P eak AS FRM ales Fem ales
1945 (Born 1921-25) 50223 70718 26
1951 (Born 1927-31) 71716 68957 25
1956 (Born 1932-36) 69180 66491 24
1961 (Born 1937-41) 80043 78020 23
1966 (Born 1942-46) 97394 93258 23
1971 (Born 1947-51) 119447 115512 23
1976 (Born 1952-56) 131644 127931 24
1981 (Born 1957-61) 137424 132219 26
1986 (B om  1962-66) 143052 139842 27
1991 (B om  1967-71) 135978 135117
Source: Population data: Census of Population and Dwellings, various years.
Fertility data. Cheung, Jackson and Pool 1994
APPENDIX 1.4
Cohort Size of Maori and Non-Maori/European, and Ratio of Maori to Non-Maori/ 
European, by Ethnic Classification, Year When Cohort Aged 20-24 Years, and
Year of Birth of Cohort, Males and Females Combined, 1945-1991
Year of Observation/ Maori Non-Maori Ratio Maori:Non-Maori
Year of Birth of Cohort (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
1945 (Born 1921-25) 7981 112960 0.07
1951 (Bom 1927-31) 10384 130289 0.08
1956 (Born 1932-36) 11972 123699 0.10
1961 (Bom 1937-41) 14288 143775 0.10
1966 (Bom 1942-46) 14947 175705 0.09
1971 (Bom 1947-51) 18476 216483 0.09
1976 (Bom 1952-56) 24235 32187 235340 207888 0.10 0.15
1981 (Bom 1957-61) 28566 39654 241077 212379 0.12 0.19
1986 (Bom 1962-66) 34374 44388 248520 217002 0.14 0.20
1991 (Bom 1967-71) 33501 42864 237594 201183 0.14 0.21
Notes: *(a) Sole/Single Origin Maori and Non-Maori
(b) Maori Ethnic Group and European
Non-Maori = Total population minus specified Maori classification.
(a) Census of Population and Dwellings, various years
(b) Database B
Source:
APPENDIX 1.5
Cohort Size at Age 20-24, Percentage of 20-24 Year Olds in Employment 
(Employment to Population Ratio), Percentage of 20-24 Year Olds in Employment 
Within the Labour Force, by Sex, Ethnic Classification* and Cohort, 1951 and 1976-1991
Y e a r o f O bse rva tion M A LE S
and Y ear N um ber E m p loym en t as P e rcen tag e  o f
o f B irth  o f C oho rt A ged  20-24 Years Labou r Force P opu la tion
N O N -M A O R I/E U R O P EAN
1951 (Bom  1927-31) 66508 98.76 94.82
1976 (Born 1952-56) 105339 97.79 88.65
1981 (Born 1957-61) 108924 95.18 87 .70
1986 (B om  1962-66) 110409 93.69 86.22
1991 (B om  1967-71) 102189 85.04 71 .69
M A O R I
1951 (B om  1927-31) 5208 97.24 90.57
1976 (B om  1952-56) 15966 94.65 87.75
1981 (Bom  1957-61) 19467 87.18 83 .94
1986 (Bom  1962-66) 21975 85.24 77 .57
1991 (Born 1967-71) 20802 68.57 50 .30
Y e a r o f O bse rva tion FE M A LE S
and Y ear N um ber E m p lo ym e n t as P e rcen tag e  of
o f B irth  o f C o h o rt A ged  20-24 Y ears Labou r Force P opu la tion
N O N -M A O R I/E U R O P EAN
1951 (Born 1927-31) 63781 98.73 53 .58
1976 (Born 1952-56) 102549 97.30 62.73
1981 (B om  1957-61) 103455 94.90 67.83
1986 (B om  1962-66) 106593 91.94 72.23
1991 (Born 1967-71) 98994 86.37 64.20
M A O R I
1951 (B om  1927-31) 5176 97.30 31 .99
1976 (B om  1952-56) 16221 91.53 41.15
1981 (Born 1957-61) 20187 85.60 42 .77
1986 (Born 1962-66) 22413 77.01 45 .86
1991 (B om  1967-71) 22062 67.45 34.72
Notes: *1951 = Sole/Single Origin Maori and Non-Maori;
*1976-1991 = Maori Ethnic Group and European 
1951: Census of Population and Dwellings 
1976-1991: Database B
Source:
APPENDIX 1.6
Ratios of Proportion of Maori to European in Employment Within the Labour Force in 
Each Age group, by Sex, Cohort and Age, 1976-1991_____________________________
Year of Birth of Cohort
1967-71 1962-66 1957-61 1952-56 1947-51 1942-46 1937-41 1932-36
MALES
15-19 0.86 0.83 0.92
20-24 0.81 0.91 0.92 0.97
25-29 0.82 0.93 0.94 0.98
30-34 0.85 0.95 0.95 0.98
35-39 0.88 0.96 0.96 0.98
40-44 0.90 0.96 0.96 0.99
45-49 0.90 0.97 0.96
50-54 0.91 0.96
0.92
FEMALES
15-19 0.84 0.74 0.84
20-24 0.78 0.84 0.90 0.94
25-29 0.79 0.87 0.95 0.97
30-34 0.84 0.91 0.97 0.99
35-39 0.89 0.94 0.98 0.99
40-44 0.91 0.95 0.98 1.00
45-49 0.92 0.95 0.99
50-54 0.94 0.96
55-59 0.96
Source: Database B (see Appendix E )
APPENDIX 1.7
Cohort Size at Age 20-24, Mean Total Income of 20-24 Year Olds, and Mean 
Total Income of 20-24 Year Olds in Full-Time Employment, By Sex, Ethnic 
Classification, and Cohort, 1951 and 1976-1991________________________
NON-MAORI/EUROPEAN
Ethnic Classification, 
Year of Observation 
and Year of Birth
MALES FEMALES
Mean Income* Number at 
20-24 Years
Mean Income* Number at 
20-24 YearsTotal Full-Time Total Full-Time
1951 (Born 1927-31) 66508 63781
1976 (Born 1952-56) 105339 102549
1981 (Bom 1957-61) 25,071 27,676 108924 17,314 23,897 103455
1986 (Born 1962-66) 21,848 24,030 110409 16,990 21,127 106593
1991 (Bom 1967-71) 17,727 21,679 102189 15,448 20,132 98994
Ethnic Classification, 
Year of Observation 
and Year of Birth
MAORI
MALES FEMALES
Income ($1991) Number at 
20-24 Years
Income ($1991) Number at 
20-24 YearsTotal Full-Time Total Full-Time
1951 (Bom 1927-31) 5208 5176
1976 (Born 1952-56) 15966 16221
1981 (Bom 1957-61) 22,391 25,348 19467 11,042 20,858 20187
1986 (Bom 1962-66) 18,940 21,455 21975 13,092 17,847 22413
1991 (Born 1967-71) 13,640 19,321 20802 12,476 17,729 22062
Notes: 1951 = Sole Maori and Non-Maori;
1976-1991 = Maori Ethnic Group and European. 
1951: Census of Population and Dwellings;
1976-1991, Database B
Source:
APPENDIX 1.8.1
Mean Income ($1991) for Population in Full-Time Employment, By
Sex, E thn ic ity  and Age, 1981-1991
MALES FEMALES
1981 1986 1991 1981 1986 1991
EUROPEAN
15-19 16,269 14,218 12,647 14,712 13,330 12,210
20-24 27,676 24,030 21,679 23,897 21,127 20,132
25-29 35,887 30,677 29,643 27,877 25,145 25,870
30-34 42,625 35,090 35,127 27,499 24,131 26,770
35-39 45,473 38,709 38,182 27,006 23,240 25,647
40-44 45,999 39,567 39,860 26,688 23,522 25,343
45-49 44,673 38,709 38,929 26,401 23,596 25,080
50-54 43,497 36,733 36,715 26,188 23,281 24,110
55-59 41,490 35,513 33,886 26,077 23,279 23,627
60-64 46,547 37,804 34,485 32,071 25,965 25,027
Total 38,485 32,973 33,331 24,428 22,018 23,651
MAORI ET HNIC GROUP
15-19 16,564 14,242 12,576 14,223 12,618 12,087
20-24 25,348 21,455 19,321 20,858 17,847 17,729
25-29 30,985 26,056 24,620 22,713 19,029 19,890
30-34 34,171 28,662 27,764 22,195 18,692 19,998
35-39 35,090 30,123 29,371 23,013 19,099 20,087
40-44 36,076 29,794 29,922 23,652 19,501 20,037
45-49 34,633 30,107 28,800 23,285 20,143 19,696
50-54 33,383 28,809 28,438 23,492 20,289 20,081
55-59 31,761 27,862 26,116 22,847 19,956 19,992
60-64 36,804 28,291 24,250 31,485 20,468 19,239
Total 29,597 25,258 25,158 20,792 17,817 18,815
Source: Database B
APPENDIX I.8.2
Maori Ethnic Group Mean Income as Percentage of European Mean Income for those in 
Full-Time Employment, By Sex, Cohort and Age, 1981-1991____________________________
Year of Birth of Cohort
1967-71 1962-66 1957-61 1952-56 1947-51 1942-46 1937-41 1932-36
MALES
15-19 100.16 101.82
20-24 89.12 89.28 91.59
25-29 83.05 84.94 86.34
30-34 79.04 81.68 80.17
35-39 76.93 77.82 77.17
40-44 75.07 75.30 78.43
45-49 73.98 77.78 77.52
50-54 77.46 78.43
55-59 77.07
FEMALES
15-19 100.16 101.82
20-24 89.12 89.28 91.59
25-29 83.05 84.94 86.34
30-34 79.04 81.68 80.17
35-39 76.93 77.82 77.17
40-44 75.07 75.30 78.43
45-49 73.98 77.78 77.52
50-54 77.46 78.43
55-59 77.07
Source: Database B (see Appendix 1.8.1.)
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APPENDIX 1.9.3
Age of Cohort at Peak Age-Specific Fertility Ratio/Rate, By Ethnic 
Classification, and Gap in Years Between Peak Age of Cohorts of Each 
Ethnic Group, Selected Birth Cohorts 1937-1971____________________
Year of 
Birth of 
Cohort
Age at Peak Age-Specific Fertility Ratio/Rate Gap in Years 
(Non-Maori minus Maori)Non-Maori Maori
Ratios Rates Ratios Rates Ratios Rates
1937 24 n/d 23 n/d 1
1938 23 n/d 23 n/d 0
1939 23 n/d 22 n/d 1
1940 23 n/d 23 n/d 0
1941 23 n/d 22 n/d 1
1942 23 n/d 22 n/d 1
1943 23 n/d 21 n/d 2
1944 24 n/d 20 n/d 4
1945 24 n/d 21 n/d 3
1946 24 n/d 22 n/d 2
1947 24 n/d 21 n/d 3
1948 24 n/d 20 n/d 4
1949 23 n/d 20 n/d 3
1950 24 n/d 21 n/d 3
1951 23 n/d 20 n/d 3
1952 24 n/d 20 n/d 4
1953 25 n/d 19 n/d 6
1954 25 n/d 19 n/d 6
1955 25 26 20 20 5 6
1956 26 26 21 21 5 5
1957 24 26 20 20 4 6
1958 26 26 19 19 7 7
1959 26 25 19 19 7 6
1960 28 27 21 20 7 7
1961 28 28 20 20 8 8
1962 27 28 22 22 5 6
1963 27 27 21 23 6 4
1964 28 28 22 22 6 6
1965 28 28 22 23 6 5
1966 21 21
1967 21 21
1968 21 21
1969 23 23
1970 22 22
1971 22 23
Notes: n/d = data not available
Peak age not shown for cohorts where most recent observation = highest ASFR yet completed. 
Source: Ratios: Compiled from Cheung, Jackson and Pool 1994
Rates: Database C
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